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The Duality of Tactical Thought

A Study of how Swedish Land Forces' Commanders
view Tactics in Irregular Warfare

Michael Gustafson

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS AND OPERATIONAL ART
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To General Sir Frank Kitson

Abstract

This is a sociological study of the views of officers in the Swedish Army and its Amphibious Forces on tactics in Irregular Warfare (IW), in particular, Counterinsurgency (COIN). IW comprises struggles, where the military weaker part uses an indirect approach with smaller units and integrates the civilian and military dimensions in a violence spectrum including subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and infantry actions. IW is the main armed warfare style in insurgencies. COIN is the combined political, military, economic, social and legal actions in counter insurgencies.

Data has been collected by means of interviews with almost all (n =43) officers, who were either commanding battalions or rifle and manoeuvre companies while undergoing training for general warfare and international operations. The main theoretical and methodological inspiration is the traditional one for research on social fields, inaugurated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The statistical technique used is Multiple Correspondence Analysis. As a background and context base, an inquiry inspired by the *Begriffsgechichte* (Conceptual History) tradition explores the genesis and development of understandings of the term Irregular Warfare. The research question is outlined as; *“how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards?”*

The most significant findings are that there are two main opposing notions separating the officers' views on tactics in Irregular Warfare: (1) a focus on larger, combat oriented and collectively operating military units versus smaller and larger, more intelligence oriented and dispersed operating units, and (2) a focus on military tasks and kinetic effects versus military and civilian tasks as well as “soft” effects. The distribution of these views can be presented as a two-dimensional space structured by the two axes. This space represents four categories of tactics, partly diverging from normative military standards for Counterinsurgency. This social space of standpoints shows different structural tendencies for background factors of social and cultural character, particularly dominant concerning military backgrounds, international mission experiences and civilian education. Compared to military standards for Counterinsurgency, the two tactical types characterized by a Regular Warfare mind-set stands out as counter-normative.

Signs of creative thought on military practice and theory, as well as a still persistent Regular Warfare doxa are apparent. Power struggles might thus develop, effecting the transformation to a broadened warfare culture with an enhanced focus also on Irregular Warfare. The result does not support research results arguing for a convergence of military thought in the European transformation of Armed Forces. The main argument goes beyond tactics and suggests sociological analysis on reciprocal effects regarding strategy, operational art, tactics as well as leadership, concerning the mind-set and preferences for Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare.

Keywords: Bourdieu, military thought, tactics, Irregular Warfare, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, field theory, sociology, War Studies.

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However, the field of tactics still generates rather a low interest within the subject of War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College; even the theories inspired by Pierre Bourdieu are not well-known areas of study. Moreover, my research during the years has been a yogic experience. Concurrently, while pursuing this academic work with its rules and doxa, I undertook training to become a Kundalini yoga teacher. Yoga means “unite” and during the process, I developed intellectual and personal philosophical perspectives and methods for viewing and living life far beyond my earlier understandings. Life has repeatedly and painfully changed, completely beyond my control; I am today not the person I was when I started this work.

Now that my work is complete, I would especially like to thank my supervisor Pasi Kesseli, colonel and professor, for trust, guidance and collegiality. To my supervisor in theory and methodology, Donald Broady, professor emeritus at the Department of Sociology, director of the research unit SEC (Sociology of Education and Culture) at Uppsala University; I extend my sincere appreciation for all good support. I would like to direct a very special thanks to General Sir Frank Kitson for inspiration and invaluable correspondence. I am very grateful for the encouraging support from my assistant supervisor Anders Palmgren, lieutenant commander and Ph.D. I am also indebted to the pre-examiners, docent Vesa Nissinen and doctor Håkan Gunneriusson, for giving me important verdicts. I would like to thank professor Jim Nyce at Ball State University and professor Gerry Larsson at the Swedish National Defence College for constructive feed-back during all the work. Special thanks go to my colleagues in the Department of Military Studies, Swedish National Defence College for their support. I am grateful to Ingrida Leimanis for valuable assistance regarding language and to Dilek Thulinsson for the help with text formations. A sincere thanks goes to the colleagues at SEC, Uppsala University, in particular Mikael Börjesson, Tobias Dalberg and Håkan Forsberg, for their support in Multiple Correspondence Analysis work. Finally, I thank doctor Yogi Bhasin for provoking, inspiring and uplifting my view of life and living life; keeping up, no matter what hardship experienced.

Michael Gustafson

Stockholm 29 October 2014

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1 Point of departure for the study

1.1 Introduction to the chapter

The following chapter introduces the study with a discussion of problems connected to contemporary transformation of military capabilities. The aim of the research is presented and the work is summarised. The background is discussed and an overview of the research situation is presented, followed by a problem discussion and outlining of the research question. The research design is then described and the chapter ends with a presentation of demarcations and disposition.

1.2 Introduction, aim and summary of the research work

What happens when Armed Forces with a traditional and cultural focus on Regular Warfare between symmetrical state enemies are additionally tasked to be equally prepared for Irregular Warfare?¹ What challenges might this mean for the transfer of knowledge and understanding between and within areas of tactics and strategy? If different preferences exist, what challenges does that imply for the modern officer's leadership in general? I argue it is important to gain knowledge of the current character of tactical thought in order to contribute to the development of tactical thinking, understanding and overall transformation of the Armed Forces. During 2011, this view was presented for the Swedish General Inspector of the Army and approved by him. Another aim is to contribute to the development of the academic subject of War Studies for Swedish officer education. For Swedish officers already taking part in multinational operations such as the NATO ISAF Counterinsurgency Operation in Afghanistan, the situation is not new, but seen from the perspective of the whole of Swedish strategy, traditions and war fighting capability, it is a new and different paradigm that challenges the military doxa.

¹ The term "Irregular Warfare" was defined 2008 in the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001, (As amended 17 October, 2008) as; "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favours' indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW". In Sweden the term appeared in governmental writings from 2008 as in; *Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence]* (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), p. 32; "A majority of the conflicts in recent years have been characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. Guerrilla Warfare, armed gangs, terrorist network systems, and the employment of fighting units in smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no signs that this pattern of conflict will change in the foreseeable future. Potential adversaries can, however, be structured and possess modern and qualified equipment, but act in an irregular context". The new Swedish Military Strategy doctrine; *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*, p. 27, writes a similar definition; "warfare, usually between states and non-state actors, or only between non-state actors, seeking legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare is based primarily on indirect and asymmetric attack that avoids confronting the opponent's military forces. It can cover the spectrum from subversion, open Guerrilla Warfare to (lower) tactical (ground forces) units that use regular tactics. The struggle is political rather than military, and it aims to wear out the opponent's will, influence and power. Civilians are included to the largest possible extent" (author's translation from Swedish).

Since 2010, The Swedish Armed Forces have been in transformation from a Regular Warfare conscript defence, to a professional military capability for Regular Warfare and primarily, in a multinational role, in Irregular Warfare environments. This is also stated in the latest Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine². Results from the present study have been used in this doctrine to describe a broader view of the conflict spectrum³. At the core of the military profession, I argue, lie tactics, generally meaning, how to use military means and methods according to strategy.⁴ In order to be able to understand politics and to provide realistic military decision support, the officer has to understand and explain what risks and possibilities might be at stake, also in Irregular Warfare. Knowledge, understandings and articulation of tactics in theory and practice are argued to be even more important when systematically entering unfamiliar and new areas, such as the demands currently being expressed. Military tactics per se and standpoints on tactical thought are however, an area of limited research in Sweden. So are even sociological studies connected to tactics.

This limited interest in studies concerning thought on practical military problem-solving might be seen as strange, looking at an organization structured clearly by groupings of people working in different sub-cultures. This background is the main motive for this study, aiming to map standpoints and background factors in order to identify indications of clustering trends. The goal is to be able to present a model of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare in 2011, possible to be discussed in comparison with normative texts, such as western doctrines and field manuals. The study focuses on battalion and company commanders in Swedish field units with mainly tactical aspects for the light infantry parts of infantry. Mechanized infantry, mechanized and ranger units are addressed as these are considered to be the main body of Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations⁵.

I argue that this group in particular has to deal with tactics for planning and direct execution of tasks, with one leg in military practice and the other in military theory. The above mentioned commanders' thoughts as expressed standpoints are therefore viewed to be unique, compared to other categories, either in higher echelons lacking the practical context, or in lower lacking the theoretical connection.

² *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*, (2011), p. 5, as in several sections in the text.

³ Ibid. p. 38. The Conflict Spectre, figure 2:9.

⁴ Definitions of the word "tactics" vary in Swedish military literature, still, in general terms, it means accomplishing tasks (traditionally combat oriented but today, including all kinds of tasks). The *Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3* [Field Manual for Ground Forces Operations] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), p. 38 declares that tactics means "*different means and methods, applied/coordinated*". *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)* [Field Manual for Ground Forces Manoeuvre Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), p. 39 says more explicitly; "*Tactics is the art of consciously choosing and coordinating means and methods in a given situation in order to reach a decided goal. Tactics is applied in a limited area and during a limited time in order to determine (win) a combat/battle or other activity to one's own advantage*". These definitions do not mention strategy; still, I have chosen to more precisely connect tactics to strategy.

⁵ Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined in NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations*, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 3.4.4, 2011, Part II - terms of definition; "*The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat Insurgency and address any core grievances*".

The empirical data involves almost all the 2011 population of officers commanding battalions and rifle (or equivalent) companies of infantry, motorized, mechanized, ranger and intelligence & security arms, also including the amphibious battalion within the Royal Swedish Navy, (n= 43)⁶ The main method is sociological prosopography, meaning collecting and analysing data concerning standpoints on tactical issues and background factors. The results are the analyses of a space of tactical thoughts and preferences in Irregular Warfare. The investigation covers thought expressed during 2010-12. An underlying assumption experienced during my service in the Swedish Armed Forces concerns a traditional disinterest in Irregular or Small War fighting capabilities, so as not to disturb thinking of the “big, real war”. Such a view, as a part of my horizon of experiences, is an aspect that has been reflected on during this work. Another view is that there are arguably differences in requirements for skills, training and education, especially if focus is on combat or reconnaissance/intelligence activities. This character of pre-understanding has motivated an approach of context objectification in order to counter an unconscious desire for results to be suitable for the researcher’s viewpoint.

An initial literature study from a collection of argued influence sources has provided a theoretical starting point in the form of an empirical generalization of the meaning in general of the so-called Irregular Warfare phenomenon. That result, validated by a survey, has guided interviews with several open and alternative answer questions. Applying an adapted field theory approach and Multiple Correspondence Analysis method, a filter is claimed to have been arranged positioning the researcher out of direct unwanted influence. An inductive approach, letting the data speak, has resulted in identification of standpoints and background factor structures, leading towards a model of standpoints. This approach is argued to provide a transparent method where specific questions can be identified and discussed.

In a time of increasing demands for knowledge and skills in traditional Regular Warfare as well as in various forms of Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, with few available ground force units and limited larger scale field exercises, tactical development is argued to be favoured with knowledge of the current state of standpoints ("from what") as well as end state formulations ("to what"). This study aims to provide knowledge of a starting point for various types of further analyses. The study concludes with a discussion of the possible implications of the results per se, also linked to strategy and operational art.

⁶ The sample consisted of officers positioned in 2011 as Battalion and Company commanding officers (Rifle Coys and equivalents) and consisted of eleven Battalion Commanding officers (BnCO), thirty Rifle Company Commanding Officers (CoyCO) and three Armoured Coy Commanding officers = 43 officers. One Bn CO was not available and some second-in-command officers were interviewed, resulting in an almost full population of representatives from all units concerned.

1.3 Background to the research focus

The following part describes my thoughts, articulations and motives for the research focus. It is a reflection of biases habituated during over 30 years in military service. The text describes an ambition to take on what is considered a classic military problem, experienced in practice, and outlines a narrative sketch covering the time period 1980 to 2008. An ambition to elucidate the dangers and possibilities of Small Wars during this period has, in general, been experienced as an up-hill road to travel.

Then suddenly, after 2007, the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare emerged unexpectedly and was unavoidable to relate to, from strategy to tactics, in practice and theory. The time had come for an attempt to gain a new and deeper knowledge approach in order to contribute to the military thought on war fighting. To characterize the researcher's perspective of the research object, poses certain challenges and whatever result, the question of truth becomes hard to measure. Human thinking, in particular one's own summaries of events and thinking from the past to now, is a question of memory, will and intentions. My first intention is however, to describe my view of the inner meaning of being an officer. Such a meaning is argued to be that tactical knowledge, understandings and thought are the cornerstones in the officer profession.

However, this meaning does not convey anything if not communicated and put into practice. The other way around, if practices are not reflected upon and returned to military theory, tactical thought will hardly develop. Risk for disruption of the connection to strategy is also thought to be imminent. Depending on internal and external political and strategic circumstances, different requirements as consequences emerge in relation to existing military tactics. Life and the world are not static, nor are thoughts of the same. Doxa and paradigms on the other hand are long-lived. The officer's mastery of tactics, and even more importantly, of mental and practical adaption to other needs than what has been predicted, prioritized and selected to be current tactical principles, is argued to be a trademark of an officer's skill. Recurrent situations occur that fall outside what articulated military tactics can handle and that obviously applies to the strategy domains to an equal extent.

During my time as an officer, I learned about tactics according to the doctrine of national invasion defence. Subsequently, I had to think totally differently about tactics during the submarine violations of Swedish territorial waters in the 1980-90s. That experience fundamentally challenged my and several other officer colleagues' mental picture of what an opponent could do, and what we could or could not do to defend ourselves. The image and idea that previous knowledge had obvious limitations mentally and practically, meant that the meaning of a duel was given a new character when the enemy was hard to be found. However, this insight was for some, of a more temporary character, such as a strategically-tactical anomaly, probably not to be encountered again and therefore of a more limited interest. The duel with an enemy that was hard to find, or acting in a way contemporary tactical paradigms had not described, gave insights of the need for further tactical thought.

From this anomaly during the national defence era, the next tactical anomaly occurred with the many years of operations in the Balkans, resulting in new requirements of long-term tactics with the character of Stability Operations of a police-related nature. In practice, the task for commanders was to provide security amongst the people, in the words of Rupert Smith.⁷ A task related more to security intelligence activities and to support arrests of subversive elements and war criminals, than to arrange attack or defence operations against a traditional mechanized enemy. Tactics for Regular Warfare during that time was to be a lesser studied area.

It was however, still supposed to be the obvious foundation for basic military thinking and practical tactical ability. Training activities of the Swedish Armed Forces were then subsequently limited in symbiosis with the Armed Forces' reductions. The conceptual tactical anomalies; an opponent who was hard to be found or was not acting according to the Regular Warfare principles, became a hard to solve challenge. Subsequently, a period began of an imagined future of being able to predict targeting with great accuracy and of long distance combat. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was supposed to change military life. The next, quite unexpected development from the imagined one, was the war in Iraq and Afghanistan leading to one of modern times' equally unexpected and unwanted debate; a focus on requirements and understanding of tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. This was in parallel with the declining understanding and knowledge about tactics in Regular Warfare due to western defence cuts.

In my view, a double challenge had therefore emerged. Regaining understanding and knowledge of Regular Warfare, and for this generation of officers, new thinking on the not wanted area of strategy and tactics in Irregular Warfare. Against that background, the need for a greater and deeper understanding and knowledge of a broader and deeper tactical sphere; the question "from what perspective?" emerged in my mind. Without comprehending the starting point, I argue that understanding and development of strategy and tactics in practice and theory might very well be too diffuse to be comprehended and managed wisely.

A question of the characteristics of contemporary Swedish thought on tactics of Irregular Warfare developed a concern of how to contribute to creating the ability to think beyond the known tactical mental images. What can be done to expand a tactical mind and what helps to promote tactical approaches aimed to increase tactical capability? A difference in the nature of thought of Irregular Warfare among senior and younger officers in general has been noticed, where younger officers seem to think more about this situation than the older officers on the whole. Few, regardless of age, however, currently seem to have the time to think about tactics. Time seems to be running out because of extensive management work and a general process-oriented and organizational mind-set.

⁷ Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2007).

I have thus, a picture of a tactical mind-set that can be characterized by a declining knowledge of Regular Warfare, and a slight but unstable increase of fragmentized knowledge of Irregular Warfare, yet little reflected and fragile in survival strengths. My preconception includes an opinion that Swedish military thought on tactics has limitations in knowledge, understanding and interest, regarding means and methods against adversaries that do not follow the traditional paradigm of Regular Warfare. Impressions over a long-time of producing fighting power rather than experiences of fighting power in real life operations might be a reason that draws the attention and interest away from the subject of tactics.

Also, it is well known that western military interest in Irregular Warfare or conflicts has been low during the 20th century. The result of the study "*Following up Frank Kitson's direction*" implies that the until now limited interest in Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare has hampered understanding, education and practical capabilities in general in the western world.⁸ Currently, the need for deeper understanding and better fighting power for irregular conflicts is recognised by the Swedish Armed Forces as well. But how to think tactically beyond a paradigm of Regular Warfare if not trained for it, educated in it, or over time, encouraged to do so? I have experienced several conversations on Irregular Warfare hardly possible to understand due to the confusion of definitions and beyond this, still a belief that understanding is imminent and adaption possible.

From my point of view, such a belief is unconsciously framed using a Regular Warfare mind-set and specific "glasses" through which the actual problem is observed. I have also experienced a focus on strategy discussions and criticism on how counterinsurgency has been understood in the new era.⁹ I have developed a view that Swedish thought on tactics would benefit from not only a broader view of tactics but also in particular, concerning how tactics is imagined as well as thought about. These personal thoughts, experiences and opinions are of course incomplete and may also prove to be incorrect in several ways, still, they do give a picture of the researcher's position when embarking upon this study in 2010. The following chapters will reveal deviations as well as adherence to this starting point.

⁸ Michael Gustafson, 'I Frank Kitsons Fotsår', *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, Nr 2/2010.

⁹ Octavian Manea, 'Learning From Today's Crisis of Counterinsurgency' by Octavian Manea, *Small Wars Journal* 2013, 8 October. Discussion with Dr. David H. Ucko and Dr. Robert Egnell about their book *Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare* (Columbia University Press, October 2013).

1.4 The research situation

The overall situation regarding research on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgencies can be characterized as maturing after the strong re-expansion starting 2007. The publishing of the American Army and Marine Corps Field Manual FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* marked a paradigm shift regarding interest for Small Wars in the western countries.¹⁰

The interest was intense in America during the Vietnam War and the research production at RAND vast.¹¹ A drastic reduction in research accompanied the end of that war and the following period until the Afghanistan War after 9/11. After the Vietnam War, the research interest for Irregular Warfare reached a low water mark in the western world outside the world of Special Operations and Special Operations Forces. Several writings, often possible to be characterized as personal accounts and experiences, were however published during this period. The new and unexpected period of interest and research since 2006/07 has matured with numerous articles, reports and books.

A new era also began at RAND, again turning to Irregular Warfare, as can be exemplified with *War by Other Means* (2008).¹² This extensive report was ordered by the Office of the Secretary of Defence early in 2006, building on an examination of eighty-nine insurgencies from World War II. The bulk of the research efforts have arguably, not surprisingly, focused on the major challenge of the diffusion or deconstruction of the military and civilian structural borders, indeed strategic questions. More extensive research efforts seem however, to have begun first after the speedy military production of doctrines and field manuals during 2007-2010.

The research world could be said to have been in the unwanted forced situation of trying to catch up instead of delivering research inputs built on previous empirical collection, subsequently, building an understanding and foundation on which the political and military approaches could be based. An intense focus became directed to questions of definitions and ways of dealing with the military and civilian intermingling sectors. The character of violence, now including low-level threats such as subversion and terrorism also became key interests, as well as regarding how to relate to post-colonial experiences in a new globalized context.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006.

¹¹ Melvin Gurtov and Konrad Kellen, *Vietnam: Lessons and Mislessons*, P-4084, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June, 1969), p. 7; “Few who are familiar with the expensiveness of the research undertaken on Vietnamese would quarrel with the view that this war has produced the vastest accumulation of information about the enemy in the history”. The author’s discussion about the problem, despite extensive research, of how to be able to understand what lessons can be learned and what should be unlearned, also to accept when no lessons exist to be used further. They argue that the latter is the most important lesson from the Vietnam War (p. 22). After the Vietnam War it seems that all sorts of lessons concerning COIN were forgotten in the western world. Since 2008, the situation changed, RAND started to re-publish old and produce several new works on the subject (author’s comments).

¹² David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, *War by Other Means – Building complete and balanced capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2008), pp. vi-vii informs of several other works in progress or produced.

Influential thought on new traits of Irregular Warfare was produced by several authors; David Kilcullen, with *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009) and *Counterinsurgency* (2010) promotes a new academic standard.¹³ John Mackinlay highlights a dilemma within the previous western focus on non-military terrorism, now to be also met in counterinsurgencies, as discussed in *The Insurgency Archipelago* (2009).¹⁴

Together with Alison Al-Baddawy, Mackinlay suggests new approaches in *Rethinking Counterinsurgency* (2008).¹⁵ Great efforts have been put into strategic research, and on the other hand at the field level, regarding how to deal with the not expected evolution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). However, research strictly on tactical thought and building new theories has not been prominent.¹⁶ Anthony James Joes in *Resisting Rebellion – The history and politics of Counterinsurgency* (2004) delivers a historical exposé on so-called Guerrilla Insurgency, focusing primarily on strategy but also including tactics.¹⁷ John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring in *Uncomfortable Wars, Revisited* (2008) develop an earlier and influential theory now drawing on a theoretical strategy study from 2006.¹⁸

A quantitative methodology derived from political science is applied to almost seventy cases of intrastate wars. The theory Manwaring and Fishel propose is however of a purely strategic character delivering fewer results with a tactical view. A genre of a more anthological character with introductory and summarizing aims can be exemplified by *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (second edition, 2007)¹⁹ and *Understanding Modern Warfare* (2008).²⁰

¹³ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Kilcullen analyses from an anthropological view, as well as from his own extensive military experiences. David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁴ John Mackinlay, *The Insurgency Archipelago* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

¹⁵ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, RAND Counterinsurgency study, Volume 5 (Santa Monica CA: RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2008).

¹⁶ Discussion with Jan Ångström, professor in War Studies, Swedish National Defence College, particularly regarding Military Strategy, 2013-09-02. Ångström has since 2002 researched and pursued the area of Small Wars and Irregular Warfare. Ångström has published several books and articles on the subject.

¹⁷ Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion – The history and politics of Counterinsurgency* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), pp. 243 – 246 (a total of 257 pages).

¹⁸ John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars – Revisited* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), pp. xi – xvi. The foreword by Edwin G. Corr describes the so-called Manwaring Paradigm with the SWORD model as a social science theory on insurgencies, also leaning on historical views from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.

¹⁹ John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen (ed), *Strategy in the Contemporary World – an introductory to Strategic Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, first edition 2002), p. 276; Stephen Biddle argues for the need of tactical, close combat skills in modern Irregular Warfare, p. 181; James Kiras claims that most theorists assess specialist units such as Special Operations Forces or Special Forces to be needed to defeat irregulars at their own game.

²⁰ David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Linsedale, Ian Speller, Cristopher Tuck and Dale C. Walton, *Understanding Modern Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, first printing 2008), chapter 5. 'Irregular Warfare' by James D. Kiras, pp. 224-292.

Other examples are *Understanding Counterinsurgency* (2010)²¹ and *Understanding Contemporary Strategy* (2012), the latter of a clearly more offensive view than the previous examples.²² Writings such as these, mainly with a strategic focus, do sometimes also include tactical aspects, not surprisingly as the two aspects do affect each other in general and especially in Irregular Warfare environments. However, discussions on tactics are not to be automatically regarded as actual research on tactical thought. Criticism of tactics and strategy has however been common. One of the earliest critiques of the strategic understanding of Counterinsurgency was delivered by James Corum in 2008.²³ Affecting tactics as well as strategy, the area of operational art is analysed by Justine Kelly and Mike Brennan in *Alien* (2009). They deliver a highly recommendable account of the development in military thought during the 20th century, and in particular in the light of the Irregular Warfare context.²⁴ In 2010, Beatrice Hauser produces an impressive historical account on strategic thinking in *The Evolution of Strategy*.²⁵ Hauser also deals with thought on Small Wars and Counterinsurgency with the conclusion that a common shared view exists, namely that only a clear focus on the people will eventually bring some victory and peace.²⁶

In her literature considerations, Hauser claims there was a prominent tactical view from writers on war until the early 20th century and thereafter, the emergence and increased writing on Strategic Studies, gradually exponentially after the Second World War.²⁷ I share that opinion, particularly in Sweden, where academic studies on tactics have been rare, especially in the post-Cold War era. The first wave of knowledge building on the subject of Irregular Warfare was mainly founded on a re-interpretation of the COIN classics from the 1950s and 60s, where previously scarcely read works by David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier were again focused on.

The extensive doctrine production in the west from 2007-2010 can be said to have largely rested on experiences and military thought extricated from these writings, arguably not supported by any substantially new scientific research body. The reason for this seems obvious when no such research body existed; the reappearance of such problematic conflicts was not on the political and military horizon of expectations or acceptance. Turning to tactics and tactical thought for land forces, the sociological research of Antony King deserves to be highlighted.

²¹ Thomas Keaney and Thomas Rid (ed.), *Understanding Counterinsurgency* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). Tactics are addressed indirectly in the section “operational aspects” and in the final part; “challenges”, pp. 73-171, still with no special section dedicated to tactical challenges.

²² James D. Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare’, in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tucker and C. Dale Walton, *Understanding Modern Warfare* (2008), and in Kane, M. Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, *Understanding Contemporary Strategy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

²³ James Corum, *Bad Strategies*, (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008).

²⁴ Mike Brennan and Justin Kelly, *ALIEN – How Operational Art devoured Strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2009), pp. 85 – 98.

²⁵ Beatrice Hauser, *The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking war from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 387 – 441. regarding Small Wars and Counterinsurgency, pp. 436 – 437; Conclusions

²⁷ Ibid. p. 33.

In his recommendable account on combat performance in *The Combat Soldier* (2013), King claims a profound attribute has become drills and training for the professional armies and platoon structure.²⁸ This is argued to be in contrast to the common presumptions that citizen armies rely on appealing to masculinity, nationalism and ethnicity. Staying within the individual sphere and connecting to leadership experiences in Irregular Warfare, Mark Moyer argues in *A Question of Command* (2009) that the quality of leadership plays a far larger role in the outcome of such conflicts than normally is acknowledged.²⁹

Culture and ways of seeing war and warfare are in close conjunction with leadership. John Lynn in *Battle* (2003) argues against some sort of western way of warfare with technological primacy, still retaining the notion of Regular Warfare primacy, leading to situations where classic conventional armies called upon to fight in a Guerrilla War try to turn the struggle into a conventional one.³⁰ Struggles that can take place regarding both strategy and tactics in an Irregular Warfare environment, eventually recognized as such, are described by Thomas E. Ricks in *The Gamble* (2009), giving an example of what can happen when junior commanders view events differently than the senior leaders.³¹

In *The Echo of Battle* (2007) Brian McAllister Linn discusses the intellectual traditions regarding what constitutes the army way of warfare.³² Not only Linn, but several other writers have called upon the argued importance to view possible impacts of existing military culture when entering Irregular Warfare environments. The vast volume of writing in the western countries on Irregular Warfare mainly as Counterinsurgency raises a warning of possible neglect of experiences by non-western countries and armies. An examination of Sumit Ganguly's and David P. Fidler's; *India and Counterinsurgency* (2009) does however give credit to several experiences that can be found in most current western doctrines.³³ The close link between tactics and strategy in Irregular Warfare is commonly underlined in several writings and discussions. Still, theoretical approaches on tactical thought or preferences per se, and/or on the relation between tactics and strategy seem less explored so far.

²⁸ Antony King, *The Combat Soldier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). An interesting historical account of the development of modern tactics is delivered in pp. 129-163.

²⁹ Mark Moyer, *A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, foreword by Donald Kagan and Fredric Kagan (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009). The Appendix; pp. 287-301 describes interesting results on leadership questions to 131 veteran officers (captains to colonels with Iraq and Afghanistan experiences) in the US Army and Marine Corps in 2008.

³⁰ John A. Lynn, *Battle, A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004, revised and updated edition, first printed in 2003), p. 342.

³¹ Thomas E. Rick, *The Gamble, General Petraeus and the untold story of the American Surge in Iraq, 2006-2008* (London: Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin books, Penguin Books, 2009).

³² Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle – The Army's way of warfare* (London: Harvard University Press, 2007).

³³ Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (ed), *India and Counterinsurgency, lessons learned* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p. 227. The conclusion highlights, for example, small unit tactics contrary to larger unit manoeuvre warfare; still, the book primarily deals with strategy.

One way for new theoretical articulations, according to Aki Huhtinen and Jari Rantapelkonen in *Messy Wars* (2008), consists of combining philosophical and practical as well as macro and micro issues as postmodern thinking of 21st century conflicts.³⁴ The logic in such thinking seems apparent, even with empirical challenges. This study on tactical thought gives one possible entrance for such an attempt, regarding strategic thought versus tactical thought for various samples. A practical approach, giving the very same warning for consequences of unlinked strategy and tactics, not least concerning military culture, is provided by Frank Ledwidge in *Losing Small Wars* (2011) regarding how to examine the current British way of acting in an Irregular Warfare environment.³⁵ As a broad summary of writings on the Irregular Warfare phenomenon, a forward looking view is delivered by Nils Marius Rekkedal et. al in *Winds of Change – On Irregular Warfare* (2012).³⁶ Rekkedal summarizes and discusses the development of thought, mostly regarding strategy and Operational art perspectives, still with tactical issues addressed. A view is offered of a possible ending to a second COIN era following the renaissance after 2006.³⁷

In 2009, long-term serving former officer Jim Storr delivers an interesting account on tactics and the argued fundamental human aspect of combat and war.³⁸ In the book, *The Human Face of War* (2009), Storr presents arguments for Historical Analysis (HA), pragmatism and empiricism as being important theoretical choices when studying combat and tactics. Storr argues against positivism and natural science bases when examining unpredictable and truly human enterprises such as tactics. However, despite highlighting the human dimension, Storr neglects to discuss the possibilities of sociology or psychology as research bases. This omission is surprising as he refers to Dixon's famous *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (1977), at the time, a book also in use in Sweden for the senior officer leadership course.³⁹ Regardless of the strong focus on the human aspect, we find as late as 2009, once again, a historical dominance compared to the possibilities of sociological exploration.

An interesting part of Storr's work concerns a development of the American historian Archer Jones' work with a generic model of troop types.⁴⁰ Storr uses four different types of troops - missile, raiding, heavy infantry and shock troops- positioned in a two-by-two model. The model is structured using two dimensions or aspects; less or more mobile and missile or close combat troops. The model is developed by Storr with relationships between these types of troops regarding who generally defeats who.

³⁴ Aki Huhtinen and Jari Rantapelkonen, *Messy Wars* (Helsinki: Finn Lectura, 2008), p. 142.

³⁵ Frank Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars, British Military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011).

³⁶ Nils Marius Rekkedal et.al, *Winds of Change – On Irregular Warfare* (Tampere: National Defence University of Finland, Department of Military History, 2012, Publication series 2, N:o 18, 2012).

³⁷ Ibid. pp. 383 and 393-401.

³⁸ Jim Storr, *The Human face of War* (London: Continuum UK, Birmingham War Studies, 2009).

³⁹ Ibid. 202. Storr refers to Norman F. Dixon, *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977).

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 65-71. Storr refers to Archer Jones, *The Conduct of War in the Western World* (London: Harrap, 1998).

This pursuit of modelling different types of tactics in relation to each other to determine combat superiority, leads rather more to historic or positivistic thinking than to some sort of permanent truth. Clearly missing is the work and result of standpoint and background factor positions seen from a sociologic view, especially as the title of the book denotes the human perspective. Another, but different future view of strategy, operational art and clearly tactical concepts in land force units is given by Antony King in *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces* (2011).⁴¹ This research is one of the few that has been found studying tactical concepts and implementations from a sociological perspective. The argument presented outlines a development in which concentrated nodes of military power are emerging at the operational and tactical level in each country and coming into a closer transnational relationship with each other to fulfil their missions. King seeks to connect detailed changes at the tactical and cultural levels to wider transformations of the military and political institutions in Europe. Current staff procedures at the operational level are scrutinized, as are the formations and use of the so-called empowered brigades (with organic combat support and combat service support) as a particular tactical development and even transformation.⁴²

A concentration and transformation of the operational and tactical capabilities is argued to be taking place within the European Armed Forces.⁴³ King describes a development of common understandings and working procedures in the new operational staffs and the emergence of a new form of tactical structures; the empowered brigades, characterized as joint resources with a hybrid content, meaning not mostly light infantry but also including special forces, elite units as paratroopers now mobile with light vehicles, and an enhanced intelligence function, capable of high mobility, air power coordination and dispersed operations with smaller units over vast areas.⁴⁴ King argues a new form of tactical paradigm is emerging, dependent on the outcome of the Afghanistan operation. A characteristic is offered as “*a convergence towards common patterns*”.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Antony King, *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). The presentation of the book says; “*This research plots the trajectory of Europe's armed forces. Focusing on Britain, France and Germany, as the major European powers, and NATO as the institutional framework in which development is occurring. He has conducted research on their rapid reaction brigades (3 Commando Brigade, 16 Air Assault Brigade, 9 Brigade Légère Blindée de Marine and Division Spezielle Operationen), staff colleges (Joint Services Command and Staff College, Führungs Akademie, College Interarmee de la Defence, NATO School) and operational headquarters (including ISAF HQ in Kabul the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, France's new Rapid Reaction Corps at Lille Einsatzführungs Commando and Joint Forces Headquarters Brunssum)*”.

⁴² Ibid. p.163.

⁴³ Ibid. pp. 16-17. King even discusses the possibility that the dynamics of this concentration and transformation might be applied to a much wider scope; the process of European integration. See also pp. 268-271.

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 176-177.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 177.

The very obvious difference in strategic and operational culture is discussed, but not regarding the status of tactical culture and preferences.⁴⁶ However, the importance of the tactical development is stated as “*central to any account of European military development*”.⁴⁷ The research is an interesting work on operational and tactical capabilities that clearly relates to strategic and operational culture with possible frictions as grounds for development. King puts it; “*the three major military powers in Europe demonstrate profoundly different profession culture and strategic orientations which obstruct their cooperation. Of course, these differences are multiplied if other European forces are considered*”. However, such a consideration of possible differences in tactical culture and standpoints is not a part of King’s work. Such knowledge is, as said before, argued important, especially in relation to the view of King regarding a development of a growing transnational horizontal collaboration at lower levels. Relational structures of some nations’ homogenous or heterogeneous tactical thought will obviously provide different transnational thought and standpoint structures.

Turning to research in Sweden on Irregular Warfare, and in particular tactical preferences in such conflicts, it has not been a substantial part of the officer education supported by War Studies research before 2008. Nils Marius Rekkedal, working as a professor in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College (2002-2008), introduced the subject on a broader scale later on. Still, it was not until 2008, a year after the publication of the U.S. Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, that a change in the officer education syllabus was decided upon, with the introduction of a 5-week course in Irregular Warfare for the basic officer course. Subsequently, in 2010, a course in contemporary operations was devoted fully to Joint Counterinsurgency operations.

Moreover, work with a summary of military thought on war and warfare, for officer education, as well as support to doctrinal work, resulted in Jerker Widén’s and Jan Ångström’s book *Militärteorins Grunder* (2005), containing descriptions of “*theories on ground operations in “Small Wars”*”.⁴⁸ Here, a summary of Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency theories is included. Rekkedal’s previously mentioned *Winds of Change* (2012) includes a description of Swedish military views and preferences in general on Irregular Warfare, with notably historical traditions of ranger warfare, as well as with the overarching and strong Regular Warfare mind-set and priority.⁴⁹

“*In general, the current debate on the whole in Sweden regarding military activities cannot be said to involve any substantial discussions and thinking concerning Irregular Warfare. Some examples of thinking can be found in the Royal Academy of War Science Proceedings.*”⁵⁰ In addition, the subject has been viewed with more interest in the theses

⁴⁶ King, *The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan* (2011), pp. 256, 274 and 281.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 149.

⁴⁸ Jerker Widén & Jan Ångström, *Militärteorins Grunder* (Stockholm, Försvarshögskolan, 2005), pp. 194-208. A revisited version in English is to be published; *Contemporary Military Theory – The Dynamics of War* (Oxon; Routledge, 2015).

⁴⁹ Rekkedal et al., *Winds of Changes* (2012), pp. 402-405; Gustafson; ‘A Swedish view on Irregular Warfare’.

⁵⁰ Michael Gustafson. ‘Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, Modern Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, Perspectives on War Studies and Irregular Warfare’, *Särtryck ur Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, 5. häftet, 2008, 1. och 2. häftet 2009.

written at the Defence College since 2008. Regarding research however, one can notice quite a change. Since 2009, several academic approaches (both from individuals and orders from the Defence Force) have seen the light; quite contrary when compared to the earlier academic interests the years before. Regarding military writings from officers, there is rather a limited interest for Irregular Warfare thinking.

*This can be said especially regarding tactics and operational art in Irregular Warfare, even if the Multinational Experimentation series, during 2008-09 focused on Irregular Warfare. This focusing more on military strategy, or strategy, and less to the core of the military profession, tactics and operational art, can be said to have been common in Swedish military thinking since the end of the Cold War.”*⁵¹

The research efforts in Sweden regarding thinking on Irregular Warfare can currently be said to be in progress.⁵² However, after a short period of interest for Irregular Warfare, 2008 – 2012, Sweden is again focusing on rebuilding knowledge and skills for Regular Warfare. Even recognizing the need for Irregular Warfare knowledge, research interest and funds seem more directed at Regular, or Hybrid Warfare challenges. According to long-time experienced researchers and teachers at the War Studies Department, the interest for the subject of tactics has been low, as for the area of Irregular Warfare during the Cold War up to around 2008.⁵³ The tide water of interest for Irregular Warfare and tactics for such environments seems to have turned again accompanying the withdrawal from Afghanistan, echoing what happened after the Vietnam War.

Two recent Swedish doctoral theses can however be noticed with connections to the context of Irregular Warfare; Marco Nilsson, *War and Unreason. Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration*⁵⁴ and Kersti Larsdottir, *Military Interventions in Internal Wars: The Study of Peace or the Study of War*⁵⁵? Nilsson questions offensive-defence theorists assuming that war is shorter and more difficult for states to create security within. When military technology favours the offensive, attacking is easier than defending. Larsdottir's thesis aims to increase the understanding of how to conduct successful military interventions in internal wars, such as in Afghanistan, focusing on knowledge production from research in different disciplines. Both theses deal with strategic and tactical issues.

⁵¹ Rekkedal et. al, *Winds of Changes* (2012), p. 405 (grammar corrections have been made compared to the original text).

⁵² From around 2009, the Swedish Armed Forces start to request research work on Irregular Warfare from the Swedish National Defence College.

⁵³ Discussions 2013-09-10 with LtCol (Ret) Anders Cedergren, who worked as a teacher and researcher in War Studies for several years. Cedergren was also head of the section for ground operations during the early 21st century. The opinion is shared by LtCol Ove Pappila, also a long-time researcher and teacher of Tactics. Cedergren and Pappila have worked at the Swedish National Defence College for a long time, Land Forces Operations section.

⁵⁴ Marco Nilsson, *War and Unreason. Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration*, Doctoral Thesis from the University of Gothenburg, 2010, <http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21522>

⁵⁵ Kersti Larsdottir, *Military Interventions in Internal Wars: The Study of Peace or the Study of War?*, Doctoral Thesis from the University of Gothenburg, 2011, <http://hdl.handle.net/2077/24073>

An overview of academic writings in general furthermore, shows a marginal interest for subjects such as tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. The Swedish data base “avhandlingar.se” contained 48,877 doctoral theses from Swedish colleges and universities⁵⁶. Searching for “tactics” resulted in forty-three hits, none however concerning ground forces tactics. Regarding “military tactics” there were five hits; none however with a similar focus to this work on Land or Ground Forces in Irregular Warfare. The combination “War Studies, ground forces tactics” resulted in nil references.

Another Swedish data base; “uppsatser.se” contained 146,168 essays of which 38,256 were university essays.⁵⁷ Searching for “tactics” resulted in 126 hits, but only two regarding “military tactics”. Searching for “COIN” resulted in twenty essays in English, of which only two related to the military discourse. Sixty-five essays were however reported in Swedish where some, mostly written by cadets undergoing basic officer training, dealt with problems and challenges in contemporary COIN operations.

One essay in particular; Robin Sääsk, SNDC, *The Effect of Strategic Culture upon COIN Writing*⁵⁸ delivers an interesting critical approach regarding the background aspects of influential writers on COIN. Another interesting essay focuses on distributed operations; Alexander Hecksén, SNDC, *Distributed Operations: A capability or a method?*⁵⁹ Several other essays have been written by officers undergoing education during the last two to three years. Still, such essays often have quite limited influence in general; nevertheless, they contribute to the discourse of tactics. In summary, the picture of the current interest for research on Irregular Warfare can be seen as, on the one hand, matured and more developed compared to the situation at the beginning of the 21st century.⁶⁰ On the other hand, academic and empirical research on tactics still seems inadequately developed. Several reasons for this can be discussed, such as a tradition of prioritizing Regular Warfare while not being familiar with Counterinsurgency operations abroad before the Afghanistan mission. However, traditions in Small Wars tactics have existed in Sweden for a long time, despite not having been a subject for research efforts other than mainly with a military history focus. Sweden has also had a long tradition of technological military development and with that comes a strong technological research tradition.

This overview of the research situation of Irregular Warfare and tactics in such environments, points to several areas not yet examined. In particular, this concerns tactics regarding standpoints, views and preferences in themselves, in combination with similar studies regarding strategy and operational art. Also, the very understanding of the meaning of the label Irregular Warfare cannot be said to have reached a stable common understanding yet.

⁵⁶ <http://www.avhandlingar.se> (2013-04-17).

⁵⁷ <http://www.essays.se/> (2013-04-24) Swedish university and college essays

⁵⁸ <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:328574>

⁵⁹ <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:273633>

⁶⁰ Jan Ångström, Swedish National Defence College, professor of War Studies (Strategy) points at expanding empirical possibilities and also, compared to the previous interest era during the Vietnam Wars, incomparably more advanced software tools supporting analysis and global sharing possibilities promoting higher research quality (discussions at The Swedish National Defence College, 2013-09-02).

Returning to Anthony King and his view of an ongoing convergence of knowledge and transformation of Armed Forces, not only concerning the three major powers in Europe, I argue a need to examine the character of tactical thought, and this from a sociological perspective. The transformation of Armed Forces, within Sweden and within Europe as a whole, is an ongoing process and different outcomes are possible, obviously also depending on tactical culture and thought. Thus the following work aims to contribute to the research situation with deeper examination of the character of tactical thought and contextual understanding, complementing and possibly questioning King's work claiming knowledge convergence within the European transformation.

1.5 The problem and research question

The result from the overview of the research situation supports a claim of needing to analyse the character of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare. Another claim is a need to analyse interactions between tactical thoughts and strategic preferences. Viewing the subject of War Studies as a social science brings forward several questions when a paradigm shift occurs, such as the Irregular Warfare phenomenon.

Due to military traditions, own operational experiences, education and content in officer training, views emerge that have certain characteristics regarding what are thought to have tactical relevance, and what need to be developed or abolished. The emergence of the "Irregular phenomenon" indeed questions how to think of war and warfare at all. It soon becomes an ontological and, especially in the education of war and warfare, epistemological question. Conceptual, physical and moral factors might possibly be thought of and articulated in different ways, if officers have a mere Regular Warfare mind-set, compared to officers with experience and education in Irregular Warfare. Imagined capabilities and utility in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency are parts of the education of officers, also the development of tactics, operational art, leadership and the command & control function; all areas important for adapting to strategy.

Priorities in turn, have links to what are held as core values and thus what are seen as military professional imperatives and what to strive for in leadership profiles, unit status, general officer attitudes and soldier or warrior ethos as well. The area of thought on Irregular Warfare can thus be examined with a plenitude of possible perspectives. The broad span of duties from traditional military combat-associated tasks, also including traditional police-related tasks or support to civilian security areas, and even non-combat related civil affairs tasks are particularly connected to COIN operations. Such a breadth of tasks for the modern officer incurs growth of different solutions and different kinds of thinking and challenges. New views of tactical solutions and opinions of a suitable mind set for such environments have to be expected.⁶¹ A reality that can be seen consisting of a new breadth of strategy and tactics which subsequently can be approached in several ways; inductive or deductive.. As an exploratory approach is argued to be in place, I have chosen an inductive approach, not to let pre-understanding take more space than necessary.

⁶¹ Moyer, *A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (2009), pp. 259-286. describes challenges for contemporary leadership in a leadership survey on 131 U.S. Army and Marine Corps veterans (mostly captains to colonels) of Iraq and Afghanistan during 2008.

Experiences live or narrated or increased theoretical thinking on a nucleus area in the officer profession articulated as standpoints, are argued vital to be included in the study of warfare. A sociological view connecting background factors is also argued to be important to study; especially as such an approach is uncommon or non-existent. Possible relational structures in tactical standpoints as well as in background factors are argued to be an interesting multi-disciplinary approach for Military Science and War Studies. Instead of choosing an argued interesting area within tactics, I have found it more stimulating to examine how it might be possible to articulate the character of thought at all, as no such research tradition exists in the Swedish approach to War Studies.

The research question has therefore been worded as; *how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive standpoint patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards?*

1.6 The research design

The research design is built on rather a broad problem setting and research question. In focus, there has been an urge to explore characteristics of tactical thought and methods for such investigations. An initial literature study, based on textual and context analyses, resulted in a theoretical generalization aiming to objectify the context. A survey is used to validate the generalization. That result is used further as guidance for the interviews with the officers. The data obtained builds the empirical material, subsequently analysed in several steps. First; a general view of the preferences of tactics per se and regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare, is obtained by a qualitative analysis of open-ended questions. The interesting differences in tactical preferences are then analysed using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) in order to present a model of the space of statements.

A collection of background factors is subsequently also analysed with MCA, aiming to characterize sociological structures in the space of statements. This result is then discussed using the capital and field concepts. Finally, the model of the space of standpoints is compared with normative doctrines. The result in total is presented and the research question is answered. A discussion and a reflection of the result and the work in general end the presentation. The design is outlined in the following figure.




Figure 1. The research design.

1.7 Demarcations

Tactics as an area of War Studies is strongly connected to operational art and strategy, particularly from the perspective of command levels.⁶² A connection exists from a purely rational and practical sense; one has to have the tools and methods suitable for certain tasks so as to fulfil strategic goals at hand. In turn; they need to be organized by operational art over the whole operational area.

However, the study does strictly focus on tactical thought and preference, involving operational art and strategy first in the discussion part of the study. The motive for the focus on tactics is the limited research in this area. The current view of declining knowledge and coherent understanding of tactics in the Swedish Armed Forces contributes to making this area particularly interesting to investigate.

A scientific result of the character of tactical thought is regarded as yet another missing dimension, important to include in the more frequent discussions and critiques regarding strategy. Operational art is seen as a highly interesting and challenging area in Irregular Warfare, different from within a Regular Warfare context, not least for the absence of mechanized warfare. Certain aspects of operational art are highlighted in the discussion part; nevertheless, such focused research is regarded necessary for dealing with this vast area. The focus for investigating tactical thought has been on articulations of tactics from land force and amphibious force field unit commanding officers. These officers are argued to be the very ones that most profoundly have to understand and deal with military theory, parallel with the ability to command units in the most practical way, when choosing tactical concepts in different conflict contexts. They are therefore viewed as representing the unity of military theory and practice in the military trade craft. Command levels below company command are argued to deal less with theory, whereas levels above battalion command are argued to deal less with practice, according to my experience.

A demarcation regarding the historical framing has been made with a start from the early part of 1800. The motive has been that Clausewitz is commonly understood and recognized as an icon of the start of relatively modern thought and philosophy on war and warfare. Irregular Warfare, seen as a particular form of warfare to be used in combination with one's own regular troops, or as an Insurgency or Counterinsurgency method, can however be argued to have been an extensive area of modern military thought and practice already during the 17th and 18th century.⁶³

⁶² Michael James Brennan and Justine Kelly, *Alien – How Operational Art devoured Strategy* (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009). The authors present a sharp critique on how Operational Art, which they argue is wrongly interpolated from military theory, has been developed since 1982 diverging and splitting strategy from tactics.

⁶³ Johan Ewald, *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*, transl. and annot. Robert Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), Introductory Essay, p. 14. In 1692, the French introduced the first experiences of light troops drawn from Eastern Europe, p. 12; a first account of this form of modern Irregular Warfare tactics is addressed to Antoine de Villes, *Memoires sur la Guerre* from 1711.

Military thought in general, containing principles of Irregular Warfare can already be found in Sun Tzu's writings as well.⁶⁴ Still, Clausewitz is recognized to be the commonly most known warfare philosopher and has therefore been chosen for the start of the literature investigation.

1.8 Disposition

The disposition consists of five main parts. The first chapter describes the point of departure where the general background for the study is outlined. Nine sections deal with an introduction and the aim of the research, the background to the research focus and the assessed research situation. Also included is a discussion of the problem and the research question, the research design and demarcations.

The second chapter presents theoretical perspectives, methodological choices and descriptions. The chapter ends with an overview of the empirical material. The following third chapter presents the study work introductory part; a literature study. The result is described in the form of an empirical generalization of how the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare has been understood and described during the 19th and 20th centuries. This generalization provides the study with an objectification of the context, which has been used in the interviews in order to harmonize the respondents' focus on what type of conflict the questions of tactics are supposed to be a part of.

The main part of the study is chapter four, answering the research question. Here the study of standpoints and background factor structures regarding Battalion and Company commanding officers is presented. After an introduction, the results from the data collection are presented and analysed qualitatively by Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), thereafter to be discussed using capital and field concepts. The result is presented as a model of the space of standpoints on tactical thought in Irregular Warfare. Thereafter, a descriptive normative analysis is described, referring to contemporary COIN doctrines and field manuals. The section ends with the answer to the research question.

The fifth and final chapters present discussions of the validity and reliability of the results per se, possible consequences in relation to strategy and operational art such as signs of disruptions and challenges, and finally regarding transformation and possible knowledge convergence departures. A scientific reflection is outlined regarding field potentiality and general reflections of the work as a whole are described. Suggestions presented on further research efforts including methodological development for War Studies ends this section. The final parts consist of a reflective discussion of the work as a whole, followed by the main conclusions; viewing thought on tactics as an obvious and not separate part of warfare in general, possibly to be perceived as diverging thoughts, fuelling the ongoing military transformation.

⁶⁴ Sun Tzu, *Krigskonsten*, 383 maximer om att segra och besegra, translation, Theo Hartman (Stockholm: Den Svenska Marknaden i samarbete med Sellin & Blomquist Förlag AB, 1989).

2 Theory, methodology and empirical material

2.1 Introduction to the chapter

The following chapter discusses theoretical perspectives in general and the inspiration of field theory together with capital concept. The methodology choices are presented and the main statistical method; the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is introduced and described. Finally, the empirical material from literature, doctrines and interviews is presented.

2.2 Theoretical perspectives

Articulations of warfare and tactics belong to experiences, explanations, expectations and thoughts, clearly wider than a particular scientific discourse⁶⁵. Military culture and tradition often view tactics as a practice, or even as an art.⁶⁶ Tactics may be understood as ways to solve military problems within a limited part of the operational environment, and is one of three parts of the scientific subject of War Studies in Sweden, also including military strategy and operational art. The subject is young and under development.⁶⁷ The discussions on what to include and exclude dwell on the problematic border between theory and practice; how to prioritize the study of war in relation to the practice of warfare. Such a challenge is observed by David Lonsdale, citing David Jablonsky; “*a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy*”.⁶⁸ Lonsdale recognized a complex relationship between theory and strategic practice.⁶⁹

It can be argued that this is equally complex regarding tactics, if the latter is viewed beyond mere capability comparisons and action processes. Both parts can be approached from a scientific basis and methodology suitable for different research questions. Choices do however inflict consequences that can be interpreted differently among military and civilian academics. An ongoing debate on the development of Swedish War Studies bears clear marks of an intellectual struggle of interests, possibly – if not yet applied - to be viewed sociologically. This means that the development of theoretical and methodological questions and limitations has many choices. However, the fundamental goals are enhanced knowledge and more profound explanation for the development of officer training and education. A contribution to new thinking regarding theory and methods has therefore been of interest for this study.

⁶⁵ I use an explanation of the term *discourse* from Michel Foucault; “*Discourse, the scientific order of conversation characterizing the scientific writings, education och exchange of thoughts within a certain area of research during a time period*”, p. 12. in Michel Foucault, *Vansinnets historia under den klassiska epoken* translation to Swedish by Carl G. Ljungman (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1983).

⁶⁶ *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)* [Field Manual for Ground Forces Manoeuvre Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), p. 39; definition of tactics.

⁶⁷ War Studies as a scientific subject has been under establishment and development since the beginning of 2000. The first modern scientific publication on basic military theory was written in 2005 and taken into the education of officers; Widén & Ångström, *Militärteorins grunder* (2005).

⁶⁸ David Jordan et al., *Understanding Modern Warfare* (2008), chapter 1. Strategy, p. 18.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 20.

The research question focuses on human thinking and articulations in order to uncover standpoints and structures. In other words, the search for some truth does not involve a direct approach i.e. what “are” tactics in Irregular Warfare for Swedish officers? Instead, it is the opportunity to generate a model of contemporary thought that is in focus. Such an empirical approach is unusual in Swedish War studies, which have a tradition closer to textual and contextual analysis of written materials. A tradition, also a common basis for strategy studies in general, where the sources according to Beatrice Heusser can be divided into historiography, practical instructions such as field manuals and analyses of war.⁷⁰

Historical influences on contextualization are commonly regarded as important to be observed in the analysis of warfare and tactics concerning strategy, not least for an understanding of spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations, according to Reinhart Koselleck.⁷¹ A tradition of discussing, studying and writing on tactics and warfare has strong links to military history traditions in Sweden. The scientific approach in War Studies is also often referred to as a social science; with more hermeneutic links than merely positivistic bases. A specific challenge lies in the striving for an understanding of historical influences parallel with understandings of contemporary conflicts, all under the limitations of time available for the researchers to produce relevant results, primarily for officer education. In the paradigm shift and transformation, as one can argue that the Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency rebirth from around 2006 meant, such parallel challenges became obvious as academic, military and political interests for developing scientific theories and methods on such subjects which had been a “no” question in the western world since the end of the Vietnam War.

I argue that the officer corps and my empirical data providers, can be broadly characterized by a mind-set traditionally and militarily/culturally striving for measurable control and knowledge of phenomena mostly existing independently of human beings, and thus can be seen and related to, at least, as the effects can be noticed. In many ways, such a mind-set has been applied to warfare questions and education of officers. An endeavour to measure effects outlined by NATO and a Swedish attempt at making staff processes as comprehensive as the reality is assumed to be, are examples of this.⁷² A measuring and procedural primacy can be argued to have promoted and habituated a mind-set and striving for structuralism with positivistic bases, even for the immeasurable.

⁷⁰ Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (2010), p. 29. and 32.

⁷¹ Reinhart Koselleck *Erfahrung, Zeit und Geschichte – Über historische Zeitensemantik* [*Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*], translation Joachim Retzlaff, (Uddevalla: Daidalos AB, 2004, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979).

⁷² For the endeavour at measuring, see NATO *Operations Assessment Handbook*, Interim Version 1.0, 2011 and regarding staff work, see NATO, *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive: COPD* Interim version 1.0, 2010, and the Swedish interpretation; *Svensk COPD 2.0* (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2012).

Even war and warfare are argued to be possible to be understood by systems thinking.⁷³ At the same time, confessions on the importance of “understanding”, echo frequently and parallel concerns do admit the existence of phenomena that are of non-material character and difficult to measure, such as frictions and intuition, particularly frequent in combat. Clausewitz’s description of frictions in war is probably the most famous theoretical influence concerning this aspect.⁷⁴ The technological focus that has characterized warfare during the 19th and 20th centuries has traits of positivism and rationality with strong links to natural science.

Tactics, as well as military strategy and operational art, are however, also possible to be seen as constructions of mental images and explanations for aspects that are immaterial. Such images are thereby interpretable to a great extent and can be seen as ways to think of truth and reality, and as such, as different forms of constructions. The current situation can be described as an emerging acceptance for discussing phenomena such as constructions for many officers during education; however, for some officers in the Armed Forces it is not a common mind-set. As can be recognised, historical descriptions of military subjects clearly matter in general, within the military collective; nonetheless, a tradition of positivist thinking exists, as does recognition of the problematic immeasurable aspects of warfare.

Since neither tactics nor Irregular Warfare and strategy can be limited to physical phenomena, they can be seen as expressions of phenomena that are difficult to define and measure with precision. Thought and articulations can be seen as constructions of representations, objects or phenomena that exist and can be identified dialectically between people and society. What is then possible to consider, discuss and think is thus understood in so-called constructionist terms. Such results however, do not exist in splendid isolation; particularly in the military milieu traditions, where experiences are held high (at least that is a strong narrative) thus also influencing expectations when thinking about tactics. A linkage exists between the milieu, the society, the military society and thought on subjects. Through social activities, such as a military background in certain units or mission experiences, knowledge about the world, particularly regarding the non-material world is constructed, subsequently leading to real consequences from effects of these constructions. Thus, certain perspectives or representations constitute the world as we know it. Such an approach in general corresponds to my own thinking and experiences of certain military phenomena, for example war and warfare. For a study on Swedish officers with scarce experiences of tactics in reality with battalion size units, the constructionist approach seems suitable to apply as a scientific base for the examination of tactical thought.

⁷³ As for a presentation of system thinking and system theory, see Harold W. Lawson, *A journey through the systems landscape* (London: College Publications, 2010) and Peter M. Senge, *The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization* (London: Random House Business, 2006), rev. and updated ed. The Swedish approach to system analysis is outlined in Försvarsmakten, *Svensk COPD 2.0* (2012). The introducer of systems analysis to Strategic Studies was Bernard Broadie, later to call for the integration of politics and history into a more suitable scientific approach for Strategic Studies, Jordan et al., *Modern warfare* (2008), pp. 18-19.

⁷⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, David Cambell Publisher Ltd. Everyman’s Library, 1993, originally published in German 1832), pp. 138-140; Chapter *Frictions in War*.

Before turning the attention to a discussion on methodological choices, we will discuss theoretical approaches connected to the context within which tactical thought is assumed to be articulated; the Irregular Warfare environment. The choice of addressing the context with the label Irregular Warfare is first to be motivated. Several other approaches could have been chosen with labels such as Asymmetric Warfare, Small Wars or Counterinsurgency Warfare, just to mention a few others, for contexts short of traditional mechanized operations. The main motive has been a view that the term Irregular Warfare, by the time of 2010 was not in use in the Swedish Armed Forces as a normative defined phenomenon. Neither were labels such as Counterinsurgency or Small Wars in use either. However, internationally and in the Anglo-Saxon military vocabulary, the label Irregular Warfare had existed for a long time, as an overarching umbrella label and was strongly beginning to be in use again. A need was therefore argued to exist to be able to develop the understanding of the phenomenon; not with an ambition of developing a theory, but rather recognizing the need for an empirical generalization as a base for following developments in military theory. It seemed also suitable to address the phenomenon as a sort of warfare, not necessarily limited to a insurgency or Counterinsurgency scenario.

The term Irregular Warfare is nowadays common when addressing contemporary conflicts and it is closely linked to the war in Afghanistan and earlier operations in Iraq since the beginning of this century. The term is however still in general understood to be vague and elusive, clearly different compared to the term Regular Warfare.⁷⁵ Internationally, a vast production of studies, discussions, literature and military doctrines has since 2007 seen the light. Nevertheless, that does not mean that knowledge and reflection still have to become standard and engrained in ordinary military life. For Sweden it might not be too unfair to say that the term still relies on limited spaces of experiences and diffuse horizons of expectations for the whole military organisation. There exist however, several clearly experienced units, officers and soldiers in different parts of the Armed Forces.

Until recently, the subject of Irregular Warfare has not been a recognised or prioritized part of military theory education or military training in general in the Swedish Armed Forces. It was not until 2011 it was articulated, defined and discussed in field manuals and doctrines⁷⁶. This challenges discussions and communication, both from current and historical perspectives, regardless of whether the subject is seen as strategy, operations, tactics or war-fighting capability production. Historically, one can argue that terms like Small Wars, Limited Wars, Insurgency, Revolutionary War, Counterinsurgency, Irregular threats and Hybrid threats have been invented, soon to be replaced by other terms. Examples of such labels are Four Block Wars, Low Intensity Operations, Hybrid War and Compound War, leaving no solid ground for firm and stable explanations as opposed to the way we understand and can conceptualize terms such as Regular War and Warfare.

⁷⁵ Jordan et al., *Understanding Modern Warfare* (2008) p. 229, the author of the chapter Irregular Warfare: James D. Kiras discusses argued problems with definitions of Irregular Warfare.

⁷⁶ Minor parts in the *Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3* [Field Manual for Ground Forces Operations] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), but rather substantial parts in the *Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine MSD 12* (2012) and in the *Army Battalion Field Manual (Manoeuvre Battalion 2010)* address for the first time aspects of both Irregular Warfare and COIN.

Compared to definitions of so-called “Partisan Warfare” during the beginning of the Cold War, contemporary conceptualization is more difficult to capture and make commonly understandable.⁷⁷ One reason for the supposed difficulty to explain and understand the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare might be the previous limited study and education efforts, both in the military and research ranks and also in political circles. But there might also be other reasons for the difficulties in thinking of and acting on violence not organized as our society traditionally and culturally assumes. The regular style of warfare arguably exists in a vast amount of commonly understood narrative principles, where violence is contained and regulated in predetermined ways having social and cultural acceptance worldwide; army, navy, air force and combat units of different types.

It can be said that for over a hundred years, a common truth existed of what warfare means or how it should be understood by people in general. As such, the concept of Regular Warfare represents the common perception and doxa of how armed violence is interpreted, despite the fact that wars and conflicts in reality commonly have forms of Irregular Warfare included.

By this, it is meant that there are prominently two principles or even paradigms. First; the involvement of civilians in the struggles on different level with different types of violence. Secondly; the use of indirect approaches avoiding confrontation with any military strength. The first and arguably most important of these paradigms implies that armed violence, instead of being regularly contained by law and social norms & traditions within predefined structures and organizations such as military forces, includes *the people* who are encouraged, threatened or persuaded to take an active part in the violence parallel with the armed violence from regular forces. Such a principle is by no means new; still, it provides a new context for military units trained according to the narrative of Regular Warfare, to engage in. The picture of the horrible, but clearly understandable regulated way of warfare, becomes disordered and disintegrates when the context includes a civilian dimension.

Theoretical approaches in writings on Irregular Warfare are several. Historical examples are James S. Corum’s strong criticism of major western Counterinsurgency approaches⁷⁸ and James D. Kiras’ historical contextualizing, highlighting the various forms which violence can take⁷⁹. Strategic study approaches can be exemplified by Colin S. Gary, with extensive writings on Irregular Warfare, particularly denoting the political aspect⁸⁰ and also by Beatrice Heuser with her inclusive descriptions on development of Small Wars.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Eike Middeldorf, *Taktik på Östfronten [Taktik im Russlandfeldzug]*, translation by Sture Palm (Stockholm: Studentlitteratur AB, 2002, Nordstedts Akademiska Förlag, 2010, originally published in English 1956), chapter 5, *Partisan Warfare*, pp. 233-243.

⁷⁸ James S. Corum, *Bad Strategies* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2008).

⁷⁹ Jordan et al., *Understanding Modern Warfare* (2008), chapter 5, Irregular Warfare, written by James D. Kiras, pp. 68-76.

⁸⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 229.

⁸¹ Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy* (2010), pp. 387-437.

A mixed sociological, strategic and military perspective analysis approach is used by Anthony King, suggesting a noticeable transformation process of the armed forces in Europe, due to the new kinds of threats that Irregular Warfare scenarios contain.⁸² Quite another and unusual approach, a postmodern perspective, is delivered by Aki Huhtinen and Jari Rantapelkonen, suggesting a new theoretical approach to capture the information age challenge of understanding emotional aspects, particularly apparent in Irregular Warfare.⁸³ A large bulk of the studies and writings has a historical or Strategic Study approach.

Constructionism and sociology in combination do not stand out as common research approaches, despite the common understanding that Irregular Warfare, to a large extent, concerns contexts where civilians fight amongst the military. As warfare is about violence, that aspect is interesting to discuss in Irregular Warfare, regardless of views of reality, narratives, symbolic thinking or non-experienced mental constructions. The term Irregular Warfare might be seen as an indicator or symbolic language for violence within and from the people, opposite to the view of structured, contained and controllable violence monopolized within the military paradigm. From a philosophical aspect, this hard to define phenomenon, in contrast to the regulated phenomenon, creates challenges.

When trying to define those activities aimed for maximum creativity and imagination, it seems easier to define what it *is not*, than to define what Irregular Warfare *is*.⁸⁴ An interesting example of a theory discussion with a constructionist approach regarding the term “National Interests” by Jutta Weldes, with references to Alexander Wendt, has been used to mirror similar thought a step further, concerning the elusive term Irregular Warfare.⁸⁵ The content of Irregular Warfare, it might be argued, is produced in or emerges out of a process of representations through which state officials (among others) make sense of their international context. The term can be argued to have been constructed and created to be a meaningful object, out of more or less shared meanings, through which the world, particularly certain conflicts in the international system can be understood.⁸⁶ However, a problem with the concept of Irregular Warfare is that in realism terms it might be understood too broadly, too generally or too vaguely, and too all-inclusively to explain military/armed actions.

⁸² King, *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan* (2011). The presentation of the book reads (extract); “*Paralleling European football, the military is currently undergoing a process of trans nationalisation. Concentrated nodes of military power are emerging at the operational and tactical level in each country and are coming into closer transnational relationship with each other to fulfil their missions. The project seeks to connect detailed changes at the tactical and cultural levels to wider transformations of the military and political institutions in Europe.*”

⁸³ Huhtinen and Rantapelkonen, *Messy Wars* (2008).

⁸⁴ US Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006 and US Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), March 2009.

⁸⁵ Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, *European Journal of International Relations*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 2(3), 1996, pp. 275-318.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 277.

Also, if the term is differently understood as sometimes only as an aggressor activity, and sometimes as what happens for both the attacker and the defender, different concepts come to mind. Weldes refers to Alexander Wendt's constructivist view which suggests a way to overcome realist limitations on conceptualization. His argument, here applied to the term Irregular Warfare, is that self-interested, security-oriented conceptions of state/military interest are not produced by or deducible from the systemic conditions of Irregular Warfare; instead "*Irregular Warfare is what the states make of it*". What is argued to be needed to explain Irregular Warfare and thus state actions and military tactics, referring to Wendt's reasoning, is a theory that accounts for "*the intersubjective constructed structure of identities*" of states⁸⁷, here outlined as "*the intersubjective constructed structure of the term Irregular Warfare*".

With this view of such a theory, or more modestly, an empirical generalization, the aim for an objectification of the term Irregular Warfare has been chosen and approached for an initial literature study. The result has been used to guide the data collection, regarding standpoints of tactical issues and the goal has been to provide "*an intersubjective constructed structure of the space of statements of thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare*". This view of articulating the principal perspective for the study is used for describing the character of results in the later presented answer to the research question. The theoretical and methodological choices for such an operation will be presented further on. Before that, connecting to the previous views of the importance of history and experiences, a historical theoretical perspective will be discussed; with a constructionist approach in general to the research; the results do not exist in a vacuum. Historical influences have always played a particular role in military thinking with a clear aim of transforming experiences into guiding principles for the future. Concepts of history, experiences and expectations seem therefore suitable as aspects for discussing and framing results regarding written and orally stated articulations of Irregular Warfare and tactics.

The German historian and professor of historical theory, Reinhart Koselleck's work on the semantics of historical times has been chosen for a theoretical view.⁸⁸ The historical changing ways of experiencing and representing time are argued to be decisive together with the relations between the concepts of experiences and expectations. A summary of Koselleck's views relate an asymmetry between the concepts of "*space of experiences*" and "*horizon of expectations*". They are argued to be what characterize the "modern time", where the latter, unlike in pre-modern societies, no longer is fixed and shaped strictly by the former. Such a view, with an accelerating "now", is argued to have been developed during 1750-1850; a time span corresponding to the era when the modern view of war and warfare developed; today commonly associated with Clausewitz's military philosophical and theoretical landmark.

⁸⁷ Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 279. referring to Alexander Wendt; 1992:401.

⁸⁸ Koselleck, *Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik* (2004). A summary of Koselleck's views and arguments is presented on the back of the paperback edition.

A new and different view of “history” as a phenomenon developed, according to Koselleck, and the old view of history as a collection of examples that could be learnt from for the current situations was replaced by a view of history as a process, a movement, even accelerating, where experiences quickly lose their relevance. Arguments such as; “*each generation has to look up on and once again explain the history*”⁸⁹ forms a foundation, according to Koselleck, where a critical analysis of the past is based on the same views that open the future for progress.

An anthropological asymmetry is argued to exist between the space of experiences and the horizons of expectations, expressed by the invention of the concept of “progress”. Progress is exemplified by all events springing from the French revolution⁹⁰; a description used to frame the era during the “new time” exploding in the French revolution. Koselleck argues that the political-social world of expectations, previously always tied to the results of generations, thus was torn apart. Eruptions in a non-continuous sequence of happenings and actions, also driven by different aspects combined with technological development, are argued to have set a scene where the difference between the experiences and expectations grows during the “new time”. The concept of acceleration, as a historical knowledge category, is argued to replace the concept of progress. The situation and challenges of today for officers belonging to the Regular Warfare ontology can be described as being able to handle experiences not possible to have been drawn from the hitherto existing experiences, and to be able to formulate expectations not yet expected.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, confrontations with Irregular Warfare, in theory and in practice, beyond the horizon of expectations have suddenly become an important space of experiences, or a way of gaining them. My experiences from Armed Forces’ work, both in field unit tactics and Headquarters’ long-term strategic planning processes, include continuous discussions of the importance of experiences and also a common view of the difficulties to predict future events.

One can describe a common view of the requirement for a deep and broad space of experience making a wide horizon of expectations possible; contrary to limited practical combat and field unit experiences (beyond company level), financial restrictions and general priorities. A narrow and shallow space of tactical experience might however, result in narrow horizons of expectations. I find this historical theoretical approach with the experience and expectation concept suitable for a discussion of the investigation in the first part, the literature study, and for the discussion of the answer to the research question. The scientific perspective in general can thus be summarized as constructionist with a historical theoretical perspective for framing the context objectification and the answer to the research question.

⁸⁹ Koselleck, *Erfahrenheit, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik* (2004), pp. 184-85; referring to George Friedrich Creutzer, *Die historische Kunst der Greichen in ihren Entstehung und Fortbildung* (Leipzig, 1803).

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 184. referring to Karl Ludwig Woltman, *Geshichte und Politik, Eine Zeitschrift* (Berlin 1806), p. 3; “*For the world, the French revolution was a phenomenon that seemed to scoff/deride all historical wisdom, and through it developed daily phenomena that were more and more problematic to ask the history of advice on*”.

The next decision concerns theoretical and methodological approaches for the key investigation, the analysis of standpoints of tactics. The aim of presenting an intersubjective structure of a space of statements and a standpoint analysis in relation to the background factor influences became an interesting approach for me. The combination of the hitherto limited sociological approaches in Swedish War Studies and an interest for Pierre Bourdieu, led to the field theory with field and capital concepts and their possibilities. These concepts and tools for sociological examinations of standpoints and background factor structures deserve a presentation, as they are not yet common in War Studies.

2.3 Standpoints and background factors viewed with an approach to field and capital concepts

Starting with the term “field”, somewhat different explanations exist, even if the overall meaning is commonly agreed on. Donald Broady writes; “*a field is a system of relations between positions occupied by persons and institutions in a struggle for something with a common interest*”.⁹¹ An example of a definition of a particular field, the field of power, is given by Hjellbrekke et al.; “*a field of power is defined whenever agents located in dominant positions in several fields are engaged in struggles that effect power relations within and between different fields*”.⁹² By field is thus meant, and here speaking of a social field, something that exists when certain groups of people and institutions are in interest conflicts over something in common.⁹³ However, every social interest or value sharing does not define a field. It requires investments such as standpoints on important questions at stake and specific properties such as e.g. recognitions, rank and command roles.⁹⁴

As was presented earlier, the context of Irregular Warfare can be understood and thought of, as for tactics in many ways. A currently narrowing space of experiences in tactics in the Swedish Land Forces might contain and develop different ways of thinking and valuing tactics. Differences and relations are thus argued important aspects to analyse. If however, particular struggles on the subject of tactics in fact exists or not, is not the question here; rather, if indications of potentialities for struggles of interest are characteristic of thought and preferences. In the case of standpoints on tactics, one might be strongly affected by the military social and cultural milieu and values, and that is where background factors might come in play.

⁹¹ Donald Broady, *Kulturens fält*, (ed), (Göteborg: Diadalos, 1998), pp. 11-26; Inledning: en verktygslåda för studier av fält, p-98-kulturens-fält-inledn-o-frontmatter.pdf, p. 1.

⁹² Johs. Hjellbrekke, Brigitte Le Roux, Olav Korsnes, Frédéric Lebaron, Lennart Rosenlund & Henry Rouanet, ‘The Norwegian Field of Power, Anno 2007’, *European Societies*, 9:2, 2007, pp. 245-273.

⁹³ Donald Broady, *Sociology and Epistemology, Om Pierre Bourdieus författarskap och den historiska epistemologin* (Stockholm: HLS Förlag, 1991), p. 26. a mini-definition of the term field is outlined as; “*a system of relations between positions possessed by specialized agents and institutions in the struggle for something in common*” (author’s translation from Swedish). For an overview and explanation of field theory; see also Pierre Bourdieu, *Praktiskt förnuft [Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action]*, translated by Gustaf Gimdal and Stefan Jordebradt (Uddevalla: Daidalos, 1995, Editiones du Seuil, 1994), pp. 11-24.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 266.

Being an officer, my own experience is that one is affected both by experiences, exercises, and expectations from influential and charismatic colleagues and senior officers as well. Bourdieu's field theory, an empirically oriented, and social-culturally structured analytical approach, delivers a tool box for these kinds of investigations. The term field should be seen as a tool given meaning by its use in examinations and research work. An examination of a field, or merely a social space, initially means to construct the system of relations that connect positions.⁹⁵ That is the key approach in this study, using standpoints and background factors.

Of particular interest is to bring focus on characteristics and possible consequences of relations between different groups of standpoints attributed with the agent's background factors⁹⁶. The approach focuses on outlining a certain structured space of statements, on identification of positions and distribution of properties in the space. After this first phase which leads to a construction of a space of statements with possible structures of background factors, a multitude of further analyses is possible, if proper data is at hand. Some examples are; types of investment demands by the agents, in order to be recognized and operated in the space, possible strategies, systems of dispositions of the agents and possible connections of the space or actual field to other fields.⁹⁷

Field theory can be described as a "*model of an approach in Sociology*".⁹⁸ It is however, about epistemology, not a social theory, which focuses on practical reasoning and a methodological toolkit based on empirical data collection of different human categories. The model was developed by Bourdieu and his associates in the late 1950s through the 60s to 80s. Striving to renew the philosophy and to develop sociology was a fundamental driver of Bourdieu. Results came under attack in established circles and were interpreted differently in different countries. A challenge for the field theory have however been to consistently make it understandable and transparent relative to prevailing philosophical traditions and everyday logical thinking. Moreover, sharp criticism was directed by Bourdieu to that part of the academic community who were not, according to him, overwhelmingly interested in self-criticism and reflection. Terms such as applied rationalism, pragmatic relativism, and constructionism, have appeared as descriptions of Bourdieu's scientific perspective, although he himself was strongly opposed to being recognized as a social constructionist.⁹⁹ The term post structuralism has also been used, and more commonly than the term social constructionist.¹⁰⁰ Field theory can be characterized as theory building in sociology, a form of knowledge building enterprise, where the relationship between the researcher and the research object (e.g. in the form of concepts, obstacles and challenges) are put in the centre. The purpose is to illustrate graphs in the form of so-called field diagrams within a space of standpoints on certain issues.

⁹⁵ Broady, *Sociology and Epistemology*, (1991), p. 267.

⁹⁶ Bourdieu, *Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori* (2004), p. 8.

⁹⁷ Broady, *Sociology and Epistemology* (1991), p. 267.

⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 575-582.

⁹⁹ Donald Broady, discussions at Uppsala University, the course "Capital and Field", spring 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Discussions on Bourdieu with Håkan Gunneriusson (PhD), Swedish National Defence College, SNDC, War Studies Department, Section for Land Forces Operations, spring 2010. Gunneriusson is the leading Bourdieu expert at the SNDC.

An image is provided, which describes how the space is structured in at least two dimensions, and where different standpoint clusters might be positioned. A landscape of standpoints is unveiled, where the difference between standpoints is what is sought. Subsequently, the focus is directed to analysis of how background factors might be distributed or structured in the space. This is where the sociology is brought in. A particular standpoint with the theories of Bourdieu is an effort for a relational view, putting relations before the individual or constructional focus, each on their own merits.¹⁰¹ Objective relations cannot be seen, but have to be conquered and validated by research work. This philosophy departs from the possibilities given by the agents as a group and the structure of the situations in which the agents act according to the relations between them.

Bourdieu argued that people are born in and characterized by different discourses, and therefore positions in spaces of statements according to social and cultural backgrounds. I do not fully agree with this part when it comes to officer standpoints on their tradecraft, unless they come from families with very strong officer or soldier traditions. For the current sample however, such heritage has been very unusual. Nevertheless, when considering the impact of military backgrounds, I do agree on impact having habituating effects. The use of field theory with unique research adaption was clearly encouraged by Bourdieu. Such an approach demands creative construction work adapted to the unique investigation, seemingly appropriate to a research area such as thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare.

The population chosen for the investigation might however be viewed rather sociologically uniform, regarding social heritage and military rank levels. This could lead to limited expectations for findings of social background factor differences connected to tactical thinking. On the other hand, differences might very well be influenced by different practical experiences, such as international missions and combat. The task for this chosen theoretical approach can be outlined as providing a foundation for an understandable and intersubjective constructed structure or model. Such a model aims to disclose categorized groupings, possible to further analyse for internal and external comparisons and hypothesis generation, particularly regarding what practical consequences might be expected.

Can some consequences for practice, education and training tactics in Irregular Warfare be argued to be observable in relation to social structures that can be linked to different value identifications? There are however challenges when adopting a field theory and method approach. Can an area such as tactical thought in Irregular Warfare be viewed as a field at all, or at least belong to a possible existing field, or one under development? The examination actually only addresses a part of tactics: tactics in Irregular Warfare, with obvious and intermingled links to strategy and operational art. Several more actors exist with opinions on tactics, others than battalion and company commanders. Obviously, officers at the Headquarters, military schools and in other units have to be included, even personnel at the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, several principal requirements exist for a space, in order to be recognised as autonomous.

¹⁰¹ Bourdieu, *Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori* (2004), pp. 7-9.

Such are exemplified by Donald Broady's nine thumb rules for accessing a degree of autonomy; a specific art of capital, a certain structure of polarities, a certain space of possibilities, certain recognitions and value systems, certain beliefs (called *doxa* by Bourdieu), certain drivers ("illusio" according to Bourdieu), certain instances which produce and manifest the *doxa* ("consecration instances" according to Bourdieu) and mechanisms for transforming imported themes and discussions to their own logic.¹⁰² From these principles it is possible to define a theoretical field of military thought, containing tactics as well as strategy co-existing and mutually affecting each other. As previously described, traditions of warfare principles (as *doxas*) exist and can be consecrated in military education and doctrines. Relational structures exist, for example, regarding how to actually solve the military problem of different conceptual solutions.

Obvious examples are the different structures, traditions and cultures within the army, air force and naval forces, as well as within the different services of the army. A further look at the field theory informs us that three dimensions or aspects are said to affect a field's present character, its structure, agents' choices, the existing opportunities. Bourdieu's view of the future of a field is interesting; "*a field's future is at every moment inscribed in its structure, agent's ability to realize the objective potentials as determined by the relationship between agents' abilities and the opportunities that are objectively inscribed in the field.*"¹⁰³ Such a discussion is interesting for the final result of the space of thought structure.

A possible field-like space must be seen in light of the military and strategic culture and the production within a larger field in its entirety, such as defence politics. The agents' positions and relationships to a field of military thought, could thus be seen as belonging to a possible subset in the total area of preferences that incorporate aspects of both Regular, Irregular, and Hybrid Warfare, or in short; warfare. The main interest for this examination is thus to be able to argue for how the thought of a certain category of officers can be described; homogenous or heterogeneous, and in such a case, in what areas or aspects certain relations can be identified. Bourdieu's *Les règles de l'art* (1992) is a comprehensive presentation that can be viewed as a research programme and as a method book with extensive descriptions regarding field theory.¹⁰⁴ Descriptions cover, for example, social struggles, epistemology and criticism of other scientific traditions such as Gadamer's Hermeneutics¹⁰⁵. Bourdieu embraces the logic; "To understand the logic of this social universe",¹⁰⁶ "and the sense, however subordinate to mind; to allow for *amor intellectualis rei*"; meaning is based "on the understanding love of the thing".¹⁰⁷ Such a mind-set, combining and integrating logic and emotions seems to me relevant and interesting when investigating officers' preferences of tactics.

¹⁰² Broady, *Kulturens fält* (1998), p. 6.

¹⁰³ Bourdieu, *Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori*, (2004), p. 13.

¹⁰⁴ Bourdieu, *Konstens Regler – Det litterära fältets uppkomst och struktur [Les règles de l'art]* translation to Swedish by Johan Stiernä (Stockholm: Stenhag, Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposium, 2000, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992, 1998), p. 18.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 30.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 35.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 34.

In military culture, status and preferences for certain units and tactics, according to my own experience, it is not always easy to separate logic from emotions. In summary, a field theory approach has been chosen for the investigation. However, the question of a military field or part of such a possible field will be discussed, as to the possible effects it might have as a result of this examination. It is the theory of relational structures, possibly conflicting with values and interests that is argued to be of importance and a new approach. Field theory is thus applied in order to indicate field-like or at least relational structures. A field per se is therefore not considered to be analysed in this study. Connected to the area of values and interests which might be found opposing different grouping of standpoints, the concept of *capital* has its place.

Capital is defined as symbolic and tangible assets in general. Capital is a tool that allows very different phenomena to be kept together, otherwise often separated in social sciences or humanities.¹⁰⁸ Symbols, material and informational resources are examples of capital. As a label of a certain kind of value that is recognised, the term *Symbolic Capital* is used.¹⁰⁹ Viewing the military community as a social group, several areas exist that are regarded as particularly valuable, requiring funds and recognition. The hierarchical structure of the officer corps, with particular education and knowledge, ranks, insignias and expected skills and performances, can be said to exemplify a social group with a special and unique assignment. A common interest is established in the area of military skills, however, concepts for producing the required skills and views of how to implement them, through tactics, vary.

However, Bourdieu uses different forms of capital. The so-called *Cultural Capital* can generally be seen as a subset of the more general concept of *Symbolic Capital*.¹¹⁰ One adapted example is the traditional preference in the armed forces for mechanized warfare and a manoeuvre culture, leading to a culturally lower status of other units in general. Combat experience, such as international experience, is another example of a culturally highly recognized property in the *Cultural Capital* class.¹¹¹ A third form is *Social Capital*, which can be seen as aspects that involve both assets; affiliation to different social networks in reality and perceptions of these compared to other assets, which is a relational activity.¹¹² Rank is an obvious example. We find however, a division hard to follow when certain properties, for example, affiliation to units, international missions, and combat experiences, generate values that might be argued to belong to both the cultural capital and social capital classes. The term *Symbolic Capital* is therefore used for discussions of social structures in the space of standpoints. This combined approach of standpoints and background factor structures and value relation analysis caught my interest for several reasons.

¹⁰⁸ Donald Broady 'Kapitalbegreppet som utbildningssociologiskt verktyg', *Skeptron Occasional Papers*, No 15, Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala, 1998, p.15.

¹⁰⁹ Broady, *Sociologi och Epistemologi* (1991), p. 169.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 169.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 174. The examples are adapted as Bourdieu referred more to educational values, "high culture" and "noble/aristocratic"; aspects of more limited use for the study of contemporary officers in Sweden.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 15.

First, my experience is that a single officer can have a strong impact on the military system as a whole. Secondly, my interest in Bourdieu can be traced to his background in Algeria during the insurgency in the 50s; his critics in the academia were mostly uninterested in deeper self-reflection and criticised his endeavours in the practical use of academic research. My experience of a limited interest in military sociology in Swedish officer education and my interest in methodological development for War Studies can also be traced to the encounter with Bourdieu. I believe that it is important to analyse relations between the standpoints *and* background factors, for example, officers' roles, rank, unit affiliation and education. I believe that such an approach is important to be incorporated in the thinking for research development of War Studies research.

In summary, the above reasons and motives applied to my thinking in general, and I decided to proceed with an adaption of the Bourdieu approach of field theory. To summarize the theoretical basis; I have a constructionist approach with my ontological perspective. Regarding the literature study; a *Begriffsgesichte approach* is discussed with Koselleck's experience and expectation concept. Finally, the empirical analysis of standpoints and background factors are discussed with a field theory approach. With these theoretical notions, we now turn to the methodology descriptions.

2.4 Methodology

The study uses three methodological approaches. First; a *qualitative textual and content analysis of a conceptual history approach* for the literature study. Secondly; *interviews* with open-ended questions and multi-choice answers for data collection from the officers.¹¹³ Finally, the main method for the investigation is a so-called *sociological prosopography*, meaning, collecting and analysing data concerning the structured pattern of officers' standpoints and background factors.¹¹⁴ Concepts, such as *capital* and *field* developed by Bourdieu and his collaborators and followers, are used as tools in the work.

The textual analysis is described in the appendixes presenting the literature study and the normative doctrine analysis.¹¹⁵ The sociological prosopography analysis of standpoints, background factor positions and relational structure has been done using *Multiple Correspondence Analysis* (MCA). MCA is a method particularly suitable for analysis, combining different kinds of aspects as they do here, i.e. relational structures of standpoints and background factors.

¹¹³ Appendix 2. The Interview Guide.

¹¹⁴ Donald Broady, 'French prosopography. Definition and suggested readings', *Poetics* Volume 30, Issues 5-6, October-December 2002, pp. 381-385, digital version at <http://www.skeptron.uu.se/broadys/p-broadys-0605-frenchprosop.htm>

¹¹⁵ Appendix 1. The Literature Study and Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine study on tactics in COIN.

MCA is a method of analysis that belongs to a family of methods for data analysis.¹¹⁶ Originating in the French mathematician Jean-Paul Benzécri's mathematical methods, data-sets are represented as clouds of points with geometrical relational calculations of every data. Other names are French Data Analysis and Geometric Data Analysis (GDA). Various other associated paradigms exist according to Le Roux and Rouanet.¹¹⁷ In short, MCA according to Henke Roose et al. can be said to be a modelling technique, which discloses underlying structures in categorized data. This is done by representing both modalities (answer alternatives) of questions as well as individuals in a multidimensional Euclidian space, similar to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for nominal data.¹¹⁸ MCA has a relational approach, which I believe suits an area such as tactical thought and preferences contextually expanded by the introduction of Irregular Warfare as a new area for the Swedish Armed Forces. MCA focuses on tables of individuals and categorized variables.¹¹⁹ As in Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the individuals possess the information. The overarching principle is inductive, outlined as "letting the data speak".¹²⁰

MCA seeks to array a range of variables (modalities) in a geometric space and the focus is on the most important properties, where the distribution of the data clouds is adjusted to axes in a diagram in order to be easier to interpret. The essence of MCA lies, according to Francois Denord et al., in the definition of the distance between individuals created by the variables for which their responses are different.¹²¹ The goal and a major feature of this method is the visualizing of data, making interpretations easier compared to rows of numbers, common in traditional statistics. In order to visualize the data, it is common to use the two or three combinations of properties (axes) that explain most of the distribution of data. One has to bear in mind that this will only be a generalized two dimensional picture and not the complete multidimensional result. The visualization of results, used for exploratory work during the research, as well as for presentations of the results, permits that a variety of factors simultaneously can be illustrated and discussed.

¹¹⁶ For an extensive presentation and guide of MCA, see Brigitte Le Roux and Henry Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2004), preface; pp. ix-x and pp. 1-20 and particular sections for specific areas when assuming MCA work. A shorter description can be found in Brigitte Le Roux's and Henry Rouanet's, *Multiple Correspondence Analysis* (London: SAGE publications, 2010), chapter 3 *The Method of Multiple Correspondence Analysis*, pp. 34-67. Another summary is found in Hjellbrekke et al. 'The Norwegian Power Field' Anno 2007, pp. 269-272. For a shorter and general introduction and description of MCA in Swedish, see Sverker Lundin, *Korrespondansanalys – rapport från en kurs*, med förord av Anna-Karin Petersen, Rapport nr. 4, ESEP: Ethos in Society, Education and Practices (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2005), pp. 7-10.

¹¹⁷ Le Roux & Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (2004), p. 11.

¹¹⁸ Henk Roose, Koen van Eijk Koen and John Lievens, 'Culture of distinction or culture of openness? Using a social space approach to analyse the social structuring of lifestyles', *Poetics* 40, August, 2012, pp. 491-513.
(SciVerse Science Direct), p. 498.

¹¹⁹ Le Roux & Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (2004), p. 11.

¹²⁰ Ibid. p. 10.

¹²¹ Francis Denord, Johs. Hjellbrekke, Johs., Olav Korsnes, Frédéric Lebraon and Brigitte Le Roux, 'Social capital in the field of power: the case of Norway', *The Sociological Review*, 59:1, 2011, p. 92.

Of particular interest are different positions of standpoints giving relational characteristics, for example, conceivable frictions and struggles or development potentiality of something, or conversely, the lack of incentives for potential struggles or creative development.

This type of result can be used to present and analyse connections of standpoints and different properties. An orthogonal transformation (without correlation) of the data is used. The method allows constructing a social space.¹²² The more the individuals differ on a number of questions and on modalities, the more they become distant from each other in the resulting multi-dimensional clouds. This cloud, the central object in GDA, is projected on the orthogonal axis according to the criteria of maximizing variance along the axis. The related clouds are then studied using relative contributions of questions and modalities to the axes. Both clouds of individuals and clouds of modalities can be studied. Finally, supplementary elements, such as further questions, can be projected onto the space.

This process makes it possible to interpret the axes depending on what kind of additional factors appear to be related with the space. It allows assessment on how similar or different the standpoint answer categories are, in terms of a range of relevant attributes, such as background factors. The possibility to also see clusters of very different aspects provides an opportunity to build understanding and knowledge of previously unknown or at least not verified patterns. This means that I have been searching for clusters that can be interpreted in tactical terms, giving military logic and possibly linking to military paradigms. For example, it is usually militarily logical to have tactical thought which connects small units' actions with intelligence gathering, versus thought that connects larger units with combat tasks or operations.

It is also logical to think of tactics and non-kinetic effects, if one focuses on civilian tasks, which is important in Counterinsurgency operations. MCA can be seen as a way to combine qualitative data, transformed to quantitative elements for presentation, finally used for qualitative sociological analysis. The interpretations used here depend on the first encoding, thus avoiding violation of the original data and risk of over-generalizations or biases from the researcher. This level of interpretation, possible to be criticized not going further with deeper analysis, is common in how MCA works. However, the aim of the analysis is an initial view of clustering trends and patterns, in order to construct a social space of tactical thought. The MCA is used as a tool to make patterns emerge from data, a geometric model that provides a frame for descriptive analysis.¹²³

¹²² Le Roux & Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (2004), p. 14. This principle is argued to be a statistical practice in sharp contrast to the conventional in social science; numerical indicators producing a sociology of variables. The GDA principle allows and aims for a construction of a social space, which is the purpose of the analysis for this study.

¹²³ Le Roux & Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (2004). p. 10.

MCA is based on an iteration of coding, recoding and new interpretations, not distant to the principles of hermeneutical analysis, here, with results in a graph and visual patterns. I consider such graphs to suitably provide a new pedagogical way of viewing and thinking of data results, compared to what usually is at work in War Studies, in the form of traditional statistical diagrams and textual descriptions. The MCA work has been performed with the French data programme Coheris SPAD; Data Mining and Predictive Analytic Software.¹²⁴

The MCA, which has been a main method of Bourdieu and his followers' work¹²⁵, has however its application primarily on large samples. Still, I argue that the present volume of informants, character of questions and numbers of answer categories, provide a suitable base for MCA.¹²⁶ Usefulness, also on small samples, is therefore suggested, when the aim is to identify clusters of standpoints in relation to certain background factors. With this presentation of the MCA as the key analytical method for the study, the other methods can be summarized as; textual and contextual analyses of conceptual historical approaches of written sources, and finally, interviews organized with open-ended and closed questions.¹²⁷

The capital and field concepts are applied to a standpoint analysis with MCA techniques¹²⁸. The result is interpreted as a model of the space of standpoints. Background factors are analysed for structural indications, followed by a capital discussion, also in relation to a larger field of military thought. The descriptive result; the model of the space of statements is then compared with normative texts on tactics in Counterinsurgency operations¹²⁹. The results from these analyses form the bases for the answer to the research question. The next section presents an overview of the empirical material.

2.5 Empirical material and sources; an overview

This section broadly describes the empirical material. More detailed descriptions are presented in the respective sections and appendixes. The main body of empirical material consists of two major parts; the first part is a collection of literature on the subject of Irregular Warfare. The second part consists of data from the interview study of Swedish army and amphibious officers. The literature on western thinking and thought on military issues relating to Irregular Warfare has been sought among two main categories.

¹²⁴ Information on the SPAD software can be found at;

http://www.coheris.fr/uploads/filemng/anglais/brochures-produits/Coheris-SPAD_EN.pdf

¹²⁵ Le Roux & Rouanet, *Geometric Data Analysis* (2004), p. 15.

¹²⁶ The question of usefulness of MCA for this study with more limited empirical material has been discussed, with positive results, with Mrs. Brigitte Le Roux, one of the current leading representatives and developers of GDA, during the MCA course at Rosersberg Castle autumn 2012, and in more detail during a seminar at the Swedish National Defence College in January 2013. Mrs Le Roux argued that the main point at issue was the character of the questions, not the volume of informants.

¹²⁷ For methodology in the literature study; see Appendix 1, pp. 5-7 (78).

¹²⁸ For an example of the work at an earlier stage not yet applying MCA, see *The Baltic Defence and Security Review*, vol 14, issue 1, 2012, pp. 152-180.

[https://www.bdcoll.se/files/files/BSRD%20VOL14\(1\)%20\(2\)%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.bdcoll.se/files/files/BSRD%20VOL14(1)%20(2)%20(1).pdf)

¹²⁹ Appendix 8. Results from a tactical COIN doctrine study, pp. 1-16 (16).

Primarily; military doctrines such as NATO¹³⁰, American¹³¹ and British¹³² doctrines have been chosen, supposedly the most influential military normative writings of the western world. For comparative examples of earlier military definitions, two American sources have been used; the US Army FM 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces*¹³³ and *Small Wars Manual*, US Marine Corps.¹³⁴ For a compilation with a contemporary Swedish governmental view, the source *Försvar i användning*¹³⁵ has been used.

Secondly, selected literature has been included, such as classic military thought and practice on the subject, influential writings from the post Second World War period, primarily between 1950 and 1970; finally, writings from the beginning of 2000 to 2010. Literature has been studied from three time periods; period one; “From Clausewitz to the Second World War”, containing writings from Carl von Clausewitz, Charles Callwell and Thomas Edward Lawrence, period two; “*Second World War to the 70s*” with descriptions on Irregular Warfare by David Galula, Werner Halhweg, Frank Kitson, John J. McCuen, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier, and the third period, labelled; “*From 9/11 to 2010*”, comprising selected books written by James Corum, Colin S. Gray, Thomas X. Hammes, David KilCullen, James D. Kiras, John Mackinlay and Gil Merom.

The empirical material from the interviews consists of data collected from 43 officers in the Swedish Armed Forces Army and Amphibious Forces, assigned during 2011 as battalion or company commanding officers. The units they were commanding comprised so-called manoeuvre battalions, containing various numbers and types of mechanized/armoured vehicles, two intelligence/security battalions, one ranger battalion and one amphibious battalion.

¹³⁰ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) -3.4 (A), second study draft 2008, NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations*, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 3.4.4, study draft 2008.

¹³¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006, US Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), March 2009, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication JP 3-24, 05 October 2009,

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008), US Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, Field Manual No. 3-05.130, September 2008.

¹³² UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms Operations, *Countering Insurgency*, Draft, 2009, UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, November 2009.

UK Ministry of Defence, *British Defence Doctrine*, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, third edition, August 2008.

¹³³ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Army Operations against Irregular Forces*, Field Manual No. 31-15, May 1961.

¹³⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington D.C.: US Governmental printing Office, 1940; a new printing of the original US Marine Corps manual by Sunflower University Press, 1996 pavilion Press, 2004 and Cosimo Reports, 2010) also <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/index.htm>.

¹³⁵ *Försvar i användning*, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), chapter 3.

The motive for choosing this category of officer was that I argue they come closest to practical tactics, still with a need for military theoretical understanding and consideration before, during and after the practical, tactical execution of action. The study involves nearly the whole population of relevant officers (n= approximately 43). The total population consisted of approximately 45 officers, depending on the status in each unit, due to the on-going transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces. Not all units had been activated during 2011 and one battalion commander was not possible to interview.

A further, but more limited set of empirical material consists of Swedish, American, British, Canadian and French doctrines or field manuals for tactics in Counterinsurgency Operations.¹³⁶ This material was used for the normative comparison with the descriptive result of the space of statements of thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare. We will now proceed with a presentation of the first part of the study; the literature study, with the aim of providing a generalization of the characteristics to be found in a large amount of literature and military doctrines covering this type of warfare.

¹³⁶Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine study on tactics in COIN, pp. 1-16 (16).

3 How can so-called Irregular Warfare be understood?

3.1 Introduction to the chapter

This chapter presents a summary of the background, questions, results, validation and discussion from the initial literature study¹³⁷. The aim is to contextualize the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare in a way where general perspectives and aspects are derived. A qualitative textual and content analysis of a collection of literature and military doctrines results in an empirical generalization, argued to grasp a common thread of 200-year descriptions on the traits of this kind of warfare, also in contrast to traditional Regular Warfare. The result is to be seen as an objectification of the context in which tactical thought is to be mirrored, and which has been used as directive guidance for the construction of the interview questions. The empirical generalization was used in the introduction of each interview in order to enhance the understanding of the context. The chapter presents a validation of the result by a survey and closes with a discussion on understanding as well as consequences of the interpretation of Irregular Warfare.

3.2 Background and questions

When describing traits of thought in Irregular Warfare, I view it as a way of characterizing the context where tactics are to be executed, giving results corresponding to a political strategy. The context is approached from a deductive angle with a qualitative text analysis on how the term has been explained and articulated in argued influential writings of military theory and practice. Texts are included from the early parts of 1800 to the year of 2010. This period can be said to cover modern military theory mainly devoted to Regular Warfare, but also intermittently to intensive writings and discussions of Irregular Warfare.

Some periods have shown the need for handling *Small Wars* against non-state enemies, e.g. during the 1950s and 60s, and the paradigm situation after the Iraq and Afghanistan operations in 2003. A new interest rose, not predicted in late 2006 with the issuing of the American Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 COIN *Counterinsurgency*.¹³⁸ However, Irregular Warfare, regarding definitions has been seen as a problematic part of military theory according to many experts such as Bernard Fall¹³⁹ and Frank Kitson¹⁴⁰ from the Cold War era to contemporary thinkers such as Colin Gray¹⁴¹.

¹³⁷ Appendix 1. The Literature Study. The full study with design, methodology and results is presented in this appendix.

¹³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006.

¹³⁹ Bernard B. Fall, *Last reflexions on a war, Bernard B. Fall's Last Reflections on a War*, Preface by Dorothy Fall, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), p. 210.

¹⁴⁰ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1971, London: Faber & Faber, 1971, new printing by Hailer Publishing, 2008), p. 2.

¹⁴¹ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp. 212-215.

However, today's experts in the field, for example, David KilCullen¹⁴² are moving more rapidly beyond the framing of definitions and focusing on sub-definitions. Another example is David Ucko¹⁴³, who in a few words gives rather a clear picture of sub-labels, such as Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism and Stability Operations, among others. Colin S. Gray delivers a comprehensive view to the question of what Irregular Warfare is and how it differs from Regular Warfare; especially in relation to western military culture.¹⁴⁴ The straight forward view is that war is war, although the character of activities in the operational environment differs. An earlier comprehensive academic view of a definition of Small Wars can be viewed in Roger Beaumont's "*Small War: Definitions and Dimensions*" from 1995.¹⁴⁵ For the Swedish Armed Forces, with few discussions and no definitions on the subject until 2011, the situation changed with the issuing of a new Military Strategy Doctrine.¹⁴⁶ This doctrine included such texts, which however must be considered as a first step on a long way to a deepening of existing military theory.¹⁴⁷

The term Irregular Warfare was not commonly used in military discourse of the western world during the 20th century, and military education mostly dealt with Regular, or conventional and traditional military warfare theory and practice. The research situation can also be characterized as limited from the end of the Vietnam War up to 2007. The following three questions have been in focus, leading forward to an empirical generalization.

"How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined and explained?"

"What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?"

"What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?"

The sources chosen are assessed to have been, or are, influential on military understanding of the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare¹⁴⁸. Also included as study appendixes are summaries of views from Clausewitz and Frank Kitson, containing information assumed not commonly known.¹⁴⁹ The purpose is to include views and articulations on the subject that might be used for further analysis, and reflections on the differences and similarities as regards western thought on Irregular Warfare.

¹⁴²David KilCullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. xvii-xix.

¹⁴³David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), pp. 9-12.

¹⁴⁴Colin S. Gray, 'Irregular Warfare - One Nature, Many Characters', *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2007 Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2007, pp. 35-57.

¹⁴⁵Roger Beaumont, 'Small Wars: Definitions and Dilemmas', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 541, No. 1, September, 1995, pp. 20-35.

¹⁴⁶*Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)* [Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine] (2011).

¹⁴⁷Parts of the texts on Irregular Warfare in the Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine MSD 12 are based on the results from the Literature study.

¹⁴⁸Appendix 1. Literature study, Sources; p. 8 (76).

¹⁴⁹Appendix 1.1 Clausewitz writing on Small Wars – a collection of views, pp. 1-7 (7), and Appendix 1.2 General Sir Frank Kitson's views on Irregular Warfare 2010 – a collection of thoughts, pp. 1-2 (2).

3.3 Background regarding the term Irregular Warfare

As a kind of warfare, which is more or less connected to Regular Warfare, Irregular Warfare has been articulated and discussed since long ago, using various labels such as; *Guerrilla Warfare*, *Low-intensity conflicts*, *Revolutionary Warfare*, *protracted warfare* and perhaps the first modern and more comprehensive, although diffuse, label *Small Wars*, particularly linked to Charles Caldwell's epos *Small Wars, their principles and practice* originally from 1896¹⁵⁰.

The most prominent military thinker in western countries since the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz, addresses the phenomenon as "*People's warfare*" or "*People's Armament*", in his famous epos *On War* from 1830.¹⁵¹ Clausewitz mostly wrote on "the big war" from a philosophical and military theoretical angle, and the interest for Small Wars can be interpreted as limited, which is evident in his views and short descriptions in *On War*. However, Clausewitz was also interested in Small Wars, or Kleinkrieg, teaching and writing on the subject during the early years of 1800.¹⁵²

Callwell's writings concern the small war from a truly practitioner perspective with a style not far from a tactical field manual. Still, both writers catch and articulate different characteristics for *Small Wars* compared to traditional Regular Warfare. Temporary periods of needing to handle *Small Wars* to a greater extent against non-state enemies, occurred primarily during the 1950s and 60s, later to be low priority areas of theory and practice in the wake of the Vietnam War. The phenomenon and resulting aspects in the USA were thereafter moved away from the army in general to the backyards of Special Forces.

From then to the first decade of the 21st century, when the U.S. Armed Forces started to acknowledge *Small Wars*, with expressions such as *Counterinsurgency* and *Irregular Warfare* in the doctrine and field manual FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, as an equally important form of warfare as traditional or Regular Warfare, the subject has been of generally limited interest for western military concepts, education and training. This is noted by James Kiras in his introduction to the chapter of Irregular Warfare in the second edition of *Strategy in the Contemporary World*¹⁵³, as also stated by Widén and Ångström in *Militärteorins Grunder* from 2004.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, Third Edition, with an Introduction by R. Douglas Porch (1996), The first edition from 1896 can be argued to present theories of Irregular Warfare with, in certain aspects, relevance even today, according to Widén and Ångström in *Militärteorins grunder* (2005) p. 196.

¹⁵¹ Clausewitz, *Om Kriget* (1991), pp. 478-483; the sixth book, chapter 26, "*People at Arms*".

¹⁵² The Literature study Appendix 1. Clausewitz writings on Small Wars – a collection of views; pp. 1-7 (7). Clausewitz refers to Johan Ewald's writings as one of the two most important thoughts of Small Wars, see p.7 (7).

¹⁵³ Baylis et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 165; chapter Irregular Warfare.

¹⁵⁴ Widén och Ångström, *Militärteorins grunder* (2005), p. 37.

The same can be said for interest from historians according to Ian Becket in his overview of the subject in *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*¹⁵⁵. The changing paradigm situation started around 2006 and was linked to the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, with the recurring requirement for military capabilities to have a broader spectrum of activities than just combating equally conceptualized armed forces. The term Irregular Warfare became accepted and started to develop, despite being more diffusely used in various forms, compared to the more specifically labelled Counterinsurgency (COIN).¹⁵⁶

COIN can be seen as a particular type of Irregular Warfare related to an insurgency scenario. Other terms strongly linked to the irregular field are so-called Hybrid wars/warfare/threats. Here, the meaning in general is a combination, in parallel with traditional symmetrical enemies and irregular adversaries. One key characteristic of the subject of how to explain and understand Irregular Warfare is that less common understandings and fewer explanations exist, compared to the term Regular Warfare. One reason for this might be significant, and that is that the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare has not been prioritized in either historical research¹⁵⁷ or by the military establishment¹⁵⁸.

The task of grasping the essence of Irregular Warfare is challenging and can be approached from many different directions and scientific perspectives. A main character of every irregularity is that it has to be different in some way to the opposite of regularity; here speaking of armed activities linked to the execution of political power or political violence. Here, the fog of war is very much lingering on, in the ability to explain and understand in a way that can last over time. Today's use of the term Irregular Warfare, as some sort of umbrella term for warfare against primarily non-state actors, could be argued to face the same difficulties as yesterday's difficulties of framing a common clear understanding and definition of the term Small Wars. The analysis only focuses on the term Irregular Warfare or that which is considered as warfare, different from what is generally and universally understood as the main content of traditional and conventional military warfare, such as it has been developed since the Napoleonic Wars. Sub-terms such as Guerrilla Warfare and alike are not analysed per se, but are understood as definitions in use today. The method is textual analysis of both a systematic and critical examination character. Chosen sources have been examined for, primarily, qualitative aspects addressing variables which have been extracted from Clausewitz's *On War*, book six, chapter 26.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Ian W. F. Becket, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. viii-ix.

¹⁵⁶ The term COIN is defined in the *Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine* MSD 12 (2012), p. 28. as political, economic, civilian, psychological, social, judicial and military activities undertaken within a comprehensive political Strategy to counter an Insurgency (author's translation from Swedish).

¹⁵⁷ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrilla and their Opponents since 1750* (2001), pp. viii-ix, "Surprisingly, Insurgency and, especially, Counterinsurgency have enjoyed relatively little attention from historians".

¹⁵⁸ Lynn, *Battle – A History of Combat and Culture* (2004), see chapter *Epilogue: Terrorism*, pp. 317-369. with descriptions of the problem of military organizations not willing to include Irregular Warfare in their culture, thus with the result of recurring ad hoc reactions when such capabilities are needed again.

¹⁵⁹ Clausewitz, *Om Kriget* (1991), pp. 478 – 483. Regarding the variables, see Appendix 1. p. 7.

Despite the limited number of pages, Clausewitz arguably characterizes Irregular Warfare from several aspects to be useful as variables, regardless of the time perspective of a subject to be analysed.

The reason for using Clausewitz to define variables in the actual subject is thus two-fold. First, *On War* is universally well-known in western military discourse and has influenced thinking and understanding of war and warfare since the 19th century, and still does. Secondly; several factors and areas of activities described by Clausewitz in the actual chapter can be argued to be normally used when theorizing military activities, thus easily understood and generally accepted as useful and common description categories.

3.4 The results of the questions on described characteristics

The Literature study addressed three questions dealing with the subject from a military theoretical or practical perspective. The questions and results were the following.¹⁶⁰

The first question; “*How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined and explained?*” is answered as; Conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, operational art and tactics with a focus on, and from, the lower violence spectrum (subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and non-state entities. These sorts of conflicts include insurgency strategies, where political and civilian perspectives dominate and the will and support of the people is of vital importance. Irregular Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars’ struggle or sometimes also includes the counter irregular party as well. From time to time this sort of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms, a specific form of warfare different from Regular Warfare, not seeking decisive battles but during extended time eroding the will to fight the enemy and thus, as such, being a natural complement.

The second question; “*What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?*” is answered as; A conceptual difference not built on distinct physical formations, moral goals that are a part of the mind and will of the people, limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and the use of concepts difficult to detect (covert, clandestine and low visibility) for existing, organizing and activating armed operations and activities. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are often used, as are criminality and other actions differing in moral/legal/ethical aspects and behaviour, compared to western and traditional views and conduct of Regular Warfare. Also, a generally low military interest exists, compared to the interest in Regular Warfare skills and competences.

The third question; “*What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?*” is answered with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressor’s perspective); A military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with people and society. The main goal to control the people and their support leads to a political and civilian focus on the fight.

¹⁶⁰Appendix 1. The Literature study, p. 74 (76).

Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groupings use what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms. Military strategy, operational art and tactical skills from subversion to mobile (manoeuvre) warfare with light ground forces are also typical characteristics.

The answers to these three questions will be discussed in the next section, aiming to describe an empirical generalization as a military theoretical sketch of the historically intermittent, highlighted phenomenon of Irregular Warfare.

3.5 Conclusions and an empirical generalization

We are dealing with conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, operational art and tactics, focused on a starting point at the lower violence spectrum (subversion, terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare). However, different forms of military operations and also joint operations can be included. Violence is thus not restricted to, and conceptualized only by the traditional military structures common for states. Violence from, and between non-state actors against a state are such examples. These sorts of conflicts include Insurgency strategies, where political and civilian perspectives dominate and the will and support of the people are of vital importance. Irregular Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregular struggle or sometimes also to include the counter irregular activities, similarly using military force. From time to time, that sort of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms; a specific form of warfare compared to Regular Warfare and also as such, a natural complement.

The conceptual difference with Regular Warfare is characterized by limited, physical structures and greater mental goals and drivers, the endurance and will of the people, limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect, requiring skills and capabilities for covert, clandestine and low visibility operations. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are often used in what is culturally effective against the opposing actor and culturally and traditionally acceptable as standards by the opposing actor. The use of criminality and other activities different and unacceptable to what is morally and ethically accepted in Regular Warfare might be used.

Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence or combat elements are important and even necessary organizational parts. The use of what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms is one characteristic. A military weakness leads to continuous needs for integration, for control of and support by the people and society. The main goal of controlling the people and their support leads to a political and civilian focus on the fight. A low military interest has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts and warfare, compared to capabilities, skills, competence and education as characteristics of Regular Warfare.

Describing the term Irregular Warfare and to summarize, a further narrowed articulation is possible; the will and capability of using violence for political reasons, even outside the military context and in ways that contradict cultural, traditional, judicial and social norms, values and constructions characterizing the western world and democracies. The contradiction lays both in a focus on attacks in the civil domain, of such character that they exceed the capacity of police and civilian capabilities, at the same time as they stay outside the role and fundamental democracy perception of the military function.

Irregular Warfare as a phenomenon can be seen as different from Regular Warfare in philosophical and conceptual ways of controlling violence. In the first place, violence is also used outside the paradigm of military containment and monopoly; it integrates with society. In Regular Warfare the violence is separated from society into a particular structure that in itself is clearly separate from everyday life. Trying to counter such irregular attacks and threats will obviously challenge various social perspectives, from considerations of violence containment (ontology of military and police), to employment of, for example; legal, structural, organizational and different power structures.

Irregular Warfare might also be seen as a phenomenon which when used, crushes the social structures/constructions. When defending against Irregular Warfare, the defenders have to adapt new or modified social structures/constructions. The irregular attackers might be said to push and move social constructions, which becomes difficult for the defenders to adapt to. Turning away from theoretical explanation challenges, there are some aspects (or social constructions) derived and condensed from the empirical generalization that might be used as focus areas because they all have something in common; i.e. that they truly challenge traditional social and military perception and as such should be included in military thinking of Irregular Warfare.

They are as follows;

“Broaden the violence spectrum with lower end bases”

“Diversity in actors’ rules of warfare”

“Political struggle based on society’s acceptance/support – not military victory”

“Asymmetrical concepts for acceptance and use of violence, limited physical focus, more social/mental emphasis and hidden forms of combat/influences”

“What the defenders address as terror and subversion are key competences and activities not excluding higher tactical forms of ground operations when suitable and possible”

“Fluid, highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groupings, using what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms”

“A military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration, for control of and support by the people and society”

“A low military interest has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts and warfare, compared to capabilities, skills, competence and education as characteristics of Regular Warfare”

These articulations might be further condensed into two categories, which together can be seen as an example of a theoretical sketch, or an empirical generalization of the term Irregular Warfare and can be seen as the key result of the literature study;

Irregular Warfare – characteristics in general

A political struggle based on society's support with a diversity of actors and rules of warfare – not a military victory. Asymmetrical concepts for acceptance and use of violence, limited physical focus but enhanced social/mental focus and hidden forms of combat/influences. Fluid, highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groupings, using what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of Western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms. A military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration of control of and support by the people and society. A low military interest has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts and warfare, compared to capabilities, skills, competence and education as characteristics of Regular Warfare.

Irregular Warfare – characteristics regarding tactics

A broadened violence spectrum with lower end bases, and what the defenders address as terror and subversion are key capabilities, not excluding higher tactical forms of ground operations when suitable and possible. Subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and Mobile Warfare are important competences in Irregular Warfare.

Figure 2. The empirical generalization of the term Irregular Warfare

3.6 A validation and discussion of the result

The empirical generalization aims to objectify and frame the context in which tactical thought is analysed. The result can be seen as broad and lacking precision, something that seems to be characteristic for western ways of thinking and articulating Irregular Warfare. In order to strictly follow the result, I have chosen not to deviate here with another complementary, possibly more distinct and precise articulation. Staying with the original results, several areas closely linked to tactics in Irregular Warfare can be identified. In order to validate the empirical generalization from the literature study and to develop indicators of other thought, a survey was performed during the autumn of 2010 for officer students at the Staff Courses and military teachers in the sections for Ground Forces and Joint Operations of the War Studies Department. The broad question was; “*What characterizes contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare?*”

Three sub-questions were developed as follows;

Do groupings in thought exist, regarding areas of violence, which have to be considered in the tactics of Irregular Warfare? If so, regarding what areas of violence?

Do groupings in thought exist, which can be linked to a military culture that regards Regular Warfare tactics to be sufficient even in Irregular Warfare, or is new thinking needed?

What other groupings, regarding similar or different thoughts on tactics in Irregular Warfare can be derived from the result?

The investigation was conducted using a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a collection of open-ended questions on the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare and tactics in general, and ten questions based on the empirical generalization from the literature study. Thirty-two people answered the survey with an equal amount of responses from students and teachers, mostly majors or lieutenant colonels. Twenty-one belonged to the army, six to the air force, one to the navy, three to the amphibious units and one to the Special Forces.

Most of them had backgrounds in operations and had mainly been serving in field units or staffs. Over 60 % had been assigned on at least one international operation and of these; almost 20% had participated in more than three operations. Still, there was rather a large amount (almost 40 %) that had no international experience at all. Regarding self-assessment of personal knowledge and understanding of Irregular Warfare; *mainly a limited knowledge and level of understanding* was assessed by 56%. 31 % viewed themselves to *have a limited level of theoretical knowledge and understanding of Irregular Warfare*.

Only about 10 % assessed themselves to *have deep knowledge and extensive experience*. Regarding the view of usefulness of the empirical generalizing, 75% of the officers mainly agreed to *the way the empirical generalization descriptions of traits of Irregular Warfare and how differences compared to Regular Warfare are explained*. 25 % *partially disagreed*.

70% of the respondents agreed with the often addressed opinion on *difficulties to communicate due to limited precision in language and symbols related to Irregular Warfare, enhancing risks for misunderstanding and also unconscious thinking in "regular terms"*. Concerning the violence spectrum in Irregular Warfare, the officers in general mainly or fully agreed (37, 5 % for each alternative) that *one trait in Irregular Warfare is a broadened violence spectrum that has to be understood and handled*. Subsequently, over 50% fully agreed and over 34% mainly agreed that *the roles of the military and the police have to be developed if Irregular Warfare is to be possible to be fought successfully*.

When it came to state opinions on “*higher tactical forms of ground operations*” as a more prominent trait in Irregular Warfare than “*terror and subversion*”, 43% either “fully” or “partly” disagreed. 28% did however mainly agree on the statement, showing signs of rather different opinions on tactical considerations. The result indicates different views on what constitutes main tactical capabilities for irregular actors. 25 % of the respondents considered the question not even to be understandable.

Over 65 % fully agreed and 25% mainly agreed that *tactics to counter irregular threats/ or Insurgency operations includes several moral/ethical aspects that have to be dealt with, due to the modus operandi of the opponents integrating amongst the people*. Over 70 % of the officers agreed or mainly agreed that *there is a need to develop other tactical skills for Irregular Warfare than what is needed for Regular Warfare*. As for challenges in Irregular Warfare tactics compared to Regular Warfare tactics, most officers perceived *new ways of thinking tactics as the main area*.

Certain indications can be derived from this result, however, note well, the small sample and broad questions. Regarding the first question, the survey identifies thinking that regards terrorism and subversion as important characteristics for Irregular Warfare, containing violence at the lower end of the violence spectrum, such as subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, having repercussions on tactics. The results from the second question do not indicate any particular traditional preference according to Regular Warfare primacy. The answers reveal challenges for tactics in Irregular Warfare and a need for tactical development different compared to Regular Warfare needs. Particular examples of challenging areas belong to the ethical and moral area and the roles of the military and police. Finally, regarding the third question concerning other aspects, an opinion of needing to handle the complicated factor of training host nation security forces could be detected. New ways of thinking and acting tactics seem to be important for many officers. The empirical generalization seems finally to be in line with many officers’ views of the meaning of the term Irregular Warfare.

The overall question for the survey; “*What characterizes contemporary military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare at the Swedish National Defence College?*” could be answered as;

Challenges exist for tactics in Irregular Warfare, many belonging to the ethical and moral area and the roles of the military and the police. Most concerns relate to the violence area of subversion and terrorism, still higher forms of tactical Land operations have to be handled. A need for developing tactical skills other than those belonging to Regular Warfare; it still is desirable and argued to exist. New ways of thinking and acting tactics are important aspects for many officers. The theoretical construction that the empirical generalization resulted in seems to be in line with many officers’ view of the content of Irregular Warfare. No particular thinking has been identified, that traditional competences for Regular Warfare are enough; on the contrary, the officers express an opinion that there exist differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare, not addressing the latter with signs, words or expressions which indicate lower status or lesser importance.

This result can be seen as trends, relevant for the actual time of the investigation. The character of the result was not particularly surprising, given the situation with Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan, the rather limited knowledge of the subject and how the questions were articulated. The bottom line on what is viewed challenging is, when the enemy is hard to find and operates amongst the people. The border area between military and police tasks for handling subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, becomes a problem, which not only concerns each area itself but all together in a seamless continuum.

Returning to the empirical generalization, a part of the description concerns a stated low military interest for the area of Irregular Warfare. The previous mentioned study on western attitudes towards Irregular Warfare; *"Following Frank Kitson's Direction"*, suggests that the military part, because of its ties to western culture and because of certain aspects of military culture itself, has paid little attention to Small Wars or Irregular Warfare.¹⁶¹ This is argued to have had an impact on doctrines, strategy, countermeasures and for how military training and education have been carried out in the Western world in the past. One reason for the time needed for transformation has to be attributed to the actual tasks for many Defence Forces, not including Irregular Warfare operations.

The results of the study can be summarized as follows; Military culture in general has given a low priority to Irregular Warfare, which has generated a negative attitude towards it and a low capability for this type of warfare. The reasons can be traced to the military focus on technology, the Western liberal tradition of separating military matters from civilian ones, an officer corps that prioritizes Regular Warfare, an aversion to Irregular Warfare unless the military factor can be decisive in a conflict, and ignorance. The result when it comes to Irregular Warfare has been a lack of military capability and a consequent increase in risk for casualties and death.

So far, there has been a rather slow interest in building countermeasures, i.e., education, training and supporting change within the officer corps.¹⁶² A way to counteract these trends is suggested to be a rethinking of military education and training and to build new capabilities within the officer corps. To achieve this, new ways of thinking about the links between war and society probably need to be incorporated into military training. Of particular importance here, it is argued that officers would better understand their own social and cultural habits and consequently, the social or cultural biases they have regarding themselves and their opponents' means, resources and capability to wage war. Such a view has been driving and underpinning the approach for investigating officers' thoughts linked to background factors in this study. However, such an approach for developing new knowledge, built on individual characteristics researched sociologically, is not within the military tradition.

¹⁶¹ Michael, Gustafson, 'I Frank Kitsons fotspår – En litteraturundersökning kring militär attityd till Irreguljär krigföring', *Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, NR 2/2010, pp. 64-91.

¹⁶² Ibid. pp. 64-91.

There are no traditions for questioning the characters of individuals and groups of individual spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations, to use Reinhart Kosselleck's tools.¹⁶³ Such a view, aiming to place the results in particular historical or time perspectives and framework is common in military history works, and equally uncommon when studying contemporary military challenges. The literature study contains periodically structured accounts of descriptions, viewed as a static set of variables and argued to be of principal value and meaning history transcendentally. From this approach, a result has been derived, argued to catch generalist aspects that more or less can be said to constitute common understanding of the so-called Irregular Warfare phenomenon. It can be argued that two aspects stand out in particular as contradictory to the common ontology of war in the western sense. The first is a broadened violence spectrum, with particular focus on lower levels of violence.

The second is a mental border deconstruction, de facto between the military and civilian sectors of the western society. The two factors are seamlessly interconnected and that is *not* a characteristic in western strategy and the tactical horizon of expectations, still within the space of experience, as the vast literature on the subject of Small and Irregular Wars evidently provide. Why have spaces of experiences then not fed horizons of expectations? One answer can be approached by viewing the character of the military ontology, as a part of common understanding of how the society is, and is wanted to be, constructed and regulated. When it comes to violence regulations per se, and regarding violence within one's own society, a culture with low violence acceptance in general and a strict military and police border for violence execution has existed since the 16th century. Civilian violence should not be a military concern in general. In crises however, the Military Police function also has a role regarding civilian violence directed at military targets.

When conflicts recurringly arise, impossible to be handled because of the agreed violence separation between the military and police spheres, nevertheless, when trying to be understood *within* the defined social and cultural set of constructions, an obvious irregularity develops. It seems inescapable that so-called Irregular Warfare will be understood with difficulty within the current society and political and military paradigm. Such a result means that we are left with few effective ways to address the problem either strategically or tactically. There is vast literature on how violence is constructed and regulated in western society and how victory has become synonymous with military force. In other words, today's military organizational forms and practices, often reflected through the "lens" of different services (army, navy, air force), has helped to legitimatize some common understandings of what war is or should be.

In the west, to put it in another way, there is a common perception in place of what violence is and the forms it should take, with a deeply held set of assumptions about warfare, which continue to exist, and express thought and practice in both western society and its military organization. This is the case, despite the fact that conflicts often include, to some degree, Irregular Warfare. What the term Irregular Warfare challenges is the extent to which violence can be contained and understood within the western military lexicon.

¹⁶³ Kosselleck, *Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik* (1979).

Irregular Warfare can thus challenge us to reconsider how we characterize war and peace, and can lead us to think about both constructions in more creative and imaginative ways. A key issue here is to what extent do our own western biases contribute to the fog of words and thought that seem to surround the term Irregular Warfare. Besides the apparent spaces of experiences and the horizons of expectations, there are obviously forces that come into play, in this case, unhinging an otherwise logically connection. I argue that social structures interpret actions, experiences and expectations, gains and losses and positions in social value structures.

Decisions on horizons of expectations, such as strategy, not only decide outcomes in conflicts, they decide on what forms of violence that resources are directed towards. Such questions effect instant life, death, development or stagnation of different military systems and units, and thus lay the ground for tactical horizons of expectations. Once again, if we look at a summary of how Irregular Warfare can be described in broad terms, the horizons of expectations at the beginning of the 21st century focusing on high technological warfare among states, and the spaces of experiences with legacies of Counterinsurgency from the 50s and 60s, it seems illogical. The empirical generalization can be discussed as follows. As a term, Irregular Warfare implies conflicts whose strategy, operational art and tactics focus on the lower end of the violence spectrum; subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, but can also include more conventional forms of military operations and tactics.

Violence is not restricted to the traditional military practices common to Western nations and states. Violence can take forms from and between non-state actors against a state. These conflicts can include Insurgency strategies, where the political and civilian elements are more important than military concerns and the will and support of the people can be of vital importance. What distinguishes Irregular Warfare can be argued to be the inventive intellectual use of limited physical military resources, parallel with hidden and subversive actions. Drivers are often the endurance and will of the people, extensive local knowledge and use of means hard to detect of organizing and carrying out operations and activities. Terrorism and subversion are key elements with the ability to identify and exploit what is culturally effective against the opponents. This can include criminal and illicit activities that fall outside of what is morally acceptable in Regular Warfare. Irregular Warfare relies on fluid, highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence groupings; ones that are often difficult for conventional military forces to detect, track and neutralize. This summary of an understanding of the traits of so-called Irregular Warfare becomes challenging when *thinking* of tactics.

On the one hand, a social and military paradigm not any longer effective for contemporary conflicts, an unsatisfactory horizon of expectations, and on the other, a diffuse and shallowly researched and limitedly educated space of experiences. The stage for understanding and acting with tactics is new. However, ways to understand and explain phenomena in the world, even the military and political, have dynamics over time. The now widespread discussion of COIN, which did not exist before 2006, is a good example of this. Explanations and understanding related statements can be seen as constructions of words, given a certain meaning. These affect how we perceive the world and thus the knowledge which we consider important.

Conversely, they affect ambient events, sometimes unexpectedly and difficult to explain with applied logic, prevailing explanatory models and designs. How we look at the phenomena, knowledge and explanations create common grounds and values, as well as criticisms and struggles of these approaches among different groups.

In situations of change, the character of power struggles might also develop. One question might be then; what interests and value structures can be identified connecting social structures with particular standpoints? Irregular Warfare can be argued to be understood in relation to the progress of our modern society, with strict borders between military and civilian institutions and functions. Subsequently, different ways of thinking, theorizing and practically handling violence have developed, giving grounds for different understandings, spaces of experience, interpretations and views of horizons of expectations, not to be taken for granted.

In this context, officers still are required to think and apply tactics and the result of the literature analysis reveals different perspectives and aspects, into which understanding of Irregular Warfare can be organized. Broadly summarizing such characteristics, in contrast to Regular Warfare, the result as illustrated in the following table shows an example of generalized principal differences divided into contextual and conceptual perspective.

Perspectives and aspects	Regular Warfare	Irregular Warfare
<u>Contextual perspectives;</u> <i>Mainly actors' aspects</i>	State actors	Non/Sub-state actors
<i>strategy aspects</i>	Military victory, enemy defeat/destruction	Political victory, People's support, enemy exhaustion
<i>Operational art aspects</i>	Joint military operations	Different operational concepts of subversion, guerrilla/terrorist and local/regional forces up to Regular Warfare structures (ground forces)
<i>Rules of Law and Engagement</i>	Follow western society norms, laws and conventions	Do not follow western society norms, laws, conventions or moral ethical standards
<u>Conceptual perspectives;</u> <i>Tactical aspects</i>	Direct approach, to control physical terrain. Overt, uniformed structures and operations, static concepts, separate from civilian functions. Combat focus with larger units operating collectively	Indirect approach, to control people's minds and political ambitions. Overt, covert and clandestine structures and operations, dynamic adaptable and fluid concepts, integrating civilian functions. Intelligence focus with smaller units operating dispersed
<i>Time aspects</i>	Striving for short duration	Accepting protracted war/campaign
<i>Physical aspects</i>	Military strengths, anti-subversive weaknesses	Military weaknesses, subversive strengths
<i>Moral aspects</i>	Exclude the people in fighting structures	Integrate people into fighting and supporting structures

Figure 3. An overview of differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare

This broad description or sketch can be seen as an example of a principal comparison between Regular and Irregular Warfare. The next chapter will now present the interview study of the 43 officers.

4 Contemporary Swedish military thought

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the design, implementation and results of the interviews of the 43 battalion and company commanding officers. Three analysis methods are described with results. The first is a qualitative analysis of a collection of open-ended questions. Secondly, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is presented, regarding the standpoint structure of the space of statements on tactical preferences and thereafter a collection of background factors. Thirdly and finally, a capital and field concept discussion is presented in order to characterize military sociological patterns in relation to the expressed thought. These three analyses end the set of descriptive investigations. Subsequently, a normative analysis follows, where the result of the descriptive standpoint analysis is compared to some contemporary doctrines on tactics in Irregular Warfare, related to Counterinsurgency operations. The chapter ends with a result summary and the answer to the research question.

4.2 The interviews and the empirical material

The collection method of empirical data consisted of interviews¹⁶⁴. The questions were developed from the literature study, to indicate new areas and different ways of thinking about tactical preferences. Aspects such as the following have been included; focus on people or enemy centric approach in COIN, thinking mainly of military or civilian supporting tasks and views on primarily kinetic or non-kinetic effects. A primary focus is on violence such as subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and more traditional infantry style operations, focus on combat or intelligence, use of larger or smaller unit concepts, and capability to carry out overt or low visibility actions. The interviews with 43 officers took place during March 2011 to March 2012 with a duration of often two hours. The interviews were, with few exceptions, performed at the regiments responsible for training and deployment of the land forces and amphibious units. The interviews were voluntarily recorded and full transcriptions were sent out afterwards for verification and correction possibilities to the respondents. The empirical generalization was initially presented and used as a contextual framework. In particular, the results regarding violence areas in Irregular Warfare were used to frame the threat context in which the tactical issues supposedly exist. The questions included open-ended and semi-structured multiple-choice ones, with sixteen background aspect questions,¹⁶⁵ eighteen questions on tactical preferences in the form of standpoints¹⁶⁶ and ten open ended questions on tactics in more general terms¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁴ Appendix 2. The Interview Guide.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 1 (4).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. pp. 1-4 (4).

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 4 (4).

The choice of background factors and categorizations has been made in the light of what can be argued to be commonly used features in military categorizations. Twelve different kinds of background factors have been examined. The following table presents the result of background factor characteristics for the sample.

Background factor	Sum (total)	Background factor	Sum (total)
<i>1. Unit affiliation</i>		<i>7. Military Education</i>	
P4	10	Basic officer course	1
P7	11	Captain course	9
LG	4	Major course before 2007	8
I19	5	Major course after 2007	14
AJB	3	LtCol course before 2007	9
K3	6	LtCol course after 2007	2 (43)
AMF1	4 (43)	<i>8. Civil Education</i>	
<i>2. Unit Type</i>		2-year programme	6
Mechanized	7	3-4 year Technical/Natural sciences programme	14
Mechanized Infantry	11	3-year Social science programme	11
Mechanized Log/Staff	5	3-year Economics programme	9
Motorized Infantry/ Amphibious	8	College/University	3 (43)
Intelligence/Security	4	<i>9. International missions</i>	
Ranger	5	0 missions	6
Armoured	3 (43)	1 mission	12
<i>3. Role 2011</i>		2 missions	13
BnCO	10	3 missions	8
BnCO2	5	4 missions	3
CoyCO	27	4 missions +	1 (6 missions) (43)
CoyCO2	1 (43)	<i>10. Role in missions</i>	
<i>4. Unit background</i>		No mission/role	6
Infantry/Amphibious	9	Mec/Inf Platoon Leader	9
Armoured/Mechanized	15	Mec/Inf Company Commander	13
Mechanized Infantry	5	Staff duty	3
Cavalry/Ranger	9	Others	11 (42)
Logistics	3	<i>11. Experience of mission areas</i>	
Staff	1	No missions	6
Artillery	1 (43)	Afghanistan	5
<i>5. Age</i>		Bosnia	3
30-34	5	Kosovo/Macedonia	7
35-39	19	Liberia	1
40-44	9	Tchad	1
45-48	9 (42)	Two areas – Three areas	14 – 5
<i>6. Rank 2011</i>		<i>12. Combat experience</i>	
LtCol/Maj/Capt.	11/18/14 (43)	Yes/Indirect/No/Unknown	14/2/26/1 (43)

Figure 4. Background factor contents and distribution.

The sample consisted of a social group of males, forty-three officers with a mean age of 40 (39.6) years. The majority (thirty-nine officers), were married or lived with a partner. Thirty-seven officers had at least one child. Only three officers were single without children. The group can generally be described as rather a homogenous social group of middle-aged family men. Regarding civilian education, thirty seven had attended 3 or 4-year secondary school (seventeen in Technical or Natural-sciences programmes and eight in Social science and Economics programmes, respectively). Four had a university degree. Nine had some sort of civilian skills; e.g. engineer, mechanic, athletics coach. The group can be characterized as homogenous in general for civilian education, where social science and technical secondary school programmes dominate, followed by economics and natural sciences programme types.

Secondary school Programme	2-year	3-year	4-year	SUM	College 2 years	University	International education
Technical		4	8	12	2	2 (80 c)	
Natural sciences		5		5			1 (High School)
Social science		12		12		1 (40 c)	
Economics		8		8			
Social	4			4		1 (60 c)	
Construction	1			1			
Aesthetics, music/art	1			1			
SUM	6	29	8	43	2	4	1

Figure 5. Summary of civilian education distribution.

As for military education, eight officers had attended Captain Courses, twenty two Major Courses (of which one officer had been promoted, because of service-related qualifications, not having attended the Major Course) and eleven had attended Staff/Lieutenant Colonel Courses. One captain and one lieutenant colonel had participated in military training in the United States.

Period	Basic Course	Officer Course	Captain Course	Major Course	Lieutenant Colonel course	International education	SUM
2010-12				8	1 (HSU 9-11)		9
2008-10			2	4			6
2006-08			1	7	3	1 (US, General Staff College). 1 (US, Captain course)	11
2004-06				2	3		5
2002-04			2	1	1		4
2000-02	1		1				2
1998-00			1		1		2
Unknown			1		2		3
SUM	1		8	22	11	(2)	42 (2)

Figure 6. Summary of military education distribution.

In conclusion, the sample showed clear differences regarding civilian and military training and education. A lesser part, fifteen officers, had their military training and education from 2008 and onwards; that is during the time when Irregular Warfare was beginning to be discussed more systematically in Swedish officer training. The two categories of command roles thus contained a broad variety of space of experiences and horizons of expectations.

Of particular interest is international experience, where thirty-two officers had been on international assignments, at least on one mission. Of these, nine had participated in two missions, nine in three missions, and four in four missions. One officer had served in six missions. Twenty-one officers, about 50% of the group had experienced at least two international missions. As regards geographical and foreign culture and command role experiences, fifteen officers had served in Afghanistan, of which five as commanders for the Mechanized Infantry Company during one mission. One officer had served twice as the commanding officer for the Mechanized Infantry Company. Fifteen officers had served in Bosnia and twenty-two in Kosovo/Macedonia. Five officers had served in Liberia/Sierra Leone.

True to Swedish requirements, the sample is characterized as containing relatively extensive international missions and geographical and cultural experience in general. Geographical mission experiences for the sample in all covered eight missions in Afghanistan, seven in Liberia, ten in Bosnia and twelve in Kosovo/Macedonia. Regarding command role experiences, nine had served as platoon leaders. Four of them claimed combat experience. Twelve had served as company commanding officers. Two of these had served twice as company commander and two as company commander on three missions. Six of them claimed combat experience. In summary, a smaller part of the sample had experiences of company command, even fewer claiming combat experience.

The results reveal a variation of content, regarding participation in international missions, where geographic and cultural spaces of experience are argued to dominate, compared to actual performance of command (and command in combat). This leaves a certain possible span of horizons of expectations of tactics in Irregular Warfare, leaning more towards theoretical thought and limited experiences. A question then rises; if and how tactical thinking is read and communicated. Here, all officers stated an interest in reading books and magazines in general. However, only sixteen considered themselves to read extensively. Fifteen considered themselves to have limited interest. Regarding topics, fifteen officers prioritized military history, six claimed to read much military history and two primarily concerning Swedish military history. Only two officers mentioned reading The Swedish Armed Forces Magazines and the Royal Military Academy journals. Thirty-four officers stated that they did not spend any time or interest at all in writing. Only three claimed spending a lot of time writing; two on book projects and one wrote a diary continuously, concerning service and military matters. Five officers indicated that they wrote articles and diaries to a limited extent.

The sample can be characterized as containing practising and action-oriented officers, seldom communicating their thinking by writing. Irregular Warfare has been a subject in their education only for a smaller part. This result means that a standpoint analysis approach regarding thought on a minor experienced area concerns mental constructions originating from a diversity of influences. The result shows an example of span in contents regarding properties, even within a rather demarcated sample such as battalion and company commanders. This sample might be considered uniformly composed and probably expected to be quite coherent in thought and preferences of tactics. After all, the military system is built on the principle of coherence in structure, thinking and acting. The next section, presenting the results from the methodological approach gives another picture, however. The approach entails a search for differences, first with an analysis of a set of open-ended questions, then to the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) of closed questions, generating clear differences and groupings of standpoints. First is however, the view of tactics in general presented from the open-ended questions.

4.3 Framing tactical thought in general.

Introduction

As a base and setting for the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) of differences, the results of a set of open questions have been used.¹⁶⁸ Eleven questions were framed using two broader questions; *how can the officer's general reflections on tactics be characterized* and; *how can the officer's general reflections of tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized?* This section describes and discusses the results and finalizes with conclusions for the following correspondence analysis.

The questions providing the data.

Results from eleven questions were used, organized in two groups corresponding to each of the two questions above. Questions used for the first group are marked (1), and for the second group (2).

1. What does the concept of tactics means to you? (Question 6 – (1))
2. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general? (Question 7-(1))
3. What has influenced you to think of tactics? (Question 13-(1))
4. What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking? (Question 15-(1))
5. How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art? (Question 14-(1))
6. Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers? (Question 11-(1))
7. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare? (Question 8-(2))
8. Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare? (Question 4.12-(2))

¹⁶⁸Appendix 3. Results from the open-ended questions.

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9. What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you think of mostly in connection with Irregular Warfare tactics? Physical, conceptual or moral aspects? (Question 9-(2))
 10. Do you consider there is a need for the development of tactics for Irregular Warfare in the Armed Forces? (Question 12-(2))
 11. Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the Armed Forces? (Question 10-(2))

The results regarding thought on tactics in general and in Irregular Warfare

The first question; *How can the officers' general reflections on tactics be characterized?* is answered by the following summary.¹⁶⁹ The meaning of tactics in general can be described as a two-fold answer. One group, almost half of the sample, viewed tactics generally as the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal. The second group, 15 responses, described aspects more related to ways of thinking in general. Reflection on principal influences for preferences can be described in three different ways; a Regular Warfare tradition that dominates (over half of the sample), a more generic and wider analytical approach, and finally, a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics focus. Influences on tactical thinking can be described as connected to five areas; combinations of influences, education and school activities, literature and gaming, personal experiences, personal influences, such as senior officers and colleagues, and exercise activities. The three last categories all connect to direct or indirect practice. Compared to the areas of strategy and operational art, the interest for tactics is prominent. However, communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed tradition. Finally, opinions of development influences on tactics and tactical thinking are scattered. Most common aspects concerned experiences and influences from past wars, though only eight replies each. Areas such as education and exercises were only mentioned by four and five officers respectively.

The second question; *How can the officer's general reflections on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized?* is answered as follows. Personal views in general of tactics in Irregular Warfare were mostly expressed referring to conceptual aspects, including capability and functional aspects, for example, intelligence. Broader aspects such as military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set were however highlighted to a lesser extent. Many of the articulations corresponded to general COIN standards in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed more traditional mind-sets, emphasizing Regular Warfare capabilities. Dominance in thinking can however be related to a view of new or other demands in command & control and functional thinking, for example, intelligence, psychological operations and Electronic Warfare. As for war-fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and moral factors), moral and conceptual factors were the most common mentioned. Thinking of physical factors was not a highlighted area.

¹⁶⁹ Appendix 3. Results of open questions, results summary of the two frame questions, p. 17.

The whole area of tactics in Irregular Warfare is mainly thought of to have a low priority in the Swedish Armed Forces, however, a rather common view does exist that development of such tactics is needed and important.

Conceptual and Contextual thinking perspectives – A Discussion of the result

The overall result of the open questions reveal battalion and company commanding officers' collective and diversified articulations of tactics in general, as well as on tactics in Irregular Warfare. Two main views exist on tactics per se, either as a label for the practical use of units for a specific goal, or as a label for methods to solve military problems, giving different approaches to discussing tactics. In combination with the dominant Regular Warfare influence, as a more generic and wider analytical approach, or a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective, different approaches might evolve when discussing and communicating the subject. Opinions on primary influences on tactical thinking concerned several different areas, which is why the possible discourse is growing.

A unifying view can nonetheless be noticed regarding the stated importance of practical experiences and exercises. However, if opportunities for practice of command decline, different views might evolve around other unifying aspects. A clear interest even so, is a common message regarding tactics compared to that of strategy and operational art. If however this is not communicated to any substantial part as indicated, tactical thinking development risks degradation. Views on how important development influences tactics and thinking, relating to experiences and influences from past wars, support an opinion of the importance of real life practice, also in a larger context. The few opinions on influences for development of tactics and tactical thinking regarding education support the above opinion. In summary, different opinions exist concerning understanding of the subject of tactics per se, doubtless with a main influence from the long tradition of Regular Warfare tactics. Turning to the more demarcated area of tactics in Irregular Warfare, it is mainly seen as a lower prioritized area of tactics. General expressions concern conceptual aspects including capability and functional area aspects, for example, intelligence. This indicates a traditional Regular Warfare mind-set, mentioned above. The more limited highlighting of broader aspects, such as military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set, supports this view.

However, indications are also clear about the existence of several, if not coherent, views that correspond to current COIN thinking. One such example is the emphasis on thinking related to new or other demands in command and function areas, such as Intelligence, Psychological Operation (PSYOPS) and Electronic Warfare (EW). As for thinking about conceptual solutions, contextual thinking intermingles and it is not possible to demarcate strictly. An apparent focus on moral aspects in Irregular Warfare contexts puts several demands on unit concepts with capabilities other than in Regular Warfare. One such example is intelligence analysis, aiming for targeting precision and hidden enemy identifications.

A rather common view is that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is needed and important. If, however tactics in general is seldom discussed, as stated earlier, challenges arise regarding how to realize such development. The results indicate a limited coherent space of tactical thought, often with articulations that concern conceptual thinking, just about possible to distinguish from intermingling contextually thinking. Seeking differences and structures of differences with the use of characteristics such as context and concepts for tactics in Irregular Warfare, has therefore been viewed as possible perspectives for the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), to which we now turn.

4.4 The space of standpoints – a generalized model of tactical types

Introduction

This section answers the question; *“How can standpoints of tactical thought be characterized?”* and describes the result of the standpoint distribution. The aim is to describe and characterize structures of tactical standpoints making it possible to construct a generic model of a space of statements. The result is discussed and the section closes with a summary and introduces the next section dealing with the question *“How can social aspects such as background factors be characterized in the space of statements?”* The presented interpretations are results from the work with Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Data has been used initially from the following eighteen questions with closed alternative answers.¹⁷⁰

- 3.5 Priority on military focus as offensive or defensive
- 3.6 Priority on People Centric or Enemy Centric focus in COIN
- 3.7 Focus on larger or smaller units
- 3.8 Focus on combat or reconnaissance/intelligence
- 3.9 Priority on national or international war fighting capability
- 3:10 Focus on commanding their own troops in operations or training Host Nation Forces
- 3.11 Priority on command/developing tactics for larger or smaller units
- 3:12 Perceive themselves foremost as a field/front officer or a staff officer
- 4.1 Focus on type of violence in Irregular Warfare (IW)
- 4.2 Focus on collective or distributed operations in Irregular Warfare (IW)
- 4.3 Priority on capability in Regular Warfare (RW) or Irregular Warfare (IW) or equal; Hybrid Warfare (HW) capabilities
- 4.4 Views on the need for specialization of units
- 4.5 Thinking about tactics often or seldom
- 4.6 Thinking about tactics as theory or practice or a combination
- 4.8 Focus on open or low visibility operations
- 4.9 Focus on the troops or technology
- 4:10 Focus on military or civilian tasks
- 4:11 Focus on kinetic or non-kinetic effects

¹⁷⁰Appendix 2. The Interview Guide.

Fifteen of these questions were chosen for further analysis, so-called active variables¹⁷¹. The following questions were not chosen due to the dominance in one answer alternative; 3.5 Offensive or defensive focus (34 officers stated an offensive focus), 3.10 Commanding own units or training others focus (33 officers stated a focus on commanding own units rather than training the host nations' security forces), and question 4.4 Conceptual focus for Irregular Warfare regarding organization structures (39 officers stated a focus on Task Force structures rather than traditional standard battalion structures). This result supports a generalization of a rather uniformly offensive focus. The officers would rather command own units before training others and work preferably with task force structures adapted for Counterinsurgency operations instead of using standard Regular Warfare organized battalion concepts.

The chosen fifteen questions were then analysed using forty-one answer alternatives, all responded to by more than five officers. The next step was to choose numbers of axes for interpretation of structural character of the space of statements. Results according to the charts below were obtained from the MCA for the first ten axes regarding specific modified values, rates and accumulated modified rates.¹⁷²

Control panel of Eigenvalues							
Trace of matrix: 1.78450							
Number	Eigenvalue	Percentage	Cumulated Percentage	Specific modified Values	Specific modified Rates	Cumulated Modified Rates	Means of Eigenvalues
1	0,2147	12,03	12,03	0,02894	0,330782	0,330782	0,044613
2	0,1786	10,01	22,04	0,017952	0,205192	0,535974	
3	0,1646	9,22	31,26	0,014386	0,164428	0,700402	
4	0,1386	7,77	39,03	0,00884	0,101041	0,801443	
5	0,1166	6,53	45,56	0,00518	0,059212	0,860655	
6	0,1044	5,85	51,42	0,003575	0,040861	0,901516	
7	0,0973	5,46	56,87	0,002781	0,031788	0,933304	
8	0,0907	5,08	61,95	0,00212	0,024237	0,957541	
9	0,0834	4,67	66,62	0,001504	0,017188	0,974729	
10	0,0761	4,27	70,89	0,000994	0,011367	0,986096	

Figure 7. Axis 1-10, Eigenvalue results from MCA calculations.

¹⁷¹ Appendix 4. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities (answer alternatives).

¹⁷² Appendix 5. Table 2 Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 modalities.




Figure 8. Graph of Specific Modified Rates for axis 1 – 16.

The results show a dominating role for axis 1 with 33% of specific modified rates, followed by axis 2 with 20%, axis 3 with 16%, and axis 4 with 10%. As two dimensions, (represented by axes) are most easy to pedagogically work with and graphically present, a more clear break is preferred to be obtained. However, the data does not show such a clear break as axis 3 is rather close to axis 2, and axis 4 rather near axis 5. This result has motivated a main analysis of axis 1 and 2, but also a discussion of axis 3 and 4. The aim has been to finally interpret two axes or perspectives.

In the following part, the results of the distribution of questions are presented for axis 1-4. Contributions of active categories with, or beyond, the mean value of 2, 44 (100/41 categories) have been used as the criterion for choosing categories to be analysed. Data regarding modality contribution and axes coordinates refer to results from specific MCA calculations.¹⁷³ For each axis the mean value contribution of the chosen modalities has been calculated as an indication of contribution value.

¹⁷³ Appendix 6. Table 3. Coordinates of active categories/modalities on axis 1-4.
Appendix 7. Table 4. Contribution of active categories/modalities on axis 1-4.

Axes results regarding standpoint distributions

AXIS 1 results

Active categories/modalities	Relative Weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 1 coordinate +	Axis 1 contribution
4.2 Collective operations focus	2,326	1,86667	1,09	12,80
3.7 Larger units focus	2,481	1,68750	1,04	12,60
3.8 Combat focus	2,946	1,26316	0,76	7,86
4.9 Troop and technical focus	1,705	2,90909	0,90	6,50
3.11 Command and develop larger units	3,566	0,86957	0,50	4,17
3.6 People centric focus	1,395	3,77778	0,70	3,22
coordinate -				
4.2 Distributed operations focus	2,791	1,38889	-0,76	7,60
3.7 Larger and smaller units focus	2,171	2,07143	-0,75	5,76
3.11 Command or develop smaller units	1,550	3,30000	-0,75	4,10
3.8 Combat and reconnaissance focus	0,775	7, 60000	-1, 01	3, 71
3.12 Front or staff officer self-image	1,240	4, 37500	-0, 72	3, 01
3.6 Enemy centric focus	2,481	1,68750	-0,51	2,99
3.8 Reconnaissance focus	2,636	1, 52941	-0, 47	2, 69
3.9 National or international focus	1,395	3,77778	-0,63	2,54
3.7 Smaller units focus	2,016	2,30769	-0,47	2,09
Active categories; 15 Mean value Contribution = $100/15 = 6.67$				

Figure 9. Axis 1. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories.

The results show that standpoints regarding collective or distributed operations focus on unit size and combat focus, all clearly position on the first axis. These modalities are all beyond the mean value. Focus on commanding or developing larger or smaller units is below the mean value but at a clear distance from each other and thus interesting.

The position of combat and reconnaissance focus, and solely reconnaissance focus in relation to the combat focus position is also interesting, and clearly contributes to an interpretation that the first axis describes conceptual thinking of two rather different kinds. Traditionally Big War or Regular Warfare thinking is on the right side, and on the left; a kind of tactical thinking promoting only or blended Small War thinking, where the intelligence function and capability are highlighted as important.




Figure 10. Distribution of the answer categories used for interpretation of axis 1.

Axis 1 is therefore labelled "*Conceptual thinking*" with tactics for larger combat focused units to the right, and for larger and smaller units (also with an indication of a smaller unit focus) with combined combat and reconnaissance focus to the left side. On that side upper part, an indication exists for solely reconnaissance focused units. The result and labelling is considered strong and easily recognizable with traditional military logic.

AXIS 2 results

Active categories	Relative Weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 2 + coord	Axis 2 contrib
4.8 Low visible activities	1,240	4,37500	1,30	11,77
4.11 Kinetic effects	1,550	3,30000	0,95	7,82
3.6 People centric	1,395	3,77778	0,90	6,37
3.11 Command or develop smaller units	1,550	3,30000	0,76	4,97
4.10 Military task focus	3,876	0,72000	0,43	3,95
4.9 Troop focus	3,566	0,86957	0,37	2,79
Axis 2 - cord				
4.1 Combination of lower threats	0,930	6,16667	-1,34	9,34
4.5 Thinking equal	0,930	6,16667	-1,19	7,39
4.9 Troop & technical focus	1,705	2,90909	-0,78	5,81
4.10 Military and civil task focus	1,550	3,30000	-0,75	4,94
3.12 Front and staff officer Self-image	1,240	4, 37500	-0, 82	4, 63
3.11 Command or develop larger and small units	1,395	3,77778	-0,71	3,91
4.11 Non-kinetic effects	1,240	4,37500	-0,72	3,58
4.8 Overt and low visibility activity focus	3,411	0,95455	-0,42	3,35
3.6 Enemy centric focus	2,481	1,68750	-0,48	3,20
Active categories=15 Mean value contribution = 100/15=6,67				

Figure 11. Axis 2. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories.

The results for axis 2 show a significant contribution to the side of axis 2, consisting of focus on combinations of lower threats (subversion and terrorism) regarding question 4.1. Combined with a mixed focus on military and civilian tasks (question 4.10) and focus on non-kinetic effects (question 4.11), it seems logical to view these aspects as parts of contextual thinking. The main opposite contextual thinking (at the + side of axis 2) is then constituted of a clear focus on kinetic effects, which is a doxa in Regular Warfare contexts. Also the results of question 4.10, the category of military task focus, support such an interpretation of contextual thinking and according to Regular Warfare thinking.




Figure 12. Distribution of the answer categories used for interpretation of axis 2.

Axis 2 is thus labelled “*Contextual thinking*” with tactics for military tasks with kinetic approaches on the + side. This side might be said to represent a Regular Warfare contextual thinking. The – (minus) side of axis 2 is interpreted as representing a broader contextual framing, with thinking in a combination of military and civilian tasks and an approach of non-kinetic effects. Such contextual thinking is prominent in descriptions of so-called Hybrid Warfare, as described in the literature study. The result is partly less obvious to interpret, compared to axis 1, still argued to be easily recognizable as having traditional military logic.

With this interpretation result for structuring aspects in two dimensions of the space of statements for axis 1 and 2, the results of axis 3 and 4 are now to be discussed.

‘AXIS 3 results

Active categories	Relative Weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 3 + coord	Axis 3 contrib
4. 5 Thinking equal/ often/ seldom on tactics	0,930	6,16667	1,35	10,29
4.8 Overt activities focus	1,860	2,58333	0,63	4,48
4.11 Kinetic effects	1,550	3,30000	0,60	3,42
4.1 Combinations of lower threats focus	0,930	6,16667	0,77	3,36
3.9 National and international focus	1,395	3,77778	0,63	3,34
4.10 Military tasks focus	3,876	0,72000	0,38	3,32
4.9 Troop & technical focus	1,705	2,90909	0,52	2,75
3.8 Reconnaissance focus	2,636	1, 52941	0, 39	2, 38
Axis 3 coord -				
4.9 Technics focus	1,085	5,14286	-1,51	15,11
4.2 Collective and distributed operation focus	1,085	5,14286	-1,22	9,78
3.8 Combat and reconnaissance focus	0,775	7,60000	-1,22	6,99
4.11 Kinetic and non-kinetic effects focus	3,721	0,79167	-0,39	3,49
4.10 Civil tasks focus	1,085	5,14286	-0,72	3,38
4.1 Guerrilla Warfare focus	3,256	1,04762	-0,38	2,86
4.8 Overt and low visible activity focus	3,411	0,95455	-0,36	2,64
Active categories=15 Mean contribution = 100/15=6,67				

Figure 13. Axis 3. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories.

The results for axis 3 are less easy to be given clear logic. The three categories beyond the mean value on the – (minus) side can however, be viewed as thinking commonly when it comes to Irregular or Hybrid Warfare contexts. Also the civilian task focus and Guerrilla Warfare focus on this side supports such an interpretation. In order to get a corresponding match on the + (plus) side of the axis, question 4.11 and 4.10 can be used (below the mean values but with clear distances). The strongest contribution to this axis is the technical focus on the – (minus) side, however minimally contrasted on the + (plus) side. In all, it is difficult to interpret and apply specific logic, which is not already found in axis 1 or 2; a possibility does exist to view this axis as contextual thinking. With such an interpretation, this axis does not contribute to any new knowledge compared to the interpretation of axis 2.

Finally a view of axis 4, aiming to examine if any new aspects can be identified other than those which have been interpreted for the previous axes.

AXIS 4 results

Active categories	Relative weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 4 coord +	Axis 4 contrib
3.7 Large and small units focus	2,171	2,07143	0,68	7,17
4.3 Regular Warfare focus	4,341	0,53571	0,45	6,46
3.9 National focus	4,496	0,48276	0,40	5,28
4.11 Kinetic effects focus	1,550	3,30000	0,63	4,42
			Axis 4 coord –	
3.9 National and international focus	1,395	3,77778	-1,22	14,90
3.7 Small units focus	2,016	2,30769	-0,95	13,20
4.3 Regular and Irregular Warfare focus	1,860	2,58333	-0,90	10,86
4.1 Combinations of high threats focus	1,395	3,77778	-0,77	5,91
4.11 Kinetic and non-kinetic Effects focus	3,721	0,79167	-0,40	4,28
3.6 People centric focus	1,395	3,77778	-0,55	3,00
4.8 Low visible activities focus	1,240	4,37500	-0,56	2,79
4.2 Distributed operations focus	2,791	1,38889	-0,77	2,58
Active categories = 12 Mean value = 100/12= 8,33				

Figure 14. Axis 4. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories.

Axis 4 provides three clear categories beyond the mean value on the – (minus) side. 3.9 and 4.11 are easy to connect to contextual thinking on Irregular or Hybrid Warfare. 4.11 support such a view on the contrary to 4.1 category; “combinations of high threats”. The main contributor on the + (plus) side; a focus equal on large and small units, connects to conceptual thinking. However, the remaining three categories on the + side are more easy to relate to contextual thinking. The categories in total can be seen as combining both conceptual and contextual thinking as strategic thinking with a focus on Regular Warfare and national strategy thinking on the axis + (plus) side. On the – (minus) side a strong identifiable international Hybrid Warfare context (parallel existence of Regular and Irregular Warfare in an operational and tactical context) can be interpreted.

The result and labelling are considered geometrically strong and comprehensive, also recognizable with traditional military logic. Still, axis 4 contributes less to the structure of the space of statements compared to the contributions of axis 1, 2 and 3. The result is nonetheless regarded as similar to the axis 2 interpretation and does not present any new indications.

The Axes and their interpreted perspectives and content

Axis 1 dominates with 33% of specific modified rates. Axis 2 comes second with 20% and axis 3 with 16%. Together, they stand for almost 70% of explanations. The perspectives *Conceptual thinking* (axis 1) and *Contextual thinking* (axis 2) are however, seen as the major analytical and pedagogical tools for interpretation and construction of the space of statements. Axis 3, and even more so, axis 4 results are argued to be possible to be interpreted similarly to the interpretation of axis 2. From this result, two dimensions or perspectives are considered to structure the space of statements of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare. The space of statements is therefore considered to be structured in two dimensions by axis 1 and 2. A summary of axes labels on perspectives and generalized aspects content is outlined in the figure below.

Axis	Aspects content - (left/lower) position	Aspects content + (right/upper) position	Thought perspective label
1.	Large and Small units Combat and reconnaissance Reconnaissance Distributed operations.	Large units Combat Collective operations	<i>Conceptual thinking</i>
2.	Military and civil tasks. Non-kinetic effects	Military tasks Kinetic effects	<i>Contextual thinking</i>

Figure 15. Summary chart of axes content and thought perspective label.

With the two dimensional structure of the space of tactical thinking in place, the next step was to characterize the four segments, making clear and logical descriptions possible. Choices of focus for seeking certain logic can be several. Descriptions are pedagogically labelled in order to make sense of the whole model of tactical thought. Subsequently, the analysis continues on a higher abstraction level in order to give life to the model.

One particular set of characteristics that struck me, regarding combinations of contextual thoughts, concerned military and/or civilian task focus, and focus on kinetic and/or non-kinetic effects. Today, the common use of defining and understanding warfare as either Regular, or Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, felt obvious for such labelling (shortened as “RW” and “IW/HW”) for the perspective of contextual thought in axis 2. As for clustering in axis 1, it became obvious for me to label different tactical thought connected to unit types such as “Infantry”, “Mechanized” and “Ranger”.

Such unit types have been designed for high specialization; either mobile combat in larger formations with combat focus (Mechanized), or for more stationary mixed tasks (Infantry), or for distributed or dispersed operations in smaller sections for intelligence or assaults (Rangers) deep in enemy or unfriendly areas.

Such characterization and understanding is common all over the western world, also in Sweden.¹⁷⁴ Later during my work, reflections were made regarding alternative labelling, for example, connected to operational definitions such as Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement and Counterinsurgency Operations. Such labels are however, not viewed as equally traditional, meaningful or precise, when it comes to pedagogically appreciating and comparing them to the very familiar common understanding of “Infantry” as foot soldiers, “Rangers” as Guerrilla Warfare soldiers, and “Mechanized” as different kinds of tanks or armoured vehicle units. The initial choice of labels did not therefore change during the work.

The following observations can be made, viewing the graph on the next page, consisting of four quarters. The first quarter counting clock-wise, contains thoughts on small as well as on small and larger unit structures, primarily with a conceptual reconnaissance focus. Contextually, a focus on kinetic effects and mainly military tasks dominates. This type of tactical thought is labelled **“Regular Warfare Ranger Tactics”**.

The second quarter contains the same contextual thoughts as in quarter 1, but conceptually, they are thoughts on larger units operating collectively and with combat focus dominating. The label chosen is **“Regular Warfare Mechanized Tactics”**, here understood as including Mechanized Infantry Tactics. In the third quarter, conceptually the same features as in quarter 1 can be observed, however, with a more equal focus on combat and reconnaissance, as on a combination of smaller and larger units. Contextually, thoughts of a broader military and civilian task focus and non-kinetic effects dominate. This combination is labelled **“Hybrid Warfare Infantry Tactics”**. Finally, the fourth quarter differs mostly from quarter 2, regarding the contextual thinking, focusing more on Hybrid Warfare thinking. The chosen label for such a generic tactical type is therefore **“Hybrid Warfare Mechanized Tactics”**.

¹⁷⁴ For a Swedish normative example, see *Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3* [Field Manual for Land Forces Operations] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), pp. 81-82. and for a more historical view; Lars Ericson Wolke, *Krigets Idéer* (Stockholm: Medströms Bokförlag, 2007), pp. 180-185: regarding Small Wars and Ranger traditions in Sweden at the beginning of 1492, and pp. 344-350. regarding thoughts on Infantry, Cavalry and Mechanized tactics.

The result in the form of a model of the distribution of standpoints

Standpoints of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare are suggested to be characterized as a space of statements in the form of a model. The space of statements is argued to be mainly structured in two dimensions by a conceptual thinking perspective and a contextual thinking perspective. The model with the two perspectives and main content is shown in the figure below.




Figure 16. The model of the space of statements structured by axis 1 & 2.

It is possible to label the content in the model according to commonly known military unit names, each in relation to a context character. This results in the four tactical types; Ranger tactics in a Regular Warfare context, Mechanized tactics in Regular Warfare, Infantry tactics in Hybrid Warfare and finally Mechanized tactics in Hybrid Warfare. This division is to be seen in principal because overlapping exists and strict boundaries can be discussed.

The result was presented to Ms Brigitte LeRoux¹⁷⁵ during a seminar at the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) on 28 January 2013. The MCA result was viewed as strong. The seminar was a co-arrangement between Uppsala University SEC¹⁷⁶ and SNDC.

Discussion on differences in the tactical model

The labelling of tactical types with traditional military unit labels indicates differences. In order to explain some principal differences in broad terms, the so-called basic capabilities have been used.¹⁷⁷ They consist of; *Command and Control*, *Intelligence/Information*, *Protection*, *Sustainability*, *Mobility* and *Effects on targets*. Requirements of these capabilities are argued to be militarily usually viewed differently, depending on what contexts and concepts are being discussed. This is supported by the existence of doctrines and field manuals for different units and different contexts. In order to give an overview of a way to outline principal differences of the four tactical types, the figure on the next page has been made. The summarized characteristics draw from my own understanding and experience of studies of warfare and war fighting capabilities. The characteristics are to be seen as indicators of broad directions.

¹⁷⁵ Brigitte LeRoux is Maitre de Conférences at the Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées (MAP 5), CNRS (the French National Centre for Scientific Research) Université Paris Decartes and associated researcher at the political research centre of Science-Po Paris (CEVIPOF/CNRS). She is a world leading expert in GDA and has contributed to numerous theoretical research works and full-scale empirical studies involving GDA. She has been Doctor Honoris Causa at Uppsala University since 2013, as recognition of her work, including substantial support to the development of sociological research at Uppsala University.

¹⁷⁶ SEC, *Sociology of Education and Culture* is a research unit with numerous disciplines within the social sciences and humanities. It is affiliated with several departments, primarily at Uppsala University. SEC is a node in Scandinavia for research in the vein of certain French traditions founded by Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Paul Benzécri and others. The research areas include studies on cultural fields, history of education, formation of elites, students' trajectories, and transnational transformations of the educational and cultural fields. There is also methodologically oriented work on geometric data analysis and prosopographical methods. Important research tools are concepts such as capital and field. Prosopographical methods and geometric data analyses are frequently used. Historical perspectives are crucial.

<http://www.skeptron.uu.se/broad/SEC/>

¹⁷⁷ *Reglemente för Markoperationer*, (RMO), remiss 3 (2009), pp. 59-61.

Basic capability	Character in RW Ranger tactics	Character in RW Mechanized tactics	Character in HW Infantry tactics	Character in HW Mechanized tactics
Command and Control	Smaller relatively stationary structures independently operating deeply in enemy controlled areas for extended periods	Larger mobile structures operating frontally against the opponent with manoeuvre warfare	Mainly smaller units operating both on enemy targets and with civilians, often in urban environments	Larger or smaller mobile structures operating frontally against the opponent with manoeuvre warfare and protecting the people
Intelligence/ Information	Extensive needs, before and during operations	Lesser needs other than own combat Intelligence	Extensive needs, before and during operations both on military and civilian conditions	Extensive needs, before and during operations both on military and civilian conditions
Sustainability	High with own resources	Low with own resources	Medium with own resources	Low with own resources
Mobility	Low after infiltration	High	Limitations due to IED threats	Limitations due to IED threats
Protection	Low (physically)	High	Low	Higher
Effects on targets	Long range recce, hit and run attacks, sabotage, Guerrilla Warfare	Symmetrical fires in order to destroy enemy resources	Patrols amongst the people (COIN tactics) and attack/ defence against military threats	Operating with Mechanized. Infantry supported with fires if needed

Figure 17. Examples of basic capabilities and characteristics for the four tactical types.

Despite being outlined with limited precision and with uniqueness in every situation and leadership, differences of this kind are argued to be of interest in relation to areas such as; unit training, organization, functional structures, personnel skill requirements, exercise character, coordination and planning need. Differences in tactical thinking, thought and preferences might develop in several directions, sometimes regarding financial needs. With this result of standpoints characterized as a four-fold model of a space of thought, the next section will deal with an analysis of the distribution of background factors.

4.5 Background factor structures in the model – Structuring indications discussed with capital and field concepts.

Introduction

This section answers the question; *“How can sociologic aspects such as background factors be characterized in the space of statements?”* The Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) result is presented and discussed and the results are then interpreted in capital terms with possible field characteristics.

The following twelve background factors were analysed; unit affiliation, unit type, command role 2011, unit background, age, rank, military education, civilian education, international mission experience (geographical, role, number of missions and combat experience). The analysis was done concerning the first two axes as the main structuring axes of the space of statements. The MCA work will now be presented including graphs. The analysis is divided into three parts containing the following background aspects, respectively; 1. *Unit affiliation, unit type, military backgrounds and role.* 2. *Age, rank, military and civil education,* and 3. *International missions. roles, numbers, geographical experiences and combat experience.*

The section closes with an introduction of the next section which presents a comparison of the space of statements with a collection of normative texts on tactics in Counterinsurgency operations.

Background factors; Unit Affiliation, Unit Types, Backgrounds and Roles 2011

Unit affiliation relates to the regiments P4, P7, Livgardet, Jäger Battalion, K3 and the amphibious regiment. Unit type refers to; Ranger, Infantry or Amphibious (Inf/Amf), Mechanized (Mec), Mechanized Infantry (MecInf) or Staff/Logistics. Unit Background relates to units such as; Mechanized (Mec), Mechanized Infantry (MecInf), Infantry (motorized) or Amphibious or Ranger (including Intelligence and Security units). Command roles 2011 refers to serving as battalion or company commanding officers (BnCO and CoyCO). The distribution result is shown in the graph.




Figure 18. Distribution graph 1; Unit affiliation, types, background and role 2011.

Unit affiliation (regiments, marked in *italics*) shows clear distribution on both axes. Affiliation of the regiment I 19 on the right side on axis 1, in clear contrast with affiliation of the regiment K3 with the Jäger Battalion on the left side of axis 1, all in the upper part of axis 2. The regiment Livgardet positions on the left side on axis 1, in the lower part of axis 2. These centrally close positions show more diffuse positioning and less unified tactical thinking. The Amphibious regiment positions on the right side of axis 1, in the upper part of axis 2. The regiment K3 and the Jäger Battalion, with typical Ranger and small unit profiles position in the first quarter. The regiment Livgardet, with a tradition of urban warfare and close civilian cooperation, positions in the third quarter. Finally, the regiment I 19, with a longstanding armoured tradition, is also logically to be found on the right side of axis 1.

The distribution of the factor *Unit type* shows a pattern where ranger background is found in the first quarter, infantry/amphibious; in the fourth. Mechanized infantry are in the third quarter and finally, the main body of mechanized background with a slight trend towards the second quarter.

Unit affiliation corresponds to the positions of *Unit background*, with rangers in quadrant 1 and mechanized background centred close to P4 and P7. Unit backgrounds such as infantry/amphibious are positioned close to the mechanized regiments in the middle and south of Sweden, but corresponding to a lesser degree in relation to the unit affiliation of the Amphibious Regiment and I 19. Regarding positions for battalion or company command during 2011, a minor but observable difference can be observed.

The Role of Battalion commanders is found slightly in the upper part of axis 2 and on the left side of axis 1. The main body of the Company commanders is however positioned axis 1-centric but somewhat in the lower part of axis 2.

In summary, we can see that the background aspect of *Unit affiliation* distributes clearly in the space of statements. *Unit type and background* also distribute significantly, however, partly corresponding to unit affiliation as well. Distribution of *Role 2011* shows a slight difference. Battalion commanders are positioned upward axis 2 and to the left of axis 1, in contrast to Company commanders who show a position more axis centric, giving no particular position trend according to the quarters. In total, the distribution of military experiences and possible traditions supports the labelling of the model. Obviously, practice influences more than education, the next area to be examined.

Background Factors Age, Rank, Military Schools and Civil Education

The factor of *Age* has four categories; 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-50 years. *Rank* can be either lieutenant colonel (LtCol), major (Maj) or captain (Capt.). *Military education* relates to basic officer education and the Captain Course (Capt. Course), the major course (Maj course) or the highest education level; the 2-year Lieutenant Colonel course (LtCol course). Finally, the category *civil education* has the categories; two-year programme secondary school, three or four-year Natural sciences or Technical programme, three-year Social sciences programme, three-year Economics programme, and university studies with degrees.




Figure 19. Distribution graph 2; Age, Rank, Military and Civil Education.

The background factor of *Age*, distributes mostly on both sides of axis 1. Here we find the age category of 40-44 years on the right side. Other categories (most clearly 45-50 years, less clearly 35-39 years) are positioned on the left side of axis 1. The age category 30-34 years differs from the others with a position trend of axis 1-centric but at the lower side of axis 2. Regarding *Rank* we can observe a minor, but identifiable distribution of Lt Col rank on the right side of axis 1, and Major rank quite axis-centric with a certain trend towards the lower sides of axis 2.

These positions follow the previous results regarding *Role* distribution trends. The distribution of *Military school/education* follows the rank distribution in general, regarding the level of LtCol, axis 2-centric but on the left side of axis 1.

Major rank and education distribute to a lesser degree but observably on the right of axis 1. Captain course and Captain rank positions are observable differently on both sides of axis 2 and axis 1, however, the distance is small.

Civilian education shows a distribution where 2-year programmes are found at the lower sides of axis 2. 3-4 year Natural/Technical programmes are rather axis-centric and therefore it is not possible to indicate any stronger positions in the space of statements. However, we can indicate a position in the second quarter for university education and 3-year Economics programmes.

Finally, in the 3rd quarter, on the left side of axis 1, the 3-year Social sciences programme position. We can thus identify a position difference regarding civilian education, clearer than that of military education and rank distribution. In summary; the background factor of *Age* distributes mainly over axis 1. *Rank and military education/school* shows a limited distribution result. *Civilian education* shows clear distribution signs in the space of statements, regarding social sciences versus economics programmes.

Background factors International Missions; Roles, Numbers, Geographical Experiences and Combat Experience

Roles in international missions are either as platoon leader for mechanized or infantry units or as company commander for mechanized or infantry units or as staff/intelligence/ other roles (Staff/Intel/other). Numbers of missions participated in were none, one, two or three (or more). Geographical experiences are categorised as; no mission, Kosovo, Kosovo and/or Macedonia, Bosnia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Africa, Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Macedonia. Finally, combat experience is categorised as; participated in some sort of combat, having indirect experience, for example, commanding a unit in combat from a distant place, or not having any kind of combat experience.




Figure 20. Distribution graph 3; Missions; roles, numbers, area and combat experience.

Regarding what roles the officers have undertaken during service in international missions, we find no particular distribution. Mec/Inf Platoon Leaders, Mec/Inf Company Commanders and Staff/Intel/Others, all positions quite axis-centric. Looking at the factor of numbers of international missions undertaken by the officers, we can however, identify clear differences. No missions in quarter 4, 1 mission in quarter 2 (axis-centric however), 2 missions strongly in quarter 1, and finally, 3 or more missions in quarter 3. However, international missions and geographical experience indicate differences. On the left side in the space, in the first quarter, we find experiences from Bosnia and in combination with Kosovo. However, experiences from Kosovo and in combination with Macedonia are positioned in the third quarter. These two positions show the clearest distance of over 1,0 in between.

In contrast, the position of Africa and Africa in combination with Bosnia and Afghanistan, all position in quarter 2 and relatively centric close. Finally, no mission area experience is positioned in quarter 4. The last background factor; combat experiences (or not) results in a limited distribution and all are relatively axis centric. A minor axis 2 position (towards the upper part) can however be indicated for “combat experience”. This difference is regarded insignificant to discuss.

Background factors roles and combat/no combat experience show a limited position distribution. Numbers of international missions do however indicate clear differences. No missions are positioned in quarter 4, 1 mission in quarter 2 (still axis-centric), 2 missions strongly in quarter 1, and finally 3 or more missions in quarter 3. Geographical area experiences show several different positions. In the left side of the space we find experiences from Bosnia and in combination with Kosovo in the 1st quarter, and Kosovo in combination with Macedonia in the 3rd quarter. These two positions show the clearest distance of over 1.0. Afghanistan and in combination with Macedonia and Africa and in combination with Bosnia or Afghanistan, are all positioned in quarter 2. Finally, no mission area experience is positioned in the 4th quarter. What roles the officers have undertaken in international missions and if they have experience from combat or not results in lesser obvious positions in the space of statements, compared to time in missions and where (places and culture) they have gained the experience internationally. Time in missions does however show a lesser position trend in the space of statements than geographical area experiences (e.g. geographical, cultural, social, mission character).

Result of background factor structures in the space of statements

The question “*How can sociological aspects such as background factors be characterized in the space of statements?*” is answered as; background factor *unit affiliation* (regimental culture and traditions), *unit type* and *military background*, distributing noticeably in the space of statement. *Role 2011* shows a less observable distribution. *Rank* and *military education* levels show weak distribution signs, in contrast to *civilian education*, where 2-year programmes are found on the lower side of axis 2, opposite to 3-year Economics and university education (axis 2 upper parts).

Age shows a nonlinear distribution on axis 1, mainly where seniors are found more significantly positioned, compared to younger categories. Regarding *International mission experiences*, *where and how many times* one has served, distributes more clearly than the roles and action one has participated in. Many background factors distribute fairly axis/quarter-centric, many with minor position distances, leaving a weaker basis for a capital analysis. Nevertheless, observable results can be found as has been described.

A Capital and Field Structure Discussion

In this discussion, the structure of the space of statements and background factor distribution will be viewed with the capital and field concepts. The purpose is to identify specific military sociological structural patterns. Such a discussion might be considered difficult to undertake on such small empirical material as 43 officers, often viewed with traditional expectations of military uniformity. Still, the foregoing section did present indications of heterogeneous thinking as well as certain differences in sociological distribution. A motive in general for such a discussion is the situation for the Swedish Armed Forces during extensive transformation the last 10-15 years. This transformation can be considered in national terms of changes, purely owned by the Swedish field of military thinking. The transformation can also be viewed regarding distinct international influences on military values and doxa.

Scientific indication for the latter is delivered, as has been mentioned earlier, by Andrew King in his *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces*.¹⁷⁸ Sociologically based variation in current tactical thinking has, as argued through this study, not yet been a research interest in Sweden. This lack of reflection motivates a closer look at indications of distribution structures with capital forms in the identified space of statements.

By capital, here it is meant symbolic and tangible assets in general, in other words, something that has a recognised value. Different kinds of capital are described by Pierre Bourdieu, for example, social, cultural and economic capital. Looking at the character of the studied sample here, we can identify several aspects that are connected to values. The military hierarchical command and rank structure results in higher social status because of higher ranks. Different unit types are considered to be more or less valuable for different tasks. Educational status and experiences of international missions are connected to certain values. One prominent military tradition is a priority in general for Regular Warfare capabilities and thus for mechanized units. Infantry and ranger units have not been seen as equally prioritized systems. Such a view has subsequently conveyed various command roles different status and capital value.

Senior (educational, rank and age) officers have traditionally been connected with a higher social and symbolic value in general, compared to that of junior officers. Regarding experience in international operations, as aforementioned, a very important competence; the situation can be different. As mainly younger officers (captains and majors) are assigned to field commands internationally, such an officer can (at least theoretically) gain a higher social and symbolic value than a somewhat older officer with no such experience. Awards on the chest with mission medals or ribbons directly signal and establish such a social capital integrated with a symbolic capital. In a capital discussion, one can also include aspects such as traditional style and performance of officers, who value different warfare styles/ tactics in different units. For example, some units/regiments value, and are traditionally established for training and fighting with smaller units. Others are, on the contrary, structured for, and traditionally value larger combat-focused units and tactics.

¹⁷⁸ King, *The transformation of Europe's Armed Forces* (2011).

The latter has traditionally been seen as the main body and the core capability in the Armed Forces, thus having a higher capital value. In all, it demands a study that goes beyond the scope of this work to systematically categorize different capital forms and value systems. Still, the obtained data gives an opportunity to sketch a structural view of value distributions in the space of statements. Not trying to separate possible social capital from cultural capital aspects, the label Symbolic Capital is used as a general term of value recognition and possession.

How can Military Symbolic Capital as Recognition and Values be described?

As background for the discussion, an overview of the Swedish military cultural heritage regarding tactical and strategic thought is sketched.¹⁷⁹ The overview aims to give a base for the capital and field discussion.

This heritage of strategic and tactical thought for the last 100 years can be characterized as a relatively defensive tradition. However, certain offensive thought can be found, as a clear tradition of Small Wars tactics. Professor Lars Ericsson Wolke describes two common threads of offensive thinking particularly identifiable. The primary offensive way of thinking and frontal attack tactics, can be seen as the ideal for the cavalry, such as the Supreme Commander's "sledge hammer", designed for frontal assault and actually crushing an invading aggressor in the south of Sweden, characterized with open terrain. Such a "direct frontal attack" dream existed until 1925, despite the experiences of the First World War fresh in mind, when traditional defensive strategy and tactics were also necessary because of extensive defence cuts.

This generalized view of certain value recognitions, put in to the model of the space of statements gives a sketch of a value or capital structure. This sketch consists of higher values in the upper part (Regular Warfare context thinking) and to the right (larger unit concepts for combat). Lower values are found in the lower part (Irregular or Hybrid Warfare contexts) and to the left (smaller or mixed unit structures promoting combat capabilities to a lesser extent). This result is outlined in the next picture.

¹⁷⁹ The text is a result of meetings and discussions at SNDC with Professor Lars Ericson Wolke during 2013. Professor Ericson is currently working in the Military History Section at SNDC, regarded a leading expert on Swedish military history with several published books and articles on the subject. http://www.ericsonwolke.se/about_lars.htm, http://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Ericson_Wolke




Figure 21. Symbolic capital structure of the space of statement.

The suggested sketch of a principal value structure, viewed as symbolic capital structure in the space of statements is now used for discussing the result from the background factors analysis. What structures are possible to be identified in relation to the capital structure? The following result was gained; unit affiliation, types and military backgrounds in the first quarter, clearly referring to ranger tactics, but more scattered regarding mechanized and infantry/amphibious backgrounds. We found one trend indication where mechanized background is positioned in the second quarter, mechanized infantry in the third and infantry and amphibious background in the fourth quarter; all indications that support the interpretation of content in the space. Looking at the regimental distributions we can identify differences for the mechanized regiments (P4, P7 and I 19).

Rank and military education showed limited interpretation possibilities, but civilian education followed some observable value distributions on axis 2. The factor of age is positioned clearly on axis 1. Combat experience did not show any particular distribution.

Finally, International mission numbers and area experience can be identified to follow a counter clockwise structure where no experience is positioned in the third quarter, experiences from one mission in the second quarter, two missions in the first quarter and three or more missions in the fourth quarter.

The most observable result is that unit type, backgrounds and affiliation follow the value/capital structure according to axis 1 for ranger and infantry unit officers, however, not regarding officers with a mechanized background. In all, it can be said that distributions of different value possessions can be identified, but also that some indications are difficult to analyse. The result does however show that background factors, with different value recognitions can be found structured in various patterns, also in the space of statements referring to tactics in Irregular Warfare. Such analysis has not yet been a part of Swedish War Studies traditions.

The space of tactical thought as statements¹⁸⁰ obtained by the sample of field commanders contains several different structural indications. We can identify *different* tactical preferences in the same context (of Irregular Warfare) that are possible to link to different sociological aspects. We can connect to a generalized value structure, and identify certain distribution trends of background factors, all in the same space of statements. Difficulties in the ability to draw conclusions do however exist. The structure of the space of statements has stronger data support than the background factor ones. Nonetheless, differences in tactical preferences have been shown, as indications of background factor structuring signs in a value/capital context. Differences exist, and differences matter, especially when values are questioned and threatened. It is a commonly known fact that frictions and struggles occur when economic interests clash with different values of tactics and unit development needs. Potentiality for interest struggles is also of obvious importance for launching new ideas and creative development enterprises.

The Bourdieu concept of field is possible to be used to discuss differences in standpoints and relations to background factors connected to properties which can reveal characteristics of the space. Two perspectives thus emerge. First, if the space of standpoints can be argued to contain some relational characteristics. In this case, the aim is to identify social groupings sharing the same values that oppose other groupings. In short, if relational structures can be indicated and their properties identified. In such a case, indications of a potentiality for tactical development struggles are possible to be described. The previous discussion identified properties relating to unit types, backgrounds and affiliation and international experiences of certain character, with a distribution of certain tactical types. However, the character of the sample consisting of field officers working hard with current unit training, production and structural transformation, is probably less likely to generate time consuming interest struggles in tactics.

¹⁸⁰ The space of statements is described as follows. Axis 1; Two different ranges of tactical thought, mainly with equal focus on larger or smaller, or a more distinct focus on smaller units. Distributed tactics with a combination of reconnaissance and combat concepts/capabilities are prioritized. Opposite, we find larger units collectively operating with a clearer combat conceptual focus. These variations are argued to belong to the *conceptual sphere of thinking (or capability needs; "how to act")*. Axis 2; Two different ranges of tactical thought are identified. The first; regarding thought of primarily military tasks and kinetic effects. Secondly; a broader thought of military and civilian tasks or mainly of civilian tasks. Here, the focus is on non-kinetic or a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. These positions are suggested to belong to a *contextual sphere of thinking (or in terms of operational/tactical environment; "where to act")*.

On the other hand, if some strong individuals emerge presenting and fighting for a new tactical solution, struggles might very well emerge. However, viewing a horizon of expectations, such as might be argued to contain differences regarding tactical thinking of Irregular Warfare, the existence of a diversity of differences in the space of standpoints is thus claimed to contain a *potentiality* of a field-like character.

Secondly, if the space of statements viewed as a social space with different value recognitions and a field-like potentiality, in a larger perspective can be seen as a part of a possible field of “Swedish military thinking”. This question is regarded as highly interesting, containing several actors and groupings all dealing with the sum of resources spent on Swedish war capabilities. It thus involves several different military cultures and traditions, influence possibilities, interests and ambitions. In such a broad and comprehensive study the concepts of capital and field will become obvious tools for structuring and analysing data.

Based on the presented result, regarding the space of statements on tactics in Irregular Warfare, a field analysis of a possible space of “Swedish Military thought of tactics and strategy” could lead to new further information. Such, currently unknown, areas are for example, how a possible sub-field of tactics in Irregular Warfare is placed in the larger field, and the connections to a possible sub-field of tactics in Regular Warfare, to operational art and, in relation to strategy. Areas such as gender, informal and formal entry requirements, ranks, and value hierarchies might thus be possible to be examined, delivering knowledge on sociological structures in relation to different kinds of tactical preferences. A structured examination of what properties are valued more or less and what doxa, or taken-for-granted truths that flourish, will also provide new perspectives on current ways of understanding tactics, and relating it to different parts of the defence and governmental structures and individuals.

After examining structural dispositions based on specific question results, still another perspective is possible to discuss, now concerning the individual distribution of the officers in the space of statements. The graph on the next page shows the individual distribution of the 43 officers. This means that the property holders of certain values (as different background factors might be associated with officially or unofficially) can be seen in relation to the four tactical types in the model.




Figure 22. Individual distribution in relation to the tactical types in the model.

As can be seen in the graph above, the broad distribution provides possibilities to view several clusters by choice. Officers position all over the space; in fact, they seem rather equally distributed over all tactical types at a first glance. However, as pointed out earlier, positions close to the centre cannot be analysed. Also a distance of more than 0.5 between positions is sought in order to be viewed as observable. Distances over 0.5 and preferably 1.0 are regarded as a clear indication of positional differences. That result shows the following numerical distribution *in total*, relating to the four tactical types;

- Regular Warfare context, Ranger tactics thinking : 14 officers (7 BnCo, 7 CoyCO)
- Regular Warfare context, Mechanized tactics thinking: 7 officers (3 BnCO, 4 CoyCO)
- Hybrid Warfare context, Infantry tactics thinking: 12 officers (2 BnCO, 10 CoyCo)
- Hybrid Warfare context, Mechanized tactics thinking: 10 officers (1 BnCo, 9 CoyCO)

The empirical quantitative individual distribution in relation to the officers' role can be summarized according to the quarters in the model in the figure below.

Concepts Context		Small or Mixed unit concepts	Larger unit concepts	Total sum
Regular Warfare (RW) Context		RW Ranger tactics	RW Mechanized tactics	
Total		14	7	21
BnCO		7	3	10
Coy CO		7	4	11
Hybrid Warfare (HW) Context		HW Infantry tactics	HW Mechanized tactics	
Total		12	10	22
BnCO		2	1	3
Coy CO		10	9	19
Total sum:		26	17	43
BnCO		9	4	13
CoyCO		17	13	30

Figure 23. Individual distribution in the model according to command roles.

Twenty-one officers are positioned in a more traditional military *contextual* base for their tactical thought. In this category almost all battalion commanders (ten) could be found, but only eleven company commanders. Almost equal; twenty-two officers, positioned in a mixed civil-military Hybrid context, but here we find only three battalion commanders. A majority of company commanders (nineteen) are however, found here. Regarding *conceptual* distribution; mainly regarding smaller (platoon or company) or a combination of smaller and larger (battalion or brigade) concepts versus primarily larger concepts, a total of twenty-six officers are positioned within the smaller or mixed concepts. In this category, the main body of battalion commanders and company commanders are to be found (nine and seventeen). Seventeen officers are positioned in larger concepts; here only four battalion commanders and thirteen company commanders are positioned. The total distribution can be said to be extensive all over the tactical types, with varying weights. The quantitative result shows quite an equal distribution in total number between Regular or Hybrid Warfare *context* positions. However, a certain dominant positioning for Battalion commander ranks is found in the Regular context category (ten to three for Hybrid Warfare).

When it come to *conceptual* thinking, a clear dominance lies in smaller or mixed concepts (twenty-six to seventeen for a larger concept focus). That dominance applies to both company commanders and, in particular, for battalion commander ranks (9-4). This result presentation has to be seen as an indication based on data from a certain time (2011). Twelve positions (38,16,41,36,21,4,40,42,1,23,17 and 19) are however, at a limited distance from the centre and are as such assessed weak indicators. However, this leaves thirty-one positions of forty-three with a clearer indication of tactical thought related to some of the tactical types. In the next graph, the twelve mentioned officers have been concealed.

The remaining positions can still be seen distributed almost equally over the tactical types (RW Ranger = 5, RW Mec=6, HW Inf= 6(8) and HW Mec=5). Command role and unit type are marked. As can be seen in the graph, a large amount of officers (31 of 43) are positioned over the four tactical types in the space of statements. Of these officers, the ones with roles as battalion commanders are marked; also their unit types have been marked.




Figure 24. Graph showing non-centric distribution of officers in the space of standpoints.

In the left part of the space, we find six battalion commanders, and only three to the right. Of four Ranger unit officers, three are to be found in the left part. Mechanized or Mechanized Infantry unit commanders are spread over all tactical types, as are the remaining part of the company commanders. This shows a result characterized by a diversified and dual view of tactics. A *potentiality* of a field-like *character* is thus argued to exist, particularly within the mechanized community and in general, regarding the whole collective of field commanders. This character is argued to have a potentiality not only internally in the space of tactical thought, but also within a larger possible field of Swedish military thought. By this, the descriptive results from the interview questions have been presented. The next part presents a comparison of the space of standpoints with a collection of current normative doctrinal texts on Counterinsurgency Operations.

4.6 The space of statements compared to normative standards for COIN operations.

Introduction

This section presents American, British, French, Canadian and Swedish normative views of context and concepts for tactics in Counterinsurgency operations¹⁸¹ Compared to the initial literature study on *Irregular Warfare in general*, this analysis has the aim of focusing only on normative articulations, as in doctrines for tactics in Counterinsurgency¹⁸², because this area is argued to be the currently most commonly articulated within Irregular Warfare. The descriptive result from the Multiple Correspondence Analyses (MCA), regarding structure of the space of statements, is compared with the normative findings. The section closes with a discussion on similarities and differences leading to a generalized answer to the question; “*How does the descriptive result of tactical thought compare with current normative standards for Counterinsurgency operations?*” The method used is a qualitative textual analysis.

Normative views on tactics in Irregular Warfare

Military normative articulations can be found in doctrines and field manuals, of which several new or re-written texts on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency have been published since 2007 in the western world¹⁸³.

¹⁸¹ Appendix 8. Results from a Tactical COIN doctrine study, pp. 1-16 (16). The analysis of normative text origins from a study by the author during 2011 at SNDC, aiming to provide knowledge to the Swedish Ground Forces Combat School (MSS) for their work with new field manuals.

¹⁸² *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)* (2011), p. 16. :” *the political, economic, civil, psychological, social, legal, and military operations by an overall strategy taken to combat the Insurgency. Noted here is that the military component is only one of the total spectrums of the exercise of power resources and the political / civil sector has the crucial role influencing the conflict.*”

¹⁸³ Some influence examples are; U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24 (2006), U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2 (2009), U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication JP 3-24 (2009) and UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (2009).

In Sweden, however, the first normative text also including descriptions of Irregular Warfare and COIN was published in 2010¹⁸⁴. Work on tactical field manuals and regulations started in Sweden from 2008.¹⁸⁵

A Diverging and Dual Result

The question; how does the descriptive result of tactical thought compare with current normative standards for Counterinsurgency operations is answered the following way. In broad terms, it is suggested that the examined normative texts outline tactical thinking based on broader military-civilian task context thinking, with capability requirements for smaller, as well as larger units, not only intelligence focused but clearly also with offensive combat capabilities.

Regarding contextual thinking, normative standards are positioned at the lower part of the model, described as a Hybrid Warfare context. As for conceptual thinking, a position of the normative texts is found on the left side in the model, focusing on smaller as well as larger unit operations, combining intelligence and combat tasks. The result is subsequently interpreted as a Swedish tactical preference, more diverse and only partly corresponding to normative standards for Counterinsurgency operations.

Background to the result – four questions on COIN tactics

Following a dialogue with the Swedish Army Ground Combat School (Markstridsskolan, MSS), several specific questions of interest arose during May 2011 and a study was initiated. Four of these questions are included in this extract, focusing on primarily conceptual and contextual aspects of tactics in Counterinsurgency operations. The questions were the following;

1. What characterizes the description of the Insurgency movements to be analysed and understood (e.g. systems thinking and the concept of Centre of Gravity)? This question can be characterized as a contextual question with emphasis on analysis needs because of a broader threat perspective (Question 2 in the appendix).
2. What characterizes the description of the insurgency movements to be affected (e.g. effects thinking, the concept of Effects Based Approach of Operations and Targeting)? This question can be characterized as a contextual question, with focus on how to deal with Insurgency in general; for example with primarily civil or military means, and with kinetic or non-kinetic effects, which require other resources compared to those in Regular Warfare (Question 3 in the appendix).

¹⁸⁴ *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12) (2011).*

¹⁸⁵ *Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO) (2009)* is one example.

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3. What characterizes the description of how the military operations are to be carried out (e.g. the Clear-Hold-Build principle or similar, division in offensive/defensive operations or otherwise)? This question can be characterized as a conceptual question with focus on military tactics in general (Question 6 in the appendix).
 4. What characterizes the perception of how to use military forces against enemy combatants; e.g. offensive, defensive, indirect methods? This question can also be characterized as a conceptual question with focus on tactics against armed opponents (Question 7 in the appendix).

The questions where qualitative text analysis with variables was chosen, were the following; linkage to strategy/military strategy, operational art, tactics, command levels, focus on irregular actors, and regarding the war fighting capability concepts; physical, conceptual, moral factors. Assessment of the variable values has been as follows: not covered, partially covered, covered clearly, and strongly addressed. The questions were analysed individually for each doctrine and then compared.

The analysis included doctrines produced in recent years after publication of U.S. FM 3-24 *COIN* in December 2006. Probably the most known and influential one regarding tactics is the U.S. FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in COIN* (2009), which has been chosen. Furthermore, the British Field manual for COIN (2009) was chosen with regard to Britain's long experience in Counterinsurgency. In 2008, Canada published a comprehensive view of COIN (on strategic, operational, as well as on tactical levels) and this document was perceived to be relatively unknown though interesting, due to the wide experience Canadian Armed Forces possess of international operations. Also chosen was the 2010 published French doctrine for COIN at the tactical level, also because of this nation's extensive experience in the field. A current Swedish normative description; the Field Manual for *Manoeuvre Battalion* (MSR 10) from 2010 was chosen to be studied. This field manual is strategically linked to the new *Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine* (MSD) 2012. MSD 12 provides the following directives in general for the Armed Forces in terms of COIN.

Directives for actions against irregular state structural attacks.

For necessary military interoperability there are currently various international doctrines for e.g. *Stability Operations* (SO), *Crisis Respond Operations* (CRO), *Peace Support Operations* (PSO) and *Counter Insurgency Operations* (COIN). The Armed Forces do not need to develop their own doctrines for national needs in the above fields. However, for international tasks, they need to have the knowledge and ability to work with others to meet irregular adversaries and hybrid threats, in parallel with a capacity for Regular Warfare, as the latter to various extents is required, regardless of the type of opponent in terms of the openly executed combat. The crucial difference in strategy and tactics in Regular and Irregular Warfare is that the fight is about the will and trust of the people in relation to the legitimacy of state power. The opponent acts hidden among the people and at times in open combat, as well as with traditional terror characteristics.

*This means that the military capability has to include the ability to change and adjust focus between protecting people locally over time and implementing direct offensive actions of precision. Large and partly new obligations are thus enforced on leadership, knowledge, experience and personal ability of the Armed Forces' personnel.*¹⁸⁶

The results of the analysis of the four questions

Question 1. *What characterizes the description of the insurgency movements to be analysed and understood?*

A summary of the results¹⁸⁷, tells us that descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency movements vary in the doctrines, all of which denounce the importance of the intelligence function, not least at a tactical level. The US view is significantly linked to systems thinking with detailed methods and models. The British and Canadian approach is not based on systems thinking or detailed models and methods.

The French approach mentions systems thinking briefly. The need for extensive analysis is shared by all. The centre of gravity thinking has a minor role in the American and French doctrine compared with British and Canadian descriptions. British focus is on how to adapt the intelligence function and organization, as opposed to the American concept which prescribes how to conduct analysis from the lowest level. The Swedish description covers discussions of analytical needs to a limited extent.

Question 2. *What characterizes the description of how the Insurgency was affected?*

A summary of the results provides the following outcome.¹⁸⁸ The description of how the rebel movements will be affected varies in content and character in the doctrines. Canadian descriptions emphasize that influence activities are superior to physical effects. The implementation concept is called "comprehensive operations". The importance of integrating local forces is emphasized and effects thinking; Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and Targeting is described. The British view contains a dominant concept and thinking as regards influence activities, which includes all types of operations, where Clear-Hold-Build is seen as a tactical activity. Targeting is described but not EBAO. The US retains the basic concept Clear-Hold-Build with variations of offensive and defensive actions. Targeting is described but not Effects Based Approach to Operations or effects thinking. The French description includes a detailed tactical concept linked to "global manoeuvre" (clearly linked to operational level) together with an organization example for units and military-police cooperation. Effect thinking is described, but neither targeting nor EBAO. The Swedish view mentions the comprehensive approach, but mostly exemplifies military operations (supporting civilian efforts) including host nation security units as well.

The Manoeuvre Warfare concept is seen as the primary one however, also including the psychological aspects. The Clear-Hold-Build concept is not mentioned directly but implied in other words.

¹⁸⁶ *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)* (2011), p. 85. (author's translation).

¹⁸⁷ Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine Study on tactics in COIN, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 7-8.

Question 3. *What characterizes the description of how the military operations are to be carried out?*

The answer to this question is summarized as follows.¹⁸⁹ Descriptions of how military operations are supposed to be carried out vary. Canada's approach emphasizes the subordinate role of the military in civil actions. Military operations are implemented with variations of defensive, offensive and stability operations (full-spectrum operations with the so-called Comprehensive Operations). Larger and smaller operations are described, without connection to the Clear-Hold-Build concept. The British approach is based on the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop" and is described as a "Joint, Operational Level of approach".

Three types of approaches are described; indirect (mainly special forces and intelligence operations), direct approach (military forces from supporting nations and also from the host nation) and balanced approaches (combined military, political and economic measures). The division of offensive-defensive operations/tasks is not described; only small-scale attacks are described.

The US description is based entirely on the Clear-Hold-Build concept with variations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks/ operations/activities. The French concepts are not based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept.

The French approach is on rapid interventions to secure key areas and to neutralize organizations, using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The focus is on the people and control of the operational environment. The efforts are sought with a principle of preserving the security of physical areas, and to dismantle the counterpart organization. The principle stated in operational planning as *Oil-spot Strategy* using a "Quadrillage" system (hierarchical area organization) in secured areas and counter-surveillance measures, called deterrent pressure, in the important areas. Substantial operational activities are described with simultaneous wide discretion at low-levels.

The Swedish view prescribes that the military function should support civilian efforts. With Manoeuvre Warfare, Comprehensive Approach and combined arms, also including civilian means when possible, efforts will be taken to secure areas, demobilize opponents, reintegrate and support the reconstruction of the civilian society.

Question 4. *What characterizes the perception of how the military forces are supposed to be used against enemy combatants?*

This question can be seen as a specific part of the previous one, explicitly concerning the enemy combatants.¹⁹⁰ Such descriptions of how military forces are to be used against enemy combatant components vary in design and detail, but the main principles are relatively similar. Overall, the Canadian approach is interpreted as defensive, the British as balanced, the American as more offensive, and the French approach clearly offensive.

¹⁸⁹Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine Study on tactics in COIN, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹⁰Ibid. pp. 12-13.

The Canadian vision can be interpreted as prudent in offensive operations and larger ones, however a combination of defensive, offensive and stabilizing capabilities are said to be required. The ability to perform concealed actions is emphasized down to lower command and unit levels.

The British approach focuses on measures that are said to primarily affect the people and secondly, insurgents directly with a "minimum necessary force". The doctrine mainly describes attack (strike/surge) actions and influence operations with clarity. The American approach is based on the principle that the military units are to operate equally well in both offensive, and defensive roles, as well as stabilizing operations. All in all, the enemy will be encountered and handled, as also the population will be protected and controlled. The offensive techniques include "movement to contact", "attack", "exploit" and "pursue". An offensive approach is characterized by surprise, simple plans, boldly executed, concentration (whether it be visible/invisible or kinetic/non-kinetic effects), appropriate speed and flexibility.

Overall, the doctrines do not describe in detail how the enemy combatant elements are to be dealt with, but the main norm can be understood as with smaller combat operations. France describes a complete tactical system, where military units support the police in security (sometimes implementing security operations), units defensively protect the population through the "Quadrillage" system (cut off relations for the insurgents), and by offensive actions in depth, also using guerrilla tactics. Concealed, surprising irregular behaviour and high operational secrecy are highlighted as important. Only carrying out large-scale operations when one is sure of success, leads to a need for the highest capacity and skills for conducting patrol activities. The Swedish view can be summarized as a balanced approach focusing on stabilization tasks, if necessary however, with offensive action to eliminate or kill insurgents. The descriptions are mainly related to traditional warfare tactics concerning combat and offensive approaches.

Summary of the answers of the four questions

These answers to the four questions on contextual and conceptual normative views can be summarized as follows. Regarding the contextual perspective, all texts confess to a more or less comprehensive approach, where the military tasks are combined with the civilian tasks and efforts, from the most civilian enhancing Canadian view to the French most militarily articulated view. A dominant contextual perspective with expectations, and need for a broader Hybrid Warfare perspective for tactical thinking can be argued to exist. Regarding the differences in conceptual views, they can be interpreted ranging from the rather clear Small Wars focused Canadian view, to the very detailed French descriptions of an adapted Brigade Combat Team of enemy centric capabilities, with Guerrilla Warfare in-depth capacities. Differences are also possible to be identified between the British and American descriptions, both describing requirements for smaller as well as larger operational and tactical concepts, however not with specific detailed examples. The Swedish conceptual view could be interpreted by a vision of tactics with task force organized manoeuvre battalions, still with an emphasis on a Regular Warfare culture mind-set.

Discussion of the results

The results suggest that various normative standards in current international and Swedish texts are viewed as having an acceptable robustness and level of validity. Despite basing on only four questions, the diversity in articulations is easy to detect. The perhaps unexpected scattered result of various tactical aspects of COIN can be criticized because of the broad and imprecise questions. The interpretation and generalization that the doctrines in many respects present varied and diverse viewpoints on tactics in COIN, are in a logical sense not surprising. Past experience and traditions in COIN vary to a large extent, such as how the area was chosen to be approached by the “rediscovery” around 2006-7. In terms of military culture, the French view is interpreted as more offensive, the Canadian more defensive, whereas the Anglo-Saxon views are more balanced. The Swedish text is viewed as balancing offensive and defensive approaches. In terms of the contextual focus on violence areas, France is perceived to outline a main focus on Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism. All doctrines focus primarily towards smaller-scale efforts, which allow a general interpretation primarily of Guerrilla Warfare.

Neither Canada nor the British describe any unit concepts to a greater extent. The American view presents thinking in Brigade Battle groups with capability requirements, and France do the same to an even more detailed level (e.g. capability need for operating with own units with guerrilla tactics, deep into enemy controlled territory). Differences in expressions do exist and were partly expected for several reasons.

As the time for rewriting, rethinking or articulating new and possible limited reflected views of tactics in COIN has been short (2007 – 2010), differences are to be expected. Secondly, differences in rooms of experiences and horizons of expectations regarding Counterinsurgency operations exist among the countries, giving a further explanation to the various articulations. However, the descriptions of the context have to be seen as rather similar regarding the contextual expectations.

Swedish conditions are different in several respects compared to the examined western doctrines and field manuals. An obvious example is the limited number of Swedish units and limited numbers of exercises beyond company level. A background not involving COIN also gives a precondition, where the Swedish standpoints have to be viewed as introductory and preliminary, mainly influenced by American and British experiences and writings. Even so, several lower conflict experiences, if not labelled COIN, such as mainly from the Balkans, have influenced Swedish thought and writings.

The result in all, with the apparent differences when comparing the normative texts to the Swedish model of tactical preferences, can be seen as unexpected. Over ten years of COIN operations in Afghanistan might be thought to have produced rather similar tactical thought and expressions. However, only parts of the sample have experiences from Afghanistan operations and Swedish normative texts had not been distributed or known; nor had the military been trained accordingly during the time of the analysis.

Answer to the question; ***“How does the descriptive result of tactical thought compare with current normative standards for Counterinsurgency Operations?”***

The normative standards' positions only partially correspond to the descriptive model of Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare. Regarding contextual thinking, the normative standards' position at the lower part of the model, can be described as a Hybrid Warfare context. As for conceptual thinking, a position of the normative texts is claimed to be found on the left side in the model, with focus on smaller as well as larger unit operations, combining intelligence and combat tasks.

Given the tradition in Sweden with, on the one hand, a deeply rooted Regular Warfare mind-set and on the other, traditions of Small Wars (ranger) tactics, the character of the result seems credible.

With this doctrine comparison of Swedish preferences, the analysis work in all has been presented and it is time to answer the research question.

4.7 The answer to the research question

This section answers the research question outlined as; *"how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive standpoint patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards?"*

The answer, generated by the results of the descriptive analyses and the normative comparison, is described in five blocks; a characteristic of how *tactics in general* is understood; a characteristic of how *tactics in Irregular Warfare* in general is thought of, the main result: *a model of the Swedish space of statements of thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare consisting of four tactical types, a sociological discussion of background factor structures and character*, and finally a *normative comparison* of the model with a selection of international and Swedish doctrinal standards for tactics in Counterinsurgency operations.

*The officers' general view of tactics per se*¹⁹¹ can be characterized with an interpretation as either the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal, or as ways of thinking in general. Reflective views on principal influences can be described as either having a Regular Warfare tradition domination, or a more generic and wider analytical approach, or a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics/tactical perspective. Influences on tactical thinking connect mainly to education and training activities, literature and gaming, personal experiences, personal influences such as from senior officers, colleagues and exercises. Direct or indirect practice is considered important for influences. Compared to the areas of strategy and operational art, the officers' interest in tactics is clearly dominant. However, communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed tradition. Experiences and influences from past wars are thought to be important for the development of tactics and tactical thinking, still the view is largely scattered. Areas such as education and exercises were only mentioned by a few.

¹⁹¹ p. 62. The result regarding general views on tactics per se.

A rather consistent way of thinking exists with a self-image of field or troop officer, thinking tactics as a combination of theory and practice, and with a basic offensive mind-set. Skills and knowledge in Regular Warfare for national defence needs are higher prioritized than skills in Irregular Warfare for multinational operations. Focus is on troops rather than technical aspects, with an ambition to lead and develop tactics for larger units (battalion structures rather than specialized company formations).

*The officers' general reflections on tactics in Irregular Warfare*¹⁹² can be characterized by expressions mostly regarding conceptual aspects, including capability and functional area aspects, for example, Intelligence. Broader aspects such as military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set are addressed only on a few occasions. Even if many of the articulations correspond to general current COIN standards, views still exist with a more Regular Warfare mind-set. A major aspect in thinking relates to new or other demands in command and functional thinking, for example, Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Electronic Warfare. A minor number of officers emphasized Regular Warfare capabilities.

As for war fighting capabilities, moral and conceptual factors (or combined) are in focus, as opposed to physical factors. A common view of tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency is a focus on Guerrilla Warfare, in contrast to lower violence areas such as subversion and terrorism. Regarding conceptual views, a unified focus on basic battalion structures with additional special functions, capable of operating in task group structures is evident. Tactics in Irregular Warfare is viewed to have a low priority in the Swedish Armed Forces. Quite a common view however, is that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is needed and important.

The Main result; *the model of the Swedish space of statements of thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare* consists of a two-by-two generic model of tactical types.¹⁹³ This model provides an inter-subjective constructed structure of the space of statements. The tactical types are labelled and broadly explained as follows: 1) Regular Warfare; ranger tactics with focus on military tasks, smaller and larger units and reconnaissance: 2) Regular Warfare; mechanized tactics with focus on military tasks, larger units, and combat: 3) Irregular/Hybrid Warfare: infantry tactics focused on mixed military and civilian tasks, smaller and larger units, reconnaissance and combat: and finally, 4) Irregular/Hybrid Warfare: mechanized tactics focused on military and civilian tasks, larger units and combat. These tactical types are suggested as the content of the space of statements, mainly constructed with two perspectives; contextual and conceptual. The investigated sample distributes quite equally over the types 2, 3 and 4. A certain weight can be noted for type 1.

Sociological structures of background factors positioned in the space of statements are possible to identify.¹⁹⁴ *Unit affiliation* (regimental culture and traditions) and *Unit background* distribute most clearly. *Unit affiliation* and *background* show correlation regarding ranger and infantry affiliation, background and tactical thinking.

¹⁹² pp. 62-63. The result regarding general reflection on tactics in Irregular Warfare.

¹⁹³ p. 75. The result in the form of a model of the distribution of standpoints.

¹⁹⁴ pp. 78-84. Result of background factor structures in the space of statements.

This is however, not possible to be identified regarding mechanized affiliation, background and tactical thinking. *Command roles* show an observable distribution. *Rank and military education* levels show signs of weak distribution, as opposed to *civilian education*, where 2-year programmes are found on the lower side of axis 2, opposite to 3-year Economics and university education on the upper side of axis 2. *Age* shows a nonlinear distribution on axis 1 mainly, where higher age are found more significantly positioned compared to the younger categories. *International mission experiences* seem to bear marks more dependent on *where* and *how many times* one has served compared to what role and action one has participated in.

Many background factors distribute rather axis/quarter-centric, several with minor position distances, leaving a weaker basis for a capital-field discussion. However, observable results can be found. The space of standpoints is suggested to be viewed as a social space where relational structures exist¹⁹⁵. Seen in a possible larger space of tactics or strategy, the results indicate a potentiality of field characteristics in Swedish military thought, implying potential power and influence struggles and development dynamics. The model with the standpoint distribution related in two dimensions (each quarter labelled with a generalized tactical type) is shown in the next figure, also including the distribution structure of Symbolic Capital.




Figure 25. Symbolic Capital structure in the space of statements.

¹⁹⁵ p. 87. Result of capital distribution in the model regarding structure of Military Symbolic Capital

Compared with normative standards, the space of Swedish tactical thought is argued to be partially coherent but also partly comprising various thoughts related to normative tactics in Irregular Warfare regarding Counterinsurgency Operations¹⁹⁶. Subsequently, there are indications of different opinions on the requirements for warfare capabilities and officer competences, leadership and education.

The Swedish descriptive result of tactical types contains two primary aspects; military task focus and focus on combat tasks, possibly conflicting or even contradicting normative texts on tactics in COIN (American, British, French, Canadian and Swedish doctrines or field manuals). Tactical type 1: Regular Warfare ranger tactics and, in particular, type 2: Regular Warfare mechanized tactics, represent tactical thought not corresponding to normative views of a contextual mind-set addressing military as well as civilian task solving capabilities.

Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare can thus be characterized as dualistic structuring in a fourfold space of statements constructed by conceptual and contextual preferences, only partly corresponding to normative standards. A Military social structure is found with expected positions of ranger officers rather equally dispersed, but a scattered result for mechanized officers, indicating a number of officers with untraditional tactical thinking compared to what is usually the modus of mechanized Regular Warfare.

¹⁹⁶ p. 100. Result of the normative comparison regarding how the descriptive results of tactical thought compare with the current normative standards for Counterinsurgency Operations.

5 Discussion, reflection and conclusions

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion of the answer to the research question. First, validity and reliability of the results and work are discussed. Thereafter, consequences of the results are discussed in relation to tactics per se, operational art and strategy. Field characteristics and potentiality are subsequently discussed, linked to the influence of Bourdieu thinking. A reflection of the work is presented and the chapter ends with the main conclusions.

The main argument proposed is that the finding of a duality of tactical thought has to be recognised per se, and obviously to be seen in relation to strategy, operational art and leadership. This, especially when discussing Irregular Warfare scenarios. Different and partly contradicting tactical preferences, problematic in resource-constrained armies to conceptualize in the same units bring forward several questions on coherence. One major question is to what extent does such tactical thought correlate with strategic thinking nationally and in an international normative perspective? If admitting to an idea where strategy and tactics are but different sides of the same coin and correlation is thus obviously important, one can ask if a broad tactical thought articulation is the result of an equally broad strategy. Or, if the first is a sign of an experienced reality different for officers in different units and only partially connecting to a vague and dim vision of strategy.

5.2 Problem and argument of the present work

Discussing the present study as a whole, it is important to recapitulate what the work is actually about. What has been studied and what results have been presented and with what precision? First, tactical preferences have been studied. However, what is really meant by the term *tactics* is not self-evident, not even in the military community. In the introduction part of the study a definition was presented, which without any further discussion, explained this phenomenon as “*methods and techniques used in order to reach a military goal, often associated to combat*”.¹⁹⁷ Such a broad explanation opens up many ways for an investigation. Merely the fact that three different activities are mentioned as key components; *methods, techniques and goals*, means that different foci are possible to be used for investigating relational structures, such as standpoints of preferences. Relational structures in different spaces bring us back to the theoretical baseline for the study. An approach, founded on Bourdieu’s field theory and methodological tools was chosen, and such an approach sets the whole study in a specific frame. An important view regarding Bourdieu’s work and types of results is that what is presented is clearly to be seen as an ideally typical model, constructed with the aim of *further* compilations using actual situations. Therefore, the results do not aim at declaring an answer to the question of what tactics and tactical thought or Irregular Warfare “are” per se.

¹⁹⁷ p. 2. Footnote no 4. Introductory discussion of the general regarding understanding of the term tactics.

The results aim for a contribution to subsequent research work, to analyse relational status in tactical thought in practice, consequently to be mirrored by the articulated strategy of the current time. This contribution is to be seen as a model, sketch or map of different positions of thought constructing a reality of relational indications. An aid to further knowledge work striving for better understanding of aspects and perspectives, contributing to development and adaption of tactics linked to strategy. Such results also seem obviously important to analyse in relation to operational art and leadership, particularly important in such complex environments as Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency.¹⁹⁸ A principal result is the possibility to show that different perspectives might exist regarding tactical thought, resulting in serious oversimplifications if trying to discuss or explain tactics without reflecting such a fact.

Tactics is thought of by people with different backgrounds, habits, intentions and experiences. Sociologically as well as culturally related parameters inflict, for example, cost-benefit thinking; thus often making generalizations not relevant other than to specific samples under specific circumstances. Bourdieu's constructionism is said to be impossible to distinguish from relational perspectives and it is such a view and result that has guided this study. The question of validity concerns how well the results of the analysis and the answer to the research question really correspond and provide a relevant answer to the research question. Have the right aspects been measured? Have terms been used consistently and equally understandably for all respondents and even afterwards during the analysis work. The degree of validity can be tested in several ways, for example, with the strategies of reasoning assessment of validity and empirical validity tests.

Validity of terms addresses if the operationalization of interview questions and measurement of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare really capture what they claimed to do. The use of opposing variables in the interview questions, for example; small or large unit structures, collective or distributed operations, focusing on military or civilian tasks and either kinetic or non-kinetic approaches, on the one hand, they can be argued to be quite clear and understandable principles for most officers. On the other hand, one has to bear in mind that the degree of understanding, knowledge and familiarity of discussing similar activities, vary to a great extent among the officers. In order to counter such deficiencies, recurring attempts were made during the interviews to explain and exemplify what in fact was meant by the questions and answer alternatives.

Nevertheless, a more stringent set of definitions on each question would have possibly resulted in a higher degree of validity of terms. For some respondents it was not self-evident if the questions concerned own actions, or actions from a potential enemy, which for some respondents required a certain amount of time, in order to sort out the actual meaning of certain questions. The opinion is however, that a reasonable degree of common understanding was reached on the whole.

¹⁹⁸ A study was launched during the spring of 2014 by the Leadership Department (SNDC) aiming to examine leadership challenges in Irregular Warfare. The study uses the result from this dissertation and in particular, the model of the four tactical types.

As for the construction, a model aiming to provide a research tool as well as a first reasonably understandable result, the axes interpretations and labelling of the quarters are argued to be valid and make sense, supporting realistic requirements for accuracy. However, a certain amount of military basic knowledge is confessed to be needed in order to understand the model.

Discussing the degree of internal validity and risks of drawing very firm conclusions of the data and measurements, the result has pointed out some difficulty in making conclusions related to certain background factor positions. The question of external validity; if the result can be generalized to other populations/samples, it is strictly beyond the scope of the study, as an almost full sample has been investigated, but it is still of interest. The question of sub-field characteristics of the space, seen as a part of a larger possible field of tactics-strategy relational structures, deserves attention. Such research can bring light to power struggle potentialities and sociological structures other than commonly known hierarchical ones, such as theories of consecrational structures forming value opinions. This is when and where the field theory actually comes into play and thus, external validity comes into focus.

Regarding the Swedish Armed Forces, the view is that the result can be applied to land forces officers in general, and also other services and arms, not only commanding rifle/manoeuvre units. For the last ten years or so, officers from all services, arms and branches have served in Afghanistan and prior to that in the Balkans. Subsequently, quite a large number of officers have broadly similar spaces of experiences and possibly similar horizons of expectations as covered by this study's results. Thus, the experience of Irregular Warfare and preferences on tactics can be assumed to be quite spread over the armed forces, making a generalization of the result model possible. Even if education and training in Irregular Warfare tactics has been less prominent for the investigated population, impact from recent years' major focus on Afghanistan has in some areas been considerable, particularly within the regiments setting up the participating units.

On the other hand, an assumption that officers in general could distribute over the model becomes of limited interest if one does not bring in the idea of background factor structures analysis. It is then, with sociology, that unknown social structures of spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations can be unveiled. With that said, a view of generalizing validity becomes interesting. The distribution of the results indicates a reality of different standpoints regarding tactical thought, and such a reality seems also logical to be found in a larger sample or group. Given the construction structure of the model, similar results will probably be found even in other samples. However, following the view of Bourdieu regarding the uniqueness of a certain condition and time period, longitudinal generalizations of the standpoint distribution in the model deserve a warning, due to the variation of focus of conflict types that are emphasized from time to time. To what extent the results might be possible to generalize to a larger group, say battalion and company commanding officers in other smaller European countries, regarding the preference of tactics in Irregular Warfare, one has to address several other issues, for example different kinds of military culture.

However, based on my professional experience and judgment, I would argue that a great many officers with similar traditions, military culture background and international mission experiences, probably would end up in one of the four tactical types, or in some combination. A preference for the Big or the Small War is not a unique Swedish military characteristic. The result that shows a dispersed space of standpoints and preference, also from this small population, does however question Anthony King's transformation argument with a knowledge and preference convergence regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare. Contrary to a convergence development, a diverging development is probably more likely when looking beneath the surface of staff structures, procedures and new brigade conceptualizations.

The question of reliability concerns whether the measuring methods can be considered to be consistent and thus argued to have a high degree of inter-subjectivity. Following on from the results of the initial literature study; the empirical generalization can be argued merely to contain aspects commonly addressed in various explanations of Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. To a certain degree that is a valid observation, but two particular interrelated aspects are argued to be emphasized more strongly and clearly than many critical texts of Irregular Warfare. The first is the military-civilian intermingling or demarcation difficulty, and the second concerns the broadened span of violence activities. In the Regular Warfare tradition, it has not been a general requirement for officers to have the skills and understanding to deal with subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, in parallel with general warfare. Altogether, the result is argued to contain a reasonable degree of reliability for the purpose of framing the context and focusing on certain commonly described aspects.

Many factors are involved to make a reliability assessment, here focusing on the work with the MCA. The use of the software tool SPAD means moreover, that the results are easy to test/re-test, as has been done several times. This supports an opinion of high intra-code reliability. The main method for analysing the interview data, the MCA, is considered to have a high degree of inter-subjectivity. Several data computations have been performed and even if a degree of variation of the graphical positions occurs, the overall picture and result stand firm. The descriptions of the work should also satisfy replication demands. However, an MCA replication does require a basic knowledge of the use of the computer-aided SPAD programme, which takes some time to acquire. The method of using this, or similar, software is therefore not recommended without previous practical knowledge, if a study work has a fairly limited time frame.

The result of the standpoint distribution was interpreted as a two-dimensional model construction, with generalized interpretations of the axes. These interpretations were for axis 1; conceptual thinking, and for axis 2; contextual thinking, where each of the four quarters was labelled with tactical type names. The first part; interpretations of axes categories structuring the model have been tested regarding inter-assessment reliability.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axes interpretations 2013-07-19.

This test aimed to identify possible differences or similarities in interpretation of the character of axis 1 and 2. Pictures of the graphs showing the result distribution were shown to a test person, who was questioned regarding what logical clusters could be identified, and what generalized characteristics each axis could be interpreted as having. The results for axis 1 were interpretations such as; “the terrain/space”, “time/space/forces in traditional military thinking”, and “strategic effects of the operational environment on units’ organization and requirements of capabilities”. Axis 2 was interpreted as “thinking of the context”, however not as clear as axis 1 interpretations. This result corresponds to the study interpretations; axis 1; conceptual thinking and axis 2; contextual thinking, which supports an assessment of the validity of the model in general.

The result from the MCA/SPAD work, based on the interview questions, is viewed to have validity and reliability for position results in the graphs. Regarding the qualitative interpretation of a higher abstraction of generalized thinking on tactics, as well as on tactics in Irregular Warfare, the result is argued to present military logic from a sample with clear differences in spaces of experiences, but rather similar traditions of horizons of expectations, regarding the purpose of Swedish military power. Concerning the normative comparison with the descriptive result, a set of military doctrines was used. This part of the study can be viewed to contain a lower degree of precision, as the degree of variable existence was analysed qualitatively and from a habituated pre-understanding.

Furthermore, there are limited connections to the total doctrine structures within each nation, though such pre-understanding and knowledge has existed indirectly due to previous work. The assessment of reasoning validity in the form of face validity or sense, in relation to common military knowledge is however, that the results capture what the texts articulate.

In sum, the work and the methods in this study are perceived as encompassing an acceptable ‘robustness’ and level of validity and reliability. An almost full population, a traceable result from a method, a relatively thorough description, positioning the researcher out of direct result impact and a traceable comparison with normative texts, all claim to present reliable work with transferable considerations of the chosen methods and references to the sources. Reliability is also supported by the scope of the description of the theory and method used. The work is argued to have been presented with a reasonable degree of transparency, although in this case, not following Bourdieu’s way, according to some criticism levelled against his work²⁰⁰.

²⁰⁰ Donald Broady (ed.), ‘Kultur och utbildning. Om Pierre Bourdieus sociologi’, *UHÄ/FoU-skriftserie* 1985:4: Universitets- och högskoleämbetet, FoU-enheten, p. 9.

Donald Broady, *Sociologi och epistemologi. Pierre Bourdieus författarskap och den historiska epistemologin*, andra korrigerade upplagan (Stockholm: HLS Förlag, 1991), p. 541.

5.3 Military mind-set – the dynamics of tactical and strategic thought

The results consist of a qualitative model of a space of current tactical thought on Irregular Warfare, comprising four rather different tactical types; Regular Warfare context with ranger tactics (RW rangers), Regular Warfare context with mechanized tactics (RW mechanized) versus Irregular/Hybrid Warfare context with either infantry tactics (HW infantry) or mechanized tactics (HW mechanized).

A quantitative result was obtained regarding the graphical distribution of the officers individually over these four tactical types. That result disclosed a rather even distribution over the four tactical types, also excluding individuals who positioned close to centre. A large number of officers (31 of 43) positioned less centric-close over the four tactical types in the space of statements. Six battalion commanders could be found in the left parts of the space versus three in the right parts. Of four ranger unit associated officers, three were found in the left parts. Mechanized or mechanized infantry unit commanders were spread over all tactical types, as were several of the company commanders. The strongest structuring feature concerned conceptual thinking; small/large or small units, operating dispersed with reconnaissance or combined combat/reconnaissance, on the left side of the space. And opposite, larger units operating collectively with combat tasks, positioned on the right side of the model. Two features are identified by this. The commanders distribute all over the tactical types, with the most obvious standpoint differences concerning conceptual solutions; one group being rather Small Wars-centric, and the other more Regular Warfare focused.

Compared with the model of tactical types referred to in the research situation description: the developed Archer Jones' generic model which deals with relationships between tactical types, this model is argued to have quite another and more multifaceted applicability.²⁰¹ This study's qualitative model of the space of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare contains four generic tactical types and a sociologically structure of background factors, making this construction, arguably, more representative when searching for a human face of war, compared to Storri's development of Archer's model. Furthermore, the model in this study questions Anthony King's claim of a convergence of knowledge and standpoints in the ongoing military transformation.²⁰²

If such a structure indeed exists, as the model outlines, one can expect different tactical mind-sets, opposing each other. Downsizing the land forces might also lead to further struggles of interest. If so, different types of interest groupings, according to tactical preferences, might emerge. The results bring forward different possible consequences for tactical development per se. Taking the basic capabilities: Command and Control, Intelligence/Information, Protection, Sustainability, Mobility and Effects on targets as a discussion base, one can argue for several differences: when it comes to training, equipment, organization and production.

²⁰¹ p. 11. regarding the Archer Jones model.

²⁰² p. 12. Anthony Kings argument regarding a knowledge and standpoint convergence.

The previously described summary chart presented some general characteristics stated to be different when comparing the tactical types²⁰³. The differences in basic capabilities can be said to cover more or less all capabilities, thus leading to different needs for education, training, equipment and organizations in order to conceptualize each tactical type. A way to conceptualize a practical meaning for the four tactical types can be to discuss the span and consequences in practice. Examples of such discussion areas are: task focus such as combat and/or intelligence, organizational structures, such as independently operating smaller units, patrols, platoon and companies, or larger formations, such as battalions and brigades as manoeuvre elements, sustainability demands, effects focus and capability requirements for only visible activities or mostly concealed/ clandestine approaches.

As the result show preferences for Small Wars with great demands on intelligence, larger warfare focusing on combat and also in “combination or Hybrid Warfare”, three meta-types of conceptual thinking or preferences can be distinguished. Two of these are more traditionally well-known: ranger/infantry and mechanized tactics, based on thought and practice with a focus on specialization for each particular use and environment. The third, combined thinking can be realized either with several specialized units under a higher command or with units containing more of both types of capabilities.

The first conceptual approach demands a certain volume of units permitting such specialization; this is not possible in the current and planned Swedish Army. The second solution demands training and exercise time and resources that result in more multi-role capable ground force units. This solution seems, at least in the current and near time perspective, also hard to realize. Different preferences and tactical thinking, per se, a valuable asset in an officer corps, will enhance the discourse development of tactics with different views and arguments on “best solutions”.

A challenge seems to exist as to what degree the arguments and opinions rest on practical experiences, deeper knowledge and understanding, on what is possible to achieve with differently trained and equipped units. Or, putting it into a Bourdieu-Koselleck perspective; on what practical sense are the tactical choices resting, due to the existing spaces of tactical experiences and horizons of strategic expectations? As the results show a large proportion of traditional Regular Warfare thinking exists, even when asked to articulate thinking in Irregular Warfare, such a tradition seems to be quite timeless and can be expected to exist in the future. Still, the slightly more dominant Small War preferences exist and might linger on and influence tactical thinking, despite the historically intermittent interest of Irregular Warfare in the western world. Again, this result does not support a view of convergence regarding views of tactics in Irregular Warfare. Conclusions from previous discussions indicate on the contrary that tactics can be understood and thought of rather differently and dualistically, even when focusing on the same type of context.

²⁰³ Figure 17. Examples of some basic capabilities and characteristics argued different for the four tactical types, p. 77.

Context understanding can therefore be said to be of significant importance for tactical thinking. Different tactical models or types will be more or less suitable in different contexts or scenarios. The ability to adapt to different tactical models is thus of high value. Education in tactics is subsequently suggested to contribute to a variety of tactical types/thinking, with capabilities that are traditional, but particularly non-traditional. A degree of caution regarding expected or taken for granted spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations is suggested. Given the often limited resources for field exercises of dignity, where units and functions are tested for extensive times, different tactical type experiences will probably seldom be found in one and the same officer. That might be the case to an even greater extent looking at Hybrid Warfare context based concepts. The same goes for tactical thought daring to combine more unorthodox or mechanized tactics with, for example, ranger tactics, not only on the operational level but also the tactical level.

A conclusion is that staffs, for planning and directing operations, have to have different tactical experts to a greater extent than ordinary organisational structures in the future. Conversely, with such variations of tactical preferences in a field unit collective, it is not self-evident that either traditional mechanized tactical thinking or modern Hybrid Warfare tactical thinking for Counterinsurgency Operations automatically will be found among staff members in a battalion or brigade staff. If expertise in Regular Warfare as well as Hybrid Warfare tactics is required, more extensive training for officers, units and soldiers in each of the different areas probably has to be organized; at least as long as larger real life field exercises are rare. Different expertise competence has always been necessary in staff organizations, this is nothing new. The novelty might however be requirements for both forms of tactics in the same units and staffs, as in Hybrid Warfare scenarios.

A concern can be a potential future lack of tactical competence, due to the combination of a widening strategy (demanding ability in Regular as well as in Irregular/Hybrid Warfare) and broadening tactical thought habituating effects in different tactical types, leading to more limited practice experience opportunities. Command assignments for field units frequently in use in real operations or at least extensive field exercises might also in the future be rare. Current general opinion of declining tactical competence from the tactical teacher and trainer collective will in such a case be supported by this study's results.

Looking at the actual positions of the officers in the space of statements, including the theoretical principle normative position from current COIN doctrines on tactics, the view of both scattered and different descriptive positions is supported. The normative COIN doctrines, including current Swedish Army texts, can be argued to contain a mainly Hybrid Warfare context thinking and as for concepts, a more mixed focus for capabilities primarily for smaller operations, however, not excluding larger units' operations for certain situations.

If different types of tactics are argued to place different demands on the basic functions and thus are a part of the future officer corps capabilities and skills, new requirements for high tactical adaption potentiality seem to be one consequence. If so, two separate areas of concerns are distinguishable. First, the knowledge and skills in practical tactics: secondly, acquired and developed and honed capability to adapt to different situations/contexts, violence, tasks and tactical composition in several perspectives. Examples are time, space, forces, physically, mentally and ethically.

The ability to adapt to different circumstances as different enemies, violence, culture, tactics, the people etc. are repeatedly emphasized, regarding Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations²⁰⁴. Differences or relations between tactical preferences are arguably important aspects for new adaption requirements of the modern officer profession, asked to be capable of operating in Regular Warfare, as well as in Irregular Warfare scenarios. What seems important is then to view the requirements of adaption in at least three ways. First; an adaption from Regular Warfare tactics to Irregular Warfare with focus on COIN Operations. Secondly, the other way round, and thirdly regarding a high adaption potential inside each warfare area. Such a demand means; to be able to think “outside the box” from different perspectives, and then not to be statically thinking in the new box, and finally, to be able to turn back to the traditional box, which might be an inner and generic challenge for officers’ thought on tactics.

For Swedish officers, a further challenge exists, due to a period of more limited thinking and acting in Regular Warfare tactics, especially in higher units and also regarding utility, function and capability of various functions and units. This means that even if an officer regards Intelligence, ranger operations, low visibility capabilities, Electronic Warfare and Psychological Operations as important capabilities in order to organize a particular task group unit, he or she might not be used to doing this in practice.

If task-group thinking, or the combined arms principle, is also adopted down at platoon level, this will also be a challenge because such training does not yet exist for platoon leaders in the Swedish army. The overall results of the open questions unveil that the battalion and company commanding officers, seen as a collective, have a diversified view on tactics in Irregular Warfare, leaning on a tradition of a Regular Warfare military paradigm or a more generic problem-solving approach. Only partly is the thought focused on challenges in an irregular scenario.

Moral and conceptual aspects and Command & Control questions together with functional aspects, such as Intelligence in particular, are highlighted as concerns in this kind of tactical thought. Personal experiences, influences and exercises are considered to affect tactical preferences the most. If this is correct, there is room for more educational development in order to enhance influences while the amount of live exercises is limited. Also the views of practical life experiences from war or combat operations reveal grounds for discussing the role of research in order to facilitate lessons learned processes.

²⁰⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, (2006), p. 196. Learning and Adapting, p. 252. The Learning Imperative.

If a command group for ground forces gives low priority to the area of tactics and at the same time, there is a need for development, such a scenario might result in frictions and power struggles in the whole field of tactics. Still, if half of this group seldom speaks and discusses the area, such a risk might be limited. Such a result opens up for situations with contradictory views between the headquarters and the field commanders in general. Other questions seem currently to be of more immediate interest. Putting this in relation to the common view that tactics is considered to be more interesting than strategy and operational art, no aspect of War Studies seems to gain any higher interest from unit commanders. This is however no surprise since an Army under transformation struggles with production questions to a higher degree, compared to issues of tactics, operational art and strategy. However, the consequences of this might reach a level where education on tactics has to be re-thought in conjunction with education in strategy.

A final conclusion regarding the dynamics of a tactics and strategic mind-set, is that cause-effect scenarios seem important to study further within the officer's education in War Studies, as is the case for an Armed Forces' development of capabilities. Even more important, I suggest, that the strategic level recognizes what tactical thought is at hand, based on previous strategic decisions, spaces of experiences and culturally formed tactical horizon of expectations. Articulations of tactics, argued to be based on experiences and narratives, tell a story regarding the view of status, problems, challenges and also possibilities of making strategy. Such stories can be posed against the normative and rhetoric strategic articulations in doctrines and directives, and should be considered when formulating a new strategy. Is the current strategy in line with tactical thought? If not, what relational characteristics can be identified for actors arguing for either a relevance of the strategy or the tactical thought at hand? Identification of characteristics in tactical thought might thus be an indicator or a tool to identify indications of disconnection between strategy and tactics.

5.4 The dynamics of operational art and tactics

Viewing operational art generically as the thinking and activities performed at the operational level, aiming to solve strategic problems with the use of adequate tactical resources, one can see it as an activity that uses ways of thinking tactics all over the operational area, over extended time periods, in order to achieve results that bring forward strategic effects serving political goals. This switch board of military thinking on the operational level has subsequently to deal with several parallel and successive challenges. A generally accepted view can be said to be that the challenges differ with the mission context and if the war fighting can be characterized as mainly Regular or Irregular Warfare.

Most officers and units are commonly trained in a Regular Warfare perspective with the military traditions and culture, and can be said to have their roots in the perception of Regular Warfare. Working then in an Irregular Warfare context involves challenges parallel in time, space and regarding forces' conceptual thinking of "the people" as well as enemies, using a broad spectrum of violent threats. Challenges will probably occur, depending on what effects are chosen to correspond to a large number of targets/influence goals.

In general, all this is to be done with too few resources of ground forces units, subsequently in need of distant fire support (e.g. air assets, drones) in an environment where the enemy is hard to identify and detect. Parallel thinking will be required, taking the protection of the people as number one priority, including the support of under-resourced civilian society-building by a ruling government.

Operational art easily becomes challenging work even if the tools, the tactical resources, can be identically handled and used by a commander's tactical thought in the same way and thus provide the operational level with a unified and stable tool-kit. If the tactical thought however differs, also on how to act in the same scenario *conceptually*, a new dimension of challenges rises for the operational commander. In short, diversified tactical thought might produce new needs for knowledge and control of tactical status on the operational level, different compared to the more traditional thinking in Regular Warfare tactics and operational art. Looking closer, several areas are included in operational art, such as Intelligence, Logistics and Information Operations (and increasingly, co-operation with conventional forces and Special Operations Forces) which are challenged in new ways in Irregular and Hybrid Warfare scenarios. These challenges will subsequently be different if tactical preferences also move between a combat focus of large forces, collectively operating, and on the other hand, focus on Intelligence and distributed operations by smaller forces.

If the operational staffs have to handle a Hybrid scenario with both regular and irregular opponents in parallel, diversified tactical thinking probably produces even more challenges. When to use what tactical resources and commanders for what tasks, aiming for what effects, will be a question that might reveal a new need of more personal and deeper knowledge between operational and tactical commanders, compared to what has been thought to be needed in the school of mission command in Regular Warfare in general. On the other hand, as long as thorough knowledge of units' capabilities exists, a diversified palette of tactical thought promotes more and new options for broadened operational art.

A broadened spectrum of activities in combination with few troops and units over extended areas for long periods of time has developed tactical thought in task groups down to squad levels. Operational art, in the sense of design and coordinating joint effects, has moved down to platoon leader level, for which training is seldom designed in Sweden. This means that a form of operational art competence is needed at least in battalion staffs, which generally are not designed for such work. The relational consequences of a broadened operational art spectrum in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare is increasingly affecting the tactical level, meeting a diversified field of tactical thought, which might be different than meeting a unified field of tactical preferences. Such diversity does question King's argument regarding a convergence of military knowledge. In general, the conclusion is that such a range of tactical preferences needs to be observed and identified differently at the operational level compared to Regular Warfare scenarios. The preconditions for operational art and even opportunities to perform operational planning and execution of a set of combined and joint tactical missions, will need knowledge and understanding of tactical thought, performance possibilities and limitations, to meet strategic goals in a more actor-centric approach.

Here, this means tactical approach which is to be expected of one's own units. Not least, in order to be able to identify preconditions which realistically connect to strategy. Such knowledge should be sought at the operational level, in order to be able to produce practical operational art, making strategic sense in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare scenarios.

Today, a commonly viewed role of operational art is to transform strategic needs to tactical missions, which are realistic to accomplish. From the tactical perspective, a task is to understand and transform tactical realities at hand, back to the strategic thinking, thus making the relational aspect of strategy and tactics alive, real and matching. Such a consequence for operational art could create a developmental need, when it comes to education of officers in Joint Warfare in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare scenarios. A combination of traditionally limited interest for Irregular Warfare in general, a limited interest in tactics in the Armed Forces, and rather dispersed tactical thinking in the officer corps, seem to be a warning sign for a strategy chosen, which requires capabilities in both Regular and Irregular Warfare. Particularly, it has to be noted that Irregular Warfare is also distinct from Regular Warfare as a way of thinking about violence in society. In Irregular Warfare, violence is not clearly separated from everyday life.

This threatens as well as challenges the legal, structural, organizational structures that constitute social order. To handle challenges of this order may require further analysis by the politicians, the military and law enforcement structures, regarding rules of engagement, in order to defend social order. Seen from a military theoretical perspective, the results indicate a certain breadth and scope of tactics in land operations against an irregular opponent that currently is seldom found in normative texts or more experience-based literature. Nor has officer education equally prioritized the four relatively different tactical types presented. This construction might be the result of generations of national defence thinking, a long period of extensive operations in the Balkans and later in Afghanistan and a certain military social and cultural inheritance. If so, a question arises if it is an appropriate and wanted heritage and, if there are reasons to discuss the results relative to the education in War Studies regarding tactics-strategy in particular.

This study has indicated that the ideal of Regular Warfare tactics lives on and is still thought to be the most important to be skilled in, also to such a degree that about half of the field commanders in 2011 (with rather an extensive space of experiences in Irregular Warfare tactics in the Balkans and Afghanistan during the last 20 years) position themselves mostly in thinking in Regular Warfare terms, even when the discussed scenario is quite the opposite. Still, the other half of the population clearly states tactical preference with a wider battle-environment contextualization, involving the civil dimension and non-kinetic effects. This is an example which directly knits strategy with the needs of tactical competences and resources together. If being tasked to act with military force in some sort of Irregular Warfare context that will particularly alter the environment of the civil dimension, such competences (e.g. a military police function and adapted intelligence apparatus down to low-level unit structures) might be suitable to be included earlier in conceptual thinking, education and training.

This leads to my conclusion that indicators of tactical preferences might be used, also outside mere tactical discussions, as indicators of operational and strategic thinking. Certain characteristics of articulated thinking, to a greater or lesser extent rely on real-life habituating spaces of experiences. These might indicate a larger span in horizons of expectations that only marginally corresponds to military strategic narratives, such as doctrines. Obviously, what matters in practice is how practical tactics, coordinated by operational art, support chosen strategy. In order to close in to such possibilities, education and training in operational art and strategic thought should include tactical thought and preferences. The indications of broadened tactical thought can be viewed as much in relation to operational art and strategic thinking as to risks and possibilities within the realm of tactical development and adaption per se. Different tactical thought and preferences in Irregular Warfare contexts might be the result of a clash between existing military ideals and political strategic ambitions or happenings. The positive side is that a palette of tactical thought might indicate different ways of thinking and articulating preferences that can contribute to a critical and more self-reflective way of living with and arguing for tactics per se, and in conjunction with strategy and operational art.

The results of the study provide a potential challenge, because of the existence of two major and possibly contradictory principles: understanding and performing tactics in Irregular Warfare either as Regular Warfare or as Hybrid Warfare. The results of such diversified thought are however not unexpected, because of the combination of Swedish traditions and on the other hand, ten years of operations in Afghanistan, soon coming to an end. However, for the first time, the results are scientifically verified for the situation in 2011 and show several aspects to reflect upon in the development of War Studies, as well as aspects corresponding less well to views articulated in the new Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine, where the classic COIN approach is clearly underlined as contrary to a Regular Warfare approach, even in Irregular Warfare scenarios. For the Swedish Armed Forces, the situation of less discussions and no definitions of Irregular Warfare changed in 2011 in the new Military Strategy Doctrine, which included texts on the subject. These articulations must however be considered as a first step on a long way to broaden and deepen existing military theory rooted in the Swedish military culture and social space and capital structure, which prioritize Regular Warfare as a system that has been avoiding less technical profiles amongst the people.

The results obtained by using an adapted field theory show that very different standpoints exist in certain aspects of tactical preferences for Irregular Warfare with a potential of practical consequences for military education, training and unit production. Power struggles might emerge where traditional military thought is challenged with possibly new and innovative military tactical thinking. Struggles might emerge at different levels and new requirements for prioritizing seem obvious. Choices on what core tactics should be the hallmark of the Swedish military practical profession seem to be necessary to be decided, if a more unified mind-set is preferred in reality and not only articulated in normative standards. Also a discussion on how education should be structured and organized is suggested. Classical divisions with compartments of strategy education and operational art and tactics, might not be the best choices if one wants to discuss different adaption possibilities between tactics and strategy.

5.5 Warfare, a comprehensive approach to viewing strategy and tactics as an interrelated whole.

Symbolic value is argued to exist in articulating an endeavour for a comprehensive view regarding strategy and tactics as synonymous with warfare as a whole. Evidently, strategy and tactics need operational art in order to achieve task solving over time and space, but the discussion here focuses on the areas of strategy and tactics for two reasons.

The first is an experienced view that these areas are often treated separately and not comprehensively. The second reason is that this study indicates rather diversified and dualistic tactical preferences. Operational art can be viewed as an area that has gained a high degree of interest and process training with NATO standards for several years. Traditional separate writings, discussions and studies of strategy and tactics seem therefore particularly challenging when dealing with Irregular Warfare, covering the whole violence and interest span, including the two segments of civilian and military functions intermingling.

Warfare is used here, with the meaning of a combination of strategy and tactics, as is also operational art; to be designed for the actual operational area. The phenomenon of Irregular Warfare does invite and demand an understanding with a dynamic mind-set, open to a comprehensive view of warfare as a whole. The purpose is however, not to invent a new label or definition that comprises a combined approach for strategy and tactics. It is about a theoretical and practical approach that in fact creates such a more inclusive and holistic perspective and the very point of doing so when addressing the area of warfare, is in fact two-fold.

First, it is to do so inclusively and relationally, aiming to produce knowledge on characteristics; on who thinks (and struggles) about different standpoints on strategy, tactics and operational art. Secondly, to serve as a model, where different strategic and tactical standpoints can be identified and discussed together. “Warfare amongst the people”, to paraphrase Rupert Smith’s famous book *The Utility of Force*,²⁰⁵ seems to be a research and educational area in need of greater comprehensive military theory and less segmental perspectives, in particular, such that do not expound the view of Small Warfare or Kleinkriege.

In contemporary articulations of Irregular Warfare, the challenges regarding military and civilian intermingling are well observed and elaborated on, even if still not solved. However, regarding the military dimension, such as thinking and acting according to the large warfare tradition, or solely or blended with the more unorthodox principles of Small Wars, there is an unbalance. The principles of Small Wars cannot anymore be regarded as a niche for Special forces or ranger units in limited resource armies, as the western armies have become. The warfare style of Small Wars should on the contrary, it is argued, be needed, emphasized and included for every officer in their education, aimed at the requirements for knowledge of Regular Warfare principles.

²⁰⁵ Smith, *The Utility of Force* (2007).

Or, following the earlier discussion; warfare, including principles for the Big, as well as Small Warfare principles, is argued as a new approach. Such an approach as mentioning Small Warfare principles could enhance adaption capabilities and cohesion in Hybrid Warfare in the future, e.g. when new, problematic Counterinsurgency contexts reappear. Also, seldom discussed, capability in Small Warfare is still the obvious option if losing against a more capable aggressor. Such an outcome has to be a consideration for smaller Armed Forces.

A Small Warfare approach does clearly challenge the view of warfare norms of the 19th and 20th century within the military establishment and fields of thought; again placing the concept of field in the frontline for research efforts. The research results indicate a duality in tactical thought, even in this rather uniform sample of field commanders on tactical level, and they support the conclusion that similar investigations should be done with operational and strategic decision-makers. Subsequently, the concern should be directed to what relational characteristics can be found regarding the whole construction of tactics, operational art and strategy, as well as regarding decision-makers at these levels.

5.6 Scientific reflections on field characteristics

The question if the proposed space of statements is linked to some sort of social field, and not simply a mapping of standpoints, is argued valuable for several reasons. A mapping of a previously unknown area, such as contemporary tactical thought is argued interesting in itself, unveiling possible dualistic or complementary areas between groups of officers. With the knowledge of background factors as properties, e.g. rank, command role, unit affiliation, international mission experiences and experiences of combat, new dimensions are obtained to be explored. Such a discussion has been presented and the structural results were identified with fairly clear differences of positions in the space regarding unit affiliation, unit type and military background, international mission area experiences, numbers of missions, age and civilian education.

Different positions have been observed, giving indications of social or military cultural properties that create structures in the space. This space could be a sub-field of a larger field, if sufficient autonomy is at hand. Such a larger field could concern a bigger area than just “*tactics in Irregular Warfare*”, possibly the interconnected areas in “*The Swedish military field of tactics and strategy*”. Such a possible field consists of a far larger population than 43 commanders of field units, from e.g. the headquarters, staffs, military schools, centres and also involving other types of units from e.g. engineer, logistics and artillery units. For such an investigation, significantly more information would be required, which is possible to collect. It is also vital to discuss the question of autonomy, whether or not it is a field at all, or possibly some sort of sub-field. In order to be able to consider autonomy in a practical social space, requirements should exist. Values that are recognized, rewards, value hierarchies, individual entry requirements, communicated standpoints on attitudes, principles, behaviours and personal identifications are examples of such requirements. Viewing the military system, it is easy to find such structures at several levels.

The rank hierarchy is the most obvious example with very clear personal identifications. Of another kind, honour appreciations such as medals, ribbons and signs on the uniform, are examples of properties of symbolic capital. However, there are no such attributes related to preferences of tactics or strategy, apart from Regular or Irregular priorities. Still, there exist norms and traditions of a military culture valuing different war fighting approaches. The COIN doctrines in this study are good examples of normative value standards, even in a hierarchical order; strategic doctrines set the overarching standards for operational and tactical doctrines. Here different positions are indicated in the model of the space of statements by officers with different properties, in particular, common for officers with some sort of ranger affiliation, though on the contrary for officers with mechanized affiliation. Another aspect important to observe in a possible sub-field is, if any particular understanding, or taken for granted truth exists empirically or is supported by narratives. Here we have diverging and unstable perceptions related to tactics in general (the mechanized assault, ranger tactics and infantry primacy) and dualistic thought regarding Irregular Warfare: the hard-handed kinetic, enemy-centric approach versus the people-centric, security-supporting and defensive approach.

It must however be considered unwise to try to argue for some “field or sub-field of tactics” as strategy is what (supposedly) sets the higher values and principles for handling violence using tactics through operational art. Several aspects speak therefore against viewing the space of tactical thought on Irregular Warfare as some existing or potential sub-field in being, per se. Tactical thought should instead be linked to strategy and operational art, and such a comprehensive space of military thought might very well bear marks of being a field. The studied space of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare has however qualities of relational structures in itself, supporting an argument of being part, or sub-part of such a larger field.

Still, a supposed space of military thought has to qualify for certain criteria to be argued as being a field. As in the earlier parts of the theoretical and methodological choices and presentations, we have to discuss the character of autonomy (a specific art of capital, a certain structure of polarities, a certain space of possibilities, certain recognitions and value systems, a certain doxa, certain “illusio”, certain consecrational instances and mechanisms for transforming imported themes and discussions to their own logic.²⁰⁶ As long as we discuss the doxa regarding warfare in its most common and narrated form, Regular Warfare with combating mechanized armies, it is easy to find versions of tactical perceptions linked to services such as infantry, mechanized units and, ranger principles of tactics, though the latter to a lesser degree.

Obviously correspondingly, one finds a clear consecrational structure and tradition within the educational and rank system, as in the former exercise structure. However, such a structure and tradition does not exist related to Irregular Warfare, at least not concerning Counterinsurgency Operations. Turning instead to the very use of Irregular Warfare principles we do find the long standing ranger tradition from the 17th century still existing, however, currently overshadowed by the mechanized paradigm.

²⁰⁶ Broady, *Kulturens fält*, (ed) 1998), pp. 11-26. “Inledning: en verktygslåda för studier av fält”, pp.11-26.

Moreover, discussing combined operations with ranger units and mechanized units has not yet become a natural tactical, or operational art discussion. The Regular Warfare tradition lingers on; partly questioned in Irregular Warfare contexts, particularly due to international military thought developments since around 2008. We can let Antony King's argument of trans-nationalization of military thought support this view.

What does that mean in that case, for a supposed "field of Swedish military thought"? Does it exist any longer at all or has it evaporated into a "western field of military thought"? Has the revival of Irregular Warfare meant a diffusion of an earlier national field of military thought or do we stand on the brink of quite a new content and value distribution in an old field? The field theory informs us that three dimensions or aspects are said to affect a field's presence, its structure, agents' choices and the existing opportunities. Bourdieu's view of the future of a field is; *"a field's future is at every moment inscribed in its structure, agent's ability to realize the objective potentials as determined by the relationship between agents' abilities and the opportunities that are objectively inscribed in the field."*²⁰⁷ The question of what abilities the agents have based on and what opportunities they are able to recognise, involves intellectual and practical thinking, understandings and actions. If thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare partly corresponds and contradicts the Regular Warfare perception, a struggle is probably going to take place.

Will the classic principles of Small Wars be involved and recognized as a developed understanding of warfare (as in the 16th and 17th centuries) or will it once again be forgotten? The answer goes beyond the area of Swedish military thought, but is still a part of the same. In all, we can see signs of a questioned doxa of warfare and, which is also a question of military sociology; if knowledge is sought regarding the character of thought driving structures. The agents' positions in this study and relationships to "the field of military thought", could thus be seen as belonging to a possible subset in the total area of preferences that incorporate aspects of both Regular, Irregular, and Hybrid Warfare, or in short; *Warfare*. Such a possible field of military thought is likely to be found at a higher level, consisting of both strategy and tactics.

The indications of a social space regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare, with a diverse preference structure, feed the question of character and structural pattern in this larger field. Diverse tactical thinking in a nowadays recognized context of conflicts, questions the strategic thinking distribution in a larger field of military thought. What social, cultural, and obviously economic and symbolic capital distributions are possible to unveil beneath articulated standpoints of military thought of strategy and tactics in general? These are the kinds of larger questions that this Bourdieu inspired approach to the concepts of field theory and capital concept will inevitably lead to.

²⁰⁷ Bourdieu, *Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori*, (2004), p. 13.

5.7 Concluding Reflection

This section presents a reflection on the dissertation work as a whole, in particular regarding the theoretical and methodological decisions, the result per se on statements and background factors and finally, regarding the result in conjunction with strategy, operational art and subjects outside the War Studies domain.

Inspired by Bourdieu, reflection has become an interesting subject for me.²⁰⁸ Adapting the principle of analysis, and becoming aware of one's biases is of course in line with field theory work. The sociological aspect, strangely almost unnoticed in military research in War Studies, opens up for several new perspectives for explanations or further hypothesis. Turning to myself, some areas of biases deserve to be observed. The first is a longer period in the military forces, working directly or indirectly with Small Wars-related activities; ranger tactics, anti-ranger tactics and different kinds of troop reconnaissance matters. A perception has been installed that the military system and career officers in general, prefer and value Regular Warfare capabilities and ideals. Knowledge or interests regarding war fighting capabilities for Irregular Warfare have been uncommon based on my own space of experience. Attitudes such as ignorance, romanticism, oversimplifications and sometimes unrealistic expectations from ranger units have on the other hand been possible to observe, also affecting parts of my horizon of expectations.

A confession to a view on tactics in general as a neglected area in War Studies research and a declining competence among the officer corps has produced a desire to highlight this subject per se. Another interest, of the individual, formed by working in and with smaller unit structures, such as combat divers and naval anti-sabotage units, has paved the way for a focus on officers' tactical thought and measuring statements and background factors. Such a combined interest for a subject, in a certain context, and the view of the importance and impact potentiality of individuals, existed before the meeting with Bourdieu. That meeting did however, conceptualize and visualize a theoretical and methodological approach which embraced my own thinking, values and preferences. A particular taste for the Bourdieu focus on practical sense and research work, the empirical digging, his criticism of the "the noble and fine culture research", his academic journey from philosophy to sociology and his research start in Algeria during the 50s, with writings from that period on challenges of Counterinsurgency, also contributed to the choice of approach for the dissertation. Several arguments and opinions regarding the severe and profound social deconstruction following the steps of an insurgency can be found in *Algerian Sketches* (2013).²⁰⁹ Returning to the subject of reflexivity, if one wants to examine on what basis a work really stands, aiming for a high degree of inter-subjectivity, education is needed on what is meant and how to relate it to already basic methodological courses.

²⁰⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). This book is recommended as an introduction of reflection and its application.

²⁰⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Algerian Sketches*, texts edited and presented by Tassadit Yacine. Translated by David Fernbach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). Examples can be found on pp. 86, 95-96, 109, 110-114, 92-103, 94-95.

A tradition focused on transparency in the methodological choices would benefit from highlighting the reflexivity principle. Who has done the research and what sociological and cultural patterns might there be possible to reveal? The importance of reflexivity and practical use of such an approach to research work is a clear message from Bourdieu, accompanied with strong criticism that this principle should be adopted a lot more by the whole of science work, in particular social science work. The researcher is, according to Bourdieu, required “*to work towards constructing a scientific truth capable of integrating the observer’s vision and the truth of the practical vision of the agent as a point of view which is unaware of being a point of view and is experienced in the illusion of absoluteness*”²¹⁰.

Such a need for a socio-analysis of the researcher to unveil biases, concerns what is expected and required in academic works. Visions exist of the neutrality of the researcher, even though there are arguably fewer demands for articulated views on one’s own biases. This applies to methodological values and preferences and also social and cultural effects that might have habituated views, of which one no longer is directly aware. The sociological and also the psychological views are sometimes underestimated, in my opinion. When entering research areas such as war and warfare, particularly outside the traditional paradigm, this might become problematic. Taking on a dissertation in the normative and academic culture world, where the ideal of objectivity is repeatedly emphasized, at the same time as everybody confesses to the practical impossibility of living up to that standard, Bourdieu’s clarity on this matter has been refreshing. His philosophical view, deeply focusing on self-reflection and living a reflexive life in order to reach new ways of enlightenment and self-realization, have appealed to me; they are close to my own way of thinking and feeling in most perspectives, of which I am aware.

Regarding the methodological approach, an interest for relational focus has been awakened. If some sort of different opinions of ideas, which in certain ways contradict or challenge important values for the actors/agents can be identified (resource or power/influence gain or loss, is one very obvious value), a relation is at hand, or might be predictable. A development of personal thinking on objectivity and truth has evolved from an earlier attempt on “better methods” and very detailed observations and analyses, to a deeper interest in who the actors are behind the ideas, and what biases they can be presumed or suspected to have. Statements, no matter what about, can clearly be analysed with Correspondence Analysis.

Capital and field concepts can be applied, as here, not pretending or presuming to analyse an actual or probable field per se. The tools are possible to be used in several social science applications, as a part or whole of War Studies, in order to indicate relational characteristics in spaces of statements combined with sociological features outlined. Such sociologically framing of spaces of statements is arguably a new empirically-based research paradigm in War Studies.

²¹⁰ Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity* (2001), pp. 115-116.

Sociological studies of spaces might generate arguments of field existences, potentialities of a field emerging or declining or possible field characteristics (de facto identified or assumed to have potentiality) and with that, I argue thus for the use of field theory beyond the questions of field or not. It is however, wise to take into consideration that quite some time is needed for both reading and understanding this sort of thinking purely theoretically, and then a good proportion of time to also basically learn and run computer aided correspondence analysis programs such as SPAD.

Such kinds of empirical work with sociology for identification of structuring patterns of different phenomena, particularly within an area as difficult to measure as war and warfare, belong to exploratory works in Swedish War Studies. This could however be argued to be an appropriate approach for a young subject undergoing a process of academic forming while finding its way as an autonomous discipline. The paradigms of War Studies and military history, with their measuring focus of non-sociological and technical aspects, as well as Strategic Studies with their way-finding between Security Studies and International Relations, are all well-known. However, this is not the case regarding the tradition of self-reflection. The result per se, of a stated diversified and dualistic space of tactical thinking in Irregular Warfare might be of a more temporary interest as a discussion platform in tactical education, such as an example of an argued relational potentiality regarding tomorrow's practical discussions and consequences for land forces tactics.

That result could however, be argued to be of a wider interest in relation to strategy and operational art. If new interests arose for such a change in this non-comprehensive state of approach due to the results presented here, it would be an outcome that might challenge values for certain actors. In such a case, power struggles might emerge in the larger field of political-military thinking and practice. Using theories and methods that can be attributed to constructionism generally, I argue that I have worked transparently from my own ethos, have adapted some analytical tools relevant for analysing and exploring possible positions of standpoints, relationship tendencies and sociological characteristic structures. By this approach, I have been able to present new and important information on the character of a subject not before researched in this manner.

The result of this methodology delivers a possibility to detect or uncover potential power characteristics in the discourse of contemporary tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. This way of examining issues related to fighting structures might however be of greater value than solely for use with the group of Swedish officers' articulated preference of tactics. A traditional officer education with a limited relational approach, risks repetitive work on subjects hiding or avoiding practical influence from sociological perspectives. A relational approach is a way to challenge existing paradigms and doxa taken for granted. Views of human practice and sense should therefore be included to spark off a living, critical and creative theoretical and methodological discussion for a subject such as War Studies.

5.8 Conclusions

Views and articulations on tactics is not a uniform discourse, particularly not when regarding so-called Irregular Warfare. As a new phenomenon for the Swedish military organization and officer collective ways of thinking, tactics in Irregular Warfare exist, emerge and structure dynamically or statically, fragile or more constant. Older more stable military social networks represented by regimental and field unit affiliations with ranger traditions consecrate and reproduce Small War thinking. Others, also traditional structures, such as the mechanized traditions are under development and not any longer solely reproducing a traditional Regular Warfare mind-set focusing on combat with large unit formations.

On the contrary, signs of new ways of tactical thinking that highlight intelligence-focused and distributed operation concepts clearly exist. Still, without a prominent and strong direction from the military strategy policy-makers, such ambitions risk to be marginalized due to generations of a habituated culture and tradition of Regular Warfare ideals. When traditional thought on tactics meets other needs in practice, such as in multinational COIN Operations, social networks emerge, questioning old thoughts and shaping new thinking. Existing social structures, such as regiments and unchanged unit structures consecrate and reproduce, as well as shape new thinking. An internationalization of tactics in Irregular Warfare has emerged, normatively parallel with the still strong living tradition and doxa of Regular Warfare as the highest ideal and a derivative of threat perception. However, no sign of convergence in tactical thought in Irregular Warfare has been identified, contrary to contemporary research arguments.

The Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare, internally and externally is partly struggling with embracing the principles of both Regular and Irregular Warfare.. Tactical thinking has a dynamic, currently moving to Hybrid Warfare scenarios, where concepts of the Big War and Small War intermingle and sometimes contradict and conflict. A creative palette of tactical thought exists among Swedish field unit commanders, the next generation of senior military strategists. A field of military thought on strategy, operational art and tactics might very well exist, or is under way, developing challenges to current visions of strategy and operational art in a revitalizing way.

Such a field might structure in ways not as uniform, according to regimental affiliation and cultural traditions which we are used to. Thoughts of high adaption and a creative mind-set might contradict normative thinking, as might more static thinking. Signs of a new generation of tactical thought exist, with a more open mind for combining principles of the Small War with the large one. It is advised to return, not only to the forgotten and unknown Clausewitz, but also beyond and to one of his tactical thought inspirers; Johan von Ewald and his *Treatise of Partisan Warfare* (1785). Ewald's space of experiences and horizon of expectations, combined with studies of the Swedish counterpart; Georg Magnus Sprengtporten (1740-1819), are suggested for studies in order to obtain a historical mirror for reflections not yet in use in our modern tactical thought and preferences. A development of tactical thought for the modern officer seems to need knowledge equal to that of ranger, mechanized and infantry principles.

An approach is suggested that deals with Small Warfare on the same level as the Big Warfare principles, in order to promote a more open mind-set, needed for a Hybrid Warfare future. The doxa or perception of Regular Warfare is not argued enough anymore and needs to be complemented by Small War principles. An approach that understands and deals with warfare as a whole, paraphrasing Frank Kitson, is one that holistically investigates and presents the character of mind-set structures regarding strategy, operational art and tactics with preferences for Big and Small Warfare principles.

The presented model of tactical thought can be used and adapted to the actual aspects investigated. The results of investigations of the characteristics of strategic, operational and tactical thought will answer the question of relational character of thought to warfare as a whole. The answers will reveal tendencies of balance, imbalance, duality or uniformity of mind-set, regarding Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare. This kind of knowledge is argued to be needed if and when embarking on a development of warfare of hybrid character in a structured way.

This work presents new knowledge on Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare for Land forces using an investigation of contemporary standpoint structures *and* background aspects, thereby introducing relational sociology to tactical studies. Sociology is considered to be an important perspective in furthering multidisciplinary research efforts, in order to be able to identify relational characteristics between strategy, operational art and tactics, as well as for other subjects, such as for example, leadership, military technology and command and control science. An entrance into a mind-set, which would also regard *ways of thinking* as important knowledge, seems vital in the current era of otherwise more technocratic and procedural systems-thinking paradigms of the military community.

Irregular Warfare, with tactics, operational art and strategy, are essentially theoretical thoughts that are realized in practice, by humans organized in different groupings, sharing the ideas and willingness to combat an opponent by denying him victory, an idea and value shared also by the opponent. As such, we can view war and warfare studies as being field studies from a scientific perspective as well, where practice and theory are mutually dependent and not possible to separate, such as warfare as a whole, *per se*.

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43 Land Forces officers in the Swedish Armed Forces, 2011.

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General Sir Frank Kitson (five letters from 23 March, 20 April, 28 May, 12 July 2010 and 6 September 2010).

Appendix

Appendix 1. The Literature Study

Introduction - an analysis of a collection of western thought

The term *Irregular Warfare* (IW) has emerged in western writings on strategy and military issues since the troublesome wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from around 2005 and onwards. In Sweden the term appeared in Swedish governmental writings starting from 2008.²¹¹ It is not always easy to get a common view of the meaning of the term, as definitions vary. The term has not previously been commonly in use in the western world of military discourse, moreover, military education has mostly dealt with Regular (or conventional and traditional military) warfare theory and practice. The research situation can also be characterized as limited before 2007.

The study focuses on the following three questions; *“How is the form of warfare, labelled “Irregular Warfare” defined and explained?”*, *“What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?”* and *“What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”*

The aim is to show examples of articulations, explanations and views on the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare from a collection of contemporary texts in doctrines and influence literature and from what can be called classic literature on the subject. The purpose is to find examples of how the subject has been, and can be described and thus to develop a framework and understanding base regarding what might be argued to be general attributes, merits and problems with the term and often related contents, and thus what challenges understanding of the phenomenon. As for the focus on tactics for the further research, and implicit aiming for knowledge enhancing within officer training and education, military concept development and planning work, sources of military thought that can be viewed as potentially influential for a military audience have been chosen for the analysis. This means that several other explanations and thought on Irregular Warfare and conflicts that could be characterized as irregular exist. The sources chosen here are however, assessed to have been or are particularly influential on military understanding of the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare. Also included as Literature study appendixes are summaries of views from Clausewitz and Frank Kitson, containing information that is assessed not to be commonly known up to today.

²¹¹ Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), p.32. *“A majority of the conflicts in recent years have been characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. Guerrilla Warfare, armed gangs, terrorist network systems, and the employment of fighting units in smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no signs that this pattern of conflict will change in the foreseeable future. Potential adversaries can, however, be structured and possess modern and qualified equipment, but act in an Irregular fashion”*. Försvar i användning, Ds 2008/09:140 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet 2009), p. 43. *“The Armed Forces should therefore have the capacity to handle both regular as well as irregular adversaries and to operate nationally and internationally”*.

The purpose is to enclose views on the subject that might be used for further reflections on differences and similarities of western thought on Irregular Warfare. The goal is strictly to answer the questions lined out on the previous page, not to establish a foundation for still a new definition. The purpose is to deliver answers that contribute to enhanced knowledge and understanding of what the term Irregular Warfare means, and of problems and benefits of different explanations. The main focus here is on contemporary explanations rather than to give a complete longitudinal view of ways of thinking and articulating warfare. The analysis only focuses on the term Irregular Warfare or on the meaning of warfare different to what is generally and universally understood as the main content of traditional and conventional military warfare, as it has developed since the Napoleon Wars. Sub-terms such as Guerrilla Warfare and alike are not analysed per se, but understood as being certain definitions in use today. Sources are limited to what can be argued to have been influential on general military thought and understanding (doctrines) and with a more prominent position in the military discourse (academic and expert literature).

Associated terms

Linked to the area of Irregular Warfare, the following terms often occur; Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Hybrid Warfare/threat, Guerrilla Warfare and Unconventional Warfare. These terms are defined and understood in this analysis according to the following definitions. As a comparison to the term Conventional/traditional Warfare, such a definition is also included.

Counterinsurgency (COIN)

1. *"Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat or contain Insurgency, while addressing root causes"*²¹²
2. *"Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency"*²¹³
3. *"The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances"*²¹⁴
4. *"Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN"*²¹⁵

²¹² UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, November 2009, the Lexicon.

²¹³ NATO, *Glossary of terms and definitions* (English and French), Allied Publication (AAP) 6, 2008, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008), US Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December.

²¹⁴ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations*, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 3.4.4, study draft 2008, proposed modification to AAP-6 definition.

As can be seen, the above definitions differ in some aspects. The British version from 2009 has included law enforcement as a specific activity, unlike the US and NATO definitions. The NATO definition places political actions before military, unlike the US and British definition. The US definition underlines that it is action taken by a government. The NATO and UK definitions emphasize the importance of addressing root causes and core grievances. In all, the political primacy and non-military aspects can be noticed in all definitions, however the British view of the law enforcement aspect is the most prominent when comparing the definitions.

Hybrid War/Warfare/Threats

The transition and development of military units able to operate in both Irregular and Regular Warfare scenarios, is today often addressed as the military contribution to “countering hybrid threats”²¹⁶ or CHT in short. As for discussions on combinations of warfare, referred to as “*Hybrid*” War/Warfare or threats, the following definitions are used; Hybrid Warfare; “*A form of conflict waged by a range of adversaries (conventional, irregular and terrorist) who will employ all forms of warfare and tactics, perhaps at the same place and time*”²¹⁷

Hybrid Threats (HT); “*HT result from a simultaneous orchestration of conventional and/or non-conventional methods and activities, employed by an opponent or a number of opponents that may include the use of military force*”²¹⁸

The two NATO working definitions of Hybrid Warfare/threats both cover all forms of actors and warfare/violent actions, maybe performed at the same time and place. The explanation becomes so broad that it encompasses everything and risks losing meaning as a definition of a specific form of threat and/or warfare.

Guerrilla Warfare (GW); “*Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW*”²¹⁹ This classic and more or less universally understood meaning of “guerrilla activities or violence” is used throughout the study.

²¹⁵ US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008)

²¹⁶ The NATO CD&E Conference 2009 in Rome (16-19 November) in particular focused on the challenge for the alliance and the military contribution for counter hybrid threats (CHT) and concept work on this. NATO MC Chairman, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola underlined the role of today’s C, D & E as the driver of NATO transition. Mind-set, capabilities and better understanding of hybrid threats was one area emphasized during his introduction. Hybrid threat has the working definition; “*hybrid threats result from a simultaneous orchestration of conventional and/or non-conventional methods and activities, employed by an opponent or a number of opponents that may include the use of military force*”. This means parallel use of Regular and Irregular Warfare. The need for a concept here was stressed by Dr Russell Glenn, working for SACT; “*for being able to understand the character of warfare in education and training*”. One difficulty today is the problem of coherent communication in NATO on the matter, which is also a problem in the Swedish Armed Forces.

²¹⁷ UK DCDC Working definition presented at the NATO CD&E Conference 2009, 17 November, Rome

²¹⁸ Working definition presented at the NATO CD&E Conference 2009, 17 November, Rome

²¹⁹ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Special Operation Task Force Operations*, Joint Publication JP 3-05.1, 26 April, 2007.

Insurgency

USA.; “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”²²⁰

UK: “The actions of a minority group within a state that is intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change”²²¹

NATO; “An organized ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks political change in a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population of a region through violence, subversion and propaganda”²²²

Unconventional Warfare (UW); “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, Guerrilla Warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW”²²³

Conventional/traditional/Regular Warfare (RW); “A form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective or influencing the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the indigenous population within the operational area is non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent government impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in those operations”²²⁴

Method and empirical material

The method for this study is textual analysis of a conceptual history approach. Aspects of conceptual content and classifications are used. The focus is the text and what can be said about limits and characteristics about a phenomenon of Irregular Warfare. Chosen sources have been examined for qualitative aspects, addressing certain variables which have been extracted from *On War*, book six, chapter 26.²²⁵

²²⁰ U.S. JP I-02 (2001), U.S FM 3-24 (2006)

²²¹ UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, November 2009.

²²² NATO AJP 3.4.4 (2008).

²²³ U.S. JP 3-05 (2008).

²²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, Joint Operations Concept JOC, version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

²²⁵ Clausewitz, *Om Kriget*, (1991), pp. 478 – 483.

Although only in a limited number of pages, Clausewitz in fact characterizes Irregular Warfare from several aspects, which can be used as variables regardless of the time perspective on a particular definition or explanation that is subjected to be analysed. The motive for using Clausewitz for defining variables in the actual subject is two-fold.

First, *On War* is universally well-known in the western military discourse and has influenced thinking and understanding of war and warfare since the 19th century and still does. Secondly, several factors and areas of activities described by Clausewitz in the actual chapter can be argued to be commonly used when theorizing military activities and are thus, easily understood and commonly accepted as useful description categories. For the examination, seven variables, seen below, have been used.

Regarding strategy, Clausewitz mainly addresses the area of Irregular Warfare, primarily as one form of strategic defence²²⁶. Clausewitz argues that this kind of warfare as a phenomenon of the 19th century could have had a revolutionary origin but does not elaborate that aspect further.²²⁷ He discusses the form of warfare as a complement to Regular Warfare. Clausewitz underlines the importance of not letting “the big strategic form of defence” develop to defend in a tactical form, here claiming that “people-in-arms” can never be a form of decisive defensive warfare.²²⁸ As for the strategic form of defence, he states however, that there are two forms of “people-in-arms” warfare to be considered, either as a “last resort” or as “natural” support connected to a decisive battle.²²⁹

He describes a concept where tactics, generally understood as Guerrilla Warfare, supports Regular Warfare combat to be used when the right opportunities occur. As for tactics Clausewitz claims, the larger the areas the enemy has to use, the more dangerous the tactics from an opponent will be.²³⁰ Regarding physical factors, Clausewitz writes that the disadvantages of weak physical power could lead to the use of this sort of tactics primarily over large areas.²³¹

As for operational conceptual factors, he speaks of combining “loose formations”, “lantstorm” and “lantstorm supported with regular elements”. Combining these elements together in parallel for more offensive use, is what Clausewitz describes, which could be argued for being a way of expressing what in modern terms is labelled as Operational Art (2) even if that term was not in use at that time. The power of actions in the rear and harassing the enemy is stressed. Also, “the power of the example”, that is courageous and brave initiatives will be examples to be followed by other “armed people units”. A third concept discussed, is to have a part of the regular army that supports and is attached to the “lantstorm”. However, it is important not to merge too much, as that could lead to merely a concept of regular-“lantstorm” composition.

²²⁶ Clausewitz, *Om Kriget*, (1991), p. 481.

²²⁷ Ibid. p. 478.

²²⁸ Ibid. p. 482.

²²⁹ Ibid. p. 482.

²³⁰ Ibid. p. 479.

²³¹ Ibid. p.479.

Clausewitz states the opinion that one of the major aspects of fighting power, the moral factors, to be fully utilized have to be born from the people.²³² Thus, he acknowledges a high potentiality of this force, the moral force, to the tactics of people-in-arms. Clausewitz argues emphatically for the preparation and use of people-in-arms as a moral necessity for the soul of the people and for the legitimacy of a state government.²³³ It is from the tactical view that Clausewitz outlines certain characteristics; such as flank attacks over large areas, harassing but not directed at the enemy strengths. A small scale attrition war in the enemy flanks and rear areas is generally the key characteristic as well as the arguably forceful force driver in war. Another is the moral power which can be found and utilized from the people usually to a greater extent than from regular military formations, according to Clausewitz.

The appropriate character of people-in-arms should be like fog, in contrast to the physical bodies of Regular Warfare concepts. This might be seen as one explanation of the differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare. The fog in the flanks can suddenly be changed to lightning with a concentration of both people-in-arms and minor attachments of more regular organized units, preferably also jointly with some organized units that together form superiority over the enemy.²³⁴ He points out different attitudes to the phenomenon, both from a political view, as being dangerous with anarchistic influence potentiality, and from a military perspective, as being doubtful of the results compared to the efforts.²³⁵

The variables and the empirical material

From Clausewitz's writings, the following seven aspects have been used as qualitative variables;

- *Strategy factors* (purpose of violence, resistance, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency etc.)
- *Tactics and operational art factors* (means, methods, coordination of the violence). The term operational art was not in use at the time of Clausewitz but instead the actual meaning was the coordination of tactics to a strategic goal. Such descriptions are categorized as operational art factors here).
- *Physical factors* (descriptions of equipment, strength of fire and protection)
- *Conceptual factors* (descriptions of structural and organizational solutions)
- *Moral factors* (descriptions of troop morale, ethics, leadership)
- *Character of warfare* (level of violence, for example)
- *Attitudes of warfare* style/form.

Quantitative assessment of the variables is made by using the following variable value categorizations; 0= Variable is not addressed, neither directly nor indirectly, 1= Variable is addressed implicitly, 2= Variable is addressed directly, 3= Variable is addressed as predominantly important/highlighted.

²³² Clausewitz, *Om Kriget*. (1991), pp. 478 and 480.

²³³ Ibid. pp. 482-83.

²³⁴ Ibid. pp. 480-81.

²³⁵ Ibid. p. 478.

Each description or definition is characterized from a “description character” angle in order to get a view of the approach and perspective of the description. To capture differences or similarities in explanations, two forms of descriptions are distinguished, either with predominantly explanatory content or of a predominantly umbrella character, less directly explanatory. Further, each explanation is focused on the actors considered to be an important aspect (the explanation focuses on either one or both of the belligerents participating or using an irregular form of warfare). Finally, it seems important to try to distinguish if the descriptions mainly focus on military or political/civilian aspects, so as to form linkage to views of violence dimensions or power executions from certain prosecutors. Each definition will be discussed on its own first. Secondly, a discussion will be held on contemporary definitions and their similarities and differences, followed by a comparison with some earlier definitions; finally, a discussion on possible benefits and difficulties of the definitions.

Empiricism on western thinking and thought on military issues has been sought among two main categories; firstly, assessed influential contemporary military doctrines addressing the subject. Here, the famous US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* from 1940 is included as well as a Swedish governmental text and an early Cold War American doctrinal text. Secondly, classical military theory or practice thinking on the subject, influential writings from the post Second World War period, primarily 1950 – 1970, and some influential writings from the beginning of 2000 to 2010.

The following contemporary doctrines or governmental writings have been used;

NATO AJP 3.4 (A) *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, second study draft 2008.

NATO AJP 3.4.4 *Counterinsurgency*, study draft 2008.

U.S. Army/ Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* – FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, University of Chicago Press; Chicago 2007.

U.S. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98) *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, March 2009.

U.S. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special operations Forces *Unconventional Warfare*, September 2008.

U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations*, 05 October, 2009

U.S. Department of Defence, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operations Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

UK Army Field Manual, Vol. 10, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, *Countering Insurgency*, 2009, Draft.

UK Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, Ratification Draft, 2009.

UK Joint Doctrine Publication, JDP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine* 3rd edition, August 2008.

For comparison, examples of earlier military definitions, two American sources have been used; U.S. Army FM 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces*²³⁶ and the U.S. Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* from 1940²³⁷. For a comparison with a contemporary Swedish governmental view, the source *Försvar i användning*²³⁸ has been used.

Regarding literature, three time periods have been chosen, each with influential thinkers. Period One: “*From Clausewitz to the Second World War*” Carl von Clausewitz, Charles Callwell and Thomas Edward Lawrence. Period Two: “*Second World War to the 70s*” David Galula, Werner Halhweg, Frank Kitson, John J. McCuen, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier. Period Three: “*From 9/11 to 2010*”, James Corum, Colin S. Gray, Thomas X. Hammes, David KilCullen, James Kiras, John Mackinlay and Gil Merom.

Analysis of doctrinal definitions and explanations

American definitions

Irregular Warfare

Irregular Warfare is explained in the U.S. FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* from 2009 as; “*A broad form of conflicts in which Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Unconventional Warfare are the principal activities*”.²³⁹

Result and conclusions

The description of the term Irregular Warfare can be categorized as an umbrella description which demands pre-understanding of the subparts. The definition is a category definition and not an explanatory definition and equates warfare with a certain form of conflict. All three subparts, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare can exist with or without formal declarations of war and they can also exist within a conflict characterized as mainly regular dominated warfare, for example the Second World War. If all or just some of the subparts exist, the conflict is still defined as Irregular Warfare. This leads to an understanding of this definition, that it can exist both as a part of Regular Warfare or as a stand-alone type of warfare. This definition is however not exact; it opens up to more content and aspects with the word “broad form of conflict” and “the principal activities” and can thus be used more as directional guidance than demarcating definite borders.

²³⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Army Operations against Irregular Forces*, Field Manual No. 31-15, May 1961.

²³⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington D.C.: US Governmental printing Office, 1940; a new edition of the original US Marine Corps manual by Sunflower University Press, 1996, pavilion Press, 2004 and Cosimo Reports, 2010).

²³⁸ *Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence]* (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), chapter 3.

²³⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), March 2009, Glossary-12, Also in U.S JP 3-24 *COIN* (2009), Glossary GL-7.

The definition requires understanding and knowledge of the subpart definitions to give some meaning and to be useful, as in itself the definition is not sufficient to understand the meaning of Irregular Warfare as a phenomenon. The potential of explaining content covers only aspects of character of activity (variable no 6) addressing no particular actors directly. The description has a partly military focus although the subpart Insurgency implies a clear political and civilian dimension. The description has the character of a circle-description, not addressing root content but merely embracing further more or less hard-to-define terms. The description is comprehensive and clear if the subparts are defined, otherwise the description has less explanatory potential. Another American definition of the term Irregular Warfare comes from the U.S. Department of Defense (2008)²⁴⁰; Irregular Warfare: *"A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular Warfare favours indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW"*.

Result and conclusions

This definition is an explanatory definition framing the phenomenon in a level of violence (violent struggle) and the participating actors (between (a) state(s) and non-state actors). The actors involved are addressed as being state and non-state actors. The purpose of the struggle is to define the extent of both influence and legitimacy over relevant populations. The definition also covers what strategy is in focus (indirect and asymmetrical approaches to erode power, influence and will) covering not just military capabilities.

The definition opens up for any forms of capabilities from civilian/political to military, especially if the struggle is "violent", thus implying a military focus. It might be a question of whether this definition constitutes all opponents (state and non-state) using mainly indirect means or if it should be understood that such strategy is the main approach from the non-state entities. A problem lies in how to define violent struggle and also if it is useful to narrow the definition, changing "struggle" to just between non-state actors or between state entities. It does not explain what is thought to be the end-state of "irregular", the state or non-state status, the ways to influence, the goal, or if all three aspects have to be present. It does however emphasize that these aspects are specific characteristics of Irregular Warfare, and not excluding that such struggles can be a part of regular dominating warfare and conflicts.

²⁴⁰ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>.

The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as conceptual and moral factors. The description covers characteristics such as the diffuse expression; “a violent struggle”. Participating actors are described with a focus on both state and non-state actors. The description leans primarily on a military emphasis of the phenomenon, but also includes political and civilian activities with the expression; other capabilities. The definition is assessed to be a comprehensive explanation, relatively understandable but non-specific as regards the means (asymmetrical). This reduces the explanatory potential.

Irregular Forces

The U.S. FMI 3-24.2 and U.S. JP 3-40 defines the term irregular forces as “Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces”²⁴¹

Result and conclusions

The description focus is on content of participating actors and of a combined umbrella and explanatory character, opening up for every individual or group that is armed and not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces to be addressed as irregular forces.

This definition does not distinguish between criminality, insurgents, and terrorist or resistance activities and thus, covers both legal and illegal activities. In itself, this definition is so open that it has to be defined further in order to be meaningful and useful. A key characteristic is that participants have to be armed. All actors addressed are non-state actors. The definition is assessed to be comprehensive and with good explanatory potential.

An example of a Cold War era definition of *irregular forces* can be gained from the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular Forces; “*The term irregular, used in combination such as Irregular forces, Irregular activities, and counter Irregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods*”²⁴². The following text section says further; “*Irregular activities include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or an occupying power, and uses primarily Irregular and informal groupings and measures*”²⁴³

²⁴¹ U.S. Army FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (2009), Glossary-12, Irregular forces, Also in US JP 3-40 *COIN* (2009), Glossary GL-7.

²⁴² U.S. Army FM 31-15 *Operations against Irregular Forces*, (1961), chapter 1. Introduction, section 2 Terms, p. 3.

²⁴³ Ibid. section 2.

Result and conclusions

This explanation, rather than definition of the term *Irregular activities* is both of an umbrella and explanatory character, containing category, activity and goal descriptions (different groupings, all with the same goal, to take political control from an existing government either originally in the country or an occupying power). It does not include non-political activities such as criminality per se and thus narrows the field of interest to the politico-military domain and needs further definitions of all subparts included, if those are not already known. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, conceptual and character factors. Attitude aspects such as included/not included are mentioned. Participating actors are described with a focus on the opposing actors as the inhabitants of a country. The description leans primarily on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon. The description is assessed to be comprehensive and with good explanatory potential.

Small Wars

In the U.S. Marine Corps “*Small Wars Manual*” from 1940 a description starts with the following statement; “*The term “Small Wars” is often a vague name for any of a great variety of military operations*”. A definition is then outlined; “*Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military forces are combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation*”²⁴⁴

A further explanation states; “Small wars vary in degree from simple demonstrative operations to military interventions in the fullest sense, short of war. They are not limited in size, in the extent of operations nor their costs in property, money or lives. The essence of a Small War is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its inception and conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing forces, and the nature of the operations themselves”. “The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not involve a major effort in Regular Warfare against a first-rate power may be termed a small war “. ²⁴⁵

*Three classes of Small Wars are outlined where the first is within the policy of the USA; “to suppress lawlessness or insurrection”, “punitive expeditions may be resorted to in some instances” and finally (not within the U.S. policy, is stated) “campaigns of contest”. An opinion of the difficulty to define the problem is stated as; “The legal and military features of each small war present distinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all of them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem”.*²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (1940), p. 1.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 1.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 2.

*A foremost character of Small Wars is stated as; “that the (U.S.) forces “dribble in” to the countries in which they intervene. It (the U.S. government) is not at war with the neighbouring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of territory; its purpose is friendly and it wishes to accomplish its objective with as little military display as possible with a view to gaining the lasting friendship of the inhabitants of the country”.*²⁴⁷

The dynamics between low-level military actions and following police actions until a withdrawal are explained. A view of a future problem with this kind of warfare and war is expressed as follows on the next page.

*“There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars”, however it is stated that the U.S. MC is probably the most experienced organization in the world on such operations”.... “This experience has been gained almost entirely in small wars against poorly organized and equipped native irregulars...”*²⁴⁸.

*”That experience must not lead to an underestimation of the modern irregular, supplied with modern arms and equipment”....”the future opponent may be as well armed as they (the Marines) are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and places he chooses; as in the past he will have thorough knowledge of the trails, the country and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater extent than white man”*²⁴⁹

*“All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantages of the marine force in organisation, equipment, intelligence and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to wrap good judgement”.*²⁵⁰

*“Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conducted in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instruction”.*²⁵¹

The definition; *“Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military forces are combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation”*²⁵² in combination with the explanations, gives the following analysis result.

²⁴⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (1940), pp. 5-6.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 5-9.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 8.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 8.

²⁵¹ Ibid. p. 9.

²⁵² Ibid. p. 1.

Result and conclusions

The description is of a combined umbrella and explanatory character. Not all is inclusive in one specific definition; several explanations are given in the first chapter of the manual. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as primarily strategy, but also operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as physical and moral factors. The description covers characteristics. Attitude aspects are not included directly but indirectly, the text points out that; *“There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars”*, which might be discussed as a general attitude of unwillingness of addressing the subject. Participating actors are described with a focus on the Marine Corps engaging inhabitants of a foreign country. The description has a clear focus on strategy as regards the purpose and consequences. The description is comprehensive and has a good explanatory potential.

An overview of American definitions 2009-1940.

Source	U.S. FMI 3-24.2 (2009), JP 3-40,(2009)	U.S. JP-02 (2008)	U.S. FM 3-15 (1961)	U.S. MC Small Wars (1940)
Term	Irregular Warfare	Irregular Warfare	Irregular Forces	Small Wars
Aspects on IW/T/A/F				
Description of level of violence	A broad form of conflict	Violent struggle	-	From show of force to military interventions short of war. Operations not involving Regular Warfare against first-rate powers.
Description of actors	-	State and non-state actors have to be involved	Inhabitants of a nation, all forms of non-conventional forces, guerrilla, partisan, revolutionary, terrorists, insurgents.	The U.S. Marines against irregulars of different kinds and force.
Description of goals	-	Legitimacy and influence over relevant population(s). Erode an adversary's power, influence and will.	To take political control from the government or against an occupant force.	To suppress lawlessness or insurrection. Punitive expedition (seldom)

Description of means			Guerrilla tactics, subversion, terrorism	Military force combined with diplomatic pressure.
Description of methods/activities	Principal activities; Insurgency, counter-Insurgency, Unconventional Warfare.	Focus on indirect and asymmetrical approaches.	military, political, psychological, economic nature.	Diplomatic, military and police nature.
Focus of the actors' concept	Describes both parties.	Focus on the opponents.	Focus on the opponents.	Focus on one's own party.

Figure 26. Appendix 1. An overview of American definitions 2009-1940.

The 1940 comprehensive definition of Small Wars has a lot in common with the 2008 definition of *Irregular Warfare*. The latter however, implies more substantial violence, which the “*Small Wars Manual*” in fact pointed out as a future risk. However, 1961 articulations do not seem to include such a risk. The 2009 explanation does not address levels of violence at all but focuses more on the Insurgency phenomenon. The *Small Wars* label addresses one's own actions primarily; the 1961 and 2008 descriptions focus on the opponent and finally, the 2009 text includes both parties' activities.

NATO definitions

Irregular Threats

NATO addresses the area of Irregular Warfare within the broader term *Irregular threats* which is defined in the study draft AJP 3.4 Non-Article 5 *Crisis Response Operations* as; “*Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric, and quite often illegal, methods and means to counter traditional military advantages. A weaker opponent often uses Irregular Warfare to exhaust collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular Warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, criminality and guerrilla warfare. Economic, political, civil and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on the influence of Western countries*”.²⁵³

²⁵³ NATO AJP 3.4 *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* (2009), pp. 1-3. paragraph (2).

Result and conclusions

This definition is both an umbrella and an explanatory definition. The umbrella perspective is very wide, from criminality to Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism. The explanations focus on opponents' use of threats or means against traditional military advantages. The term Irregular Warfare is used here as a category definition, including explanations such as terrorism, Insurgency, criminality and Guerrilla Warfare. That contains everything short of military tactical operations and beyond. The comprehensive political, civil and cultural dimension is explained as the main aspects for attacks on the influence of western countries. The definition does not exclude that irregular threats or warfare may coexist with *Regular Warfare*. The definition focuses on effects on (western) military capabilities as a specific, very broad, aggressor activity.

A key characteristic is said to be “*to exhaust the will by protracted conflict*”, thus not focusing on destroying military power, if at all focusing on military force. The explanation opens up for all constellations of legal-illegal opponents, focusing both on political/civilian and military perspectives. The definition does not address irregular capabilities on the higher military level, such as company/battalion formation assaults and offensive operations against military forces, and can thus be said to deal with mostly indirect violence up to some level of Guerrilla Warfare, nevertheless mainly within guerrilla tactics capabilities.

NATO also explain this area as; “*The term Irregular threat is used in a broad, inclusive sense to refer to all types of non-conventional methods of violence employed to counter the traditional capabilities of an opponent. Irregular threats include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted by both indigenous actors and non-state actors for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of a government or influencing an outside power, and using primarily asymmetric methods. Included in this broad category are the activities of insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, and similar irregular groups and organizations. Countering an irregular threat requires that NATO forces have an understanding of the particular character of the conflict, its context, and its participants. Typically this is more difficult in a conflict involving Irregular threats as opposed to conventional forces*”.²⁵⁴

NATO divides *Counter Irregular Threat Operations* into; Antiterrorism operations, Counter Terrorism Operations and Counter Insurgency Operations.²⁵⁵ COIN is further developed in the study draft AJP 3.4.4 *Counterinsurgency* where *Counter Irregular threats*, described; “*As stated before an increase exists towards the use of Irregular activities by various opponents in an operating environment.*” NATO considers the following Irregular activities²⁵⁶: *Insurgency, Terrorism and Other Irregular activities such as: Criminality, Disorder and Piracy.*²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ NATO AJP 3.4 *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* (2009). p. 3-3. paragraph 0303, Counter Irregular Threat Operations.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 3-3. – to 3-9.

²⁵⁶ Ibid. Chapter 3. Irregular activities are described in chapter 3.

²⁵⁷ NATO AJP 3.4.4 *Counterinsurgency* (2008), pp. 7-127.

Result and conclusions

This text provides both explanations and an umbrella definition. It attempts to explain a broad content of activities and actors all within the label “Irregular threats”. The content addressed is so broad that it comprises all activities that actors can use up to the level of “*Regular Warfare*”, not saying it explicitly. The explanation points out the goal as being, eliminating or weakening the authority of a government or influencing an outside power. Here, both Insurgency and terrorism (not included in an Insurgency) are included. The definition requires several under-definitions in order to be useful. In fact it just opens up for all forms of influences on governments short of traditional military violence, which has to be defined further regarding responsibility between the military and police tasks.

Result and conclusions –total NATO

The description of the term Irregular Warfare, as a form of sub-term under the umbrella term *Irregular threats* is both of an explanatory and umbrella character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics, though the latter more indirectly. Fighting power factors are covered as foremostly conceptual and moral factors. The description covers characteristics. Attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on aggressors in the western countries.

The description leans primarily on a comprehensive (both political/civilian and military) focus of the phenomenon. The description demand understanding of sub-terms such as; “*Insurgency*”, “*Guerrilla Warfare*” and “*Terrorism*”.

British definitions

Irregular activity

In Britain the term *Irregular activity* is explained as; “*Irregular activity is the use, or threat, of force by Irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.*”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁸ UK JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilization: the Military Contribution* (2009), p. 14; Irregular activity is the use, or threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).

Result and conclusions

The description is both an explanatory and a broad umbrella definition, with a focus on actors at a sub-military level, who oppose authorities with both legal and illegal means, mainly from a non-military perspective. Compared to the British definition; “*countering-irregular activities*”; The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes, the level of force including military levels is not particularly underlined.²⁵⁹

The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as are primarily conceptual factors. The description covers characteristics and attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with an emphasis on actors who oppose governments. The explanation includes all levels of violence from non-violence (disorder) to non-specified levels of terrorist and/or Insurgency violence, goals, actors, means and ways. It opens up for legal or illegal activities, thus not distinguishing between military or non-military violence. Not addressing the term warfare, it gives the impression of “sub-military” level of threat or use of force, even though the term insurgency indicates the opposite. The description leans primarily on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon. The description requires the understanding of sub-terms such as; insurgency and terrorism.

Swedish view

The term Irregular Warfare is used in the 2008 Swedish governmental publication *Försvar i Användning (A Useful Defence)* in the following way; “*A majority of the conflicts in recent years have been characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. Guerrilla Warfare, armed gangs, terrorist network systems, and the employment of fighting units in smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no signs that this pattern of conflict will change in the foreseeable future*”²⁶⁰

Result and conclusions

This explanation is both of an umbrella character, containing all actors and means of violence from criminality to small groups Guerrilla Warfare and of some explanatory character. Goals for the actors are however not addressed, focusing on levels and actors, implicitly threatening a government and its military system. The potential of explaining content covers aspects operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as conceptual factors. The description includes characteristics spanning from Guerrilla Warfare to criminal activities and attitude aspects such as included/not included.

²⁵⁹ UK JDP 3-40, *Security and Stabilization: the Military Contribution* (2009), p. 234, Lexicon, The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).

²⁶⁰ *Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence]* (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), p. 32.

Participating actors are described with a focus on the opposing actors (non-state actors). The description leans predominantly on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon.

The description is relatively comprehensive and has a good explanatory potential.

The 2002 *Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine* defines Irregular Forces as follows; “*The description of “Irregular forces” contains all forms of actors from loose formations to guerrilla units and is thus both a broad umbrella description and an explanatory description*”²⁶¹

Result and conclusions

The description of the term Irregular forces can be categorized as an explanatory description with an umbrella perspective. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics, though the latter mostly indirectly. Fighting power factors are covered primarily as conceptual factors. The description covers characteristics though attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described from an aggressor perspective. The description leans predominantly on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon, up to the military level of handling Guerrilla Warfare. The description requires understanding sub-terms such as; “guerrilla”, “partisan” and “terrorist”. The term “insurgent” or “insurgency” is not mentioned.

²⁶¹ *Militärstrategisk doktrin* [Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine] (2002), p. 27.

An overview of modern definitions

<i>Definitions Variables</i>	<i>SW 2008</i>	<i>U.S. 2008</i>	<i>U.S. 2009</i>	<i>NATO 2008</i>	<i>UK 2009</i>
1. Strategy	No	Legitimacy and influence on population (s).	No	A weaker opponent's Strategy. Economic, political, civil and cultural initiatives may be chief means.	Ideology or criminality. Strategy to affect or prevent change/challenge authority.
2. Tactics and Operational Art	Guerrilla Warfare	Indirect and asymmetrical approaches.	No	Unconventional, asymmetric, illegal methods and means. Terrorism, Insurgency, criminality, Guerrilla Warfare.	Insurgency, Terrorism, criminality, disorder.
3. Physical factors	No	No	No	No	No
4. Conceptual factors	Network systems, fighting units in smaller groups.	Full range of military and other capabilities.	No	No	Irregular forces, groups or individuals.
5. Moral factors	No	Erode an adversary's power, influence and will.	No	To exhaust collective will.	No
6. Character of activity	Many actors are non-governmental. A pattern of conflict. Guerrilla Warfare, armed gangs, terrorists.	A violent struggle.	A broad form of conflict. Principal activities; Insurgency COIN un-conventional warfare.	Protracted conflict.	Use or threat of force.
7. Attitude aspects	No	No	No	No	No
8. Explanatory description	Yes	Yes	Limited	Yes	Yes
9. Umbrella description	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
10. Addressing actors	The opponents.	Yes, State and non-state actors.	No particular actors.	The opponent.	The opponent.
11. Military focus	Limited	Partly	Predominantly	Limited	Limited
12. Political/civilian focus	Mostly	Partly	Partly implicit	Mostly	Mostly

Figure 27. Appendix 1. An overview of modern definitions.

Result and Comments

The collection of contemporary doctrines and governmental writings from USA, UK, and NATO provides the following result.

The UK, NATO and U.S. 2008 writings address strategy aspects in different ways. The Swedish writing and U.S. 2008 doctrine do not directly address strategy aspects. As for aspects concerning tactics and operational art, which are linked to strategy and to each other and not always strictly separable, the Swedish, the U.S. 2008, the NATO and the UK documents do highlight such aspects (in different words) though the clearest examples are in the NATO and UK writing (Insurgency, terrorism, criminality, disorder, Guerrilla Warfare). The 2009 U.S. doctrine does not mention the same/similar or other examples.

Regarding physical factors no writings address this directly. As for conceptual factors, there are quite different examples given in the Swedish document (smaller groups in network systems) compared to the 2008 U.S. writings (full range of military and other capabilities). The 2009 U.S. document does not deal with conceptual descriptions at all. Nor does the NATO document, if one can understand labels such as *terrorism* being tactical/operational or strategy factors. The UK paper can be seen, like the Swedish one, to provide an image of both *forces*, *groups*, and more loosely formatted or independently operating *individuals* within the conceptual framework. As for addressing moral factors, only the U.S. 2008 and NATO paper give guidance. They differ however regarding content, where NATO only identifies *the collective will* as a target for an aggressor. The U.S. paper also includes *the power* and *the influence* as targets for an aggressor.

When describing “character of activity” the papers do this in different ways, from the loose UK expression of; “use of threat of force”, the NATO; “protected conflict”, the U.S. 2008; “a violent struggle”, to the Swedish and U.S. 2009 different but clearer examples such as “Guerrilla Warfare”, “Insurgency”. One can notice that the Swedish writings and NATO 2008 use the term “Guerrilla Warfare”, which the U.S. and UK do not. As for attitude aspects, no writings deal with it.

All writings except the U.S. 2009 can be seen as explanatory descriptions, identifying a field of violent activities, threatening the state and striving for influence over the population. These descriptions can also be seen as umbrella explanations of different aggressions against a legitimate state from non-governmental actors. The U.S. 2009 description can, on the contrary, be seen as an umbrella description also covering the defending activities for such aggressions (for example, “counterinsurgency”). This view differs from the UK, NATO and Swedish explanations, which only focus on the aggressors. As for the focus on military activities, the U.S. has a clearer focus. The other papers have more limited military focus addressing “terrorism”, “criminality”, “armed gangs”, which are usually in the area of concern for police forces. Conversely, as regards political focus on the subject of Irregular Warfare, the Swedish, NATO and UK writings express this more than the U.S. perspective.

From this a pattern can be seen, where the view of the aggressor in Irregular Warfare is fairly similar for NATO, Sweden and UK, concerning aggressions from armed criminals, terrorists and “guerrillas” or Insurgency. The UK view also embraces the lowest form of aggression such as *disorder*, which NATO and Sweden do not. The U.S. view might be said to indirectly include this, because the use of the term *Insurgency* by definition incorporates such “lower-level” aggression, but it is not highlighted in the same way as by the others. On the other hand, the U.S. clearly include the higher violence spectrum (“full range of military and other capacities”) that the others do not.

Violence-influence spectrum focus

Different views of the violence spectrum or focus on this can be seen between the U.S. and more European view. Also, only the U.S. view expresses the opinion that the “defender” conducts Irregular Warfare, contrary to the other view that it is the “attacker” who conducts Irregular Warfare. A rather similar view exists on the character of the attacker and that the struggle concerns the legitimacy of the state and the influence of the people, regardless if the cause is just criminality or Insurgency or other form of attack on the state. As a consequence of this, the aggressor is not conceptualized to defeat the opponent’s military forces in open direct combat, which is basically a key concept and modus operandi for classic Guerrilla Warfare in its early stages.

Answers to the three questions

The first question; “*How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare (IW) defined and explained?*” can be summarized as a conflict between state and non-state entities, where the latter threatens and attacks the ruling governmental function with violence that exceeds the capability of the police function to handle. The U.S. view in contrast to NATO, UK and Sweden is that IW covers activities from both the attacker and the defender. NATO, UK and Sweden view IW as activities from the attacker. Indirect means and a more political than military focus are generally addressed as characteristics. The explanations often address criminality and terrorism as components for the aggressor. The definitions and explanations differ in use of words and also in the emphasis on what part of the violence spectrum is of main concern. The explanations often include terms such as “Guerrilla Warfare”, “Insurgency” etc. where it is not always self-evident as to what they exactly mean, thus giving a broad potential for different understanding and mental pictures of the phenomenon trying to be explained.

The words “unconventional” and “asymmetrical” are used, as are “Guerrilla Warfare” and “Insurgency”, which might cause interpretation to stray away from the traditional mental picture of armed combat between military forces at land, sea or in the air. Most explanations narrow the violence spectrum to the lower end and highlight the civilian and political focus. U.S. explanations on the other hand, open up the violence spectrum to more comprehensive combat, still with an indirect main approach.

All in all, the explanations try to both restrict and open up for what can be included, making it difficult to produce a distinct demarcation and more commonly understood picture of what it is and is not. Depending on education, experiences and working or studying within this field, a broad range of mental pictures might emerge for different people, even for those in the military forces.

The second question; “*What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?*” can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; IW can include criminality and terrorism, contrary to what is stated as rules for conventional and traditional western Regular Warfare. A protracted campaign where military capability is not the main key target also differs from Regular Warfare. Non-governmental aggressors, focusing on influencing the people (local, regional and transnational) are also main differences in Regular Warfare. Even if IW can also include tactical combat, the main emphasis is on different types of network groupings, nestling within the population, hard to detect, which differ from the traditional formations of Regular Warfare units. Looking strictly at what is addressed as characteristics of Irregular Warfare, one can list the following five aspects as different from the traditional, main view of conventional warfare. First, the actors do not follow rules of law and might involve criminality in their activities. Secondly, they might use terrorism as a means. Thirdly, the main goal for combat is not to defeat the opposing military forces. Fourthly, time is on the aggressor’s side in Irregular Warfare. A key goal is to influence the population and the military focus is secondary.

The third question; “*What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?*” addressed to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary; a violence/influence spectrum starting at the low end from “disorder”, “criminality” via terrorism, Insurgency to Guerrilla Warfare and further on including on hand, available tactical concepts for ground operations. This broad span of activities/tactics should not only be seen as sequential but also as possibly used back and forth and in parallel. As non-state actors are able to hide from the governmental forces, a sort of integration within the social structure can be argued to emerge, where the control and influence of the people become a vital and typical trait in IW, which differs from Regular Warfare. With this sort of struggle, often for a long time, where the will of the people stands high, the political aspect becomes another typical trait where actions other than military and police-related ones are the most important.

Discussion of the result

The texts with their definitions and explanations have in common that they are articulations in doctrines and governmental writings with very varying degrees of pre-understanding, background research, tradition of the subject and different levels of political sensitivity regarding words, labels and willingness to address possible consequences for security policy. The Swedish text does not mention “Insurgency” and the NATO texts are merely at the very beginning of addressing this sort of conflict. On the other hand, the U.S. and UK have backgrounds with both research and educational efforts on IW, although in varying degrees.

Despite different words in explanations and diverging views of emphasis on the violence scale, there seems to be rather a common view in general of the phenomenon – although there are several limitations for making distinct demarcations.

The very fact that something “irregular” obviously is supposed to indicate a difference to what is understood as “regular” leads to perspectives that in turn might be infinitely different. As some of these differences might very well also occur in “regular contexts”, this challenges the whole effort of understanding.

This broad overview of definitions and explanations must be seen from the perspective that some words have been easier to observe and deal with for me, compared to a total stranger to the subject and this could have affected the result in some way. The definitions and explanations in the actual texts have a somewhat different result in how to define the phenomenon of IW, both regarding the use of words and actual meaning of the term. What seems remarkable is that no attempt can be found highlighting the importance of intelligence conceptually, the requirements of the police function and the conceptual needs for addressing military and police functions simultaneously, by the U.S., NATO, UK and Swedish articulations on the subject.

Analysis of the literature definitions and explanations

Period One; “From Clausewitz to the Second World War”

Carl von Clausewitz

Clausewitz uses the expression “*People at Arms*” in his limited analysis of what might be called the irregular character of war as another form of armed struggle, compared to the main interest in his Magnus Opus *On War*. Clausewitz underlines that his discussions on the subject have to be seen as more of “*an intuitive seeking for the truth than an objective analysis*” because so little was known in general, and those who had studied the subject for longer times had written too little about it so far. He argues that this kind of warfare as a phenomenon of the 19th century could have had a revolutionary origin. Clausewitz does not elaborate on the physical aspects of “People at Arms” other than the opinion that the disadvantages of weak, physical power could lead to the use of this sort of tactics, primarily in large areas. Thus, Clausewitz claims; *the larger the areas the enemy has to use, the more dangerous the tactics from an opponent will be.*²⁶²

He does not go into the political-revolutionary aspect but instead, focuses on tactics, which he sees as a development resulting from the former artificial borders of warfare and an enlargement of the operational environment. Wisely used, which can be interpreted as having a sound strategy, tactics in most cases will give relative superiority against opponents, according to Clausewitz. “*It destroys like smouldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces*”, is how he expresses the effect of tactics.²⁶³

²⁶² Clausewitz, *Om Kriget* (1991), p. 479.

²⁶³ Ibid. p. 479.

He stresses the importance of proportions between the operational area and the army in order to withstand distributed hostile tactics. Clausewitz claims that this form of tactics is mostly a part of major campaigns, where regular and irregular (people-in-arms) forces complement each other in an overarching (operational) plan. If used as *a single form or warfare*, he gives examples where it can give effect; that is, if the war is fought in the inner parts of a country and if the country is large enough, and if the people's support is ensured and finally, if the terrain is suitable, it would be disadvantageous for the enemy to fight.

Three concepts of Irregular Warfare are discussed, one is an organized form of units, "*lantstorm*", and another is a more loosely composed structure of "*armed people*". The power of actions in the rear and harassing the enemy is stressed. Also, "*the power of the example*", i.e. courageous and brave initiatives will be examples to be followed by other "armed people units". A third concept, a part of the regular army that supports and is attached to the "*lantstorm*" is discussed. However, it is important not to blend too much as that might lead to a mere concept of regular "*lantstorm*" composition. The power of the "*will of the people*" declines in "*lantstorm-units*" if too many regular troops coexist in the same area, according to Clausewitz.²⁶⁴ The advantages of operations in small formations and attacking weak points and bases are important to be recognized, according to Clausewitz, neither should this form of tactics be over or underestimated. The right character of "*people-in-arms*" should be "*fogs*" in contrast to the "*physical bodies*" of Regular Warfare concepts. This might be seen as one explanation of the differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare.²⁶⁵

The "*fog*" in the flanks can suddenly be changed to "*lightning*", with a concentration of both "*people-in-arms*" and minor attachments of more "*regular*" organized units, preferably also combined with some organized units, which together create superiority over the enemy. Clausewitz underlines the importance of not letting "*the big strategic form of defence*" develop into Regular Warfare tactical defence, claiming that "*people-in-arms*" can never be a form of decisive defensive warfare. As for the strategic form of defence, he states however, that there are two forms of "*people-in-arms*" warfare to be considered, either as a "*last resort*" or as "*natural*" support connected to a decisive battle. Clausewitz states the opinion that one of the major aspects of fighting power, the moral factor, to be fully utilized has to be borne from the people. Thus, he acknowledges high potentiality in this "*force*", the moral force, to the tactics of "*people in arms*".²⁶⁶ A main question he argues is to analyse what influence actual "*people-in-arms*" tactics might result in. The mental aspect, "*the willingness to resist is everywhere and nowhere*"²⁶⁷ is emphasized by Clausewitz, with respect to the people, no matter rich or poor. Clausewitz argues emphatically for the preparation and use of "*people-in-arms*" as a moral necessity for "*the soul of the people*" and for the legitimacy of a state government.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Clausewitz, *Om Kriget* (1991), p. 481.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 480.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 478.

²⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 480.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 483.

Also, he points out different attitudes to the phenomenon, both from a political perspective as being dangerous with anarchistic influence potential, and from a military perspective as being doubtful of the results compared to the efforts. As a whole, Clausewitz mainly addresses the area of Irregular Warfare, primarily as one form of strategic defence. It is from the tactical view he outlines certain characteristics, such as flank attacks over large areas, harassing but not directed at the enemy strengths. As for the operational concept, he speaks of combining “*loose formations*”, “*lantstorm*” and “*lantstorm supported with regular elements*”. Combining these elements together in parallel for more offensive use is what Clausewitz writes, which links to operational art. Clausewitz describes a concept where tactics of what generally is understood as Guerrilla Warfare, support Regular Warfare combat, to be used when the right opportunities occur. Otherwise, a small scale attrition war in the enemy flanks and rear areas is the key characteristic. The arguably forceful force driver for war in general is the moral power, which can be found from the people rather than from regular military formations, according to Clausewitz.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are both of an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered; physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description covers characteristics and attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described mostly with a focus on the aggressor perspective (people-at-arms). The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The description is clear and substantial in its content and has potential understanding without complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Although from the Napoleonic times, a surprisingly comprehensive content is outlined, which expressed in more modern words could well be a contemporary definition of “*Irregular Warfare*”.

Charles Callwell

Callwell’s descriptions in his famous *Small Wars* are said merely to aim to give a sketch of the principles and practice of Small Wars regarding strategy and tactics.....against adversaries of whom modern works on military art seldom take account.²⁶⁹ The first chapter gives the following description of the term Small Wars as; “*somewhat difficult to define*”..... “*...practically can be said to include all campaigns other than those where the opposing side consists of regular troops*”²⁷⁰ Further on Callwell states; “*It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and Guerrilla Warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations varying in their scope and in their conditions*”²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1996), p. 22.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 21.

²⁷¹ Ibid. p. 21.

Another broader articulation regarding the term Small War is that “is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces”²⁷².

Callwell outlines three different forms of Small Wars: 1 Partisan warfare, which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in quelling sedition and of insurrections in civilised countries, 2 Campaigning for conquest, (of a Great power), 3 Punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.²⁷³

In the third chapter, Callwell describes the following different classes of Small Wars; campaigns of conquest or annexation (external war), campaigns for suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory (internal war) and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult or to overthrow a dangerous enemy.²⁷⁴

Callwell recognizes warfare differently depending on the adversary forces’ character or if the adversary is weaker and thus fights in other ways.

*“Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against Irregular forces, or forces which in their armament, their organisation, and their discipline are palpably inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern Regular Warfare, and it is with hostilities of this nature that this volume purposes to deal”*²⁷⁵

Callwell also discusses Irregular enemies organized regularly²⁷⁶. The work is discussed merely from the regular troop point of view.²⁷⁷

As for explaining a view on what is different from Regular Warfare, Callwell writes the following; *“The teachings of great masters of the art of war, and the experience gained from campaigns of modern date in America and on the continent of Europe, have established certain principles and precedents which form the groundwork of the system of regular warfare of to-day “.....”But the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case. The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established”*²⁷⁸

²⁷² Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1996), p. 21.

²⁷³ Ibid. p. 22.

²⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 22.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 22.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 29.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 23.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 23.

Callwell underlines a “*great diversity in tactics and strategy in different Small wars and different Guerrilla wars*”²⁷⁹ and regarding Intelligence; “*The vital importance of understanding the enemy and the war to embark*”²⁸⁰, however, Callwell recognizes, echoing several contemporary statements; “*Despite Intelligence work ...in Small wars the regular forces are often working very much in the dark*”²⁸¹ A view of complexity is also to be noticed; “*So different conditions....actions*”²⁸² “*It is this extraordinary diversity of conditions which makes the consideration of small wars so complex and so difficult to discuss as one general subject*”²⁸³

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are of both an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, but the focus is on tactics. Fighting power factors are covered for physical, conceptual factors and moral factors. The description covers several characteristics and attitude aspects as not directly included. Participating actors are described both for the regulars and the irregulars. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are clear and substantial in content and have potential understanding without complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Although from the 19th century, a comprehensive content is outlined, which, in more modern words, could well be a contemporary discussion on “*Irregular Warfare*” from the military part of operations.

Thomas Edward Lawrence

Thomas Edward Lawrence’s personal accounts and despatches from the Arab revolt cover the period of 1918-1919 and were written in 1921. The epos *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*²⁸⁴ has become an unmatched and unique classic concerning Irregular wars seen from a westerner’s eye, from the actual time period. The book covers 661 pages, appendixes excluded, and is a personal narrative, not pretending to be impartial.²⁸⁵ Lawrence uses the terms regulars²⁸⁶ and irregulars.²⁸⁷ He also equates rebellion with the form of an Irregular war, a term he uses; “*the Sheriff’s rebellion had been unsatisfactory for the last moths: (standing still, which, with an Irregular War, was the prelude to disaster)*”²⁸⁸ Lawrence also uses the term “*Guerrilla Warfare*” and “*mobile columns*”, the latter of regular character.²⁸⁹ A character of the “irregulars”, not suited for combat in larger formations, instead the smaller the better, is described.²⁹⁰

²⁷⁹ Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1996), p. 23.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 33.

²⁸¹ Ibid. p. 43.

²⁸² Ibid. p. 43.

²⁸³ Ibid. p. 42.

²⁸⁴ Thomas Edward Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph* (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1926/1935; New York: Anchor, Imprint of Random House, 1991).

²⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 6.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 65; “Arab regulars”

²⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 137.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 67.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 104.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 136.

An example of Unconventional Warfare is given in the following passage; “We received a great reinforcement to our cause in Jaafar Pasha, a Baghdadi officer from the Turkish Army. After distinguished service in the German and Turkish armies, he had been chosen by Enver to organize the levies of the Sheikh el Senussi. He went there by submarine, made a decent force of wild men, and showed tactical ability against the British in two battles”.²⁹¹ Lawrence gives a glimpse of another character of Irregular Warfare, that of a “difference to the principles of Regular Warfare; “I began to recall suitable maxims on the conduct of modern, scientific war. But they would not fit, and it worried me”.²⁹²

Lawrence discusses the moral cause to fight and the British attitude; “Efforts to make our men hate the enemy usually made them hate the fighting”.²⁹³ Lawrence continues with a discussion of the aim of Feisal and the Arabs fighting the Turks geographically and opposing their freedom of action. Only if absolutely necessary, killing was the answer; if possible, victory without combat.²⁹⁴ Another way to characterize differences in warfare and traditions and mind-set is this passage; “Armies are like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through the long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live with, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat in, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.²⁹⁵ Special conditions for distribution of raiding parties are described (unorthodox), as tribes could not be mixed or combined due to distrust.²⁹⁶

Further explanation on the special character of the warfare; “In character our operations of development for the final stroke should be like naval war, in mobility, ubiquity, independent of bases and communications, ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will. And we commanded the desert. Camel raiding parties, self-contained like ships, might cruise confidently along the enemy’s cultivation-frontier, sure of an unhindered retreat into their desert-element which the Turks could not explore”.²⁹⁷

We should use the smallest force in the quickest time, at the farthest place.²⁹⁸ In all, Lawrence describes his personal experiences and thinking during the time of the Arab rebellion. He does little in giving that form of particular warfare a name or a label. The depths in descriptions of character, content and tactics are however comprehensive in many aspects, from material to mental perspectives, not least concerning the importance of cultural understanding. Lawrence uses the term Irregular War at least in one passage.

²⁹¹ Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph* (1926), p. 166.

²⁹² Ibid. p. 188.

²⁹³ Ibid, p. 190.

²⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 191.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 192.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 338-339.

²⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 337.

²⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 337.

Result and conclusions

Lawrence's descriptions of Irregular War and Warfare, without dealing with definitions are of a comprehensive character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, but focuses on tactics. Fighting power factors are covered such as; physical, but mainly conceptual factors. The description covers several characteristics and attitude aspects are limitedly included. Participating actors are described mostly with a focus on the aggressor perspective. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are clear, colourful and often also metaphorical and substantial in content, and have potential understanding without complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Lawrence describes his view of the advantages of this form of warfare during this conflict, and also the difficulties related to what today is defined as Unconventional Warfare in order to support Regular Warfare campaigns.

Summary of views on *Irregular Warfare*, Period One; 1900 century – Post First World War

	<i>Clausewitz</i>	<i>Callwell</i>	<i>Lawrence</i>
Definitions			
Variables	<i>People-at-Arms</i>	<i>Small Wars</i>	<i>Irregular War/Warfare</i>
1. Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revolution, Uprising. - Strategic defence against a foreign military force (last resort) - (Natural) complement/support to Regular Warfare. 	Callwell outlines three different forms of "Small Wars"; 1. "Partisan Warfare", which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in quelling or subduing and of insurrections in civilised countries. 2. Campaigning for conquest (of a Great power). 3. Punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.	Irregular war as complement to Regular Warfare. <i>"We received a great reinforcement to our cause in Jaafar Pasha, a Baghdadi officer from the Turkish Army. After distinguished service in the German and Turkish armies, he had been chosen by Enver to organize the levies if the Sheikh el Senussi. He went there by submarine, made a decent force of wild men, and showed tactical ability against the British in two battles"</i>
2. Tactics and Operational Art	Guerrilla tactics over large areas, flank attacks, harassing in the rear areas. Combining three concepts within a higher plan or only "IW-concepts" (inside a large country, people support, suitable terrain).	<i>"great diversity in tactics and strategy in different Small wars and different Guerrilla wars"</i> . The work focus on tactics.	<i>"Camel raiding parties, self-contained like ships, might cruise confidently along the enemy's cultivation-frontier, sure of an unhindered retreat into their desert-element which the Turks could not explore"</i> . Guerrilla Warfare principles. Mobile column principles.

3. Physical factors	Weak force compared to regular forces.	Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against Irregular forces, or forces which in their armament, their organisation, and their discipline are palpably inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern Regular Warfare, and it is with hostilities of this nature that this volume purposes to deal.	<i>We should use the smallest force in the quickest time, at the farthest place.</i>
4. Conceptual factors	<p>“Loose formations” “Lantstorm-units” “Lantstorm supported with regular detachments”</p> <p>Natural support and complement to regular combat.</p>	<i>But the conditions of Small Wars are so diversified, the enemy's mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that Irregular Warfare must generally be carried out in a method totally different from the stereotyped system.</i>	<i>“We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live with, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat in, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.</i>
5. Moral factors	The great importance of the will of the people is addressed.	Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against Irregular forces, or forces which in their armament, their organisation, and their discipline are palpably inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern Regular Warfare, and it is with hostilities of this nature that this volume purposes to deal.	<p>Special conditions for distribution of raiding parties are described (unorthodox) as tribes could not be mixed or combined due to distrust.</p> <p>Lawrence discusses the moral cause to fight and the British attitude; “Efforts to make our men hate the enemy usually made them hate the fighting...”</p>
6. Character of activity	<p>“a fog against the physical enemy”, “a fog that suddenly could be concentrated to lightning”.</p> <p>Important function /activity and claiming high effect, when wisely used, on enemy and particular on one's morale and fighting power potential.</p>	<p>It is this extraordinarily diversity of conditions which makes the consideration of small wars so complex and so difficult to discuss as one general subject”.</p> <p>Callwell recognizes warfare differently depending on the adversary forces' character or if the adversary is weaker and thus fights in other ways.</p>	<p>A character of the “irregulars” as not suited for combat in larger formations, instead the smaller the better.</p> <p>“I began to recall suitable maxims on the conduct of modern, scientific war. But they would not fit, and it worried me”.</p>
8. Attitude aspects	Negative political and military attitude is mentioned.	Negative attitude is not directly mentioned but Callwell points out that the understanding of “modern Regular Warfare” is not enough to understand and deal with Small Wars.	Not a focus in the descriptions

9. Explanatory description	The work has mainly explanatory character.	The work has mainly explanatory character.	The work has explanatory character often with use of philosophical metaphors.
10. Umbrella description		The work has an overarching umbrella character in the beginning.	The descriptions cannot be characterized as umbrella descriptions.
11. Addressing actors		Participating actors are described mostly with focus on the aggressor perspective (people-at-arms).	Focusing on the aggressor perspective (the insurgents).
12. Military focus	The focus is military.	The focus is military.	The focus is mainly military.
13. Political/civilian focus	C chooses not to elaborate further on the political side of his “On War”.	The political focus is limited.	Political focus is included.

Figure 28. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period One.

Result and Comments

The three chosen influential experts are of very different character; Clausewitz – the primus classic military philosopher of the 18th and 19th century, Callwell – the primus British practitioner from the Imperial War period and Lawrence – the debated, unique British Irregular Warfare leader, self-reflector and mentor from the First World War period. They stand for views on the subject from the end of 1700 to the beginning of 1900, during which the development of armed violence took huge steps, from Napoleonic warfare to mechanized combat on the ground, at sea and now also in the air.

Moreover, they express their views from different lengths of experiences, two of them focusing on how to defend or defeat Irregular opponents and one from the position of how to use Irregular Warfare in order to defeat a regular opponent. Lawrence and Clausewitz respectively, note that they have incomplete views or limited knowledge on the subject.

One grand war philosopher in general, deriving theories within and beyond the scientific paradigms, one COIN commander pragmatically writing on methods and finally, one tactical Insurgency commander reflecting on the subject of personnel, sociological/psychological aspects that clearly go beyond positivistic aspirations. With such differences in time, context, social realities, personal backgrounds and purposes for their descriptions, explanations and thinking, there exist innumerable possibilities to extract some nucleus from their views. The thirteen aspects here used to structure and examine traces of expressions give nonetheless, the following result. Apart from addressing strategy aspects, all three experts refer to revolutionary up-risings as a natural complement to Regular Warfare.

Tactics and operational art characterized as different forms of Guerrilla Warfare with classic aspects of high mobility, self-contained forces, flank attacks, harassing the enemy and great diversity in execution, are rather similarly addressed. As for physical factors, the Irregular side’s military weaker position is recognised. As regards explaining different concepts of warfare, Clausewitz gives three conceptual examples, Callwell denotes “*the great differences*” and Lawrence focuses on the non-material centre of gravity (“the mind”).

Callwell also notes concepts of irregulars using Regular Warfare principles. These three different explanations can be said to complement very different perspectives though all point in the same direction. The strong moral factor, through the will of the people is underlined by Clausewitz. Callwell deals with the need of a high offensive spirit in the regular troops and Lawrence discusses the problems of adopting a new cultural moral perspective for westerners practising Irregular Warfare in foreign countries and different parts of the world.

As for the character of the activity, Clausewitz uses the fog and lightning metaphor that goes well with Lawrence's expressions. Callwell underlines the uniqueness in every case, making generalization very difficult. One characteristic has a weaker military potential, another focuses on the fight. As a result of this form of warfare and the character of irregulars, they are not suitable for Regular Warfare according to Lawrence. Regarding the attitude towards this kind of warfare, both Clausewitz and Callwell write about negative or limited interest in the western world. All writings are explanatory, from a theoretical and more positivistic approach, seeking specific and demarcable structures in the romantic and emotionally loaded formulations. Clausewitz and also Callwell give structural approaches and classifications of an umbrella character, even if admitting the difficulties for doing this. Clausewitz and Lawrence focus on the user of Irregular Warfare, Callwell focuses on the defender for such aggressions. The political focus is mentioned by Clausewitz, little addressed by Callwell and integrated into Lawrence's texts. The military focus is in dominance for all.

Answers to the three questions

The first question; *"How is the form of warfare, labelled "Irregular Warfare" defined and explained?"* can be summarized as a sort of warfare, either as a complement to Regular Warfare, a substitute for Regular Warfare (for example after occupation or against Irregular attacks) or attacks on the ruling power within an uprising, where means and methods are physically very different to the actual forms or military Regular Warfare. A main characteristic is that military force and seeking "the decisive battle" is not a goal or possibility here. Both actions from irregulars and against such enemies are included.

The descriptions give expressions for other techniques and tactics than just for Regular Warfare and with a view that these concepts can (and should) be used in combination with Regular Warfare as well. Irregular Warfare can exist both standing alone and linked to Regular Warfare.

The second question; *"What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?"* can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts. The different terms such as "People-at-Arms", "Small Wars" and Lawrence's "Irregular War", despite different explanations and description techniques, point towards a conceptual view of a form of activity that opens up for diversity and adaption, motion and flexibility, on the contrary to structural pre-determined formations and manoeuvres in certain orders. The power and consequences of involving the "people" in this sort of warfare differ from the Regular Warfare conducted by soldiers only.

Requirements for certain abilities to lead different formations, or irregulars using Guerrilla Warfare strategy, tactics, and operational art, possibly in combinations with regular operations, can be seen as differing for the usual needs of Regular Warfare. As this sort of warfare is based on needs for high mobility in the actual cultural and climatological conditions (under extended periods), a need for survival capability, hiding and at times a very high offensive spirit, greater than compared to what is demanded of units in Regular Warfare units (special forces excluded). A protracted campaign where military capability is not mainly the key target, also differs from Regular Warfare. A certain combat form where the enemy is worn down – not “fought down” differs much from Regular Warfare.

The third question; “*What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?*” addressed to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary. First, one trait is that the activity is hard to explain in distinct categories and definite demarcations. Traits such as “the weaker tactics or strategy”, high mobility, total culture/climatological adaption, non-material motivators, loose formations and “blowing winds”, not being able to engage physically and Callwell’s view of the necessity to hunt down the irregulars using all means, can be said to be typical traits from expressions during this time.

Discussion of the result

The texts with their definitions and explanations have in common that they are articulations of the same phenomena and that problems are thought to exist in defining and explaining it properly. Clausewitz argues that little is written on the subject, even if he himself was lecturing in the subject during 1810-11 and wrote 250 pages for this purpose. The authors view the phenomena from different time perspectives, different lengths of time (Lawrence only a couple of years), and different roles with different aims for their studies and writings. Also they were differently educated and very differently linked to the subject. These differences and many more not expressed here, in spite of or possibly due to their existence, still point out several similar core aspects of Irregular Warfare. As for symbolic influence, Lawrence’s images have probably had the most important impact reaching an audience far beyond the military structures, highlighting the role and character of the lonely leader (western) of Irregular forces. Similarities considering the phenomena do exist as can be shown; still, this overview has to be looked upon as very brief and rather as examples of articulation than a solid textual analysis of each author’s view in total.

Period Two; “Second World War to 1970s”

David Galula

David Galula starts his well-known book *Counterinsurgency Warfare* from 1964 with an analysis of the nature and characteristics of the term *Revolutionary War*, with the following paraphrasing of Clausewitz; “*Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means*”²⁹⁹ On the contrary to Regular War, Insurgency can start long before the insurgents resort to the uses of force, Galula claims.

Not using the term Irregular Warfare, Galula differs between revolution, plot and insurgency, the latter described as a “*protected struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order*”.³⁰⁰

He describes the differences of conventional war as the asymmetry between the opposite camps in strengths, assets and their liability.³⁰¹ The political goal and the people as the objective is underlined, as the gradual transition from peace to war.³⁰² More differences between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are addressed as fluidity for the first and rigidity of the latter.³⁰³ One fundamental difference between conventional war and insurgency, according to Galula is that the latter has its own principles.

Secondly, that these “*laws of war or insurgencies*” do not apply in the same way for the counterinsurgent.³⁰⁴ Another difference is that only the insurgent can start to struggle, Counterinsurgency is only an effect of Insurgency.³⁰⁵ Galula admits there is a problem in generalization and extrapolation from a limited amount of studied insurgencies (learning about conflicts after the Second World War), thus only claiming for a “*hope merely to clear away some of the confusions that we have found so often and so long witnessed in the (wrong camp)*”.³⁰⁶ Galula sees Revolutionary War primarily as an internal conflict “*although external influences seldom fail to bear upon it*”.³⁰⁷ An Insurgency is seen as a protracted struggle conducted methodically and Galula differentiates between two types of Revolutionary Warfare as the base for an Insurgency; the Communist pattern and the Bourgeois-nationalist pattern with different uses of organization phases and terror.

²⁹⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, second printing, 1965. Reprinted 2006 with new page numbers), p. 1.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 2.

³⁰¹ Ibid. p. 3.

³⁰² Ibid. p. 5.

³⁰³ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. p. xii.

³⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 1.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. p. xiv.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 1.

The pattern of the communist Insurgency is outlined by Galula as;

1. Creation of a party
2. Unified front
3. Guerrilla Warfare (mostly to organize the population – not military aim)
4. Movement Warfare (not fixed defence operations)
5. Annihilation Campaign

The situation of overwhelming superiority in forces for the governmental side is noted.³⁰⁸ The political primacy of this kind of war is underlined and “*politics becomes an active instrument of operations*”.³⁰⁹ The gradual transition from peace to war is noted³¹⁰ as the “*fluidity of the insurgent, rigidity of the counterinsurgent*”³¹¹ as characteristics. Another characteristic is that the insurgents operate clandestinely although their actions other than subversion are overt.³¹² Galula deals thoroughly with the area of propaganda, both for the insurgent and for the counterinsurgent. Galula states; “*The military efforts need to be supplemented by an intensive psychological offensive against the guerrillas; the trump card here is an amnesty offer*”.³¹³ Galula also maintains that Revolutionary War never reverts to a conventional form; creation of a regular army does not end subversion and guerrilla activity, instead these methods are combined for synergy.³¹⁴ The vital role of the police organization and forces is clearly stated.³¹⁵ Galula’s view of having an adapted military force, also with the aspect of moral issues (if the Counterinsurgents’ forces develop feelings for the insurgents’ stated cause) is discussed.³¹⁶

Galula underlines the role of the counterinsurgents’ leader’s knowledge of Counterinsurgency Warfare and his resoluteness and addresses his role as paramount.³¹⁷ As for the subject of Guerrilla Warfare, Galula spends time on discussion principles. He states the attrition of the enemy military forces is merely a by-product here, and not the essential goal, which Galula states is the impact on the people.³¹⁸ A strategy when turning to “*Movement Warfare*” is described where in occupied areas, clandestine structures will still be existing in order to resume the struggle, if the enemy re-takes the area.³¹⁹ Galula discusses two forms of Counterinsurgency; in Cold Revolutionary War (legal and not violent Insurgency actions) and in Hot Revolutionary War (openly illegal and violent insurgent actions).³²⁰

³⁰⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* (1965), p. 3.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. pp. 4-5.

³¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 5-6.

³¹¹ Ibid. p. 7.

³¹² Ibid. p. 49.

³¹³ Ibid. p. 94.

³¹⁴ Ibid. p. 9.

³¹⁵ Ibid. p. 20.

³¹⁶ Ibid. p. 21.

³¹⁷ Ibid. p. 17.

³¹⁸ Ibid. p. 35.

³¹⁹ Ibid. p. 39.

³²⁰ Ibid. p. 49.

Galula advocates not adopting the insurgent style of warfare (Guerrilla Warfare, for example) as the main form of Counterinsurgency Warfare.³²¹ Command and control of the people is vital and the “irreversibility” occurs when leaders emerge from the people.³²² Territorial control and an adaption of mind-set of the Counterinsurgents’ forces are crucial (politics are central to the struggle).³²³ Important aspects “from strategy to tactics” are single direction, political primacy, coordination, territorial command, and adaption of the forces to Counterinsurgency Warfare and adaption of minds.³²⁴

Galula describes tactics for operations as “simple in essence” and consisting of mobile units and earmarked units to stay in the area, in order to reinforce whatever static units were originally there, or are suddenly concentrated around the area. They start operations from the outside in, aiming at containing the guerrilla in a ring. At the same time, units garrisoning the adjoining areas are ordered to intensify their activity on the periphery of the selected area. The sweep is next conducted from the inside out, aiming at least at expelling the guerrillas. The over-all operation is finally broken down to several small-scale ones. All the static units, the original ones as well as the new ones, are assigned to their permanent sectors. A part of the mobile units operate as a body. Centrally controlled; the rest are allocated to the sector. All the forces work on what is left of the guerrillas after the two earlier sweeps.³²⁵ Galula is clear in his view regarding the need for a Counterinsurgency doctrine in order to unite both civilian/political and military actions.³²⁶

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are of an explanatory character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects of strategy but focuses on operational art and tactics. The political aspect is however underlined throughout the book. Fighting power factors are covered as are physical factors with a focus on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics of subversion, mainly overt insurgencies and even the necessity of considering personal characteristics when dealing with Counterinsurgency Warfare. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender position. The description focuses primarily on military activities in the phenomena, although police work is stated as vital. The description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Galula clearly explains them as they occur. The description is clear and has good potentiality of being understood easily.

³²¹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* (1965). p. 51.

³²² Ibid. p. 57.

³²³ Ibid. p. 66.

³²⁴ Ibid. pp. 66-67.

³²⁵ Ibid. p. 76.

³²⁶ Ibid. p. 65.

Werner Hahlweg

Werner Hahlweg wrote his well-known “*Guerilla, Krieg Ohne Fronten*”³²⁷ during 1964-1966, linked to his research on Clausewitz lectures on people-in-arms (or Guerrilla War) 1810-1811 at the “*Allmänna Krigsskolan*” in Berlin.³²⁸ The work was linked to military history and War Studies seminars at Munster Westfalen University faculty of history. Clausewitz’s view on the relationship between the “Small War” and the “Big War” was that the former was mainly a support to the Big War (until the First World War). There was low German interest according to Hahlweg, in contrast to the British and French greater interest, according to Callwall, but for all the “Big War” was the key concern. In Austria there was some interest and military historians are claimed to have had low interest³²⁹

Some military people wrote about it (German, Russian, Lawrence of Arabia) and the idea was that the Guerrilla War was so linked to the people and that the people’s war should be regarded as “war”, with its particular character of psychology of the people, that it should also be acknowledged outside the military aspects (Schraudenbach, 1926).³³⁰ A main aspect is said to have been the integration of military and political issues (the military becoming more civilian and politics more military).³³¹

The work of Hahlweg is organized in seven time perspectives;

1. From the “beginning” to the 19th century (the foundations for Guerrilla Warfare as a trade craft and art of war)
2. The North American War of Independence, the French Revolution, The Napoleonic War, Guerrilla War and People- in-arms
3. Guerrilla War during the 20th century as a part of the regular army operations and a means of national insurgencies.
4. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Partisan Warfare/War as a revolutionary way of combat and a mean of revolutionary state building
5. Guerrilla War in the First World War
6. Guerrilla War, total war and resistance, the “fourth arm”, the Second World War
7. Guerrilla War as a way of war in the coloured and under-developed people’s freedom fight and a mean in the revolutionary world politics.

³²⁷ Werner Hahlweg, *Gerilla, Krig utan Fronter* [*Guerrilla, Krieg ohne Fronten*], translated by Karl Gustav Kavander and Crister Ellsén, (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska förbundet nr 252, 2003, original published in German, 1968).

³²⁸ Ibid. pp. 9-11.

³²⁹ Ibid. p. 12.

³³⁰ Ibid. p. 14.

³³¹ Ibid. p. 18.

Hahlweg asks what the general traits in Guerrilla Warfare are and what specific traits there are in different conflicts. He also addresses the legal aspect and the possibility of studying Guerrilla Warfare from anthropological and typological aspects. He refers to Carl Schmitt's study "*Theorie des Partisanen*" with four different aspects ; the "room"-aspect, the "crushing of social structure", the incorporation of the strategic perspectives and the technology-industrial aspect, all of which stand in interdependency of each other.³³²

Hahlweg also points out another aspect, the relations between the guerrilla and the supporting power/countries/governments. Other aspects are the relations between military and civilian differences and if even a new form of combatant emerges. Too many aspects to be handled in one study, Hahlweg claims his work only to be "*a first inventory on the total phenomenon of Guerrilla Warfare*"³³³ Hahlweg uses diverse sources such as expert literature, published literature, training manuals, archive materials, however, not explaining what method he used or from what perspective he directed his work. The goal is however explained as being one to create an introductory base for the subject of Guerrilla Warfare; "*with comprehensive explanations of many aspects often discussed*". The aim is to give impulses for further work; the focus is the modern guerrilla phenomenon.

Hahlweg outlines six typical traits stated to be differing from Regular Warfare³³⁴ where he concludes that all are connected to one form of warfare, which overall is characterized by a vast versatility and different forms of applications not found in "Regular Warfare".³³⁵ He chooses to further use interchangeably, the terms of Guerrilla War or Partisan War. The following traits are typical for the character of Guerrilla Warfare, according to Hahlweg; small detachments fighting with lower ambitions than ordinary Regular Warfare, fighting dispersed and not in regular pre-determined formations, Revolutionary Warfare (social revolutionary impulses) bringing forward an urge from the opponent to strike back with the same means as Counterinsurgency against insurgencies.

As the human being is carrying the main burden in Guerrilla Warfare, the label "partisan" catches something special, a human being with certain characteristics; a warrior with initiative, wholeheartedly fighting for his cause, alone with his cause still attached to a larger unit to which he is committed, no matter if for social or nationality reasons. A special combat technique, the subversive war, with its hard-to-define tactical rules compared to overt war between states. An anonymous fight by ambushes, sabotage and resistance everywhere and nowhere at the back of the enemy and on his installations.

³³² Hahlweg, *Gerilla, Krig utan Fronter* (1968), p.19.

³³³ Ibid. p. 21.

³³⁴ Ibid. pp. 23-24.

³³⁵ Ibid. p. 24.

Finally, in the terrain, the guerrilla know no frontiers which Regular Warfare is connected to. Different labels exist according to Hahlweg, all meaning the same form of warfare, where in the west the term “*Guerrilla Warfare*” is used and in the east, “*Partisan Warfare*”. Hahlweg noticed that the term “*Klienkrieg*” is frequent in Switzerland and in Austria.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are both of an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered; physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description covers characteristics and attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described mostly with focus on the aggressor perspective (people-at-arms). The description leans primarily on a political-social base with military focus on a fighting perspective of the phenomena. The description is clear and substantial in its content and has potential understanding without complementary sub-explanations or definition. A deep social and human dimension is included in the descriptions, as well as a thorough explanation of the characteristics of the type of warfare, based on a subversive and anonymous ground.

Frank Kitson

As one of the most well-known experts on Irregular War and Counterinsurgency during the Cold War, Frank Kitson’s famous *Low Intensity Operations*³³⁶ discusses and explains terms such as subversion and Insurgency. The term *Irregular Warfare* is however, not mentioned by Kitson. Regarding many problematic areas with these kinds of military operations, Kitson acknowledged a problem of yesterday that still stands today (1971 when the book was published the first time), which concerns the matter of terminology. Kitson lines up variations in use in The British Army; civil disturbance, insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, subversion, terrorism, civil disobedience, communist Revolutionary Warfare and insurrection on the one hand.

And counterinsurgency, internal security and counter revolutionary operations on the other. Other terms in use are *Partisan*, *Irregular* or *Unconventional War*.³³⁷ Kitson discusses merits and disadvantages of the term “Revolutionary Warfare”, which he on the one hand finds covering the field, but due to “*the expression is too heavily weighted towards the activities of communist or left-winged groups*”, does not mentally cover non-communist activities of the same kind.³³⁸ Kitson does not find it useful to try to outline a completely comprehensive new definition and stays with the pair of terms; “*subversion*” and “*Insurgency*”. Kitson chooses to define subversion as; “*all means of measures short of the uses of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do*”.

³³⁶ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1971, London: Faber & Faber, 1971, new edition by Hailer Publishing, 2008).

³³⁷ Ibid. p. 2.

³³⁸ Ibid. p. 2.

He defines “Insurgency” as; “to cover the use of armed force by a selection of the people against the government for the purposes mentioned above”, here referring to the explanation of subversion.³³⁹

The area of Peacekeeping, understood as “how to prevent by non-warlike methods, one group of people from fighting another group of people” is also covered by Kitson, thus already in 1971, covering the whole spectrum of emergencies that might have to be handled by, or supported by military forces.³⁴⁰ This perspective is uncommon to be found in most analyses of Irregular Warfare during the Cold War. Still today, with the expanding writing on the subject, Peacekeeping is seldom included. Kitson argues for *some main differences* between Irregular and Regular Warfare. The first he claims are the areas of subversion and Insurgency; both are forms of civil conflicts. The second is the claim that the use of “*persuasion is the main method of gaining support*” (of the people), sometimes backed up by uses of force and this in contrast to *regular war where the opposite is the rule, that is mainly force*, sometimes backed up by persuasion.³⁴¹

With the terms subversion and insurgency, Kitson covers all influence and violence activities directed by people (often needing support from the outside) up to the conduct of Regular War with these two terms. He also includes civil war as a result of an insurgency in some ways.³⁴² He refers to Roger Trinquier’s term “*Modern Warfare*” as a lumping together of subversion and insurgency, as being an interlocking system of actions, political, economic, psychological and military that aim at the overthrowing of established authority in a country.³⁴³ Regarding attitudes for this kind of operation by the army and military organizations in the western countries, Kitson discusses this in his last chapter of the book.³⁴⁴ Attitude problems will in turn be the subject for fighting morale and thus a question regarding fighting power for military units countering subversion and insurgencies.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are of both an explanatory and umbrella character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects of strategy but focus on operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered such as physical factors but the focus is on conceptual factors. Moral factors are implicitly dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics of subversion and insurgencies and also regarding the need for personal characteristics, dealing with “Low Intensity Operations”. Attitude aspects are included and participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender position. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena, such as handling such operations. The description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Kitson explains them as they occur. The descriptions are clear and have good potentiality of being easily understood.

³³⁹Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (1971), p. 3.

³⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 4.

³⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 4-5.

³⁴² Ibid. p. 4.

³⁴³ Ibid. p. 5. Kitson refers to Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, reprinted 2006), p. 6.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 198-201.

John J. McCuen

American author John McCuen's book *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* from 1966, departs from the Mao school of Revolutionary War.³⁴⁵ Taking into account the number of books regarding various aspects of Revolutionary Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Psychological Warfare, his book tries to give a broad, unified counter-revolutionary Strategy.³⁴⁶ The attempt is to deal comprehensively with political, psychological and military fundamentals. The view is primarily from the indigenous governing authorities. Stating that the form of War(fare) is new in this comprehensive form that Mao designed, he claims too many people do not understand the problem involved.³⁴⁷

The key message is that a governing power can defeat any revolutionary movement if it adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and apply them in reverse to defeat the revolutionaries with their own weapons on their own battlefield.³⁴⁸ McCuen defines the revolutionary strategy stages as; organization, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare (which governments often underestimate, according to McCuen) and mobile warfare (the final stage).³⁴⁹ The large scale resources for civic actions in the organization phase are emphasized.³⁵⁰ McCuen outlines the following principle, the same one stated, both for the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary side; Preserving Oneself and Annihilating the Enemy, Establishing Base Areas, Mobilizing the Masses (where the organization of the people fits in), Seeking outside Support and Unifying the Effort. All these five strategic principles require a unity of principles so as to coordinate them all.³⁵¹

Counter-revolutionary strategies are outlined for; Counter-Organization, Counter-Terrorism, Counter Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-Mobile Warfare.³⁵² The Counter-Organization is claimed to be the goal of all Counter-Revolutionary strategy.³⁵³ The Counter-Terrorism part contains all the examples from Algeria and asserts that the police should lead the intelligence work.³⁵⁴ Regarding territorial consolidation, examples from Malaya are used. Detailed examples of deep patrol operations, also with the use of trackers, are given.³⁵⁵ Neither the city-bred British nor the village-bred Malayan soldiers possessed the skills needed in the jungle.³⁵⁶

³⁴⁵ John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. The Strategy of Counterinsurgency*, foreword by Sir Robert Thompson (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1967, first published by Faber & Faber, London, 1966. New printing, St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishers, 2005).

³⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 19.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 27.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 29.

³⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 40.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 43.

³⁵¹ Ibid. p. 73.

³⁵² Ibid. p. 80.

³⁵³ Ibid. p. 125.

³⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 141.

³⁵⁵ Ibid. pp. 143-147.

³⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 146.

The use of air power and especially the role of helicopters in Counterinsurgency operations is discussed.³⁵⁷ The French were training tribes for fighting Viet-minh as early as in 1946 as described in the book and can be seen as an example of Unconventional Warfare.³⁵⁸

As for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare, including fighting up to divisional strength, the problem with too few troops is discussed, either to finish clearing and pacifying, or to attack and destroy the guerrilla bases. For the French during the seven and a half years of war in the area of operations in Indochina, it was never possible to have sufficient forces for all needs.³⁵⁹ McCuen describes different tactics; the most successful for countering guerrillas is stated to have been small units nomadizing an area under long periods with high mobility.³⁶⁰ Different combinations of partisans, local forces, river patrols and regular combat teams are described.³⁶¹

As an example of larger mobile operations, Operation Hironde (Swallow) in 1953 is described: the raid of two parachute battalions, covered by up to about sixty fighters and bombers.³⁶² The merits and risks of counter-guerrillas are mentioned, over all, giving that form of tactics a positive character, at the same time recognizing the dangers.³⁶³ As for the strategy of moving back and forth between terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and Mobile Warfare, the counterinsurgent forces have to be able to understand and deal with this capability and way of warfare.³⁶⁴ McCuen argues that a solid politico-military base is of prime necessity before countering the adversaries. The strategic bases consist of the people's loyalty to the government. The Oil-spot strategy is suggested to be very calculatedly based on where the government's resources can be placed. McCuen recognizes the general lack of troops as for the need over the region.

He stresses the local perspective, "the grass root level", when establishing work to "mobilize the masses" (the support of the people). The importance of counter-organizing the people as the very first step for a secured area is stressed, and here the role of a functional civil administration and economic programme is underlined. Outside support is often necessary but McCuen recommends that foreign military should not be used in police work. The training of new police forces is however important.

The final chapter³⁶⁵ in his book is focused on the challenges of understanding the problem and how to out-administrate the insurgents, which in turn demands unity of effort between military and civilian activities. This he admits is a problematic area to activate due to differences in opinions between the military and civilian parts. He emphasizes that the police have lead-roles in counter-terrorism activities, which need an adapted intelligence apparatus with clandestine resources.

³⁵⁷ McCuen, *The Art of Counter-revolutionary War. The Strategy of Counterinsurgency* (1967), p. 169.

³⁵⁸ Ibid. pp. 179-182.

³⁵⁹ Ibid. pp. 201, 290.

³⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 214.

³⁶¹ Ibid. pp. 222-223.

³⁶² Ibid. p. 236.

³⁶³ Ibid. pp. 239-245.

³⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 329.

³⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 325-330.

The ultimate goal is to out-administrate the enemy, according to McCuen.³⁶⁶ A strategy and military operational art, with tactical capabilities to work both statically and mobile, from patrol operations to large scale anti-guerrilla-operations, up to the capability of joint operations against enemy mobile warfare are outlined, all with a focus on territorial defence and activities. McCuen concludes with the following statement; *“Winning a revolutionary war will take massive organization, dedication, sacrifice, and time. The government must decide early if it is willing to pay the price. Half-measures lead only to protracted, costly defeats”*.³⁶⁷

Result and conclusions

The descriptions of the term Counter-revolutionary Warfare, not using the term Irregular Warfare can be categorized as being of both an explanatory and umbrella character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, focusing the descriptions mostly on military operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors mainly include physical and conceptual factors. The description covers characteristics though attitude aspects are included to a limited extent. Participating actors are described from the view of the defending side. The description leans primarily on a military focus even if the comprehensive character is emphasized several times.

Robert Thompson

Sir Robert Thompson was one the most famous British and also western world Cold War experts in Counterinsurgency during the Cold War. With a background³⁶⁸ from Guerrilla Warfare in Burma during World War Two, a civil servant in Malaya, a Ferret Force trainer during the Malayan emergency and advisor to the USA during the Vietnam War, he had unique experiences from “both sides of such a struggle”. In his well-known book *Defeating Communist Insurgency*³⁶⁹ he aims to describe a basic theory for Counterinsurgency.³⁷⁰ Thompson saw a new form of insurgency; *“with armed intervention by neighbouring countries in support of next-door subversive and insurgent movements on a scale which in the past has been termed aggression and has led to war”*.³⁷¹ Thompson underlines that the book should not be taken out of context; alluding to the discussions concerning the insurgencies of Malaya and Vietnam.

³⁶⁶ McCuen, *The Art of Counter-revolutionary War. The Strategy of Counterinsurgency* (1967). p. 325.

³⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 330.

³⁶⁸ Robert Thompson, *Make for the Hills, Memoirs of the Far Eastern Wars* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989). The book describes Thompson’s experiences and reflections on the challenges of Guerrilla Warfare and Irregular Warfare with the British Chindits in Burma during WW2 and insurgencies (here communist influenced insurgencies).

³⁶⁹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency. The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005, original publication New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966).

³⁷⁰ Ibid. Preface, p. 9.

³⁷¹ Ibid. Preface, p. 10.

His vocabulary does not include the term Irregular Warfare but deals with the terms subversion and insurgencies, and only applied with a communist base. Thompson is referred to by Frank Kitson.³⁷² Thompson describes a communist struggle, initiated by subversion combined with selective terror and murders of officials with extreme brutality. The volume of civilian victims of terror is given in numbers.³⁷³ In general, the method is described as subversion supported by selective terrorism, followed by a second prong of attack; the armed struggle. The need for a safe sanctuary is discussed being part of the methods and aims of the guerrilla-phase of an insurgency.³⁷⁴ The combined aims of political and military efforts are described and referred to with a phrase of Mao Tse-Tung, in which he states that the villages must be used to encircle the towns.³⁷⁵ The primacy of organizational efforts both for the insurgents and the counterinsurgents is one key note in Thompson's argumentation.³⁷⁶

Thompson uses an organizational view of insurgent movement, which outlines two different sub-organisations, the political and military, where subversion, intelligence, terror and sabotage belong to the political wing. The military wing organizes village guerrilla squads, local units and regular units who perform ambushes and attacks respectively.³⁷⁷ The problem of governmental overreliance on higher violence with "*aggressive search-and-clear operations*" is noted by Thompson.³⁷⁸ A third stage is described with alternatively moving the Guerrilla War up to a war of movement with higher formations (up to division), combining Guerrilla Warfare with higher pressure to demoralize the government to achieve negotiation or additionally, forcing an increasing number of the rural communities to seek refuge in the towns, thus creating a large-scale refugee situation.

Thompson argues that a communist armed Insurgency is not a "people's Revolutionary War", but only a revolutionary form of warfare designed to enable a very small ruthless minority to gain control over the people.³⁷⁹ Insurgency is equalled to war.³⁸⁰ Thompson discusses the argued problems of a conventional army structure and mind-set in detail, when confronting an Insurgency, but also the hampering effect of giving low priority to civilian administrative efforts.³⁸¹ Concerning military affect, Thompson argues for the same theory of Guerrilla Warfare as for the counterinsurgent, emphasizing "*clear-hold operations*" instead of "*search and clear operations*".³⁸² Here, he emphasizes using ambushes on the guerrilla to disrupt the lines to the populations, on the same premises as the guerrillas, but with even more determination than theirs.³⁸³

³⁷² Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations* (1971), p. 28.

³⁷³ Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966), p. 27.

³⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 29.

³⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 30.

³⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 10.

³⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 33.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 35.

³⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 49.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 51.

³⁸¹ Ibid. pp. 60-62.

³⁸² Ibid. pp. 115-120.

³⁸³ Ibid. p. 120.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions are of both an explanatory and umbrella character, where the terms subversion and Insurgency cover all power aspects from nonviolence to divisional warfare with ground forces. Thompson uses the term “Guerrilla War” and “war of movement” to separate ambushes from attacks with formations. The potential of explaining content covers aspects of strategy and, to a degree, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as physical factors but the focus is on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics of subversion and insurgencies and also regarding the need to re-design regular military units for Counterinsurgency operations.

Greater demands on junior officers and capabilities to operate “like guerrillas” are advocated by Thompson. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender positions. The description leans primarily on an administrative/political and civil focus. The military focus of the phenomena is, however, clearly elaborated on when speaking of such operations. The descriptions do not demand understanding of sub-terms as Thompson explains them as they occur. The descriptions are clear and have good potential of being understood easily.

Roger Trinquir

Roger Trinquir, together with David Galula, represents one of the most prominent Cold War writers of Irregular Warfare, or “*Modern warfare*” (*La Guerre Moderne*), the title of his well-known book, which has seen growing interest since western countries’ renewed concern about Counterinsurgency.³⁸⁴ Trinquir uses the terms, Subversive Warfare or Revolutionary Warfare, claiming them to be a new kind of warfare.³⁸⁵ Characteristics are argued to be “*an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military – that aim at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement of another regime*”³⁸⁶.

Trinquir says; “*on so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy their accustomed decisive role.....combat actions carried out against opposing armed forces, are of limited importance and are never the total conflict*”.³⁸⁷

Trinquir labels this arguably new kind of war; “*Modern War*” and states that studies about subversive warfare have been frequent, but that these studies rarely go beyond the stage of Guerrilla Warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.³⁸⁸ According to Trinquier, mostly the offensive form of Guerrilla Warfare has been studied.

³⁸⁴ Roger Trinquir, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, reprinted 2006).

³⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 5.

³⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

³⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 5.

³⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 6.

The subtlest aspects of this kind of war are stated to be, the manipulation of the population and the *sine que non* of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population.³⁸⁹ Terrorism is said to be the most effective tool for an enemy to gain such support. Characteristics are a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.³⁹⁰ Victory for the defender belongs to the one who completely destroys the armed clandestine organisation. Trinquier gives comprehensive examples of the structure of clandestine organizations.³⁹¹

Terror as a “*weapon of warfare*” is stated to have the goal of controlling the population and Trinquier equals terrorists with soldiers and thus motivates such methods used by the terrorists to be used on them (controlled torture in order to get information).³⁹² Problems of identifying the adversary are discussed. The vital role of the inhabitants to protect themselves against Terrorism is underlined. Defence organizations with police and army operations in the cities combined with countrywide intelligence are needed, according to Trinquier. The importance of intelligence is discussed.

Police operations, propaganda efforts and social programmes are considered in detail in what Trinquier also calls “*internal warfare*”.³⁹³ Police actions are said to be “actual operational warfare”. Trinquier admits the risk and possible need for harsh action amidst the population in order to get to the enemy, but leans on army discipline and methods to correct transgressions.³⁹⁴ A problem lies in that the military forces usually are unprepared for such kinds of operations.³⁹⁵ With Terrorism in the cities as the main weapon, Guerrilla Warfare is the method in the countryside. Both methods are seen as only one stage in “modern warfare”.³⁹⁶ This stage is designed to create a favourable situation to build up a regular army. Even with regular units, Guerrilla Warfare will continue, aiming not so much to support regular combat but nonetheless, to instil a climate of insecurity for the defender and the population. As for military operations, Trinquier does not recommend trying to adapt to Guerrilla Warfare with command units, outposts or more conventional sweeps and large scale operations. The best way of getting knowledge of the enemy is (if possible) to turn the inhabitants against him, fighting and getting intelligence in the same fashion.³⁹⁷

³⁸⁹ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency* (1964), p. 6.

³⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁹¹ Ibid. pp. 9-13.

³⁹² Ibid. pp. 18-19.

³⁹³ Ibid. p. 38.

³⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 40.

³⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 42.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 45.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. pp. 46-50.

Counter guerrilla operations should be conducted using three principles, according to Trinquir; *to cut the guerrilla off from the population, to render guerrilla zones untenable and to coordinate these actions over a wide area and for long enough*. Here, Trinquir talks about divisional operations.³⁹⁸ The counter guerrilla strategy is outlined as; *“the most desirable objective is the destruction of the politico-military organization in the intermediate area”*.³⁹⁹ Trinquir describes various tactics in detail (*grid units* in the town for police operations, well-trained *interval units* with a basic four-company battalion of light infantry structure for deep sector operations to destroy the politico-military organizations, to organize inhabitants and to regroup dispersed populations, and *intervention units* of elite troops (nomads)).

In all, Trinquir mentions volumes of at least four divisions for a theatre for this kind of operation.⁴⁰⁰ Here he states the opinion that this kind of war is not a war for junior commanders, but for the highest coordination and command officer. The problem is not a lack of troops but of how to use the available resources, according to Trinquir.⁴⁰¹ In order to bring the war to the enemy, he advocates the establishment of “*Maquis Zones*” with indigenous partisans, an example of the use of Unconventional Warfare in order to perform counter guerrilla operations deep in the enemy areas.⁴⁰²

This could also include “*a few well-calculated acts of sabotage and terrorism will then compel any reluctant citizen to give the required cooperation*”.⁴⁰³ Trinquir’s key message is that the army has to use all available means to fight an enemy using “*Modern Warfare*”. At the same time, he poses an implicit question, if this is possible. Throughout the book, there are examples of statements regarding military unwillingness to fight these wars and the problems of adapting when de facto engaged in such conflicts.

Result and conclusions

The description of the term “*Modern Warfare*” is of an umbrella character, complemented with thorough explanations. The potential of explaining content covers aspects of strategy but the focus is mainly on operational art and tactics, as well as on police and military operations. The political aspect is underlined, mainly as regards the Insurgency perspective through the book. Fighting power factors are covered as are physical factors but with a focus on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics of subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare and countering activities against them. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender positions. The descriptions focus primarily on the military activity of the phenomena, including police work. The description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Trinquir clearly explains them as they occur. The description is in all, clear and has good potential of being understood easily.

³⁹⁸ Trinquir, *Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency* (1964), pp. 54-55.

³⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 60.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. pp. 60-74.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. p. 74.

⁴⁰² Ibid. pp. 84-88.

⁴⁰³ Ibid. pp. 84-88.

Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two; “Second World War to 1970s”

Definitions Variables	<i>Galula</i>	<i>Halhweg</i>	<i>Kitson</i>
1. Strategy	Insurgency is seen as a Strategy.	The strategic perspectives are discussed but are not the focus of the work (complement to the big war, resistance, revolutionary aims etc.)	Insurgency can be seen as a Strategy.
2. Tactics and Operational Art	All different forms of influence activities are mentioned from both sides of the perspective.	Ambushes, sabotage, rear attacks, subversive war.	All different forms of influence activities are mentioned, short of Regular Warfare.
3. Physical factors	The weaker military force of the insurgent is addressed	Smaller formations.	A weaker military force.
4. Conceptual factors	The span covering subversive structures up to more overt structures is discussed.	The connection to the people and the political aspect.	The span covering subversive structures up to more overt structures is discussed.
5. Moral factors	Problems for the countering side are discussed.	The human will to fight.	Kitson discusses attitude problems, which can affect fighting power.
6. Character of activity	Is discussed directly.	Crushing of social structures, the room-aspect, the anonymous fight, the human perspective, high versatility and different forms of tactics.	Is discussed directly.
8. Attitude aspects	Mentioned is the need for adaption of the mind of those who are going to work with counter measures.	Low interest for military and historian side is apparent.	Are mentioned in the full description in the book.
9. Explanatory description	Predominant.	Predominant.	Predominantly explanatory descriptions.
10. Umbrella description		Partly described as resistance or Insurgency struggle or complement to Regular Warfare.	Kitson uses “subversion” and “Insurgency” as covering terms.
11. Addressing actors	Deals with both parties.	Mostly the user of Guerrilla Warfare.	Deals with both parties.
12. Military focus	Mostly as discussions on the army counter-activities but heavily underlining the political importance.	Military tactics.	Mostly as discussions on the army activities for counteractions.
13. Political/civilian focus	Predominantly from both parties’ perspective.	Predominantly political and social aspects.	Predominantly from the perspective of the aggressor.

Figure 29. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two.

<i>Definitions Variables</i>	<i>McCuen</i>	<i>Thompson</i>	<i>Trinquier</i>
1. Strategy	Directly addressed as a main theme.	The political aspect is clearly described.	The strategy behind subversion and Insurgency is outlined.
2. Tactics and Operational Art	Directly addressed with several examples.	Military aspects and subversion, sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla warfare are described.	Different operational and tactical aspects are described, both for counter subversion and counter Guerrilla Warfare.
3. Physical factors	Directly addressed as the need for outside support.	Different forms of warfare strategies based on the actual strength of the insurgent are discussed.	Physical factors on both sides are discussed.
4. Conceptual factors	Directly addressed with several examples.	The span covering subversive structures up to over Regular Warfare is discussed.	Concepts for both sides are described.
5. Moral factors	Not addressed.	Moral aspects both on insurgent's terror activities and possible consequences for the government are discussed. Also wrong behaviour of the army towards the people.	Problems for the counter-insurgent side are discussed.
6. Character of activity	Directly addressed, not least with the final statement of the book.	Is discussed directly.	Is discussed directly.
8. Attitude aspects	Limitedly addressed.	Are mentioned regarding big armies' interest in "big wars".	Are mentioned as a need for adaption of the mind of those who are going to work with COIN.
9. Explanatory description	The description of "Counter revolutionary Warfare" is explanatory.	Mainly explanatory descriptions.	Several explanations are given.
10. Umbrella description	Covers the areas of counter-organization, terrorism, guerrilla and mobile warfare.	Thompson uses subversion and Insurgency as covering terms.	The term "Modern Warfare" can be said to be a version of Irregular Warfare.
11. Addressing actors	Primarily from the defenders' side.	Deals with both parties.	Deals with both parties.
12. Military focus	Primarily.	Mostly as discussions on the army activities for counter activities.	Predominantly as discussions on the army activities for counter activities.
13. Political/civilian focus	Is stated to be the vital part, but the descriptions are mainly military.	Predominantly and with the key aspects: organization and administration.	Mostly from the aggressors' perspective.

Figure 30. Appendix 1.Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two.

Result and Comments

The six chosen experts are represented in all writings from the 1960s-70s, during and shortly after the East Asian and African revolutionary Insurgency experiences. All but Hahlweg were officers with extensive experiences of Small Wars, some as far back as guerrilla operations during the Second World War. Hahlweg represents the well-known historian, scholar and professor; a Clausewitz expert. Galula; the military-theory thinker and Thompson; the adviser with extensive own experiences. McCuen; the military practitioner, leaning also on Thompson's views. Trinquier represents the commander of irregulars and Kitson the intelligence officer and pragmatic participant in counter-subversion operations.

The writers deal with the subject with obvious biases and from different levels of academic degree and perspectives. Turning to the variable strategy, all experts point out its vital influence on Irregular Warfare, obvious for Thompson as an adviser. Also McCuen and Kitson are clear here, as is Galula. Hahlweg does the same although his focus, as McCuen's and Trinquier's is more conceptual. Concerning tactics and operational art, all experts give examples of means and methods both for the irregulars and their opponents. Activities such as ambushes, sabotage, rear attacks, subversive war/subversion, and terror and Guerrilla Warfare are described by Hahlweg and Thompson. In general, McCuen gives the most comprehensive examples here, also including the higher level of tactics as mobile warfare

Kitson gives the broadest examples of intelligence work against subversion and insurgency. One particular difference in opinion stands out for Galula, who clearly dismisses any attempt to "copy" irregular strategy and tactics. McCuen on the other hand, seems to suggest a sort of reverse copying of the irregular approach. Physical factors are dealt with by all, suggesting a military weakness for the irregulars, smaller formations and, according to Thompson, a need for outside support. Regarding conceptual factors, all experts, albeit in a slightly different way, address the subversive dimension and develop further to open combat. Kitson mostly deals with the lower span of violence. McCuen on the other hand, deals more with the higher level, guerrilla and mobile warfare. Hahlweg refers to the connection to the people.

As for the moral factors, the irregulars' frequent use of terrorism is highlighted as a problem of ethical/moral perspective by Trinquier and Galula and Thompson, but not by Hahlweg and Kitson. McCuen gives several examples of moral problems for the counter-irregular forces. All experts give their view of conceptual factors but Hahlweg might be argued to give the most generalized articulations with explanations such as a crushing of social structures, the room-aspect, the anonymous fight, the human perspective, high versatility and different forms of tactics. As for attitude aspects, both Galula and Trinquier argue for the need of adaption of the minds of those who have to work with counter-irregular activities. Hahlweg, Kitson, McCuen and Thompson all describe an argued, traditionally low interest within military and historian circles for Irregular Warfare. All texts can be seen as explanatory attempts and regarding umbrella descriptions.

Hahlweg uses the term Guerrilla Warfare as a cover for resistance, insurgency and a complement to Regular Warfare. Kitson and Thompson use the terms subversion and Insurgency as overarching terms for non-armed respectively armed violence/attacks on the government. McCuen's "Counter-revolutionary Warfare" covers; Counter Organization, Counter Terrorism, Counter Guerrilla Warfare and Counter Mobile Warfare. Trinquir uses the term "Modern Warfare" as an umbrella term for Irregular Warfare. Galula, Kitson, Thompson and Trinquir address both sides of the struggle. Hahlweg mostly focuses on the irregular side and McCuen vice versa, on the defenders' side. All experts write with a clear focus on the military activities, with Thompson primarily viewing the strategic horizon and Hahlweg the tactical perspective. Trinquir addresses the military perspective predominantly in contrast to Thompson, who predominantly focuses on political/civilian perspectives, such as organization and administration. This is followed by McCuen, who conversely has a military focus. Galula views these perspectives equally for both parties where Trinquir and Kitson mostly write from the aggressors' perspective.

Answers to the three questions

The first question; "*How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare defined and explained?*" can be summarized in general, despite different names, to be understood as including different forms of uprisings (revolutionary or against an occupier) or a complement to Regular Warfare. A specific character of this form of violence is stated to include the lower span – from subversion and sabotage via terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare with classic ingredients such as flank attacks and harassment to mobile warfare. The political aspect of the struggle with vital needs for support from the people is often highlighted. Means and methods are physically very different from the actual forms or military Regular Warfare. A main character is that military force and seeking the decisive battle is not a goal or possibility here. Both actions from irregulars and against such enemies are included. All descriptions focus on Irregular Warfare as a specific form of warfare, excluding Hahlweg, who includes such explanations as a complement to Regular Warfare.

The second question; "*What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?*" can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; limited physical strength, crushing of social structures, room-aspect, the human perspective, the anonymous fight, high versatility and different forms of tactics are factors argued as being different from Regular Warfare. The power and brutal consequences of terror and involving the "people" in this sort of warfare differs from Regular Warfare performed by soldiers, only because of higher levels of moral and ethical behaviour and standards. Another difference is stated to be a generally low interest from the military side in this form of warfare. The almost complete focus on ground combat differs from the Regular Warfare focus, which is on joint operations.

The third question; “*What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?*” addressed to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary. First, one trait is that the activity is labelled and explained in slightly different ways. The political and civilian perspective, the violence spectrum from subversion to mobile warfare, the role of the police and the argued necessity of organization and administration can be seen as other typical traits.

Discussion of the result

The texts with their descriptions and explanations all have in common that they are written during the same time period of 1960-71, a period dominated by the revolutionary wars in Indo-china, Algeria, Malaya, Kenya and the growing fear of terrorism in the European mainland. The writers, except the historian professor Hahlweg, who can be seen as the link to Clausewitz and 19th century views of “kleinkriege”, are all military professionals. Some of them, such as Trinquier and Thompson had extensive experience of working both as “irregulars” and “counter-irregulars” in the field. Galula stands out as an example of an early warrior scholar and so might McCuen also be seen, despite not being as influenced as his French counterpart. Strictly historical academic perspectives stand side by side with practitioners’ emotional or more theoretical attempts, to not only explain but also solve the “Irregular riddle”. Of these, only Kitson is still alive, possibly to be asked if his articulations have been correctly understood. The result shows a fairly similar direction in expressions and explanations. Differences in details might be addressed at the different aims of the authors’ analyses and discussions rather than at their different views of what the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare is all about. These differences and many more not here expressed are in spite of or possibly due to, still drawing attention to several similar core aspects of Irregular Warfare.

Period Three; “From 9/11 to 2010”

James Corum

James Corum defines Insurgency in his book *Bad Strategies* (2008) as; “*an attempt to overthrow an established government by violent means*”.⁴⁰⁴ The term Irregular Warfare is not used, but Insurgency is addressed as a form of warfare; “*Insurgency is also a highly political form of warfare*”.⁴⁰⁵ Corum includes very different forms of insurgencies, from terrorist campaigns to Conventional Warfare.⁴⁰⁶ All insurgents are said to have the same goal, to attain power. The range of influence activities is mentioned, from propaganda and organizing the people to military means. A characteristic is described as; “*a war of choice for non-state groupings mounting challenges against governments*”.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ James S. Corum, *Bad Strategies* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2008), p. 18.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 18.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 18.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 19.

Dealing with a non-state enemy is legally complex as regards developing a strategy.⁴⁰⁸ Different centres of gravity are claimed to exist for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (COIN) compared to conventional state-on-state warfare.⁴⁰⁹ One of the biggest problems in COIN is that there is rarely one enemy and they often wear civilian clothes and blend in amongst the people.⁴¹⁰ The intelligence problem, when there are large underground civilian support networks is stated. In combination with a common feature of Insurgency, that of changing sides; the challenges increase.⁴¹¹

The time factor and usually protracted lengths of insurgencies are also a difficulty.⁴¹² The paramount aspect for democracies in COIN conflicts to win and maintain public support for the war is stated.⁴¹³ Corum also uses the term “Unconventional Wars”, not explained but implied implicitly to be equal to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.⁴¹⁴ The need for democracies to conduct a war, and in particular Counterinsurgency within a basic and recognizable standard of ethical behaviour, is stressed.⁴¹⁵

The use of guerrilla tactics as a means for insurgents and irregular troops is mentioned.⁴¹⁶ A more apparent need for fewer military resources and more efforts towards civilian aid is stated.⁴¹⁷ Special requirements for understanding and the ability to perform and function in Counterinsurgency operations are argued and linked to a discussion of western military culture.⁴¹⁸ Corum also addresses a view of the problem of a traditional military mind-set for Regular Warfare and negative attitude towards Irregular Warfare and COIN in several places in the book. In all, not specifically using the term Irregular Warfare, it is possible to analyse what Corum implies, as a way of explaining content in such kinds of conflicts.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions running throughout the book are of an explanatory character. In some places an umbrella character is given to the term Insurgency, even equalling it to warfare as a whole. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as mainly strategy but also operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. physical, conceptual and moral factors. The descriptions define characteristics and attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described for both parties. The descriptions lean primarily on a political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The descriptions have a comprehensive explanatory potential.

⁴⁰⁸ Corum, *Bad Strategies* (2008), p. 24.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 24.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. p. 24.

⁴¹¹ Ibid. p. 26.

⁴¹² Ibid. p. 25.

⁴¹³ Ibid. p. 27.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid. p. 28.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid. p. 28.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid. p. 205.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid. p. 241.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 254-256.

Colin S. Gray

In Chapter 6 in Colin Gray's book, *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, Irregular Warfare and Terrorism* are discussed⁴¹⁹. Gray argues that terrorism is a mode of Irregular Warfare, which in turn is warfare, thus defining terrorists as soldiers.⁴²⁰ Gray disagrees with Kiras' definition of terrorism, and leans on Bruce Hoffman's ("*the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change*"). According to Gray, Kiras distinguishes between terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Gray defines Irregular Warfare as "*warfare between regulars and irregulars*" and that is warfare between a state and a non-state adversary. The legal status of the rival belligerents is the key, not the character of fighting, according to Gray.

The weak use Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism but later on develop regular war-fighting capabilities (as Mao). Warfare of all kinds, other than that between states, can be seen as Irregular Warfare. The ability to turn the opponent's strengths to his weakness and one's own weaknesses (material) to strengths.....*a paradox.....a character of Irregular Warfare*.⁴²¹ The Irregular warrior needs to behave covertly with stealth, be highly motivated, possess excellent intelligence and have territorial sanctuary and support, according to Gray.

"*Post-modern Terrorism*" (Al Quaida) is, according to Gray, not new, it is terrorism; Irregular Warfare and warfare.⁴²² Regular and Irregular Warfare have always co-existed.⁴²³ Gray gives historical examples. A typical trait is said to be that Irregular Warfare almost invariably makes the regular belligerent use terror against the civilian populace, who provide, or might provide recruits or support for the guerrillas. The problem of elusive guerrillas is described.⁴²⁴ Gray argues for the result potentiality of harsh means, although it is ethically wrong according to western standards..... "*given doubt to more half-measured hearts-minds actions*", "*a brutal war*"⁴²⁵ Gray claims the only new thing is, that the latest technology will permit both irregulars and regulars to perform their bloody deeds either in new ways or more efficiently in old ways.⁴²⁶ Referring to Callwell, who "*explained for all times*", the key problem of conducting Irregular Warfare is "*the difficulty of persuading or coercing an irregular enemy to home out and fight so that he could be duly slathered in satisfactorily large numbers*".⁴²⁷

⁴¹⁹ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare*, (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp. 212-254.

⁴²⁰ Ibid. p. 213.

⁴²¹ Ibid. p. 215.

⁴²² Ibid. p. 219.

⁴²³ Ibid. p. 222.

⁴²⁴ Ibid. p. 223.

⁴²⁵ Ibid. pp. 223-224.

⁴²⁶ Ibid. p. 224.

⁴²⁷ Ibid. p. 224.

Irregular Warfare is in its very nature structurally asymmetrical and more political according to Gray.⁴²⁸ The importance of linking Counter Terrorism (CT) with Counterinsurgency (COIN) is underlined.⁴²⁹ Irregular Warfare is said to demand an attrition strategy.⁴³⁰ Gray favours the simple way, defining warfare (future) as either Regular or Irregular Warfare. Gray uses a minimalistic definition of Irregular Warfare; “*warfare between regulars and irregulars*” and that it is warfare between a state and a non-state adversary.

Result and conclusions

The description of the term Irregular Warfare can be categorized as a clear umbrella term. Explanations are included in the text linked to the definition. Potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description explains several characteristics though attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the non-state actors. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The description is clear and gives a precise understanding potential with a low risk of misinterpretations.

Thomas X. Hammes

Thomas Hammes describes two particular and outstanding aspects of insurgents; “*their utter determination to continue the struggle despite the odds*” and “the remarkable ingenuity they displayed for overcoming problems”⁴³¹ Claiming there are no revolutions in war, Hammes puts forward a theory of a “*fourth generation warfare*” (4GW) as a fundamental different kind of warfare⁴³² as an evolved form of Insurgency⁴³³.

The characteristics are said to be that they “use all available networks – political, economic, social, and military - to convince the enemy’s political decision-maker that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”⁴³⁴. It directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision-makers to destroy the political will and, unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces.⁴³⁵ Hammes claims Mao’s work as being the fundamental work upon which the fourth generation of war would be built.⁴³⁶ A specific characteristic is that 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight.⁴³⁷ Another is the adversary’s act of constantly changing sides.⁴³⁸ He claims that even a 4GW effort will only be resolved by Conventional Warfare.

⁴²⁸ Gray, *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare* (2005), p. 229.

⁴²⁹ Ibid. p. 245.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. p. 246.

⁴³¹ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), pp. viii-ix.

⁴³² Ibid. p. xi.

⁴³³ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴³⁴ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴³⁵ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴³⁶ Ibid. p. 55.

⁴³⁷ Ibid. p. 208.

⁴³⁸ Ibid. p. 210.

Hammes denotes there is an ability to create political paralysis in both the international system and in the target nation ranging from non-military means to Guerrilla Warfare and to include the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁴³⁹ From a military view, Hammes includes terrorist, guerrilla though rarely, conventional actions.⁴⁴⁰ The timelines, organizations, and objectives are said to be different from those of earlier generations.⁴⁴¹ Hammes distinguishes between two types of 4GW, an insurgent movement to seize control of a territory and a nation using 4GW techniques and alliances to neutralize the power of the United States.⁴⁴² A main task to prepare for 4GW is to select and groom the right people.⁴⁴³ Only people create change in an organization, which is needed to understand and act against 4GW, according to Hammes.⁴⁴⁴

Result and conclusions

The description of 4GW is both an umbrella and an explanatory description. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as both strategy and operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. conceptual and moral factors. The description explains a broad range of characteristics. Attitude aspects are not included. Both parties of the antagonists are described. The description leans primarily on a comprehensive and not mainly a military focus of the phenomena. The description has a comprehensive explanatory potential.

Frank Hoffman

In 2007, the American warrior-scholar Frank Hoffman launches a discussion on the term *Hybrid War*.⁴⁴⁵ Arguing new threats create unique dilemmas for states planning for either conventional capabilities or, for more likely scenarios of non-state actors employing asymmetric or irregular tactics.⁴⁴⁶ The key message is that future threats will consist of more simultaneously conducted “hybrid” threats of different conventional and “irregular” character, blurring the possibilities of distinguishing between war, warfare, capabilities and separate discussions on Regular Warfare, Irregular Warfare, terrorism etc. It is stated future threats will include all forms of warfare and even criminal activities.⁴⁴⁷ Not suggesting a decline of interstate warfare and conventional or Regular Warfare, the message is a fusion of different kinds of warfare and power executions,

⁴³⁹ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (2004), p. 217.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 220.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid. p. 221.

⁴⁴² Ibid. pp. 254-55.

⁴⁴³ Ibid. p. 244.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 289.

⁴⁴⁵ Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 7.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

even delivered by non-state actors with decentralized planning, using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovated ways.⁴⁴⁸

A specific character of Hybrid Wars is argued to be that different modes of warfare will occur on all levels of war and in the same operational battle space. Also, it will be difficult to label actors or wars as either regular/conventional or irregular.⁴⁴⁹ The main characteristic of convergence and combinations in several modes is said to target the strategic weakness of America's conventional military thinking.⁴⁵⁰

Hoffman defines Hybrid Wars as; "Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder."⁴⁵¹ A term such as Hybrid War is used interchangeably with Hybrid Warfare and linked to Irregular Tactics, "Irregular adversaries" and "primitive forms of warfare" in Hoffman's writings. Hoffman started to use the term Hybrid Warfare in 2005.⁴⁵² Hoffman discusses 4GW (Lind et al, 2001) its critics, its merits and a probable linkage to Clausewitz.⁴⁵³ Different from the term of 1996, Compound Wars (Huber, 1996), Hybrid Warfare is not supposed to occur with regular and irregular operations separated in the operation area, but simultaneously in the same area.⁴⁵⁴ Hybrid Wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervour of Irregular Warfare, addressing both the hybrid character of organizations and means.⁴⁵⁵

Hoffman distinguishes Hybrid Wars from "Maoist or compound wars" as not facilitating the progression of the opposing force through phases, nor helping set up a conventional force for decisive battle.⁴⁵⁶ Hoffman gives several research examples of thinking as regards a problematic mix of future warfare and conflicts and how to define these. An example is the following statement from Dr Mike Evans in an overview of future conflicts; "Armed conflicts also began to reflect a bewildering mixture of modes – conventional and unconventional activity merged – while many combatants simultaneously employed modern Kalashnikov assault rifles, pre-modern machetes and post-modern cellular phones in their operations".⁴⁵⁷ The key example of Hybrid Warfare by Hoffman is the Hezbollah operations against Israel in southern Lebanon during the summer of 2006.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁴⁸ Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (2007), p. 7, Here, Hoffman cites General Conway, Admiral Roughead and Admiral Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy For Maritime Security*, Washington, D.C, 2007

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 8.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 9.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁴⁵² Ibid. p. 14.

⁴⁵³ Ibid. p. 20.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 20.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 28.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 29.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 33, Hoffman cites Michael Evans, 'From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century', *Australian Defence College, Occasional Paper No. 1*, 2007 p. 6.

⁴⁵⁸ Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (2007), p. 36.

Result and conclusions

The descriptions of *Hybrid War* and *Hybrid Warfare* are of both an umbrella and explanatory character. Sub-terms such as Irregular Warfare or Irregular threats are not explained however. The potential of explaining content covers aspects partly on strategy but mainly on operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered partly on physical, but mainly on conceptual, and finally on some aspects of moral factors. The descriptions explain characteristics. Attitude aspects are limitedly included. Participating actors are described for both parties. The descriptions lean primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The descriptions have a good explanatory potential, but due to the span of the terms, there is a risk that *hybrid* becomes “*Everything at the same time and place*”.

David KilCullen

David KilCullen is currently the most well-known warrior scholar, who offers several explanations and theories about different kinds of warfare in his book, *The Accidental Guerrilla* from 2009.⁴⁵⁹ He provides a theory which claims that “*The War on Terror*” might be best understood as a form of globalized Insurgency.⁴⁶⁰ He distinguishes traditional Counter-Terrorism being enemy-centric, from classic Counterinsurgency being people-centric, and finds both of them inadequate models for today’s conflicts e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁶¹ He uses expressions such as “*Small Wars*”, “*Hybrid Warfare*” and mentions the term “*Irregular Warfare*” in the beginning. Later he mentions “*Asymmetric Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and unconventional enemies*”.⁴⁶² KilCullen claims that one characteristic of “*Asymmetric Warfare*” is that it is logical for any rational opponent, if fighting the United States, to use non-conventional means.

Such means may include propaganda, subversion, terrorist attacks, Guerrilla Warfare, weapons of mass destruction, or attempts at dragging conventional forces into protracted engagements for little strategic gain, so as to enthuse the American people’s political support for the conflict.⁴⁶³ Economic Warfare and Unrestricted Warfare, referring to a Chinese study about “Unrestricted Warfare”, is mentioned.⁴⁶⁴

Two forms of terrorism are discussed; “expeditionary terrorism” (exemplified by the 9/11 Attack) and “guerrilla terrorism” (exemplified by Al Qaida operations in Pakistan), where the latter is described as consisting of four elements (infection, contagion, intervention, rejection).⁴⁶⁵ KilCullen names this theory “The Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome”. A characteristic is that the enemy presents a form of confederated movement which blends Insurgency with terrorism and information operations.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁵⁹ David KilCullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid. p. xiv.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid. p. xv.

⁴⁶² Ibid. pp. 22-23.

⁴⁶³ Ibid. p. 23.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 25.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 34-35.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. pp. 52-53.

Different kinds of status of forces are described, the first generation of Irregular conventional forces operating in a linear fashion using light cavalry tactics, a second generation with embryonic guerrilla forces with raiding operations, a third generation with an extremely proficient, well-organized, and well-equipped insurgent force combining cynical, experienced, hard-bitten leaders with extremely well-motivated, disciplined fighters and a new capacity for terrorist attacks”.⁴⁶⁷ Structures of local clandestine networks, a main force of full-time guerrillas and part-time networks of villagers are described.⁴⁶⁸ Tactics is described in detail.⁴⁶⁹ KilCullen advocates the conduct of Counterinsurgency; “persistent presence”, as being opposite to “repetitive raiding” and “extreme kinetic approaches”.⁴⁷⁰

He further describes “in Counterinsurgency terms, “clearing” an enemy safe haven does not mean destroying the enemy in it but rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation or, more clinically, separating the enemy from the population”.⁴⁷¹ Regarding the term Hybrid Warfare, Kilcullen offers a model, a framework, claimed to be “a systematic oversimplification, designed to clarify an extremely complex, rapidly changing reality”. The fundamentals are four strategic problems, an underlying capacity-building problem of building/supporting a weak and fragile state-construction, terrorism, Insurgency and communal conflicts. The suggested actions against these are a combination of counter-terrorism, Counterinsurgency, peace enforcement and, at the bottom, capacity-building (inclusive governance, law and order functions).⁴⁷² He exemplifies the Iraqi operations as “*a hybrid war involving Counterinsurgency plus*”.⁴⁷³

As for discussions on Hybrid Warfare concepts, KilCullen refers to Frank Hoffman as a leading thinker of Hybrid Warfare. KilCullen discusses subversion and counter subversion, going through some earlier definitions of subversion, giving his own: “the conscious, clandestine manipulation of grievances, short of armed conflict, in order to weaken states, communities and organizations”.⁴⁷⁴ He claims there is importance in looking further into this when addressing new forms of warfare and conflicts. Finally, he underlines that understanding (new) threats might be the most important challenge the western world faces.

Not explicitly using the term Irregular Warfare, KilCullen explains and describes certain activities related to power struggles that can be embraced by that term. The phenomena KilCullen altogether deals with are analysed as “a description of Irregular Warfare”, possibly called Irregular Warfare “plus”. Throughout the book, KilCullen returns to the negative attitude of western warfare to irregular adversaries and Counterinsurgency operations.

⁴⁶⁷ KilCullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009), p. 53.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 55.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 55-58.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 124-125.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid. p. 145.

⁴⁷² Ibid. pp. 149-151.

⁴⁷³ Ibid. p. 152.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 252-253.

Result and conclusions

The description is a predominantly explanatory description. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. physical and conceptual. The description explains characteristics from manipulation to threats of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), but focuses on the lower end of violence (subversion). Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the adversary. The description leans primarily on the political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are comprehensive and have an explanatory articulation, but need pre-understanding or complementary sub-definitions of several terms. KilCullan's descriptions might be seen as an argument for a new form of threats and enemies, focusing on the lower end of the "Hybrid Warfare School".

James Kiras

James Kiras defines Irregular Warfare in 2008 as; "the use of violence by sub-state actors or groups within states for political purposes of achieving power, control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities".⁴⁷⁵ The definition addresses "violence" not specifying any level, thus, in theory, leaving open a field from civil disturbances to nuclear attacks. Only the sub-state actors or groups know or can use Irregular Warfare, according to the above definition; it is "their violence". The character of violence is left to the reader, with no further explanation than, the approaches are "unorthodox" or "unconventional". This form of explanation simply moves the definition problem from certain words to others; diffuse words such as "irregular" are changed to words e.g. "unorthodox" or "unconventional". Kiras later defines five categories of Irregular Warfare as coup d'état, terrorism, revolution, insurgency and Civil War.⁴⁷⁶ An earlier definition of Irregular Warfare by James Kiras from 2002 and 2007, is outlined by the following working definition; "Irregular Warfare is the umbrella term used to describe violence used by sub state actors and including different forms, including terrorism and insurgency".⁴⁷⁷ Kiras defines terrorism as "the sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, by inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response".

Thus terrorism does not by itself result in a political change, which is the sign and strategy of an Insurgency activity, according to Kiras.⁴⁷⁸ Principal differences between Irregular and Conventional War are that the latter involves more or less symmetrical adversaries, in equipment, training and doctrine. In an Insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetric and weaker, almost always a sub-state group attempting to bring about political change by administrating and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe,

⁴⁷⁵ Jordan, David, Kiras, James D., Lonesdale, David J., Speller, Ian, Tuck, Christopher and Walton, Dale C., *Understanding Modern Warfare*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 232.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 232.

⁴⁷⁷ Baylis, John, Cohen, Eliot, Gray, Colin S., Wirtz, James, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 164-167.

⁴⁷⁸ Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), p. 165.

through the use of guerrilla tactics. Such tactics are characterized by hit-and-run raids and ambushes on the security forces. Insurgency is also characterized by the active and/or passive support and mobilization of a significant proportion of the population. Kiras mentions a wide difference in the characteristics of Insurgency, such as cultural, social and economic aspects. Moreover, Kiras describes different types of insurgencies where he includes Revolutionary, Guerrilla, Partisan, Liberation, or Civil War. The ultimate goal is to wield political power. Kiras does not include Coups as he claims they do not involve required popular support. Finally, Kiras notes the importance of external support (physical and moral) for insurgencies.⁴⁷⁹ He remarks that his explanations are just functional attempts at definitions and not the final word.

The problem of definitions is discussed, as there are considerable difficulties for western democracies to conceptualize responses and understand the phenomenon of violent global terrorism⁴⁸⁰. The political dimension of Irregular Warfare is thus underlined. Kiras also points out that many military officers view terrorism and Insurgency as “dirty war”⁴⁸¹. Also, the perception; “Irregular diversions distract from what state-based military organizations are most comfortable with, namely preparing to fight against one another” is noted. Kiras argues that the baseline in Clausewitz’s spirit is the same as in Irregular Warfare; the primacy of politics. Even if today’s religious, social, cultural and economic factors are recognized to play a substantial role, politics still override. Principal differences between Irregular and Conventional War are that the latter involves adversaries who are more or less symmetrical in equipment, training, and doctrine. In an insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetrical and weaker, almost always a sub-state group, attempting to bring about political change by administration and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe through the use of guerrilla tactics.⁴⁸²

Great differences in terms of character (social, cultural, economic aspects) and type (Revolutionary, Partisan, Guerrilla, Liberation and Civil War) are said to characterize the concept of insurgency.⁴⁸³ Coups are not included. The role of the people is emphasized. Kiras discusses subversion, as a phenomenon of Insurgency, and notes that a weakness is one of taking a very long time, which alone cannot guarantee success. Four areas are discussed as important for Irregular Warfare (here insurgency) time, space, legitimacy and support and how to gain advantages over the regular opponents.

The moral superiority of the guerrillas is said to be a vital cornerstone in all irregular and terrorist theory, according to Kiras. Different opinions on the use of terror against the population have existed (Che Guevara - against, Mao and Marighella - for).⁴⁸⁴ Kiras uses Samuel Griffiths’ (his translation of Mao’s book *Yu Chi Chan*), summary of three words as the most important in anti-guerrilla warfare; *location, isolation and eradication*, as a departure in his part on Counterinsurgency.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷⁹ Bylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), p. 165-166.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid. p.163.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid. p.165.

⁴⁸² Ibid. p.166.

⁴⁸³ Ibid. p. 167.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. p.174.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 176.

Kiras discusses the *challenges of anti-subversion and military – civilian roles*.⁴⁸⁶ Tactics and passive-active techniques are discussed.⁴⁸⁷ Finally, Kiras concludes with a warning when analysing Irregular Warfare/insurgency and terrorism out of their actual contexts, ignoring the overriding political reason.⁴⁸⁸ Irregular Warfare is about political goals even if very different warrior cultures can be seen as conceptually unlike Regular Warfare. A comment can be that the “toolbox” for strategies and tactical applications might vary a lot between different states and sub-state structures as regards “power projection”, fighting ethics and traditions and rules.

Result and conclusions

Kiras’ definition of the term Irregular Warfare from 2002/07; “the umbrella term used to describe violence used by sub state actors and including different forms, including terrorism and insurgency” differs a lot from the developed definition of 2008; “the use of violence by sub-state actors or groups within states for political purposes of achieving power, control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities”. The latter has several explanatory attributes (goals, character of weakness and “approaches to warfare” notations) however; the “approaches” descriptions are imprecise and open up for further questions. How should “unorthodox” and “unconventional” be understood?

The definitions are of an umbrella character with unevenly developed explanations. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as primarily strategy and limitedly on operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as mostly conceptual factors. The description covers characteristics including Insurgency and terrorism. Attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the aggressor. The descriptions lean primarily on a political focus of the phenomena. The descriptions do not demand pre-understanding of sub-terms (e.g. insurgency and terrorism), as they are explained and discussed in Kiras’ texts.

John Mackinlay

The key subject in John Mackinlay’s “*The Insurgent Archipelago*”, is an argumentation on the disputably limited understanding of the *development* of Insurgency, from the jungles of Malaya to the British Home Office Counter-Terrorism operation, CONTEST. A development, it is argued, that has neither been properly understood nor has it been shown any interest as having a link to the area of Counterinsurgency⁴⁸⁹. Mackinlay suggests several disadvantages of understanding and countering operationally, due to the focus on terrorism and Counter-Terrorism not analysing the phenomena linked to Counterinsurgency.

⁴⁸⁶ Bylis at al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2007), p. 179.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 182.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 186.

⁴⁸⁹ John Mackinlay, *The Insurgency Archipelago*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2009), p. 7.

Absence of a clear strategy is addressed as a major disadvantage. The development of Insurgency as a function of the development of society is discussed.⁴⁹⁰ The problem with the word “Insurgency” as a political word, compared with the unpolitical word “terrorism”, is that the latter is easier to manage politically. Mackinlay develops a theory of the “*Post Maoist Insurgency*” concept, with different characteristics compared to the traditional understanding (if studied) of the “*classic Maoist Insurgency*” approach. Globalisation of communications has given individuals opportunities to influence not only organizations. This is a new development argued to create multifaceted self-sustaining phenomena with organic similarities, making it difficult to identify centres of gravity. Regarding the different influence possibilities of Insurgency, the area of subversion is the key area in Mackinlay’s discussions and here, “the propaganda of the deed” is emphasized as a major weapon.

The absence of a doctrinal evaluation after the post-colonial Cold War phase of Insurgency is said to have led to difficulties in the strategy to comprehend the situation after 9/11, and also to a lack of appropriate tactics and resources at the practical level.⁴⁹¹ As regards the whole spectrum of power forces, (politics, terrorism, subversion, persuasion and Guerrilla Warfare including military, or armed, organized violence at the lower end of warfare), Mackinlay focuses on politics and subversion as key elements. The problem of the military attitude to Counterinsurgency and not the “real war” is mentioned.⁴⁹² Also, the fact that no NATO or international concept existed or was universally understood, is pointed out as being troublesome.⁴⁹³

One important cause of the argued declining British understanding of Counterinsurgency during the period after the Cold War, is said to have been due to the disappearance of the previous corps of highly experienced civil-servants all over the world, linked to the previous long colonial era, who possessed both the political-strategic perspective as well as a deep cultural understanding, both being key aspects able to link a military support intervention to “a comprehensive approach”.

Today, the force commanders seldom, if ever have such expertise to connect with, at the same time as having a comprehensive approach to strategy. Absence of knowledge, due to neglect of the area of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency is suggested as being important factors for this argued lack of understanding of insurgency development. Narrow definitions with more politically suitable articulations of terrorism have also contributed to limited understanding possibilities and subsequently, limitations for strategy. Military disinterest in limited tactical development is argued to have played a part in an “unlearning” period, which characterizes the difficulties of contemporary understanding of terrorism and insurgencies. Mackinlay does not use the term Irregular Warfare as a label however, he discusses the development of activities concerning insurgency, terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Guerrilla Warfare and mainly the aspect of subversion.

⁴⁹⁰ Mackinlay, *The Insurgency Archipelago* (2009). p. 10; “*Insurgency changes at the same speed as the society from which it arises*”

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. p. 12.

⁴⁹² Ibid. p. 44.

⁴⁹³ Ibid. p. 45.

Thus, he indirectly deals with Irregular Warfare as a function of a power struggle. He does not however, elaborate on the military-police labouring tasks or the difficulties of both overt and covert warfare. He has a clear political focus and not a “*this is war/warfare*” attitude. Finally, he does however discuss a “non-centre of gravity” theory, as a mark of the “Postmodern Maoist” Insurgency concept, argued so far as not to be understood in governmental as well as military circles.

Result and conclusions

The description is a predominantly explanatory description. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as are mainly physical and conceptual factors. The description explains characteristics with a lower-end violence focus. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described with a focus on both sides of the parties. The description leans primarily on the political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The description is civilian comprehensive, but limited for the military part though it has clear explanatory articulations, with good understanding potentiality not needing any complementary sub-definitions.

Gil Merom

Gil Merom does not use the term *Irregular Warfare* but relies on the label *Small Wars*. He writes in the introduction of his well-known “*How Democracies lose Small Wars*” from 2003, as follows; “*a small war has the following distinct characteristics: It involves sharp military asymmetry, an insurgent that fights guerrilla war, and an incumbent that uses ground forces for Counterinsurgency warfare. The incumbent can be an indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a foreign power that imposes itself on the population*”.⁴⁹⁴ The definition does not include moral aspects though the whole book extensively deals with this aspect. Merom also mentions explanations from Eliot A. Cohen, Charles Callwell, Loren B. Thompson, Andrew F. Kerpinevich and Walter Laqueur.

Result and conclusions

The description is mostly an explanatory description with an umbrella character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, and operational art and tactics and the terms “Guerrilla War” and “Counterinsurgency War” indicate all aspects. Fighting power factors are covered only in physical factors, referring to “*ground forces for COIN*”. The description explains characteristics only for “military asymmetry”. Attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the incumbent. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. Merom’s definitions and explanations focus mainly on the guerrilla aspect, for the part which is militarily weaker than an incumbent, (which can be either the existing government or a foreign power), which in turn uses ground forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare.

⁴⁹⁴ Gil Merom, *How Democracies lose Small Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4.

The descriptions are not comprehensive and have a military focus with a narrow scope. The explanatory potential is assessed as being precise.

Summary of views on “Irregular Warfare”, Period Three

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Corum</i>	<i>Gray</i>	<i>Hammes</i>
1. Strategy	Political form of warfare, attempt to overthrow a government.	Warfare between regulars and irregulars.	To seize control of a territory or to neutralize the power of the USA. Directs the mind of an enemy.
2. Tactics and Operational Art		Covert activities with great stealth from the non-state actor.	From non-military means to Guerrilla Warfare and WMD, terror and (rarely) conventional warfare.
3. Physical factors	Lack of military resources.	The weak opponent.	
4. Conceptual factors	Intelligence driven operations.	Sub-state actors or groups against states.	Network organizations.
5. Moral factors		Highly motivated personnel.	The will of the enemy.
6. Character of activity	Time factor, changing sides, legally complex, from terrorism to conventional warfare.	Need territorial sanctuary. A political war, often drives the defenders to behave as terrorists towards the people, a brutal war.	Uses the society’s networks, different timelines, objectives and organizations compared with previous warfare. Utter determination and ingenuity by the aggressors. Changing sides.
7. Attitude aspects	Negative attitude to Irregular Warfare is mentioned several times.		
8. Explanatory description	Predominantly.	Partly, describes characteristics.	Predominantly.
9. Umbrella description	Limited.	Predominantly a form of warfare between states and non-state actors.	Predominantly.
10. Addressing actors	Both parties.	Addressing both sides.	Addressing both sides.
11. Military focus	Limited.	Mostly.	Partly.
12. Political/civilian focus	Predominantly addresses the political perspective.	Mostly.	Mostly.

Figure 31. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three.

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Hoffman</i>	<i>KilCullen</i>	<i>Kiras 08</i>
1. Strategy	The combination of different strategies, fewer or Regular Warfare capabilities.	Globalized Insurgency, clandestine manipulations of grievances. Underlying capacity building problem.	Political purposes, achieving power, control, legitimacy.
2. Tactics and Operational Art	Predominantly a focus on different “armed” activities simultaneously.	Different forms of tactics; terrorism, Insurgency, counter-Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, WMD, attempts at Conventional Warfare.	Unorthodox or unconventional approaches.
3. Physical factors	States that no intentions exist of building larger formations for decisive battles.	Different statuses on insurgent forces.	Fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities.
4. Conceptual factors	Decentralized execution of different forms of regular, irregular and terror tactics.	Expeditionary terrorism. guerrilla terrorism.	Sub-state actors or groups.
5. Moral factors	The role of fanaticism is mentioned.	Extremely well motivated insurgents.	
6. Character of activity	Simultaneous operations in the same area with very different characters of combat and warfare.	Subversion, mix of terrorism, Insurgency and information operations. Blended form of adversaries, pointing to cultural aspects and the so-called “accidental guerrilla” syndrome.	Unorthodox or unconventional approaches.
7. Attitude aspects	The American weakness towards favouring conventional warfare.	Mentioned throughout the book.	
8. Explanatory description	Descriptions to a certain level exist.	Predominantly.	Defines actors, goals, use of violence as a means.
9. Umbrella description	The term covers everything except nuclear warfare.		Covers all actors (sub-state or groups) with a violent political ambition. Does however not explain unorthodox and unconventional.
10. Addressing actors	Both parties are described.	Addressing the adversary predominantly.	
11. Military focus	Mostly military focus.	Partly, regarding the risk of military over-focus and violence.	Partly.
12. Political/civilian focus	Partly terror. Criminality is mostly within the police domain.	Predominantly.	Predominantly.

Figure 32. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three.

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Kiras 09</i>	<i>MacKinlay</i>	<i>Merom</i>
1. Strategy	Insurgency.	Political power struggle.	Guerrilla War and Counter-insurgency war.
2. Tactics and Operational Art	Terrorism.	Subversion.	Guerrilla War and Counter-insurgency capabilities.
3. Physical factors		Different kinds of insurgents (adversaries).	Ground forces for COIN.
4. Conceptual factors	Sub-state actors or groups.	Sub-state actors or groups against states.	
5. Moral factors			
6. Character of activity	Violent activities, Insurgency, terrorism.	Mainly at the lower end of the violence spectre, non-COG character.	Military asymmetry.
7. Attitude aspects		Problems of military attitude.	
8. Explanatory description		Predominantly.	Mostly.
9. Umbrella description	Predominantly.	Limited.	Partly.
10. Addressing actors	The opponent of a government.	Addressing both the state and the sub state actors.	Predominant focus on the incumbent.
11. Military focus	Partly.	Limited.	Addresses “war”, military forces.
12. Political/civilian focus	Insurgency and terrorism mainly have a political goal.	Predominantly.	Talks about guerrilla and COIN which are broader aspects than just military.

Figure 33. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three.

Result and Comments

The nine chosen experts represent a collection of thought on the subject during the period 2004 to 2009, the period when the western interest for Small Wars and particularly the problematic area of Counterinsurgency, once again appeared and formed new discourse. Professor Gray, with over 30 years’ experience as a practising strategist and scholar in the USA and his native Britain, could be seen as the sharp pragmatist, postulating that “war is war”. His influence is well-known. His American colleague James Kiras, also well-known from strategy literature, exemplifies a scholar with more emphasis on history aspects and lengthier descriptions and explanations than Gray. James Corum, also from the USA, exemplifies an early so-called “warrior-scholar”, or “scholar-warrior” , with history research as a main area and his own extensive experiences of Counterinsurgency operations. The Australian Dr KilCullen, also a warrior scholar but with an anthropological background, exemplifies a current, most influential strategic adviser on the subject. The British former General, MacKinlay, is currently one of the most notable UK military writers on the subject, but is not a scholar. Neither is the American Colonel (ret) Thomas Hammes a scholar, but represents one of the most influential thinkers on how to understand new forms of Irregular Warfare in the early years of 2000.

The American warrior-scholar Frank Hoffman has been one of the most influential thinkers concerning new forms of Irregular Warfare, with his articulations and ideas of “Hybrid Warfare”, also in the early years of 2000. Finally, the Israeli Dr Gil Merom has been noted in 2008, for his social science-oriented study of western problems with Irregular Warfare and linked to a confessed unwillingness to use force against irregular opponents and thereby lose those kinds of conflicts. Turning to the variable strategy; Corum, KilCullen, Kiras and MacKinlay address the political perspective and power struggle in various ways, mainly by overthrowing a government. KilCullen widens the horizon with his discussions on globalized Insurgency. Hammes on the other hand, highlights the strategy for seizing control of a territory or for neutralizing the power of the USA. Merom addresses Guerrilla War contrasted with Counterinsurgency wars, both in strategic terms. Gray reduces explanations to warfare between regulars and irregulars, which like Hoffman he argues, can be strategies of combinations.

The variable “Tactics and Operational Art” can include; subversion, according to Mackinlay, terrorism according to Kiras, Hammes and KilCullen, covert activities with great stealth according to Gray and Guerrilla Warfare according to Hammes, KilCullen and Merom. Kiras’ latest more sketchy explanations from 2010 state unorthodox or unconventional approaches. Regarding physical factors, most experts address low or lack of military resources for the insurgents. Hoffman on the other hand, discusses that such actors have no intentions of building large formations for decisive battles. Conceptual factors are mentioned such as intelligence driven operations, according to Corum, net-work organizations, according to Hammes and decentralized execution, according to Hoffman. KilCullen uses expressions like “Expeditionary Terrorism” and “Guerrilla Terrorism”. Kiras, MacKinlay and Merom point out the sub-state actors’/groups’ actions against states, which can be seen indirectly as conceptual needs for existing and execution in secrecy with covert capacity. Regarding moral factors Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Kilcullen present a view of very highly motivated insurgents.

The character of this sort of struggle is argued to involve the time factor, changing sides, complexity from terrorism to Regular Warfare (Corum), need of territorial sanctuary, brutality on the people (Gray), using the society’s networks, utter determination and ingenuity by the aggressor (Hammes), simultaneous operations in the same area with very different characteristics of combat (Hoffman), subversion and a mix of terrorism, Insurgency and information operations, different cultural aspects in different groupings of adversaries (KilCullen), violent activities of unorthodox approaches (Kiras), mainly activities at the lower end of the violence spectrum and with non-centre of gravity character (MacKinlay). Finally, Merom addresses an expressed character of military asymmetry. Attitude aspects are addressed by Corum, Hoffman, KilCullen and MacKinlay as well as the general negative attitude (especially in America) towards Irregular Warfare.

Corum, Hammes, KilCullen, MacKinlay and Merom can be said to predominantly discuss using an explanatory, descriptive technique. Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Kiras (2010) can be said to use umbrella descriptions, with different contents of explanations. As for addressing actors, Corum, Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Mackinlay deal with both sides. KilCullen focuses mostly on the irregular side as also does Kiras and Merom.

Regarding a focus on military or political/civilian perspectives, Gray deals with both military and political/civilian aspects. Hoffman, Hammes and Merom focus slightly more on the military perspective, while Corum, KillCullen, Kiras and MacKinlay have a predominantly non-military perspective.

Answers to the three questions

The first question; *“How is the form of warfare, labelled “Irregular Warfare defined and explained?”* despite having been discussed in various ways, can be summarized here as; Hoffman; Hybrid Warfare, Hammes; Forth Generation Warfare and Merom; Small Wars; primarily a form of political warfare between regulars and irregulars including attempts to overthrow a government and seize control of people and territory. Globalized aspects are often included using different strategies such as subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare and on the defenders’ side, Counterinsurgency operations. All descriptions focus on Irregular Warfare as a specific form of warfare, not addressing such concepts as a complement to Regular Warfare as well.

The second question; *“What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?”* can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; limited physical strength, importance of covert and clandestine structures and activities, the human perspective, the use of terror as a weapon, effects of globalization regarding the use of psychological operations, the use of society’s networks and the simultaneous use of different tactics within and outside what is permitted in Regular Warfare. The power and brutal consequences of terror and involving the “people” in this sort of warfare differs from the style of Regular Warfare. Another difference is stated to be a general low interest from the military side in this form of warfare.

The third question; *“What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”*, according to the experts from this period, can be answered by the following aspects; military asymmetry and weak physical resources, opponents that change sides, use of subversion and terrorism and a combination of strategies usually not included in Regular Warfare, a political form of struggle with limited military decisive goals, complex to defend against, need of sanctuaries, covert activities with great stealth, fanaticism and utter determination in the Irregular forces and groups.

Discussion of the result

The descriptions and explanations from the nine experts show several commonalities regarding separate factors and some key characteristics. On the one hand, it can be noticed there are rather different arguments when discussing what possibly might be new or fundamental weakness for democracies to handle this sort of warfare. On the other hand, the writers do however; look at the subject from different angles, with different background knowledge and different degrees of scientific perspectives and theoretical approaches (history, sociology, anthropology) thus using different formulations.

Several difficult experiences and problematic actions have also occurred between the writings of e.g. Hammes 2004 and KilCullen 2009. The writers have had differing amounts of information to work with. Nevertheless, the result gives an overall, fairly unified picture of the subject.

Hoffman differs mostly by not specifically addressing Irregular Warfare but instead an argued new form of warfare that includes IW, as well as parts of Regular Warfare. Also Hammes argues for a new form of warfare different from Gray, Corum, Kiras, MacKinlay and Merom, who all rather see the phenomenon as timeless, even if it naturally adapts to actual conditions. Some of the authors strive to give new explanations to the phenomena and some strive to build a strong historical base. Corum and Hammes are exemplary writers with a message, mostly for the way it is argued that the USA have neglected to observe and adapt defence against Irregular attacks. As for biases to an important employer, KilCullen might be observed as the most current prominent adviser for the U.S. government.

The result in total of the doctrine and literature analysis - Summary

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Doctrines</i>	<i>Literature period 1; Clausewitz to the First World War</i>	<i>Literature period 2; The 50-70s</i>	<i>Literature period 3; 9/11 to 2010</i>
Question 1				
Label	<i>Irregular Warfare</i>	<i>People-at-Arms Kleinkriege Small Wars Irregular War</i>	<i>Insurgency Counterinsurgency Low-intensity operations Revolutionary Warfare Modern Warfare</i>	<i>Irregular Warfare Hybrid Warfare 4G Warfare Small Wars</i>
1. “How is the form of warfare, labelled <i>Irregular Warfare</i>, defined and explained?”	A conflict between state and non-state entities. Violence spectrum exceeding police capacities. Primarily, but not limited to lower violence spectrum. Includes insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, terrorism. Indirect, as well as political and civilian focus. The label might include both sides of warfare or only the irregular part of warfare.	Primarily a complement or substitute for Regular Warfare. Might however have revolutionary/ political origin. Different means and methods that do not seek military decisive battles. The label describes the warfare style of the irregulars.	Uprisings against a government or a complement to Regular Warfare. Lower span of violence, subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare up to mobile warfare. Political aspect and need of support from the people. Not seeking military decisive battles. The label includes both parties’ actions.	Political warfare between regulars and irregulars (state and non-state entities). Overthrowing a government also with globalized ambitions. Control of people. Different strategies and tactics, subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare. A specific form of warfare.

Figure 34. Appendix 1. The result of the doctrine and literature analysis – Question 1.

All in all, the first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled *Irregular Warfare*, defined and explained?” can be answered as follows; conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, operational art and tactics with an emphasis on, and from the lower violence spectrum (subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and non-state entities. These sorts of conflicts include insurgency strategies, where political and civilian perspectives dominate and the people’s will and support are of vital importance. IW is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars’ struggle or sometimes includes the counter irregular party as well.

Over time, that sort of warfare has been understood as being different from Regular Warfare in conceptual terms, a specific form of warfare, and as such, also a natural complement.

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Doctrines</i>	<i>Literature period 1; Clausewitz to the First World War</i>	<i>Literature period 2; The 50-70s</i>	<i>Literature period 3; 9/11 to 2010</i>
Question 2				
Label	<i>Irregular Warfare</i>	<i>People-at-Arms Kleinkriege Small Wars Irregular War</i>	<i>Insurgency Counterinsurgency Low intensity operations Revolutionary Warfare Modern Warfare</i>	<i>Irregular Warfare Hybrid Warfare 4G Warfare Small Wars</i>
2. “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?”	<p>IW can include criminality and Terrorism.</p> <p>IW benefit from protracted campaigns.</p> <p>IW does not focus on military battles but on the control and will of the people.</p> <p>IW seeks integration and hard-to-detect networking within the society.</p>	<p>IW opens up for diversity and adaption and flexibility in contrast to the Regular Warfare more rigid concepts.</p> <p>The power and influence of the people in the struggle.</p> <p>The less physical power and more mental power.</p>	<p>Limited physical power.</p> <p>Crushing of social structures.</p> <p>The room aspect.</p> <p>The anonymous fight.</p> <p>The human perspective.</p> <p>The use of terror and consequences thereof.</p> <p>Little interest from the military.</p>	<p>Limited physical strength</p> <p>Importance of covert and clandestine capabilities.</p> <p>The human perspective.</p> <p>Terror as a weapon.</p> <p>Influential use of globalization.</p> <p>Use of society’s networks.</p> <p>Low military interest.</p>

Figure 35. Appendix 1. The result of the doctrine and literature analysis – Question 2.

The question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?” can be summarized with several common opinions that originate from Clausewitz via Callwell to contemporary views. A conceptual difference not built on distinct physical formations, moral goals that aim at the mind and will of the people, limited physical military power and extensive knowledge and use of hard-to detect (covert, clandestine and low visibility) concepts for existing, organizing and activating the influence operations and activities. Terror and subversion as key activities are used when it is culturally effective. There is common use of criminality, moral and ethical standards other than those, which are standards in Regular Warfare. Moreover, military interest in Irregular Warfare is traditionally lower compared to the interest in Regular Warfare skills and competences.

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Doctrines</i>	<i>Literature period 1; Clausewitz to the First World War</i>	<i>Literature period 2; The 50-70s</i>	<i>Literature period 3; 9/11 2010</i>
Question 3				
Label	<i>Irregular Warfare</i>	<i>People-at-Arms, Kleinkrieg, Small Wars, Irregular War.</i>	<i>Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Low-intensity operations, Revolutionary Warfare. Modern Warfare</i>	<i>Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, 4G Warfare, Small Wars.</i>
3. “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”	<p>The violence spectrum starting with “disorder”, “criminality” via terrorism, Insurgency, to Guerrilla Warfare and further on.</p> <p>Parallel and “back and forth” movement. Use of all overt and covert tactics and strategies.</p> <p>Integration into society and hard to detect enemies.</p> <p>The will of the people and political aspects from local to global levels.</p>	<p>A weaker strategy or tactics.</p> <p>High mobility.</p> <p>Total culture/ climatological adaption.</p> <p>Non-material motivators.</p> <p>Loose formations.</p> <p>Not able to fight down physically.</p>	<p>Political and civilian prime perspective.</p> <p>The violence spectrum from subversion to mobile warfare.</p> <p>The role and importance of the police.</p> <p>The need for organization and administration.</p>	<p>Military asymmetry.</p> <p>Weak military resources.</p> <p>Opponents changing sides.</p> <p>Use of subversion and terrorism.</p> <p>Limited military goals.</p> <p>Legally complex to defend against.</p> <p>Need for sanctuary.</p> <p>Covert activities with great stealth. Fanatics and utter determination in the irregulars.</p> <p>Combination of strategies less of Regular Warfare.</p>

Figure 36. Appendix 1. The result of the doctrine and literature analysis – Question 3.

The question; “*What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?*” can be summarized with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressors’ side); A military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with the people and society. The main goal to control the people and their support, leads to a political and civilian focus for the fight. Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible network of influence/combat groupings, using what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms. Military strategies, operational art and tactical skills, from subversion to mobile or manoeuvre warfare with light ground forces.

Summary of the result

Three questions have been addressed dealing with the subject from a military theoretical or practical perspective. The questions answered are summarized as follows.

The first question; *“How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined and explained?”*; conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, operational art and tactics, with an emphasis on and from the lower-violence spectrum (subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and non-state entities. These sorts of conflicts include Insurgency strategies, where the political and civilian perspectives dominate and the will and support of the people is of vital importance. Irregular Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars’ struggle or sometimes also includes the counter irregular party as well. From time to time, that sort of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms from Regular Warfare – a specific form of warfare - not seeking decisive battles but during an extended time, eroding the will to fight the enemy and thus, as such, a natural complement.

The second question; *“What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?”*; there is a conceptual difference, not built on distinct physical formations but on moral goals, which is part of the mind and will of the people; limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect - covert, clandestine and low visibility – necessary for the existence, organisation and activation of the armed operations. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are often used, as are criminality and behaviour, often different in moral/legal/ethical aspects compared to western and traditional views when conducting Regular Warfare. Also, there is generally a low military interest compared to interest in Regular Warfare skills and competences.

The third question; *“What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”* is answered with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressors’ perspective); a military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with people and society. The main goal is to control the people and gain their support, resulting in a political and civilian focus in the fight. Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groups, using what is supposed to bring the desired result, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms. Military strategy, operational art and tactical skills from subversion to mobile or manoeuvre warfare with light ground forces are also typical characteristics.

A first step to an empirical generalization summary from this result, not pretending to say what is the truth, just reporting expressions often occurring in attempts to explain and understand the phenomena in *“Irregular Warfare”*, indicates that the term might be described as in the following figure, which contrasts commonly described characteristics of Regular Warfare.

Overview of commonly described characteristics of Regular and Irregular Warfare

<i>Warfare form</i>	<i>Regular Warfare</i>	<i>Irregular Warfare</i>
<i>Aspects</i>		
<i>Dominant Actors</i>	State actors.	Non/Sub-state actors.
<i>Strategy</i>	Military victory, enemy defeat/destruction.	Political victory, people's support, enemy exhaustion.
<i>Operational design</i>	Joint military operations.	Different operational concepts of subversion, guerrilla/terrorist and local/regional forces up to Regular Warfare structures (ground forces).
<i>Tactics</i>	Direct approach, to control physical terrain.	Indirect approach, to control people's minds and political ambitions.
<i>Time</i>	Strive for short duration.	Accept protracted war/campaign.
<i>Conceptual factors</i>	Overt, uniformed structures and operations, static concepts, separate from civilian functions.	Overt, covert and clandestine structures and operations, dynamic, adaptable and fluid concepts, integrating civilian functions.
<i>Physical factors</i>	Military strengths. Anti-subversive weaknesses.	Military weaknesses. Subversive strengths.
<i>Moral factors</i>	Exclude people's will in the fighting structures.	Integrates people's will in the fighting and supporting structures.
<i>Rules of Law and Engagement</i>	Following western society norms, laws and conventions.	Does not follow western society norms, laws, conventions or moral, ethical standards.

Figure 37. Appendix 1. Overview of characteristics of Regular and Irregular Warfare.

Generic aspects of Irregular Warfare

According to the findings, it is possible to generalize aspects in a non-specific perspective. Generic aspects that are attributed to, and commonly understood connected to the field of Irregular Warfare and related areas, are the following;

Contextual and Conceptual aspects

- *Influencing one's own people for support is vital*
- *Influencing the people of the opponents is crucial today*
- *Propaganda of the deed is very important*
- *Ability to perform various tactics as well as operational art are essential to be able to adapt to the opponents' strategy*
- *Strategy and tactics are often very closely linked from the highest to the lowest level*
- *Capability within the same organisation to use the whole range of non-violence to violence, overt or covert/ clandestine and armed influence on the opponent.*
- *Integrate civilian / military aspects and activities*
- *Integrate all forms of influences (passive-active) violent (armed, sabotage, terrorism) and non-violent*
- *Limited capability to influence regular military in direct confrontation (indirect strategy, military strategy, operational art and tactics)*
- *Parallel use of subversion, Guerrilla Warfare, terrorism and different levels of ground operations*
- *Conceptually high adaption to the society and opponent*
- *Strategy of attrition and transforming/changing centres of gravity*
- *The will or "the idea" is the driving force (moral force and not physical force)*

Tactical aspects

- *Small groups operating dispersed*
- *Operating over large areas*
- *Hit-and-run attacks/ambushes*
- *Only attacking weak points*
- *Avoiding combat unless on own terms*
- *Sabotage actions and terrorism*
- *Civilian support (for control / indoctrination)*
- *Close relations between warfare and politics must be understood down to soldier level*
- *Covert, clandestine, low visibility capabilities*
- *Mobility*
- *Light armament*
- *Difficult terrain*
- *Surprise and high tactical adaption capability*
- *Great demands on low ranking officers*
- *Smaller formations with coordination to larger operations*
- *Support of the people*
- *Sustainability for long periods*

Appendix 1.1 Clausewitz's writings on Small Wars – a collection of thoughts.

Introduction and content

The following part contains extracts from a report written by LtCol Claes Bergström, (working at the Swedish National Defence College during 2010), as a result of research in Germany, during the spring of 2010. The purpose of the work was to get information on more views of Clausewitz's thoughts on *Small Wars/Irregular War* than what can be derived from *On War*. All texts examined are in German and have been translated by LtCol Bergström. The content consists of a background part on the development of military theory written by Werner Hahlweg and the main part, Clausewitz's thoughts of Small Wars, with references to Werner Hahlweg, The Clausewitz-Gesellschaft and Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.

Background – Development of military theory on Small Wars from the 18th and 19th century.

Werner Hahlweg, in his book *Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg*, writes about the Guerrilla or Small War in the context of Prussia during the early 19th century.⁴⁹⁵ During the occupation of Prussia (1808-1813) by Napoleonic troops, the Guerrilla or Small War was seen as an option for a Prussian repossession of independence.⁴⁹⁶ The Spanish Guerrilla War during this period was seen as an example to follow. In 1811, the talented Major von Clausewitz was tasked to develop a memorandum on the possibility of a Small War in Mark Brandenburg.⁴⁹⁷

Hahlweg writes that the concept of Small War was well known and documented in the early 19th century.⁴⁹⁸ A number of generals and field marshals (among them Scharnhorst) had documented that the Small War and the concept, tactics and techniques could (unless a revolution in warfare happened) be considered perfected.⁴⁹⁹ However, a new paradigm did occur in the form of the American Revolution, the French Revolution and not least through Napoleon. The Small War had until then been almost an exclusive military affair, but the revolutionary times made the Small War a matter for revolutionaries and became an instrument for revolution. Its importance was moved from the periphery of a conflict closer to (or becoming) the centre of the conflict.⁵⁰⁰

At the same time however, the Small War kept its importance for the normal armies. Hahlweg further state that the Prussian reformers Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Gneisenau and von Stein were all involved in questions regarding the Small War.

⁴⁹⁵ Werner Hallweg, 'Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg': *Beiheft 18 der Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau, Zeitschrift für Europäischen Sicherheit*, (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag E.S.Mittler & Sohn, September 1962), p. 7.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 7.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 10-11.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid. pp. 10-11.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

Also people outside the group of reformers were involved, among them de la Roche-Aymon and General York.⁵⁰¹ Schanhorst wrote at least two papers (studies) on the subject.⁵⁰² In 1808 de la Roche-Aymon wrote what could be described as a field manual for Small Wars. This manual, written originally in French, was reprinted three times. In 1810 light Brigades were formed in Prussia and de la Roche-Aymon was commander of one of these.

Due to pressure from Napoleon, de la Roche-Aymon being a Frenchman, had to leave Prussian service in 1811.⁵⁰³ One of the more important concerns for de la Roche-Aymon was the ability of light troops to accurately and quickly be able to hit a target with a gun. Shooting was therefore one of the most important skills for a light soldier.⁵⁰⁴ In 1810 and 1811, General York issued instructions for light brigades.⁵⁰⁵ York required an officer to be “independently thinking”.⁵⁰⁶ The fighting of the light troops consisted mostly of independent direct fire, i.e. a loose line without simultaneous firing but with precise single shots.⁵⁰⁷ According to Hahlweg, York always looked at the Small War as something for regular troops and not as Revolutionary War or Volkskrieg.

Werner Hahlweg makes the connection between *Small Wars* and different forms of Irregular War in his book *Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che Guevara*.⁵⁰⁸ In this book, Hahlweg claims the Small War as the root of the different forms of Irregular Warfare, Revolutionary War and Partisan War. All these types of Irregular War are, according to Hahlweg, related and represent different forms of Small Wars.⁵⁰⁹ The Small War is, according to Hahlweg, the original form of warfare and was brought to its fulfilment during the 16th and 17th centuries. During the wars of the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, Small Wars evolved and developed into something not only engaging military forces.⁵¹⁰ Among the foremost theorists and practitioners of Small Wars, Schanhorst, Valentini, Duhesme and Schels are particularly noted by Hahlweg. Also Gneisenau and Clausewitz are specifically mentioned by Hahlweg.⁵¹¹ Hahlweg claims that at the beginning of the 19th century, the Small War was already fought as today, defined by fighting with “intensity and dedication, continuous offensive action, for a long time and with utmost brutality”.⁵¹²

⁵⁰¹ Hahlweg, *Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg: Beiheft 18 der Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau*, (1962), p. 16.

⁵⁰² Ibid. pp. 16-17. *Von der Nothwendigkeit, leichte Truppen zu haben und deren Nutzen und Unterstützung der leichten Infanterie und Jäger*:

⁵⁰³ Ibid. pp. 18-20.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid. pp. 20-21.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid. pp. 22-25.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 24.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 24.

⁵⁰⁸ Werner Hahlweg, *Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che Guevara*, (Darmstadt: WEHR UND WISSEN Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1968).

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid. pp. 7-11.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 10-11.

⁵¹¹ Ibid. p. 11.

⁵¹² Ibid. p. 11.

One of the deciding particulars of the Small War was that parties fighting understood that a prerequisite for success was that the population embraced the idea or the purpose which formed the motivation for the Small War. The support of the population was necessary in order to receive information about the enemy, receive logistical support, in emergencies be able to get refuge, and to create a basis for further recruitment.⁵¹³ The development of Small Wars as Revolutionary War continued through the 19th and 20th century, among others, through the uprisings in Africa and Asia and the Russian revolution 1905. According to Hahlweg, the great wars of the 20th century showed that Small Wars fighters were not marauders but had completely different qualities and strategic impact. Hahlweg also mentions the Partisan Wars on the eastern front and in Yugoslavia as well as Mao's resistance against the Japanese.⁵¹⁴ During the 20th century, the Small Wars (or Partisan War) has been an important part of world politics.⁵¹⁵

Clausewitz lectures on Small Wars

In 1810, Clausewitz was ordered to be a teacher at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, with the subjects of "Small Wars, general staff duties, field fortifications and artillery".⁵¹⁶ The manuscripts for the lectures held on the theme of Small Wars in 1810 and 1811 are preserved. Hahlweg notes that Clausewitz at this time was responsible within the Prussian Staff for questions regarding the general armament of the Prussian people (Volksbewaffnung).⁵¹⁷ Hahlweg takes the stand that Clausewitz emerged as the leading military theorist of Small Wars during the 19th century.⁵¹⁸

Clausewitz defines Small Wars to be limited by the number of soldiers participating in fighting, with an upper limit of 300-400 soldiers. This is true unless the fighting takes place as part of a larger whole. In principle, according to Clausewitz, everything a small unit does independently is a part of the Small War. The difference between Small Wars and larger wars is not defined but has to be decided every time. One of the specifics of the Small War compared to the larger war is the ability to hide, which a unit within the Small War has. Units involved in a larger war cannot hide as easily and are dependent on supply and support, including combat support to a larger degree.⁵¹⁹ Clausewitz also defines the connection between strategy and tactics in a Small War.

In the larger war, strategy decides purpose, time, location and strength of troops participating in the battle, meaning that strategy determines tactics. In the Small War, strategy is part of the tactics.⁵²⁰

⁵¹³ Hahlweg, *Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che Guevara* (1968), p. 11.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid. p. 12.

⁵¹⁶ Hahlweg, *Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg* (1962), p. 26.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid. p. 26.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. p. 54.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. p. 28.

⁵²⁰ Ibid. pp. 28-29.

In order to remember the 200th anniversary of the birth of Carl von Clausewitz, the German Clausewitz-gesellschaft published an anthology in 1979, where different aspects of Clausewitz's thinking were reflected upon⁵²¹.

In this book, Werner Hahlweg contributes with an article about Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare. In this short (seven pages) article, Hahlweg highlights the chapter in book 6 about Volkskrieg, stating that this is the same as Guerrilla War.⁵²² Among the particulars of Clausewitz's writings highlighted by Hahlweg, notice should be taken of the following:⁵²³

- an important war is to be fought internally
- a decisive battle must be avoided
- war should be fought over a large geographical surface
- the people must support the war (cause)
- guerrilla forces should use the terrain and avoid the areas where strong regular enemy units are

Hahlweg concludes this article by stating that Clausewitz did consider Small War within his theory, in particular by the statement that the Small War (Volkskrieg) can never be looked upon as an isolated phenomenon, but needs to be considered within the whole of politics, strategy etc.⁵²⁴ The lectures, held in 1810 and 1811 are preserved in the form of complete manuscripts. These manuscripts were published in 1966 by the *Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*.⁵²⁵ In the introduction, written by Werner Hahlweg, the history of the Clausewitz papers is told, starting with the publications in 10 volumes (the first three containing *Vom Kriege*), in 1832 to 1837.⁵²⁶ Part of the first volume is the lectures held by Clausewitz on the theme of Small Wars. In the here published form, they cover 244 handwritten pages.⁵²⁷ The lectures are, according to Hahlweg, complete and previously not published. The lectures have four main topics:⁵²⁸ Small War and field fortifications, examples, collectaneen⁵²⁹ to the lectures, and techniques of artillery firing.

⁵²¹ Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., *Freiheit ohne Krieg?: Beiträge zur Strategi-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz*, (Bonn; Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980). The anthology contains an article by Werner Hahlweg about Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare

⁵²² Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., *Freiheit ohne Krieg?: Beiträge zur Strategi-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz*, (1980), pp. 353-356.

⁵²³ Ibid. pp. 354-355, These writings can also be found in the sixth book of *On War*.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. pp. 356-357.

⁵²⁵ Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, *Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Band 45: Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe: Erster Band*, Herausgeber Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966).

⁵²⁶ Ibid. p. 11.

⁵²⁷ Ibid. p. 217, In *Band 45* these notes with comments from Hahlweg cover the pages 208-599.

⁵²⁸ Ibid. p. 217.

⁵²⁹ Collectaneen = notes and comments to the lectures, not part of the lectures (Bergström's comment)

The Small Wars lectures have the following structure in the chapters;⁵³⁰

- General (Introduction to Small Wars and tactics of the Small War)
- Vorpostensystem
- Detaschements- oder Parteigängerkrieg

Hahlweg states that this manuscript is almost totally written by Clausewitz personally and without the intent of being published.⁵³¹ The third chapter; *Detaschements- oder Parteigängerkrieg*, is according to Hahlweg, not completed by Clausewitz.⁵³² Clausewitz was engaged in the subject of Small Wars at later dates, which a letter in 1823 from the Prins August of Prussia brings to light. The letter is accompanied by eleven booklets containing Clausewitz's lectures, in a more advanced state than those from 1810-1811.⁵³³ In the introduction to his lectures, Clausewitz defines Small War and what it is that makes it different from the low intensity. Clausewitz's definition concerns the size of the troops involved, saying it is unphilosophical but true. All war-like actions taken by these smaller units are part of the Small War.⁵³⁴ The main particulars which make the difference between small and larger wars are according to Clausewitz the following:⁵³⁵

- Small units will almost always find supplies in the field
- Small units can keep their whereabouts hidden easier
- Small units can, particular in combat, move faster
- Armies and larger corps need to be divided into subunits; in smaller units a subdivision is mostly not possible
- Small units lose their character when fighting from fixed positions
- Combat of the small units will almost always be supported
- Small units can retreat easier and faster, without need of prepared roads
- The tasking of small units does not require major preparations
- Small units have the task of observing the enemy more often than to attack or defend

Clausewitz also discusses the terms strategy and tactics, saying that all actions in the larger war are motivated by one or the other and states that the same is valid for the Small War.⁵³⁶

In the chapter; *Über den Charakter des kleinen Krieges*, Clausewitz states that the Small War means a higher personal danger for the soldier, requiring the greatest

⁵³⁰ Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Band 45: Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften – Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe: Erster Band , (1966), p. 217.

⁵³¹ Ibid. pp. 217-218.

⁵³² Ibid. pp. 218-219.

⁵³³ Ibid. p. 220.

⁵³⁴ Ibid. pp. 231-233.

⁵³⁵ Ibid. pp. 234-235.

⁵³⁶ Ibid. p. 235.

courage and bravery, compared to the larger war.⁵³⁷ In the third chapter, Clausewitz discusses tactics in the Small War, stating that in the Small War there are no differences in how weapons are used compared to the larger war. Further, the particulars of tactics for the infantry, cavalry and artillery in the Small War is discussed.⁵³⁸ He states that the infantry most often will fight in open formations, from protected positions.

Clausewitz lists four principles of the Small War valid for the infantry:⁵³⁹

1. Often and almost always, the opponent will be numerically greater than the enemy.
2. Should you not be weak compared to the enemy, you will always be inferior compared to the area you are to occupy.
When defending, a total defence is almost never necessary, and the need to defend is limited in time. Additionally; total defence is the task when a point must not be taken by the enemy; for example a fortification. A relative defence should be limited in time, in order to make the advance of the enemy difficult. .
3. In Small Wars, respect for enemy fire is greater, because the risk of serious losses will only be taken when bigger goals can be achieved. However, these situations seldom occur in Small Wars as you will more often be engaged by the other side.

After discussing the infantry, Clausewitz continues with cavalry, cavalry and infantry together, artillery together with infantry and cavalry, ending with a discussion on how to use the terrain.⁵⁴⁰ In the lectures Clausewitz uses the terms *Grosser Krieg* (larger war) and *Kleiner Krieg* (Small War).⁵⁴¹ The following lectures on Small Wars include one on defence in Small Wars. In the introduction to the lecture, Clausewitz argues that in Small Wars defence is never totally passive or reactive, but that to defend means waiting for the right moment to attack. Clausewitz further argues for two most important things regarding defence in Small Wars,⁵⁴² these are; that you win time by waiting for the enemy and his action, that you fight him in terrain that you know and that you know of his intentions when you take on the fight. Therefore (argues Clausewitz), I'm being defensive when I wait for the enemy to approach my position or that the enemy approaches the terrain that has advantages for me. To be defensive in Small Wars means to fight the enemy in one's own theatre of war or from one's own defensive position.⁵⁴³ Further on in the lectures, it is stated that in the Small War, almost all attacks will be surprise ones. Clausewitz also argues for the moral effects that a sudden attack has on the defenders.⁵⁴⁴

⁵³⁷ Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1966), pp. 237-238.

⁵³⁸ Ibid. pp. 239-266.

⁵³⁹ Ibid. pp. 239-240.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 246-266.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid. p. 250. Example is given.

⁵⁴² Ibid. pp. 300-302.

⁵⁴³ Ibid. pp. 300-302.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 397-398. (Angriffe kleine Posten und Überfälle)

The final comments to the lectures include the wish for the students not to memorize the principles but to reflect for themselves in order to learn.⁵⁴⁵ Clausewitz further states that there is much more written on the small war than on the larger war, but most of the writings of the Small War are similar, and Clausewitz recommends that it is enough to read the work of either General Scharnhorst or General (Danish LtCol) Ewald.⁵⁴⁶ The lectures cover a large number of topics, including retreat, detachments, patrols and reconnaissance.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1966), pp. 443-449.(Schlussbemerkungen über den kleinen Krieg)

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. pp. 445-446.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 226-227.

Appendix 1.2 General Sir Frank Kitson's views on Irregular Warfare 2010 – a collection of thoughts.

The following part contains part of my correspondence with Sir General Frank Kitson during the spring of 2010.

Letter One, 23 March, 2010

During 1953 to 1973 Sir General Frank Kitson was very much concerned with low intensity operations of one sort or another, including peace keeping. During this period he was very much concerned with getting people to understand the differences between low intensity operations and operations of a more conventional type, he writes; *"For some time I had trouble getting anyone to take an interest in these operations, but later when Commandant of the Staff College, 1978-1980, I was well placed to get my views taken seriously"*. His famous book *Low Intensity Operations* was written in 1969 before he was moved to take command of the troops in Belfast 1970-1972. Therefore, his experiences gained there are not included in the book. In 1975, he wrote *Bunch of Five* (Faber and Faber, 1977, republished in June 2010) designed to explain how he gained the experiences that led to *Low Intensity Operations*. Kitson writes; *"I would have liked to have described my time in Belfast, but that was too sensitive for publication at that time"*. *"I did however summarize my experiences in the last three chapters which therefore contain my most up to date views of Counterinsurgency"*. The U.S. Army extracted three chapters and for some time used them for instructional purposes. His experiences were gained in Kenya (The Mau-Mau rebellion), Malaya, Muscat and Oman (1958), Cyprus (1963-1964 and 1967-1968) and Northern Ireland (1970-1972).

Letter Two, 20 April, 2010

I had asked what to do about the disinterest in the subject of Irregular Warfare from officers in general and Kitson writes; *"You can't do anything about the fact the more senior officers are likely to be the most difficult to convince [of the importance of understanding Irregular Warfare]". The good thing is that they will die or relive and the younger ones who you can teach, will eventually fill their place"*.

To my suggestion of COIN operations for levels of intensity, giving each a separate name (Counter-Subversion, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Guerrilla operations), Kitson says; *"So far as I am concerned this is fine. Anyone can choose to use any name they like so long as they define it carefully"*.

Asking for an opinion on my idea of focusing on the company and battalion level for training levels (of basics in Irregular Warfare), Kitson agrees; *"that it would be wise"* and *"By doing so you will be teaching the people most likely to be involved in the immediate future and who will be going on to become the senior officers later on"*.

Regarding different personal interests and ability to gain understanding of Irregular Warfare, Kitson puts it; *“If there are some who cannot understand it, they just have to be moved to other posts”*. He also recommends reading his book; *Directing operations* where he also deals with selection and training and career management.⁵⁴⁸

Letter Three, 28 May, 2010

Referring to my writing on the subject of “Hearts and Minds Operations” as not being a special strategy and an alternative, but rather a complement to other operations of more offensive character, such as killing/capturing/turning, Kitson writes; *“ In my opinion you are absolutely correct”*. The interest in Irregular Warfare and particularly in Counterinsurgency was limited mostly during the time when Kitson experienced such operations. Later on, this changed. Kitson writes; *“The subject became increasingly taught in a general sense like Sandhurst School of Infantry, Staff College etc. as time went by starting in the 1960/1970’s. Specific training for units about to take part became much more efficient from the early 1970’s and dealt with preparing units for the particular places to which they were going”*.

Kitson also says; *“You are correct in thinking that the British took insufficient interest in teaching COIN until the 1970’s, although there had been some interest earlier”*. *“It is certainly right that a few senior officers thought knowing how to deal with Regular Warfare was all that mattered right up to the 1980’s, but not many”*.

Letter Four, 12 July, 2010

Regarding needs for the military to understand and know police work (related to countering or supporting Counter-subversion and Insurgency) Kitson writes; *“I agree with you that the military needs to know how police work when dealing with subversion, so they can be ready to assist them if necessary”*. *“Also the Army should be kept fully informed of events because subversion can so easily develop into Insurgency and must be ready to get involved as soon as it does”*.

As for relevance of teaching different sorts of warfare, Kitson writes; *“I agree that discussing different sorts of warfare can be helpful for training purposes. But when trouble breaks out it is necessary to realize that no two situations are alike and people must learn to deal with every situation on its merits”*.

Also in this letter Kitson comments, regarding “Hearts and Minds Operations”; *“Hearts and Minds is definitely not an alternative to other sorts of actions. It needs to be worked in with other aspects of the campaign”*.

⁵⁴⁸ Frank Kitson, *Directing Operations* (London; Faber and Faber, 1989, reprinted in August 2010).







Appendix 2. The Interview Guide

This appendix presents an extract from the Interview Guide, including the questions used for analysis.

General information at the start of the interview; these questions are based on Irregular Warfare aspects, which simplified can be seen as; use of, or defence against one or more of the following violence types; subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and tactics/ operational warfare (traditional infantry activities up to company/ battalion size). Below, an extract from the Interview Guide with the questions that have been analysed is presented.

1. BACKGROUND FACTORS - SOCIAL and EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS (16)				
1.2 Year of birth				
1.4 Rank and command role				
1.5 Command of unit type				
1.6 Regiment affiliation				
1.7 Arms affiliation – unit background				
1.10 International missions (where, when, for how long, position)				
1.19 Participation in combat/war				
2.1 Post-graduate education				
2.2 Professional training/education				
2.3 University education				
2.4 Other civilian education/training				
2.5 Military education/training				
3. TACTICAL THOUGHT (8)				
<i>What is your position/standpoint in relation to the following polarities with regard to your personal tactical thinking? For example; what you prioritize and highly value or want to highlight as important for tactics in IW.</i>				
3.5 a) Offensive b) Defensive focus, where is your basic focus?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
3.6 a) Enemy-centric b) People-centric approach in COIN operations?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
3.7 a) Mechanized, collective combat with larger units or b) Ranger combat, distributed operations with patrols?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)

3.8 a) “Combat” or b) “Recce”?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
3.9 a) National defence focus or b) International mission focus, regarding tactics (i.e. to be familiar with FM 3.24-2)?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
3.10 If you can choose, what do you prefer to lead and command? a) own operations b) training others (meaning Host Nation units) implementing operations	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
3.11 What do you rather prefer to command or develop tactics for? a) larger units b) smaller structure (i.e. Mechanized battalion combat or distributed ranger combat)	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
3.12 Do you consider yourself primarily to be? a) “troop” or “front” commander b) planner/staff officer	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
4. TACTICAL THOUGHTS (10)						
4.1 Types of violence in IW can be describes as; a) subversion, b) terrorism, c) Guerrilla Warfare, d) tactical combat. Which of these do you think of in particular when tactics in IW is the concern?	a	b	c	d	equal	neither a) or b)
4.2 Where is your tactical emphasis in general? a) collective unit combat b) distributed unit combat	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		
4.3 What do you consider to be most important to have capabilities for in general? a) Regular Warfare b) Irregular Warfare	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)		

<p>4.4 Conceptually, one can think of a battalion structure, capable of IW in different ways.</p> <p>See the examples in the picture below. What do you think of in the first place?</p> <p>a) traditional infantry, no specialized units</p> <p>b) different levels of specialization</p> <p>c) a totally new concept</p>	<p>a b c equal neither a) or b)</p>
	<div data-bbox="292 772 794 987"> <p>Alt 1.</p>  <p>Traditional RW Bgd with 3 Manouever Btn of Infantry character.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="818 772 1294 987"> <p>Alt 4.</p>  <p>"IW/COIN" Brigade Combat Team with 3 Manouever Btn structures that are <i>similar specialized for IW/COIN</i>.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="292 996 794 1265"> <p>Alt 2.</p>  <p>Traditional RW Bgd with 3 Manouever Btn Infantry character. Enablers for IW/COIN capability</p> </div> <div data-bbox="818 996 1294 1265"> <p>Alt 5.</p>  <p>"IW/COIN" Brigade Combat Team with <i>different specialized structures</i> for cordon & encirclement, "Jagd Commandos" and Anti-guerrilla patrols. Enablers for functions</p> </div> <div data-bbox="292 1276 794 1556"> <p>Alt 3.</p>  <p>Brigade Combat Team with 3 Manouever Btn structures that are Task-group organized. Enablers for IW/COIN capability</p> </div> <div data-bbox="818 1276 1294 1556"> <p>Alt 6.</p>  <p>Totally new conceptual thinking</p> </div>
<p>4.5 Do you think of tactics?</p> <p>a) often</p> <p>b) seldom</p>	<p>a b equal neither a) or b)</p>

4.6 Do you think of tactics primarily as a) theory? b) practice? c) a combination?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
4.8 Do you think of tactics in IW primarily as a) open/visible activities b) covert, low visible activities?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
4.9 When speaking of tactics, is your focus on a) troops? b) technology?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
4.10 Where is your focus in tactical thought in COIN operations? a) military tasks b) civilian tasks	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)
4.11 a) Hard (kinetic) effects? b) Soft (non-kinetic) effects?	a	b	equal	neither a) or b)

Ten Open-ended Questions

- 1) What does "tactics" mean to you?
- 2) How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general?
- 3) Linked to the concept of "war fighting capabilities", what aspects do you mostly connect to tactics in IW; physical, conceptual, moral?
- 4) Do you think tactics in IW is a priority in the armed forces?
- 5) Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers?
- 6) Do you think tactics for IW needs to be developed in the armed forces?
- 7) How have you been influenced to think of tactics? Self-perceived experiences or indirectly read experiences, by colleagues, through exercises or real life operations?
- 8) How do you assess your interest in tactics compared with strategy and operational art?
- 9) What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking?
- 10) What would you like to add anything regarding tactics in IW, not mentioned in these questions?

Appendix 3. Results from the open-ended questions

This appendix presents the summaries and results of the twelve open-ended questions from the interview guide. The questions, listed below, are marked with the question number referring to the Interview Guide, as well as with the analyses of group (1); *views of tactics in general*, or (2); *views of tactics in Irregular Warfare explicitly*. The answers regarding these two overarching questions are summarized at the end of the appendix.

- What does the concept of tactics means to you? Question 6 (1)
- How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general? Question 7 (1)
- What has influenced your tactical thinking? Question 13 (1)
- What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking? Question 15 (1)
- How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art? Question 14 (1)
- Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers? Question 11 (1)
- How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare? Question 8 (2)
- Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare? Question 4.12 (2)
- What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you mostly think of in Irregular Warfare tactics? Physical, conceptual or moral aspects? Question 9 (2)
- Do you consider there is a need for the development of tactics for Irregular Warfare in the armed forces? Question 12 (2)
- Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the armed forces? Question 10 (2)
- What would you otherwise like to add anything regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare, not mentioned in this interview? Question 26 used in the discussion part of validity.

Results

Question 6. What does the concept of tactics mean to you?

The result (35 of 42 possible answers) can be divided into two major groups. The first and dominant group; 20 answers, describes a view where tactics is understood as; *“the use or manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or adaption of units or resources, in order to reach a specific goal”*.

The concept of winning or achieving success was only used by five officers. Four officers stated a view that tactics could also include civilian resources. Four officers meant that it had to do with available resources or from a certain base of resources. One officer claimed that resources could also be employed. The concept of art was related to by one officer. Concepts such as enemy and terrain were used in one answer

One officer viewed tactics as related to command level. Tactics is a unique opportunity, during a limited time frame, a way of thinking and aiming for a common goal, were other descriptions.

The other group (15 answers) covered several *aspects not directly related to the overarching description; "use of units for a certain goal"*. Six answers described tactics as thought processes, problem-solving activities or as an intellectual process. One officer viewed tactics as a combination of theory and practice. Two officers stated the ability to transfer will-power and ideas to combat techniques related to command levels. Two officers viewed tactics as unit level related up to battalion size units. The use of hard and soft methods and a connection to combat were stated by three officers. Another officer implied that combat techniques in Irregular Warfare would soon reach the area of tactics.

A clear relation to the enemy or aggressor was described by two officers. A typical traditional Regular Warfare description was sketched by one officer as; *"find holes, advance routes, move squares, draw arrows"*. Another, more generic and holistic view was stated by one officer as; *"to calculate and think of all parameters and do the best one can in a given situation (from soldier and upwards)"*. A third officer described aspects such as troops and technology, theory and practice, leadership and social and political science all woven together in tactics, as the most important subject for an officer. One officer expressed views such as; *"cunning, wisdom and reflection....a thought process.....to out-manoeuvre the enemy physically and mentally, leadership, to think freely and openly, an accepting working environment and to encourage your personnel to take responsibility and initiative and to award such ambitions, to encourage to assume responsibility, think freely and creatively and be able to take command when needed"*.

Result summary; the question resulted in two major areas of thinking. The first, and dominant group (20 answers) described a view of tactics meaning; *"the use (or manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or adaption) of units or resources in order to reach a specific goal"*. In this category several different articulations could be found. The other group (15 answers) comprised several aspects not directly related to the overarching description such as; *"use of units for a certain goal"*. About half of the total sample (20 officers) viewed tactics as an overarching expression, meaning more directly; *"the use of units for a certain goal"*, however, there were several different interpretations.

The second group (15 officers) viewed tactics to mean primarily aspects not directly related to the use of units for a certain goal, also here, interpreted in many different ways. The result shows a slight tendency towards the direct view, i.e. tactics in general is thought of as the use of units. Another group, somewhat smaller, highlighted a view that tactics is mainly a way of thinking. These views can be summarized with; *"to use practically"* and *"to think about how to use units"*, or generalized as one practical and one theoretical view. Therefore, two perspective angles are argued to be found here; the general understanding perspective characterized by focusing on theoretical problem-solving, and the principles of warfare-related perspective, the latter indicating a more direct and hands-on view.

Question 7. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general?

The result (38 of 43 possible) can be categorized in four areas;

1). *General aspects not directly related to war fighting capabilities or performance* (14 answers). The following views were stated in this group; own and the enemy intelligence needs, strengths and weaknesses analysis, general method thinking, a problem-solving principle, striving for simplicity and need for limitations, a task-oriented process and method and need for rapid reaction. Problem analysis in order to tie down or avoid confronting the enemy. Need for several solutions to the goal and being able to revise (the tactics). Theory and practice, an intellectual process, minimal solutions with limited means, should be able to answer the question why, context-oriented thinking, forward-focused thinking, what is to be accomplished? Goal articulated (to the lowest cost) tactics, great demands on understanding. Aggressor-oriented thinking better than terrain-time-oriented thinking, as the “*mechanized fundamentalists*” according to one officer.

2). Traditional Regular Warfare tactical aspects (10 answers); the following views were stated in this group ; armour habituated manoeuvre thinking, rapid and unexpected actions, time-space-force calculation with a clear and distinct attack focus and little knowledge of aspects important in Irregular Warfare. Psychological operations and air coordination were described as a way of thinking by one armoured company commanding officer. Strictly following the field manuals, surprisingly, is viewed the most important aspect. Deception, such as decisive combat offensive thinking, little patience, controlled aggressive and rapid decisive operations were other examples, as also combined arms and manoeuvre warfare, avoiding frontal attacks by the enemy.

One officer argued there was a problem to be available with a so-called field exercise mentality, with consequences such as difficulties or impossibility to manoeuvre with more than platoons out- flanking each other, followed by frontal assaults. Two officers described their way of thinking about tactics in general, clearly related to Swedish ranger traditions; small unit operations, surprise and deception and unconventional thinking.

3). *New thinking with a wider approach to tactics in general* (8 answers); to balance habituated thinking, needs for new ways of thinking, understanding new cultures, a reflective way of thinking tactically and to be capable of different tactical approaches. One description implied that the armed forces had requirements that were too low for developing such abilities, for example, no particular reading requirements and not providing the best teachers at the schools. A greater knowledge other than in planning methods is thought to be required. One officer missed deeper tactical discussions in general. Other views were; “*a need for new thinking, alternative solutions beyond old patterns, finding unconventional solutions outside the field manuals (also in Regular Warfare tactics). Task analysis thinking, new ways of organizing the units, less traditional. Striving for the unconventional*”.

4). *Tactics in general with links to Irregular Warfare* (7 answers); the manoeuvre principle and Regular Warfare capabilities as a foundation but recognizing differences in Irregular Warfare. The need for extensive knowledge of the aggressor, time calculations, thinking innovatively or differently, training based on tactics and reflections on the manoeuvres in COIN. Be able to see devolvement of events and flow, experience-based tactics, with particular demands on the leadership area in Irregular Warfare with Swedish units, which comprise more experienced soldiers than commanders. A strive for simplicity, even though this is difficult in Irregular Warfare because of the great unwillingness to take risks or preparedness to take risks. Military theoretical concepts such as mobilization, surprise and local superiority have different meanings in Irregular Warfare. One officer says that his thinking could be described as traditional Regular Warfare thinking, with a certain amount of Irregular Warfare knowledge. Another officer described a geographically heavy focus, including human terrain aspects, the units, the terrain and the enemy as components in his tactical thinking in general.

Result summary; the result can be categorized in four areas; general aspects not directly related to war fighting capabilities or performance (14 answers), traditional Regular Warfare tactical aspects (10 answers), thinking innovatively with a wider approach to tactics in general (8 answers), and tactics in general linked to Irregular Warfare (7 answers).

Twenty-four officers, that is about half the total sample state rather a traditional way of thinking, mainly influenced by Regular Warfare thinking (the first two groups) A smaller group of fifteen officers revealed thinking with either a more generic and wider analytical approach, or with a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective. Generalized, it can be concluded that a more direct Regular Warfare perspective is common, whether as a wider generic approach or a more direct Irregular Warfare approach, which is less common.

Question 13. What has influenced you to think about tactics (from what)? Self-perceived experience or indirect experiences? Via colleagues? Through exercises or operations?

The answers (38 of 43 possible) were distributed relatively evenly into five groups of aspects that were considered to have influenced the officers' tactical thinking.

1. *Education / school activities* (9)
2. *Personal experiences* (11)
3. *Literature / games* (9/2)
4. *Personal influences (senior officers, colleagues)* (7)
5. *Exercise activity* (10)
6. *Combination of the influences* (11).

Two smaller groups consisted of *Colleagues' influences* (1 reply, regarding international colleagues) and operations (4 replies). Aspects of the officers' *Personal experiences* and *Exercise activities* go together, when primarily within the tactical exercises from which experiences can be drawn.

These two aspects were emphasized by twenty-one officers, about twice as many than for each of the aspects, *Education / school activities* and *Literature / games* and *Combination of influences*.

Result summary; the question resulted in answers distributed relatively similarly into the following five groups:

1. *Education / school activities* (9)
2. *Personal experiences* (11)
3. *Literature / games* (9/2)
4. *Personal influences (senior officers, colleagues)* (7)
5. *Exercise activity* (10)
6. *Combination of the influences* (11).

Aspects of the officers' *Personal experiences*, *Influences* and *Exercise activities* connect when primarily within these areas from where more practical experiences can be drawn. These three aspects together were emphasized by twenty-eight officers, and dominate clearly above each of the aspects *Education / school activities* and *Literature / games* and *Combination of influences*. Clearly addressed educational influences are only stated by nine officers as dominant. This result reveals that the structure and content of exercises might be particularly important to analyse and implement, according to the current form of tactical thinking that is normatively addressed.

Question 15. What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking?

The responses (34 of 43 possible) were divided into a large number of positions. Two areas; *Experiences and influences from past wars / interventions* received the most replies (8 each). Three areas; *Schooling / training* and *External developments* and *Lack of influences due to the low priority in the armed forces* received five (5) responses each. *Exercises/training* and *Individual influences* (strong commanders, people with strong will and drive in general), *Technological development*, and *the Swedish Armed Forces organizational and material development* then received four (4) replies each. *Personal experience*, *History (WW2)* and *Money* received two (2) responses each. Finally, one (1) reply each concerned the following aspects; *Research / studies*, *Lack of opponents to practice against*, *Time inhibitory processes and staff work*, *Current workload on commanders*, *Social climate* and *Resource allocation*, *Past conflicts*, *War experience*, *Doctrines*, *USA*, *Types of threat (existential threats or threat types in international missions)*, *Climate for discussion*, *Open-mind to new solutions*, *Swedish ranger tactics/mind-set*.

Result summary; the question resulted in responses divided into a very large number of different positions. Two areas; *Experiences and influences from past wars* received most replies (8 each). *Schooling / training* received five (5) responses. *Exercises/training* received four (4) replies.

This question and the results are argued to connect to relational cognitive value perspectives with indications of a high value in personal experiences and in general “*lastest war*” influences indicating a less influential view than theoretical influences from schools.

Question 14; How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art?

The answers (31 of 43 possible) were distributed as follows; a major interest in tactics (19), equal interest in tactics and operational art (4), most interest in operational art (OpArt) (4), equal interest in all three aspects (2), and finally, most interest in strategy (2).Result summary; the question resulted in answers distributed as a major interest in tactics (19), equal interest in tactics and operational art (4), most interest in operational art (OpArt) (4), equal interest in all three aspects (2), and finally, most interest in strategy (2).

Question 11; Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers?

The replies (38 of 43 possible) distributed mainly over two larger groups of 15 statements each. The “Yes group” contained two officers; one mechanized battalion CO and one amphibious rifle company CO, who said they often discussed tactics with subordinates but not with their senior commanders. This group also included two officers; one armoured company CO and one amphibious battalion CO, with the contradictory view that they discussed tactics mainly with the senior commanders. The “No group” contained 15 statements of which two argued that they discussed tactics during international missions. Six officers claimed they occasionally talked a lot about tactics. One officer said he discussed tactics amounting to about 3 weeks during a year.

One officer said that there is an increasing amount of tactics discussions. Four of the battalion commanders stated that they often discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders said they did not discuss tactics often. Replies from two battalion commanders are missing.

Result summary; the question resulted in replies that distributed mainly into two larger groups of 15 statements each. Four of the battalion commanders stated that they often discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders said they did not discuss tactics often. Replies from two battalion commanders are missing. The result indicates that discussing tactics is not a habitual tradition generally in the ground forces.

Question 8. How would you describe your way of thinking tactics in Irregular Warfare?

The results (31 of 43 possible) were distributed over two larger, and four smaller groups.

1) Other demands, Planning and coordination/command and functions (13 answers). Need for accurate planning, possibly more dynamic decision making, less direct combat command, hard to do the analysis - not schooled in Irregular Warfare, increased demands on consequence analysis, other goals than in Regular Warfare.

The analytical method, "The Interest Model" was appropriate according to an officer who highlighted answers as follows; "what makes a village leader behave in a certain way officially and another unofficially, what causes certain behaviours and needs for action, what can I do to strengthen actors' positions that benefits me?".

Other issues raised were; the importance of having a variety of perspectives, more parameters are contained in Irregular Warfare. One answer said that *"it becomes much less sequential.....it is about finding, weighing parameters as when you were new in tactics ... to manoeuvre.... "*. Another officer viewed that, *"there are new influences, other influences, and it is possible that our business sometimes should really just be to act against one influence"*. Other views were; *"It may be far from manoeuvring, it's a completely different thing"*. *"Need for increased endurance, need for tactical adaption, we are weak at tempo shifts"*. *"Bigger need for concentrated effort in what you do, not a lot of small scale operations"*, *" it requires movement capability...helicopters"*, *"it is difficult to do simply"*, *"a vast area to deal with"*.

As for coordination needs at lower levels, three officers specifically address the following: "operations are pressed down (to platoon combined arms), you have to be able to use different types of units", "one must be able to use different types of systems have more understanding of lower level than I think you need in national invasion defence warfare," , "bigger requirement to work with the lower level units".

2). A need for knowledge of more and new functions; e.g. Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Electronic Warfare) (11 answers). Other functions than in Regular Warfare such as gender, logistics and CIMIC (civil-military cooperation), which also have new requirements, e.g. combat logistics. Six answers regarded intelligence as having a *"very big difference within intelligence and information functions compared to Regular Warfare"*, *"extensive uncertainty of the opponent"*, *"other types of opponents and goals"*.

A need to organize the Intelligence function from below, very Intel-heavy with requirements for adaption. A need to affect the opponent in several dimensions, coordinated in time and space.

3) Regular Warfare capability as a fundament (6 answers). Take advantage of the regular types of units and add units with special skills. Task groups with regular units that clear areas, then build communities with specialists, including civilians. An officer expressed his thinking; *"It's all of how I will be able to use the Regular Warfare model and apply it to another opponent, another type of opponent"*.

Adaption is needed. *"Maybe I need to be even cleverer right there and then, than I need to be to cope with the real Regular Warfare. To be able to act with confidence as a whole unit, and have good self-esteem, based on the feeling I can conduct Regular Warfare very well"*.

The basic skills of Regular Warfare are adapted by certain centralized competence centres because it is impossible to have all the necessary expertise and skills at all the regiments. Primarily, offensive actions but also combined with defensive methods.

One officer implied that there is no difference compared to situation-adapted Regular Warfare thinking; the centre of gravity and the decisive points of the opponent are identified and targeted mainly kinetically, in order to break resistance and capability.

4) Commanders' skills and leadership (5 answers); *"Then it will become much more difficult, for commanders who may not be trained in it (Irregular Warfare), but the importance of making it easy becomes even more important, so to speak". "Needs for greater functional knowledge even among the commanding officers", "completely different challenges today if you look at requirements for a Battalion Commander"*.

One officer exemplified using a Regular Warfare situation, a different leadership challenge; *"I can translate it actually with FS xx and the three different platoons we had. One platoon had one, if not a huge, battle in which the squads were involved for a while. Another platoon went out on a contact and battle where they did actually use their weapons, even if they did not shoot at an actual opponent. They fire some antitank grenades and flares, seized the terrain and felt that they had pushed away the insurgents. Whilst the third platoon was not involved in anything at all, they were very concerned, to the last day, to get into the little more troublesome areas to get a confirmation for they were also good."*

"They were certainly as good, there certainly was no difference, but they wanted the confirmation, something the rest got". One officer took up the area of morale *" ... and you must have an extremely high morale and spirit"*. One officer took up the opinion of increasing demands on commanding officers and leaders at lower levels.

5) *Execution of COIN tactics* (5 answers). Military operations in collaboration with civilian actors who ensure an increased standard of living for everyone involved in the conflict, and thus counter the will to fight and recruit insurgents. The combination of troops and technology, working among the people to fix problems. The social aspects are more significant compared to Regular Warfare, more solutions can be found. Enemies that are not visible can be frustrating for military self-confidence, not being able to *"do things"*. A Hearts and Minds approach in order to minimize the opportunities for the opponent to recruit more people.

Surprise or force mobilization works differently in Irregular Warfare compared to Regular Warfare. Indirect methods working with civilians and the population. Cunning and surprise, deception and unorthodox methods are possible to learn. A lot of troop experience is important, as is also to read a lot (e.g. on ranger tactics and history). Execution of tactics in COIN is opposite to traditional Regular Warfare frontal attacks.

6) A need for a different understanding and mind-set (4 answers). Need to not act too quickly, to reflect, sometimes doing nothing, to understand "why" in the longer term. It takes time and patience, patience with tempo changes.

Result summary; the question resulted in answers that were distributed over two larger, and four smaller groups as follows;

- 1) *Other demands on planning and coordination/command and functions* (13 answers).
- 2) *A need for knowledge of more and new functions;* e.g. Intelligence, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare (11 answers).
- 3) *Regular Warfare capability as a fundament* (6 answers).
- 4) *Commanders' skills and leadership* (5 answers)
- 5) *Execution of COIN tactics* (5 answers).
- 6) *A need for a different understanding and mind-set* (4 answers).

The result shows dominance in thinking about new or other demands in *Command and functional thinking*. A minor number of officers articulated a way of thinking that emphasizes Regular Warfare capabilities as a fundament. Also, a limited number of officers specifically highlighted the commanders' skills and leadership abilities, COIN tactics execution and a need for a new mind-set. This result indicates a clear emphasis on thinking connected to the principles of warfare related perspectives, in particular, regarding conceptual factors in conjunction with a view of a more difficult context to operate in.

Question 4.12. Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare?

39 (of 43 possible) answers was distributed in three major groups of aspects; *Capability*, Conceptual and Intelligence aspects as major focus areas. Also, the following aspects were highlighted, but to a more limited extent; Military and civilian relations, Education and training, mind-set (7) and a group of Other aspects (5). Each sub-group consisted of views as follows;

- *Capability aspects* (18 standpoints); combat, harassment, hard and soft effects, primarily Regular Warfare capability needs, probably more need for enhanced capability in Regular Warfare (tactics), capability requirement for civilian tasks as a part of tactics, capabilities for Irregular Warfare only necessary for a smaller part of the armed forces, special forces capabilities, requirement for tactical adaptability, ability to take risks, need for psychological operations, need for manoeuvre and surprise, collective and distributed operations, sustainability, task force capability for both collective as well as distributed operations. Comment; the results are summarized as mostly traditional military Regular Warfare dominant views.

- *Conceptual aspects* (13 standpoints); tactical concepts for permanent operations among the people, concepts for distributed operations, concepts that prevent camp behaviour, concepts for indirect effects, concepts that permit ranger operations, concepts for military-civilian cooperation.

Concepts of offensive, defensive and stabilization approaches, area responsibility for smaller units, concepts for combined arms and special functions, particular care during planning, conceptual basis in battalion structure, concepts with platoon task forces/groups that work with host nation security forces. Comment; the results are summarized as mostly modern/contemporary Irregular Warfare dominant views.

- *Intelligence* aspects (14 standpoints); a focus in general on the importance of intelligence in Irregular Warfare. One standpoint addressed the capability of clandestine intelligence. Comment; the results are summarized as mostly modern/contemporary Irregular Warfare dominant views.

- *Military-civilian relationship* (10 standpoints); a central aspect in tactics in Irregular Warfare, a balance regarding focus of "the people" and "the enemy". The most important aspect, a need for winning the confidence from the people, "a part of the tactics is to build a relation to the people, economical recourses, enhanced living standards should be the winning concept, but this should be effected by civilian actors, protected by the military function if so necessary." *If the people have a good living standard, the motivation for combat and war fighting shrinks drastically*" according to one officer's view. Another view was expressed as a need for civilian social advisers (social reconstruction) together with the military units.

- *Education and Training related aspects* (10 standpoints); need for enhanced understanding of the operational concept, need for training that provides greater self confidence in combat capability, training needs across the whole armed forces regarding Irregular Warfare in general, need for education in military history experiences, need for training of platoon leaders in combined arms and task force created units, more needs for command training in general (particularly on company command level), better exercises.

- *Mind-set* (7 standpoints); in general a need for another mind-set compared to Regular Warfare, more "grey areas", everything is not either black or white, need for an offensive mind-set with tempo adaption, need for a generic mind-set that handles the time-terrain-troops, an enhanced need for general interest in the area of tactics. Need for patience, leadership and discipline.

- *Other aspects* (5 standpoints); The vital importance of Information Operations, the importance of the linkage between tactics and strategy, the most common type of conflicts the coming ten years, last major operation for the Swedish Armed Forces – Kosovo – was bad as it drew the focus away from combat capability. Finally, aspects such as "a complex and difficult task" were stated.

Result summary, the question resulted in three major groups of aspects; Capability aspects (18), Conceptual aspects (13) and Intelligence (14) as major focus areas. Moreover, the following aspects were highlighted, but only from a few officers and to a minor extent; Military and civilian relations (10), Education and training (10), Mind-set (7) and a group of Other aspects (5). The three major groups (Capability and Conceptual and Intelligence aspects) mostly covered aspects commonly related to contemporary COIN operations; still some answers addressed a more Regular Warfare mind-set.

Few officers refer to commonly COIN addressed vital areas such as military-civilian relations, education/training, mind-set and meta-aspects on a higher level. The result points to a general way of articulating tactics usually from a principle of a warfare related perspective. The actual content is fragmented regarding actual aspects without prioritization, still, in all with a certain connection to contemporary IW/COIN thinking.

Question 9; What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you think of mostly in tactics in Irregular Warfare; physical, conceptual or moral aspects?

32 of 43 possible responses were obtained, and mainly clustered in two larger and one minor group. Eleven answers focused on the moral aspects of tactics in Irregular Warfare. Eight answers emphasized the conceptual aspects as most important. Five answers viewed the moral and conceptual aspects as equal, or more important than physical aspects. Three answers viewed the three aspects equally important, two answers viewed combinations of physical-conceptual or physical-moral as most important. One officer stated, somewhat surprisingly, that he had no opinion in this question.

Result summary: the question resulted in answers mainly clustered in two larger and one minor group; *Moral aspects* (11), *Conceptual aspects* (8), and *Moral and Conceptual aspects* (5). A few officers mentioned other combinations. All together, a distribution of views emphasizing the moral factors, closely followed by the conceptual aspects to be in focus. Clearly, something expressed that was not articulated with emphasis were the physical factors.

Question 12. Do you consider there is a need for development of tactics for Irregular Warfare in the Armed Forces?

32 of 43 possible responses were obtained. These consisted of a major group of twenty-seven answers. This group, responding "yes", consisted of comments such as; *"yes, but mainly concerning mental flexibility," "yes, but changing all the time," "yes, evidence of own knowledge gaps," "yes, but the need is our own, not only to take the U.S. / NATO – concept", "yes, but not a specific Swedish style," "yes, for example, development of the ranger concept," "yes, methodology, scenarios," "yes, not handled at all today in my company," "yes, but more importantly that we develop a strategy for the defence of our country"*. Two officers gave answers "yes and no" with the following comments: *"too conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same time important not to go too far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that needs to be developed, not developing systems," focus on Regular Warfare tactics but also be able to handle Irregular Warfare "*. Three officers entered "no" with the following comments: *"conventional capability first," "we have the tactics, it's the composition and ways of thinking that need to be developed," "no, develop an understanding of what to do in order to win the war."*

Result summary; the question resulted in responses consisting of a major group of twenty-seven answers responding “yes”. Two officers answered "yes and no" with the following comments; *"too conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same time important not to go too far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that needs to be developed, not developing systems," focus on Regular Warfare tactics but also be able to handle Irregular Warfare "*.

Three officers stated "no" with the following comments; *"conventional capability first," "we have the tactics, it's the composition and ways of thinking that needs to be developed," "no, develop an understanding of what to do in order to win the war."* The result indicates quite a common view that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is thought of to be needed and important.

Question 10. Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the Armed Forces?

The answers (30 of 43 possible) were distributed over one major group with nineteen answers not viewing tactics in Irregular Warfare to be a prioritized subject. One officer implied that it had a certain priority but is now declining. A smaller group of six officers felt that the area could partly be said to be in priority, e.g. the Afghanistan training. Four officers perceive that the area is of priority. One officer responded that Regular Warfare is the most important.

Result summary, the question resulted in a view of low priority for tactics in Irregular Warfare. Overall, this result does not give an indication that the area would be considered to have a high priority within the Swedish Armed Forces.

Question 26. What would you otherwise like to add concerning tactics in Irregular Warfare?

41 of 43 possible responses were collected.

Result Summary; the answers resulted in 14 responses where two groups dominate. These two are related to the areas of "Tactics in general" (11 standpoints) and "Education / Training" (9 standpoints). The other areas were;

- *Capabilities* (1)
- *Politics / strategy* (3)
- *Violence areas* (1)
- *Organization / division* (3)
- *Personal skills* (3)
- *Unit activities* (2)
- *Management / leadership* (4)
- *Civil interaction* (1)
- *Experiences* (1)
- *Other comments* (3)

In the area of "Tactics in general" the following was addressed;

- Important to have a Swedish approach and not solely rely on foreign doctrines, and from a Swedish thought take the tactical discussions.
- Important to remember tactics at different levels and understand the need for different types of units that can be combined into composite forces. Tactics cannot be one-dimensional time-space-force thinking.
- Important with knowledge on unit capabilities to create composite task groups (also at low-levels) and to lead them. New capability needs are for example UAVs, IEDD and dogs.
- Tactics discussions will increase in line with the transformation stabilizing. However, a rough road lies ahead especially for a brand new unit concept such as at P7.
- Some units are often excluded in discussions on IW, such as tank units. Removes creative thinking. For example tanks with barricade-fences, which definitely make people move away.
- Extensive need for breadth of possible resources, from conversation skills with villagers to battalion attacks with indirect fire and air support
- Tactics are controlled by the financial framework
- Every conflict and every mandate has its frames. We have mostly been on the defensive side, but in these operations an offensive approach is needed.
- Tactics are given little space (not even prior to the operations)
- Danger of excessively equating IW/COIN with Afghanistan
- Initiatives are important, requires on-going analysis, planning and action.
- How to measure success.

In the area of "Education / training", the following was addressed;

- We need to educate younger colleagues at the schools better; insight that sometimes it is not black or white but there are grey areas. Everything has its time.
- The second lieutenants are very dynamic, specialist officers are more stereotypical. Difficulties when all platoon leaders have exactly the same tactical thinking.
- Increased requirement for training platoon leaders in complex tasks. Not existing today.
- Must know the basics first. Warning for quick tactics and fighting style adaption. The regulations apply. Skills to shoot at long ranges come first.
- Once the Major Course and the Basic Officer Course read the same military theory, it will result in completely different tactical thinking as personal experiences and perspectives are completely different.
- More command training for complex situations and composite units. Today, it is a short time at the regiment Livgardet and tomorrow, the need remains if smaller units are to be deployed abroad.
- Field manuals, doctrines, books are one thing - what matters is how they are practised. It is practised well at Livgardet training section for international missions up to company level.
- Important to have good trainers, it is not enough with a good theory. National training teams for certain things might be needed.
- More emphasis on training of the units, not just officer training.

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- The link between culture and religion is needed to be more emphasized in officer education. It is important in Irregular Warfare.

Result summary; the answers resulted in 14 response groups where two dominate. These two are related to the areas of "*Tactics in general*" (11 standpoints) and "*Education / training*" (9 standpoints). Several other areas were addressed, all however, to a limited extent. These areas were *Capabilities* (1), *Politics / strategy* (3), *Violence areas* (1), *Organization / division* (3), *Personnel skills* (3), *Unit activities* (2), *Management / leadership* (4), *Civil interaction* (1), *Experiences* (1) *Other comments* (3).

In general, regarding the area of tactics, a deeper and more analysed and reflected view and discussion, from the unique Swedish perspective was addressed as being needed. In the area of "*Education / training*", development efforts were addressed for all levels, particularly highlighting the importance of extensive practice based on deep analysis of lessons learned and experienced trainers.

Summary of the answers to the open-ended question

Question 6; "*What does the concept of tactics mean to you?*" resulted in two major areas of thinking. The first and dominant group (20 answers) describes a view of tactics that can be generalized as; "*the use (or manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or adaption) of units or resources to reach a specific goal*". In this category several different articulations can be found. The other group (15 answers) contains aspects not directly related to the overarching description such as; "*use of units for a certain goal*", but as a way of thinking in general. These two views can be summarized with; "*to use practically*" and; "*to think about how to use*" (units) or generalized as one practical and one theoretical view.

Regarding question 7; *views of one's own thinking on the subject of tactics*, three categories can be generalized. Twenty-four officers, who are about half the total sample, state a rather traditional way of thinking, mainly influenced by Regular Warfare thinking. The two other categories can be described as containing a more generic and wider analytical approach, as a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective. Generalized it can be said that a more direct Regular Warfare perspective is common, whether as a wider generic approach or a more direct Irregular Warfare approach.

Question 13; "*Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers?*" resulted in 38 replies (of 43 possible) distributed mainly over two larger groups of 15 statements each. The "Yes group" contained one mechanized battalion commanding officer and one amphibious rifle company commanding officer, saying they often discussed tactics with subordinates, but not with their senior commanders.

This group also included one armoured company commanding officer and one amphibious battalion commanding officer; contradictably saying that they discussed tactics mainly with the senior commanders. The "No group" contained 15 statements of which two said that they discussed tactics during international missions.

Six officers argued that they intermittently talked a lot about tactics. One officer said he discussed tactics to the amount of 3 weeks during a year, and one officer said that there is an increased amount of tactics discussions. Four of the battalion commanders stated that they often discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders claimed they did not discuss tactics often. Replies from two battalion commanders are missing. The result indicates that discussing tactics is not a strong tradition generally for these land forces commanding officers.

Question 15; "*What has influenced you to think about tactics?*" resulted in 38 of 43 possible replies divided in five response categories; Education / school activities (9), Personal experiences (11), Literature / Games (9/2), Personal Influences (senior officers, colleagues) (7), Exercise Activity (10), Combinations of the influences (11).

Aspects of the officers' personal experiences, influences and exercise activities connect to primarily more practical experiences. These three aspects together emphasized by twenty-eight officers, dominate the above aspects; Education / school activities, Literature / Games and Combinations of influences. Clearly addressed educational influences are only stated by nine officers as dominant.

Question 14; Regarding views on interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art resulted in answers from 31 officers. The area of tactics dominated with 19 responses, whereas the interest for tactics and operational art was equal, receiving four responses. Few responses were interested in all the three aspects and in strategy alone.

Question 11; *Regarding thinking about aspects affecting the development of tactics and tactical thinking.* The question resulted in responses divided into a large number of different positions. Two areas; experiences and influences from past wars received most replies (8 each). Schooling / training received five responses; Exercises / training received four replies.

Question 8; *Regarding ways of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare* resulted in responses of two larger and four smaller groups as follows;

- 1) *Other demands on planning and coordination/command and functions* (13 answers).
- 2) *A need for knowledge of more and new functions; e.g. Intelligence, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare* (11 answers).
- 3) *Regular Warfare capability as a fundament* (6 answers).
- 4) *Commanders' skills and leadership* (5 answers)
- 5) *Execution of COIN tactics* (5 answers).
- 6) *A need for a different understanding and mind-set* (4 answers).

The result shows dominance in thinking as the first two areas together deal with new or other demands in command and functional thinking. A minor number of officers articulated a way of thinking that emphasizes Regular Warfare capabilities as a fundament. Also, a limited number of officers specifically highlighted commanders' skills and leadership abilities, COIN tactics execution and a need for a new mind-set.

Question 4.12; *Personal view of IW?*; resulted in three major groups of response aspects; Capability aspects (18), Conceptual aspects (13) and Intelligence (14) as major focus areas. Moreover, the following aspects were highlighted, but from few officers and to a minor extent; Military and civilian relations (10), Education and training (10), Mind-set (7) and a group of Other aspects (5). The three major groups; Capability and Conceptual and Intelligence aspects, can be viewed as all concerning conceptual thinking about needs. Mostly, the articulations correspond to general COIN norms currently found in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed a more Regular Warfare mind-set. A rather limited number of the sample referred to commonly COIN addressed vital areas, such as military-civilian relations, education/training, and mind-set compared to needs in Regular Warfare. The actual content is fragmented regarding real aspects, however, all in all, with a certain connection to contemporary IW/COIN thinking.

Question 9; *Regarding aspects of war fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and moral factors)*, resulted in responses mainly clustered in two larger and one minor group. *Moral aspects* (11), *Conceptual aspects* (8), *Moral and Conceptual* (5). Some officers stated other combinations. All together, a distribution of views emphasizing the moral factors, closely followed by the conceptual aspects to be in focus.

Question 12; *Do you consider there is a need for development of tactics for Irregular Warfare in the Armed Forces*, resulted in responses consisting of a major group of twenty-seven answers responding "yes". Two officers gave answers "yes and no" with the following comments; "too conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same time important not to go too far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that needs to be developed, not developing systems," *focus on Regular Warfare tactics but also be able to handle Irregular Warfare* ". Three officers entered "no" with the following comments; "conventional capability first," "we have the tactics, it's the composition and ways of thinking that need to be developed," "no, develop an understanding of what to do in order to win the war." The result indicates quite a common view that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is thought of to be needed and important.

Question 10; *Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the Swedish Armed Forces*, resulted in a view of low priority for tactics in Irregular Warfare.

Result summary of the two frame questions

The summarized results regarding thought on a) *tactics in general* and b) *tactics in Irregular Warfare* are presented below.

The first question; *How can the officer's general reflections on tactics be characterized?* is answered with the following summary. The meaning in general of tactics can be described as a two-fold one. One group (almost half of the sample) views tactics generally as; "the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal". The second group (15 responses) described aspects more related to ways of thinking in general. Reflective views on principal influences for thinking can be described in three different ways; a Regular Warfare tradition that dominates (for over half of the sample), a more generic and wider analytical approach, and finally, a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics focus.

Influences on tactical thinking can be said to connect to five areas; combinations of influences, education and school activities, literature and gaming, personal experiences and personal influences, such as from senior officers and colleagues, and exercise activities. The three last categories, all connect to direct or indirect practice. Compared to the areas of strategy and operational art, the interest for tactics is prominent. Still, communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed tradition. Finally, views are scattered concerning influences on tactics and the development of tactical thinking. The most common aspects concerned experiences and influences from past wars, still only eight replies each. Areas such as education and exercises were only mentioned by four and five officers respectively.

The second question; *how can the officer's general reflections of tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized?* is answered as follows; personal views in general of tactics in Irregular Warfare were expressed mostly regarding conceptual aspects, including capability and functional aspects, for example, Intelligence. Broader aspects such as military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set were however, more limitedly highlighted. Many of the articulations corresponded to general COIN standards in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed a more traditional mind-set emphasizing Regular Warfare capabilities. Dominance in thinking can however be related to a view of new or other demands in command & control and functional thinking, for example, Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Electronic Warfare. As for war-fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and moral factors), moral and conceptual factors were the most common mentioned. Thinking of physical factors was not a highlighted area. The whole area of tactics in Irregular Warfare is mainly thought of as having a low priority in the Swedish Armed Forces, still, a rather common view does exist that development of such tactics is needed and important.

Appendix 4. Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities

This appendix presents the 15 chosen questions and corresponding 41 answer alternatives (m = modalities). Only modalities of a minimum of 5 responses are included.

<p>3.6 People – Enemy-centric focus</p> <p>m1 - EC 16</p> <p>m2 - P/EC 18</p> <p>m3 - PC 9</p> <p>3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus</p> <p>m1 - L/S Units 14</p> <p>m2 - L Units 16</p> <p>m3 - S Units 13</p> <p>3.8 Combat - Intelligence/Recce focus</p> <p>m1 - Combat 19</p> <p>m2 - Combat/Recce 5</p> <p>m4 - Recce 17</p> <p>3.9 National Defence - International Mission focus</p> <p>m2 - Nat/Int focus 9</p> <p>m3 - Nat focus 29</p> <p>3.11 Command/Developing larger - smaller unit structures</p> <p>m1 - Dev l/s units 9</p> <p>m2 - Dev larger units 23</p> <p>m3 - Dev smaller units 10</p> <p>3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus</p> <p>m1 - Front/Staff officer 8</p> <p>m2 - Front officer 31</p> <p>4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW</p> <p>m1 - Comb high threats 9</p> <p>m2 - Comb low threats 6</p> <p>m4 - Guerrilla Warfare 21</p>	<p>4.2 Collective ops - Distributed ops in IW focus</p> <p>m1 - C/D ops 7</p> <p>m2 - Coll ops 15</p> <p>m3 - Distrib ops 18</p> <p>4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities</p> <p>m3 - R/IW 12</p> <p>m4 - RW 28</p> <p>4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom</p> <p>m1 - Think equal 6</p> <p>m2 - Think often 19</p> <p>m3 - Think seldom 18</p> <p>4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a combination</p> <p>m2 - Practice 12</p> <p>m4 - Theory/Practice 28</p> <p>4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW</p> <p>m1 - Low vis act 8</p> <p>m3 - Overt/Low vis 22</p> <p>m4 - Overt act 12</p> <p>4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW</p> <p>m2 - Technology 7</p> <p>m3 - Troop/Tech 11</p> <p>m4 - Troops 23</p> <p>4.10 Military tasks or Civilian task priority in COIN</p> <p>m1 - Civ task 7</p> <p>m2 - Mil/Civ task 10</p> <p>m3 - Mil task 25</p> <p>4.11 Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in IW</p> <p>m1 - Kin/Non-kin eff 24</p> <p>m2 - Kin effects 10</p> <p>m4 - Non-kin eff 8</p>
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Figure 38. Appendix 4. Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities.

Appendix 5. Table 2. Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 modalities

This appendix presents the Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 modalities (or active categories).

Control panel of Eigenvalues						
Trace of matrix: 1.78450						
Number	Eigenvalue	Percentage	Cumulated Percentage	Spec modified values	Specific modified Rates	Cumulated Modified Rates
1	0,2147	12,03	12,03	0,02894	0,330782	0,330782
2	0,1786	10,01	22,04	0,017952	0,205192	0,535974
3	0,1646	9,22	31,26	0,014386	0,164428	0,700402
4	0,1386	7,77	39,03	0,00884	0,101041	0,801443
5	0,1166	6,53	45,56	0,00518	0,059212	0,860655
6	0,1044	5,85	51,42	0,003575	0,040861	0,901516
7	0,0973	5,46	56,87	0,002781	0,031788	0,933304
8	0,0907	5,08	61,95	0,00212	0,024237	0,957541
9	0,0834	4,67	66,62	0,001504	0,017188	0,974729
10	0,0761	4,27	70,89	0,000994	0,011367	0,986096
11	0,0729	4,08	74,97	0,000798	0,009116	0,995211
12	0,0622	3,49	78,46	0,000311	0,003552	0,998764
13	0,0523	2,93	81,39	5,93E-05	0,000677	0,999441
14	0,0506	2,84	84,23	3,61E-05	0,000412	0,999853
15	0,0469	2,63	86,86	5,16E-06	5,9E-05	0,999912
16	0,0418	2,34	89,20	7,71E-06	8,81E-05	1
17	0,0301	1,69	90,89			
18	0,0284	1,59	92,48	0,08749		
19	0,0265	1,49	93,97			
20	0,0236	1,32	95,29			
21	0,0168	0,94	96,23			
22	0,0160	0,89	97,13			
23	0,0114	0,64	97,77			
24	0,0085	0,48	98,24			
25	0,0076	0,43	98,67			
26	0,0065	0,36	99,03			
27	0,0050	0,28	99,31			
28	0,0046	0,26	99,57			
29	0,0027	0,15	99,72			
30	0,0018	0,10	99,82			
31	0,0011	0,06	99,88			
32	0,0009	0,05	99,93			
33	0,0006	0,03	99,96			
34	0,0003	0,02	99,98			
35	0,0002	0,01	99,99			
36	0,0001	0,01	100,00			
37	0,0000	0,00	100,00			
38	0,0000	0,00	100,00			
39	0,0000	0,00	100,00			
40	0,0000	0,00	100,00			
41	0,0000	0,00	100,00			

Figure 39. Appendix 5. Table 2. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities.

Appendix 6. Table 3. Coordinates of active categories/modalities on axis 1-2

Label	Relative Weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4
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3.6 People - Enemy centric

EC	2,481	1,68750	-0,51	-0,48	-0,38	-0,08
P/EC	2,791	1,38889	0,10	-0,03	0,18	0,34
PC	1,395	3,77778	0,70	0,90	0,32	-0,55

3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus; Off focus on larger units

L/S Units	2,171	2,07143	-0,75	0,19	0,17	0,68
L Units	2,481	1,68750	1,04	-0,38	-0,17	0,18
S Units	2,016	2,30769	-0,47	0,26	0,03	-0,95

3.8 Combat - Intel/Recce focus

Combat	2,946	1,26316	0,76	-0,26	0,02	0,05
Combat/Recce	0,775	7,60000	-1,01	-0,25	-1,22	-0,07
Recce	2,636	1,52941	-0,47	0,30	0,39	-0,02

3.9 National Defence - International Mission focus

Nat/Int focus	1,395	3,77778	-0,63	0,00	0,63	-1,22
National focus	4,496	0,48276	0,21	0,03	-0,09	0,40

3.11 Command/Dev larger - smaller unit structures

Dev l/s units	1,395	3,77778	-0,38	-0,71	0,41	-0,43
Dev larger units	3,566	0,86957	0,50	-0,06	-0,14	0,16
Dev smaller units	1,550	3,30000	-0,75	0,76	-0,04	0,09

3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus

Front/Staff officer	1,240	4,37500	-0,72	-0,82	0,24	0,13
Front officer	4,806	0,38710	0,24	0,21	-0,11	0,04

4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW

Comb high threats	1,395	3,77778	0,41	0,09	0,43	-0,77
Comb low threats	0,930	6,16667	-0,56	-1,34	0,77	-0,06
Guerrilla Warfare	3,256	1,04762	-0,15	0,20	-0,38	0,14

4.2 Collective ops - Distributed ops in IW focus

C/D ops	1,085	5,14286	-0,23	0,58	-1,22	-0,26
Coll ops	2,326	1,86667	1,09	-0,04	0,25	-0,25
Distributed ops	2,791	1,38889	-0,76	-0,16	0,21	-0,77

4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities

R/IW	1,860	2,58333	0,17	-0,39	-0,38	-0,90
RW	4,341	0,53571	-0,03	0,14	0,14	0,45

4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom

Think equal	0,930	6,16667	-0,50	-1,19	1,35	-0,17
Think often	2,946	1,26316	0,06	0,27	-0,15	0,30
Think seldom	2,791	1,38889	0,10	0,11	-0,29	-0,26

4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a combination

Practice	1,860	2,58333	-0,13	-0,08	-0,51	0,28
Theory/Practice	4,341	0,53571	0,07	0,09	0,17	-0,10

4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW

Low vis act	1,240	4,37500	-0,22	1,30	0,04	-0,56
Overt/Low vis	3,411	0,95455	0,19	-0,42	-0,36	0,25
Overt act	1,860	2,58333	-0,34	-0,04	0,63	-0,07

4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW

Technology	1,085	5,14286	-0,34	-0,04	-1,51	-0,03
Troop/Tech	1,705	2,90909	0,90	-0,78	0,52	0,10
Troops	3,566	0,86957	-0,27	0,37	0,22	-0,06

4. Military task or Military and Civilian task priority in COIN

Civ task	1,085	5,14286	-0,63	-0,47	-0,72	0,32
Mil/Civ task	1,550	3,30000	0,30	-0,75	-0,43	-0,35
Mil task	3,876	0,72000	0,08	0,43	0,38	0,08

4.11 Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in IW

Kin/Non-kin eff	3,721	0,79167	0,03	-0,16	-0,39	-0,40
Kin effects	1,550	3,30000	0,47	0,95	0,60	0,63
Non-kin eff	1,240	4,37500	-0,60	-0,72	0,43	0,49

Appendix 7. Table 4. Contribution of active categories/modalities on axis 1-4

This appendix presents the contribution of the answer alternatives/modalities/active categories for axis 1-4. Contribution mean value is 100/41 (the total number of answer alternatives included for the analysis) = 2,439 (2,44). Modalities with contribution of minimum, 2,44 are marked grey in the table.

Contributions of active categories
Mean value; 2,439024 (100/ 41 categories)

Label	Relative Weight (%)	Squared distance to origin	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4
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3.6 People - Enemy centric focus

EC	2,481	1,68750	2,99	3,20	2,17	0,10
P/EC	2,791	1,38889	0,13	0,01	0,54	2,33
PC	1,395	3,77778	3,22	6,37	0,86	3,00
TOTAL	6,667		6,34	9,58	3,57	5,43

3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus

L/S Units	2,171	2,07143	5,76	0,45	0,37	7,17
L Units	2,481	1,68750	12,60	2,03	0,46	0,59
S Units	2,016	2,30769	2,09	0,78	0,01	13,20
TOTAL	6,667		20,45	3,27	0,85	20,97

3.8 Combat - Intelligence/Recce focus;

Combat	2,946	1,26316	7,86	1,10	0,01	0,05
Combat/Recce	0,775	7,60000	3,71	0,26	6,99	0,02
Recce	2,636	1,52941	2,69	1,34	2,38	0,01
TOTAL	6,357		14,26	2,71	9,38	0,09

3.9 National Defence or International Mission focus

Nat/Int focus	1,395	3,77778	2,54	0,00	3,34	14,90
Nat focus	4,496	0,48276	0,96	0,03	0,22	5,28
TOTAL	5,891		3,50	0,03	3,56	20,17

3.11 Command/Development of larger or smaller unit structures

Dev l/s units	1,395	3,77778	0,95	3,91	1,41	1,89
Dev larger units	3,566	0,86957	4,17	0,07	0,42	0,65
Dev smaller units	1,550	3,30000	4,10	4,97	0,02	0,09
TOTAL	6,512		9,22	8,95	1,84	2,63

3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus

Front/Staff officer	1,240	4,37500	3,01	4,63	0,45	0,15
Front officer	4,806	0,38710	1,34	1,19	0,37	0,05
TOTAL	6,047		4,35	5,83	0,82	0,20

4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW

Comb high threats	1,395	3,77778	1,11	0,07	1,60	5,91
Comb low threats	0,930	6,16667	1,38	9,34	3,36	0,02
Guerrilla Warfare	3,256	1,04762	0,36	0,72	2,86	0,46
TOTAL	5,581		2,85	10,12	7,82	6,39

4.2 Collective operations - Distributed operations in IW focus

C/D ops	1,085	5,14286	0,28	2,04	9,78	0,53
Coll ops	2,326	1,86667	12,80	0,02	0,89	1,01
Distrib ops	2,791	1,38889	7,60	0,40	0,78	2,58
TOTAL	6,202		20,68	2,46	11,45	4,12

4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities

R/IW	1,860	2,58333	0,26	1,60	1,65	10,86
RW	4,341	0,53571	0,02	0,48	0,49	6,46
TOTAL	6,202		0,28	2,08	2,13	17,31

4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom

Think equal	0,930	6,16667	1,08	7,39	10,29	0,19
Think often	2,946	1,26316	0,06	1,22	0,39	1,90
Think seldom	2,791	1,38889	0,13	0,19	1,46	1,36
TOTAL	6,667		1,26	8,80	12,14	3,45

4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a combination

Practice	1,860	2,58333	0,15	0,07	2,89	1,04
Theory/Practice	4,341	0,53571	0,11	0,18	0,77	0,29
TOTAL	6,202		0,26	0,25	3,66	1,33

4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW

Low vis act	1,240	4,37500	0,28	11,77	0,01	2,79
Overt/Low vis	3,411	0,95455	0,60	3,35	2,64	1,54
Overt act	1,860	2,58333	1,00	0,02	4,48	0,07
TOTAL	6,512		1,88	15,14	7,12	4,40

4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW

Technology	1,085	5,14286	0,58	0,01	15,11	0,01
Troop/Technology	1,705	2,90909	6,50	5,81	2,75	0,13
Troops	3,566	0,86957	1,21	2,79	1,01	0,08
TOTAL	6,357		8,29	8,61	18,87	0,22

4.10 Military task or Military and Civilian task priority in COIN

Civ task	1,085	5,14286	1,98	1,35	3,38	0,82
Mil/Civ task	1,550	3,30000	0,64	4,94	1,74	1,41
Mil task	3,876	0,72000	0,11	3,95	3,32	0,17
TOTAL	6,512		2,73	10,25	8,44	2,39

4.11 Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in IW

Kin/Non-kin eff	3,721	0,79167	0,01	0,56	3,49	4,28
Kin effects	1,550	3,30000	1,57	7,82	3,42	4,42
Non-kin eff	1,240	4,37500	2,06	3,58	1,42	2,19
TOTAL	6,512		3,65	11,95	8,34	10,88
Numbers of active categories (modalities/ answer alternative) for axis 1-4			15	15	16	12

Comment. Modality Smaller Units 3.6, is below mean value but assessed interesting to include in the analysis as such thinking clearly can be connected to IW/HW tactical thinking in general, as with traditional ranger tactics thinking in Regular Warfare.

Appendix 8. Results from a tactical COIN doctrine study

The following appendix presents results from a study delivered to the Swedish Ground Forces Combat School in 2011. A study of several questions was decided in June 2011. The study was done with the same textual analysis approach as for the literature study. The study was labelled “*Tactics in COIN – On the Western front, Different news*”. Results from four, of the total ten questions are presented in the following.

Question 2; *What characterizes the descriptions of how to analyse and understand the Insurgency movements?*

Summary answer Canada⁵⁴⁹; descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency movements occur frequently through the doctrine down to company levels with characteristics described.⁵⁵⁰ It is argued to be important to understand the causes and characteristics of the specific and general in a given situation and culture.⁵⁵¹ The vital importance of the intelligence function and requirements for development and adaption is underlined.⁵⁵² Six different forms of insurgency are defined to support analysis and understanding.⁵⁵³ The people (in the area, as in the home country) are viewed as the strategic centre of gravity.⁵⁵⁴ The concept of centre of gravity is used (according to the NATO view) and described in several places.⁵⁵⁵ These centres of gravity are said to be complex at lower levels.⁵⁵⁶ The descriptions do not include references to systems thinking.

Summary answer Britain⁵⁵⁷; the section "Fundamentals" highlights the importance of intelligence⁵⁵⁸. Intelligence is said to depend as much on the tactical level pattern of life in each area of operation as it does on the top-down feed of intelligence from operational and strategic levels.⁵⁵⁹ Also, it is emphasized that the intelligence, including analysis, must be integrated at every level of management, as well as across and between "agencies engaged in Counterinsurgency".⁵⁶⁰ A variety of characters of insurgencies are described that challenges the search for root causes.⁵⁶¹ The start for the Insurgency is viewed vital in order to correctly identify the nature of the problem that exists.⁵⁶²

⁵⁴⁹ National Defence Headquarters, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, Ontario, December 2008.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid. Chapter 2.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid. p. 45.

⁵⁵² Ibid. section 306, p. 73.

⁵⁵³ Ibid. p. 50.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 48.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 107. section 5-11, pp. 107-108. and 115.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid. pp. 89. and 125.

⁵⁵⁷ UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms Operations, *Countering Insurgency*, October 2009.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid. Chapter 1. Fundamentals.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-10.

⁵⁶² Ibid. Chapter 2. section 2-1.

This leads to a need to adapt the intelligence function. Different models for focused analysis are mentioned to facilitate the categorization of Insurgency, such as Dr. John MacKinlay's model with five different types of insurgencies.⁵⁶³ Understanding of "the Human Terrain" is emphasized as a basis for understanding the uprisings⁵⁶⁴. A detailed description on integrating intelligence with the work in general emphasizes the importance of the tactical level, time, training and continuity.⁵⁶⁵ The importance of intelligence and having such a capability at the tactical level as the instrument for the analysis is clear. References to systems thinking are not included.

The concept of centre of gravity (COG) is described as more complex (compared to in Regular Warfare), but important to use.⁵⁶⁶ As an example of an "*Operational COG*", "*Population optimism about their future*"⁵⁶⁷ is mentioned. The description of how insurgents must be understood is characterized by emphasis on adaption of the intelligence function and work needed to be integrated throughout the whole staff work structure, and this will be built up over time. Accurate descriptions of how and why this is required are included. The Intelligence and Security functions and work are emphasized as an integral part of the entire planning and implementation process, as well as important for education of officers in general. HUMINT specifically is mentioned, as well as analysis and research.⁵⁶⁸ The intelligence function is placed at the top of the summary of experience⁵⁶⁹ to develop. Intelligence, the intelligence staff, ISTAR and problem areas have 14 pages devoted to them.⁵⁷⁰ Understanding of "the Human Terrain" is emphasized as crucial; only understanding the enemy is not viewed sufficiently.⁵⁷¹

Summary answer U.S.⁵⁷²; descriptions of insurgencies to be analysed and understood are frequent, down to the company level.⁵⁷³ Effective analysis is viewed to require knowledge of the Insurgency strategically, its operational and tactical objectives, which can be both physical and non-physical.⁵⁷⁴ Descriptions are characterized by pervasive system thinking. Descriptions of centre of gravity (COG) do not occur (the dictionary indicates COG as a joint description). The COIN environment is said to consist of a "system of systems" (inter-connected systems).⁵⁷⁵ A clear structure and concept for the analysis is described. Eight *operational variables* are used (the so-called PMESII-PT; the political, military, environment, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time aspects).

⁵⁶³ UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms Operations, *Countering Insurgency* (2009), Annex A to Chapter 2.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-12 – 16.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-33 – 37.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid. Chapter 7. section 7-8 Planning Concept.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid. Chapter 7. figure 7-2.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-37 and 3-44.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid. Chapter 4. section 4-51.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1 – 42.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1.

⁵⁷² U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2, April 2009.

⁵⁷³ Ibid. Chapter 2.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 45.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 251.

There are *mission variables* described where particularly "Civil considerations" are stressed.⁵⁷⁶ An analysis method; "ASCOPE" is introduced and described.⁵⁷⁷ Several analysis methods for different levels are described, often in table and matrix forms. Detailed examples of patterns and linkage analysis at a low-level are provided, as are examples of completed matrixes and tables. A conceptual idea is presented of how the Insurgency should be analysed on the basis of five groups of categories of persons in the uprising, eight dynamic categories that characterize the actual Insurgency, and six Insurgency strategies.⁵⁷⁸ The idea for the systematization of the analysis is described.⁵⁷⁹ The conditions to carry out such an analysis are described at the company level, using the so-called "*Company operational team or Company Intelligence Team*".⁵⁸⁰

Summary answer France⁵⁸¹: A brief and general description of less than one page describes the now common and assumed important aspects of human-, signal- and open sources intelligence, as well as troop reconnaissance.⁵⁸² It is stated that in order to understand Insurgency, a systemic analysis of multiple factors of the opposing party's intentions is required. The requirements for analysis of capabilities is described, however, no problem discussion is included. The insurgent's centre of gravity is exemplified by popular support, logistical network for arms and ammunition, as well as a need for sanctuaries. The description is superficial, but may be presumed to be seen as complementary to the corresponding description (more detailed) in the doctrine FT - 02.⁵⁸³

Summary answer Sweden⁵⁸⁴: The Field manual covers tactics in general at battalion level and is not solely aimed at Irregular Warfare and COIN. However, the introductory part addresses the dominant civil dimension, the supporting role for the military function, and the different Irregular actors.⁵⁸⁵ Insurgency movements in the section are described as "the aggressor", whereas irregular actors are outlined generically regarding organizational structures and aims.⁵⁸⁶ Specific requirements regarding analysis needs are described in different places but to a limited and shallow extent.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁷⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24.2, April 2009, section 1-30.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 20.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 39, section 2-1.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid. subsection A-7.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 83.

⁵⁸¹ Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level*, Army Manual, Centre De Doctrine d'Emploi Des Forces, Paris, April 2010.

⁵⁸² Ibid. p. 16.

⁵⁸³ Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, *General Tactics*, FT 02, Centre De Doctrine d'Emploi Des Forces, Paris, June 2010.

⁵⁸⁴ *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)* [Field Manual for Land Forces Manoeuvre Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010).

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid. pp. 18, 27-33.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. pp. 30-32.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 42. and p. 148. describing the need for longer periods of extensive intelligence work, however not emphasizing the need for more analysis efforts, also at lower level units such as battalion and company.

No discussion of the centre of gravity and systems thinking exists; however, the dominant role of the civilian dimension is stated.⁵⁸⁸

Summary answers question 2.

Descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency movements vary in the doctrines, all of which denounce the importance of the Intelligence function, not least at a tactical level. The U.S. view is significantly linked to systems thinking with detailed methods and models. The British and Canadian approach is not based on systems thinking or detailed models and methods; the French approach mentions systems thinking briefly, though the need for extensive analysis is shared by all. Centre of gravity (COG) thinking has a minor role in the American and French doctrines compared with British and Canadian descriptions. The British emphasis is on how to adapt the Intelligence function and organization, as opposed to the American concept which prescribes how to conduct analysis from the lowest level. The Swedish description covers discussions of analytical needs to a limited extent.

Question 3: *What characterizes the description of the insurgency to be affected?*

Summary answer Canada: Descriptions of the Insurgency movements to be affected, are characterized by the view that this is mainly done by the influence of the people and also directly against insurgents. Further, it is considered that "Influence activities" (IA) override "Physical effects".⁵⁸⁹ Coordination is done by so-called "Comprehensive operations".⁵⁹⁰ Comprehensive targeting is described.⁵⁹¹ Insurgents must be affected separately from their physical and moral forces.⁵⁹² A classic description outlines firstly, the establishment of bases and then the activities to physically and psychologically/morally neutralize insurgents.⁵⁹³ The importance of integrating local forces and civilian resources to the greatest extent possible is stressed. Comprehensive Approach and Comprehensive Operations through all command levels are described.⁵⁹⁴ Effects Thinking, EBAO and comprehensive targeting are described.

Summary answer Britain: Descriptions are characterized by the view that it is primarily the population that should be affected; secondly, the Insurgency movement is to be influenced. This will be achieved through the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop", where intelligence is the cornerstone to understanding and being able to work with "Influence Activities" (IA).⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁸⁸ *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)*(2010), pp. 30-31.

⁵⁸⁹ National Defence Headquarters, *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, Ontario, December 2008, p. 66 describes the IA and Fire/Physical (including Electronic warfare) effects.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 208, section 108.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 212 Chapter Information Operations – Influence Activities, section 808.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.* p.75, section 307.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.* section 308 and 517.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 99.

⁵⁹⁵ UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms Operations, *Countering Insurgency*, October 2009, Section 4-5 – 10.

IA are described in a separate chapter, where clear conceptual descriptions are available on organising at different levels (division, brigade, battle group).⁵⁹⁶ To influence people to neutralize the irregular players is argued as important using a combination of physical and psychological means and methods.⁵⁹⁷

Strong troop presence is claimed to be particularly important in areas where Insurgency activities are directed at influencing the population. Influences are stressed to have to be according to the law.⁵⁹⁸ Self-criticism is directed at exemplified occasions when the British army acted, or is said to have acted outside the legal framework. Influences must be planned for implementation during a long time. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency are said to be about a "war of ideas". The Clear-Hold-Build concept is seen as a basic tactical activity, which can be applied to an area under insurgent control.⁵⁹⁹ Specific staff elements (officers) need to monitor the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations, as well as coordination with civilian activities.⁶⁰⁰ A new concept for Influence Activities is described, including deception, Psychological Operations, Key Leader Engagement, Electronic Warfare, Presence, Profile and Posture, Computer Network Operations and Physical Destruction.⁶⁰¹ Influence considerations for tactical level are exemplified.⁶⁰² Targeting covering all types of influences is described in the manual but the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBAO) is not mentioned.

Summary answer U.S.; Description of how the Insurgency is to be affected can be characterized with the view that "analysis" is a primary activity. Analysis must occur at all command levels, from tactical level down to company level, and needs to have resources to do this, which are different compared to the need during Regular Warfare. The principle of Clear-Hold-Build, with various combinations of offensive, defensive and stability operations, is described as the framework.⁶⁰³ Other major tactical operations in COIN such as "Strike Operations" and "Populace and Resource Control Operations" are also described.⁶⁰⁴ Targeting is described specifically in planning descriptions and is said to have a wider role than targeting in Regular Warfare.⁶⁰⁵

Targeting is included in all seven operational lines. A distinction is outlined regarding Person and Regional Targeting, and within these a division of lethal and nonlethal and, in terms of area, combined targeting.⁶⁰⁶ Effects thinking and EBAO are not specifically mentioned. There are traditional and very detailed alignment descriptions of the performance of different types of offensive and defensive operations, as well as described stabilizing operations down to patrol activities. No examples of large-scale operations/activities are presented.

⁵⁹⁶ UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms Operations, *Countering Insurgency*, October 2009, chapter 6, annex AD.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid. section 3-9.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid. section 3-15.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid. section 6-2.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid. section 6-3.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid. section 6-5-7.

⁶⁰² Ibid. section 6-D-1-3.

⁶⁰³ U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 *Tactics in COIN* (2009), Chapter 3, section 4.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid. Section 5.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid. Chapter 4, section 4.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid. Section 4-138.

Information operations are given no detailed description throughout the document.⁶⁰⁷ The emphasis can be said to be on traditional physical offensive or defensive implementations.

Summary answer France; the struggle takes place in the context of a "global manoeuvre", where the population is in the centre against "anti-organizational forces", which indiscriminately use guerrilla tactics and terrorism.⁶⁰⁸ The aim is to neutralize organizations using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The focus is to control the operational environment.⁶⁰⁹ COIN is said to represent a "compelling" (coercive) operation.⁶¹⁰

Efforts are focused on preserving the security of physical areas, and to dismantle the opponent's organization.⁶¹¹ Military and police work in collaborative efforts is described.⁶¹² COIN must comprise operational planning to neutralize the insurgents by taking up the fight against the armed elements. The Oil-spot Strategy is described as the "Quadrillage-system" (hierarchical area organization) in secured areas and counter surveillance measures, "deterrent pressure" in the other important areas though some areas are not covered.⁶¹³ Substantial operational activities are advised amongst others to be conducted with so-called operational latitude i.e. simultaneous wide discretion at low-levels.⁶¹⁴ Effects thinking is articulated in the doctrine for general tactics and linked to the COIN doctrine, however, the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBAO) is not mentioned, neither is Targeting specifically described. There is more emphasis on how to organize forces in; *permanent sector forces*, *intervention forces*, and *supporting forces* with directions on how to utilize these forces tactically and operationally.⁶¹⁵

The descriptions which are explanatory and of an alignment character, display detailed principles for the organization of the forces and principles for implementation, and should be read together with the doctrine *General Tactics*.⁶¹⁶

⁶⁰⁷ U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 *Tactics in COIN* (2009), Chapter 5. The chapter includes mainly summarized descriptions.

⁶⁰⁸ *Doctrine For Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level* (2010), p. 9.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 10.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid. p.11.

⁶¹¹ Ibid. p. 24.

⁶¹² Ibid. p. 22.

⁶¹³ Ibid. pp 28- 29.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid. p. 28.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid. pp 50-62. Appendix A.

⁶¹⁶ *General Tactics*, FT 02, Centre De Doctrine d'Emploi Des Forces, Paris, June, 2010. This general doctrine for tactics includes; overall tasks; coercion, controlling, influencing (p. 22.), Effects thinking as a basis for the manoeuvre (p. 55.). Here a force structure of four control elements capable of combined arms to the lowest level is advocated (p. 59.). Regarding tactics, the importance of sequential activities of disruption, manoeuvres and destruction are emphasized (p. 74.). A clear compilation of activities and tasks is related to organizations (p. 76.)

Sweden Summary answer: This type of tactics is necessary for all units in order to be able to function in various conflicts.⁶¹⁷ Capabilities are needed for offensive, defensive and stabilization approaches within the principle of Manoeuvre Warfare.⁶¹⁸ Combat or stabilization methods are described, where the latter can also include offensive and defensive activities, mainly supporting the police and civil activities.⁶¹⁹ Manoeuvre Warfare with physical and psychological dimensions is supposed to be carried out by task force units with the battalion or part of it in combination with fire and movement, surprise and also non-military contributions.

Initiative, high tempo, mission command, indirect methods and joint actions are general articulated views. The descriptions include limited articulations regarding COIN tactics explicitly, instead, there is an attempt to outline generic approaches for assault and defence tactics and techniques, mainly with a Regular Warfare mind-set. The Stabilization methods part mostly includes low intensity activities such as surveillance, control and escorting tasks. There are limited discussions on intelligence function adaptations, Effects Based Operations and systems thinking, when regarding the opponent. The concept Clear-Hold-Build is not mentioned, nor is Targeting or Comprehensive Approach.⁶²⁰

Summary responses to question 3.

The descriptions of how Insurgency movements should be affected vary in content and character in the doctrines. Canadian descriptions emphasize Influence Activities as being superior to physical effects. The implementation concept is called "Comprehensive Operations". The importance of integrating local forces is emphasized. Effects thinking, EBAO (Effects Based Approach to Operations) and Targeting are described.

The British view contains a dominant concept and thought on "Influence Activities", which includes all types of operations where Clear-Hold-Build is seen as a tactical activity. Targeting is described but not EBAO. U.S. retains the basic concept of Clear-Hold-Build with variations of offensive and defensive actions. Targeting is described but not EBAO and effects thinking. The French description includes a detailed tactical concept connected to "global manoeuvre", which is clearly linked to the operational level with organization examples for units and the military-police cooperation. Effects thinking is described, but not targeting and EBAO.

⁶¹⁷ MSR 6, *Manöverbataljon, Markstridsreglemente för Manöverbataljon* (2010), pp. 27-33 describes different types of actors (regular or irregular, civilian populations and aid organizations) regarding aims, organizational principles.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 39-52.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 135-150. section *Stabilizing methods*

⁶²⁰ This pre-release of a Swedish tactical view of Irregular Warfare including COIN leans on a parallel production of a regulation for Ground Operations in general (*Reglemente för Markoperationer, RMO*, remiss 3, 2009) with clearer articulation on COIN principles (pp. 101-106.). There is also an example of offensive action during a Stabilizing approach outlined; pp. 118-119. A certain toning down of COIN can be noticed in 2010 MSR 6 compared to the 2009 RMO. This can be seen as an example of how the view of COIN in Sweden by no means can be viewed to have a stable and fixed direction.

The Swedish view mostly exemplifies military operations supporting civilian efforts within a traditional Regular Warfare manoeuvre concept, however, developed mainly with a defensive stabilizing approach.

Question 6: What characterizes the description of how the military operations are to be carried out?

Summary answer Canada; descriptions are based on capabilities for variations of defensive, offensive and stability operations/tasks, starting with the first. The ability to balance so-called Full Spectrum Operations is viewed necessary.⁶²¹ The Clear-Hold-Build concept is not mentioned. Military operations are clearly described as "comprehensive" and part of a "Comprehensive Approach". Clear descriptions of meaning for tactical ability are described.⁶²² Host country strategy will be supported, legal conditions are emphasized and operations are built from below with a focus on people and different forms of attacking insurgents, thereafter physical separation, intellectual and moral separation, neutralization.

Manoeuvre and indirect intervention are clearly advocated. Military capabilities are not solely believed to be able to destroy the Insurgency.⁶²³ Requirements for minor and larger operations are clearly described.⁶²⁴

Summary answer Britain; descriptions are based on how military operations will be carried out founded on the ten principles of Counterinsurgency with a description of a number of paradoxes from the U.S. FM 3-24 from 2007⁶²⁵. The framework "Shape-Secure-Develop" is described by a "Joint, Operational Level of approach", where the "transition" (transfer of responsibility for security to the host country's resources) is clearly described as being a vital objective and activity to be achieved. Clear-Hold-Build operations are described as part of the overall security efforts for specifically high priority areas exposed to insurgent operations⁶²⁶. The Clear-Hold-Build concept is problematized through the description of a number of conditions that need to be considered.⁶²⁷ Each part of the Clear-Hold-Build concept is described clearly and with practical examples.

The meaning of "Info Ops Messages" in every action is described lucidly.⁶²⁸ Three types of approaches are described; Indirect (mainly Special Forces and Intelligence), Direct (military forces, also host nation forces) and, Balanced (combined military, political and economic measures)⁶²⁹. Methods, means and basic implementation are fully described generically (e.g. in text, image, and checklists in detail for Urban Strike Operations). Strike operations are considered to often need specially trained personnel.

⁶²¹ *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (2008), Section 528.

⁶²² *Ibid.* p. 30. figure 1-3. Tactical Activities and Tasks

⁶²³ *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (2008), p. 80. section 310.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.* section 6-12 – 16.

⁶²⁵ British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 *Countering Insurgency* (2009), Chapter 3.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.* Section 4-14.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.* Section 4-35.

⁶²⁸ British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 *Countering Insurgency* (2009). Section 4-20.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.* Section 1-1.5

"Detention Operations" are described in detail. The division of offensive, respectively defensive operations is not mentioned; only small-scale attack operations are described. Special Forces operations, larger Air Operations and relatively limited naval activities are described.⁶³⁰

Summary answer U.S.; descriptions of how the military operations are to be carried out are based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept, with different variations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Each part of the Clear-Hold-Build concept is described clearly and with practical examples, however, often with a less tactical but considerably more combat technical character.

Summary answer France: The focus is described in the context of the so-called "Global Manoeuvre", where the population is in the centre against the "anti-organizational forces", which indiscriminately use guerrilla tactics and terrorism.⁶³¹ The aim is to neutralize organizations using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror and the emphasis is on people and controlling the environment.⁶³²

The activities focus on preserving the security in physical areas and dismantling the insurgency organization.⁶³³ The main concept is to establish security for the population in some areas. Here, "General protection" with a quick "intervention plan" is established, which can be complemented by training local security resources. There is obvious emphasis on the activities of the people in secured areas, the Quadrillage system and "deterrent pressure" to take the initiative and disrupt / attack in the enemy's depth.

Summary answer Sweden; The Field manual describes a tactical approach based on generic principles that more or less are supposed to be suitable in a Regular, as well as Irregular Warfare scenario. Combinations of assaults, defence and stabilizing methods are to be planned and executed.⁶³⁴ The military function should support the civilian efforts and police work in a multifunctional operation.⁶³⁵ The descriptions of stabilizing methods are mainly of a defensive character.

Summary answers to question 6.

The description of how military operations are supposed to be carried out varies. Canada's approach emphasizes the military's subordinate role in civil actions, implemented with variations of defensive, offensive and stability operations (full-spectrum operations with the so-called Comprehensive Operations). Larger and smaller operations are described, without connection to the Clear-Hold-Build concept. The British approach is based on the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop" and is described as a "Joint, Operational Level of Approach".

⁶³⁰ British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 *Countering Insurgency* (2009), Chapter 9.

⁶³¹ *Doctrine For Counterinsurgency At The Tactical Level* (2010), p. 9.

⁶³² Ibid. pp. 9-10.

⁶³³ Ibid. p. 24.

⁶³⁴ *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)*[*Field Manual for Ground Forces Manouever Battalion, preedition*] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), pp. 52-53.

⁶³⁵ Ibid. p. 53.

Three types of approaches are described; Indirect (mainly Special Forces and intelligence), Direct (military forces both from supporting nations and the host nation) and Balanced (combined military, political and economic measures). The division of offensive and defensive operations/ tasks is not described; only small-scale attacks are described. The U.S. description is based entirely on the Clear-Hold-Build concept with variations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks/ operations/activities.

The French concepts are not based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept but on rapid intervention to secure key areas and to neutralize organizations using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The focus is on the people and control of the operational environment. The efforts focus on preserving the security of physical areas, and dismantling the Insurgency organization. The principle stated in operational planning is Oil-spot Strategy with the "Quadrillage" system (hierarchical area organization) in secured areas and counter surveillance measures, "deterrent pressure" in the important areas. Substantial operational activities are described with simultaneously wide discretion at low-levels. The Swedish view prescribes that the military function should support civilian efforts. Clearly COIN-focused tactical approaches are not included. Tactical principles, less detailed, seem to be viewed contextually similar regarding assault and defence tasks, though a more detailed view is presented regarding stabilization tasks and performance.

Question 7: What characterizes the perception of how the military forces are supposed to be used against enemy combatants?

Summary answer Canada: The view is characterized by restraint in offensive operations and larger operations e.g. the risk of security leaks is emphasized. A combination of defensive, offensive and stabilizing abilities is described as required. These are summarized clearly. The difficulties of Cordon are described and the importance of being able to "pin down" and pursue is stressed. By having the freedom of action at lower levels and by using covert surveillance a position for "pre-emption, dislocation and disruption" can be established and used.⁶³⁶

Summary answer Britain: The doctrine consistently describes an approach that primarily focuses on measures that directly affect the people and secondly the insurgents; secure the population and neutralize the insurgent.⁶³⁷ An important view is the use of "minimum necessary force", where the keyword is the interpretation of "necessary", which sometimes can mean even larger units. As an example, the U.S. operation against Fallujah in 2004 is described, where two regimental battle groups of a total of seven battalions attacked the city. The principle Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyse (F3EA) can be said to be a description of military engagement against enemy elements requiring armed capability⁶³⁸. The importance of precision in efforts is emphasized.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁶ National Defence Headquarters, *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, Ontario, December 2008, section 602-604.

⁶³⁷ British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 *Countering Insurgency* (2009), Section 3-8-9.

⁶³⁸ Ibid. Section 5-6.

⁶³⁹ Ibid. Section 7-4.

Joint Action is stressed where the combinations of hard and soft means/effects are coordinated.⁶⁴⁰ Special Surge and Strike Operations, with risks, are described.⁶⁴¹ In general, the doctrine clearly describes attack operations, strike / surge actions and influence operations.

Summary answer U.S.: the doctrine consistently describes an approach based on the principle that the military units should be able to operate equally well in offensive, defensive as well as stabilizing operations. In all these operational types, the enemy should be handled humanely and the population should be protected, though also controlled. The offensive roles include "movement to contact", "attack", "exploit" and "pursuit".⁶⁴² The offensive mood is characterized by surprise, simple plans - boldly executed, concentration (whether they are visible /invisible/kinetic, or non-kinetic effects), high speed and flexibility. The doctrine does not describe in detail how the enemy combatant elements should be dealt with, other than mainly with the smaller combat activities.

Summary answer France: the doctrine describes a completely tactical system based on the principles stated in the answer to question 6. In principle, the military units should support the police in security work, sometimes by conducting security operations, defensively protecting the population through the "Quadrillage" system (cutting off relations for the insurgents), and executing offensive actions in depth, (also using guerrilla tactics). COIN must comprise operational planning to neutralize the insurgents by taking up the fight against the armed groups.⁶⁴³ The principle known as Oil-spot Strategy with the so-called "Quadrillage system" (hierarchical area structure and organization) in secured areas and counter surveillance measures, "deterrent pressure" of the other key areas.⁶⁴⁴

Substantial operational activities with simultaneously wide discretion at low-levels (operational latitude) are described.⁶⁴⁵ The Clear-Hold-Build concept is not mentioned at all. Guerrilla tactics are advocated. The divisions of "offensive" and "defensive" actions are not described. Indirectly, however, such a focus can be interpreted. Divisions are achieved in static / permanent and dynamic activities in the "Quadrillage" and "deterrent pressure" concepts.⁶⁴⁶ "Nomadic behaviour" i.e. units that walk and live among the people, can be used for extended operations.⁶⁴⁷ Skills, especially in intelligence capability are stated as being "at the heart of COIN".⁶⁴⁸ Moreover, command and control capabilities are mentioned. Concealed and/or surprising irregular behaviour and vital operational secrecy are highlighted as important aspects. Large-scale operations are only to be carried out when one is sure of success. The highest capacity for patrol activities is therefore considered important.

⁶⁴⁰ British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 *Countering Insurgency* (2009), Section 7-8.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid. Section 8-7.

⁶⁴² U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 *Tactics in COIN* (2009), Section 5-8.

⁶⁴³ Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level*, Army Manual (Paris: Centre De Doctrine d'Emploi Des Forces, April 2010), p. 28.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 29.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 28.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 33.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 28-29.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 55.

Summary answer Sweden; The field manual describes operations with combinations of offensive, defensive and stabilization activities with the use of indirect or direct approaches of manoeuvre warfare.⁶⁴⁹ A balanced approach can be argued to be implied in the text, even if rather a more defensive stabilization method part dominates in the descriptions of tactics in COIN (even if that label is not used)⁶⁵⁰. Regarding the offensive and combat perspective, a view is expressed on its similarity to Regular Warfare. The descriptions are in general not very detailed compared to the other doctrines.

Summary answers question 7.

Descriptions of how military forces are to be used against enemy combatant components vary in design and detail, but the main principles are relatively similar. Overall, the Canadian approach is interpreted as defensive, the British as balanced, the American as more offensive, and the French approach clearly offensive. The Canadian vision can be interpreted as prioritizing offensive operations and larger ones to a lesser degree, however, a combination of defensive, offensive and stabilizing abilities are said to be required. The ability to be able to hide actions is highlighted down to lower command and unit levels. The British approach focuses on measures that affect the people directly and secondly the insurgents with a "minimum necessary force". The doctrine mainly describes attack, strike / surge actions and influence operations with clarity. The American approach is based on the principle that the military units are to operate equally well in offensive, defensive as well as stabilizing operations. In all, the enemy should be encountered and dealt with, as should the population be protected and also controlled. The offensive specialization includes "movement to contact", "attack", "exploit" and "pursue".

An offensive approach is characterized by surprise, simple plans - boldly executed, concentration (whether it be visible/invisible/kinetic/non-kinetic effects), adapted speed and flexibility. Overall, the doctrines do not describe in detail how the enemy combatant elements are to be dealt with, but the main norm can be understood as being similar to smaller combat operations.

France describes a complete tactical system where military units support the police in security, sometimes implementing security operations, defensively protect the population using the so-called "Quadrillage" system to cut off supply and mobility freedom for the insurgents. Offensive actions in depth are clearly included and also using guerrilla tactics. Concealed, surprising irregular behaviour and high operational secrecy are highlighted as important. Only carrying out large-scale operations when one is sure of success, can lead to a requirement for the greatest capacity and skills when conducting patrol activities.

⁶⁴⁹ *Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)*[Field Manual for Ground Forces Manoeuvrer Battalion, preedition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), pp. 39-50.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid. pp. 135-150. Stabilizing Methods.

The Swedish view can, in contrast, be summarized with a less detailed description and a balanced approach focusing on stabilization tasks, if necessary however with offensive actions. The descriptions are mainly related to traditional warfare tactics involving combat and offensive approaches.

Comprehensive result comparison of COIN doctrines

<i>Question</i>	<i>CAN</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>FR</i>	<i>SW</i>
2. Analysis of Insurgency contexts (Context perspective)	Important. Adapted Intel on tactical level. Extensive descriptions. COG concept used. No systems thinking addressed.	Important. Adapted Intel on tactical level. Extensive descriptions. COG concept used. No systems thinking addressed. Focus on preconditions for the analysis work.	Important. Adapted Intel on tactical level. Concept with tools and models. Systems thinking in use. Focus on the analysis work.	Important. Adapted Intel on tactical level. Limited discussion.	Important but little discussed.
3. How to affect the Insurgency in general? (Context perspective)	Influence Activities superior to physical effects. EBAO and Targeting concepts.	A complete concept. Influence Activities, including physical effects. CHB concept seen as a tactical concept. No Targeting concept.	CHB concept with developed descriptions of tactical/combat techniques. Targeting, no EBAO or effects thinking.	Detailed tactical concept. Static and intervention units. Effects thinking. No EBAO and Targeting concepts.	Primarily military support to civilian efforts. Mainly kinetic effects exemplified.
6. How to act in a military way in general? (Concept perspective)	Subordinated to civilian actions, Full Spectrum Operations concept, Comprehensive Operations, no CHB concept.	Strategic concept. "Shape- Secure - Develop", Indirect, Direct, Balanced approach concepts.	CHB concept with off/def/stability capabilities.	Rapid intervention concept for securing areas. Quadrillage, neutralizing the enemy, deterrent pressure, guerrilla tactics and larger units.	A version of the UK/U.S. approach with concepts for off/def and stabilizing capabilities.
7. Tactics against armed opponents? (Concept perspective)	Defensive approach concept.	Balanced off/def concept mainly indirect. Still, underlines significance of direct action capabilities and concepts.	Balanced concept for off/def/stability operations.	Offensive approach with complete operational /tactical concepts on Brigade level.	A balanced concept focusing on stability tasks, still, with offensive capability, both offensive and defence concepts from RW inspired tactical thought.

Figure 40. Appendix 8. Overview of the result comparison of COIN doctrines.

The result of this general interpretation of the different text articulations on contextual and conceptual normative views can be summarized follows. Regarding the contextual perspective, all texts confess to a more or less comprehensive approach where military tasks are combined with the civilian tasks and efforts (from the most civilian embracing Canadian view to the French more militarily articulated view). This is summarized with a dominant contextual perspective of expectations and requirements for a broader “Hybrid Warfare” contextual perspective in tactical thinking.

Regarding the differences of conceptual views, they can be interpreted ranging from the rather obvious “Small Wars” focused Canadian view to the very detailed French descriptions of an adapted Brigade Combat Team with enemy centric capabilities and also using Guerrilla Warfare in-depth capacities. Differences might also be possible to be interpreted between the British and American descriptions, both describing needs for smaller and larger operations and tactics concepts, however, not specifically outlining examples. The Swedish conceptual view could be interpreted as a vision of tactics with task force organized manoeuvre battalions, still based on a cultural mind set of Regular Warfare emphasising assault and defence concepts. The result of the normative analysis gives a result where the different nations’ position in the Swedish model of the space of tactical standpoints is as follows. In broad terms it can be argued that all normative texts outline tactical thinking positions based on a broader military-civilian task context perspective, with capabilities in concept perspectives for both smaller and larger operations, not only Intelligence-focused but clearly with offensive combat ability as well.

Answer to the question.

The question; *“How can contemporary normative views on context and concepts for tactics in COIN in general be characterized compared to the case study descriptive result?”* is answered as follows.

In general, the normative views characterize an equal view of Insurgency characteristics and challenges to be met contextually and strategically. Descriptions on how to do this conceptually in general as well as militarily differ explicitly in terms of offensive-defensive orientation, realization of military-civilian cooperation, comprehensive approach, operational-tactical principles (e.g. the American Clear-Hold-Build concept versus the French intervention principle), staff associations and joint concepts and links to fighting style). This might be explained by cultural attitudes and horizons of expectations as well as by the nations’ various rooms of experiences.

In principal, the articulations are quite equal regarding contextual perspectives, comprising a blend of military and civilian aspects of an Irregular Warfare environment, such as a COIN operation. Such a position explicitly is found in the lower part of the descriptive Swedish space of tactical statements. Regarding a conceptual normative view of different weightings, all countries highlight smaller unit concepts, often in combination with an emphasis on the intelligence function. Still, requirements for larger unit concepts are addressed, mainly by France and the U.S.

The capability of offensive combat actions is addressed by all nations. Conceptual thinking can be argued in general, to be mostly found on left side, in the lower part of the Swedish space of statements. In summary, the international and also Swedish normative texts mostly fit into one of the theoretical four parts of the descriptive Swedish space of tactical standpoints on Irregular Warfare.

Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axes interpretations 2013-07-19.

The Inter-assessments reliability test concerned the interpretations of axis 1 and 2, regarding generalized structuring aspects. Based on the result of the distribution of answers in the space of statements, logically connecting features are sought, making it possible to decide what each axis can be argued to represent. In order to test the interpretations made in this study, a test person was selected. A researcher working at the War Studies Department at the Swedish National Defence College was chosen, someone with long experience of tactical thinking and thought per se. As a lecturer of War Studies, Ingvar Sjöblom knew about the dissertation work, however, not regarding the analysis methods and results. Sjöblom was presented with two graphs depicting results of the standpoint distribution on axis 1 and 2 via e-mail. The pictures with questions were the following;





Figure 41. Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axis 1.



How can axis 2 be labelled
Concerning types of thoughts?

Base your answer from
combinations of results
in the upper and lower parts
of axis 2, viewed to be logically
connected. What results do you
consider particularly prominent?

Figure 42. Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axis 2.

A meeting was arranged a day after the graphs had been sent to Sjöblom and he presented his interpretations and results. The results can be summarized as follows.

Axis 1 has the dominating aspects of; terrain and traditional military aspects such as time-space-force, geography and units. The operational environment consequently determines the military strategy and use of units. The logics of results in axis 1 are not as obvious as in axis 2. The results regarding national-international emphasis affected the interpretations. The dominating aspects of axis 2 were; objectives, goal-effect based focus, ways of thinking in the operational environment. The result was discussed and the interpretations made in the study were presented, which corresponded very well to the outcome of the test done by Sjöblom.



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