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Capital and field.
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The common space of European higher education policy as a 'field of struggles'

My intention with the following paper is, with the help of the theoretical framework outline in the course 'Capital and Field', to investigate the struggles between people and institutions and the mechanisms, which govern the relations between positions in what may be described as a common space of European higher education.

In order to comprehend the relations between different agents with a stake in this common space, or what may potentially be a *social field* (also known as a 'field of struggles' or a 'field of competition', Broady, 1998: 13-15), I will discuss one of the major issues around which people and institutions involved in European higher education struggle at present. I am namely referring to struggles over the right to define and judge academic quality, currently taking place under the so called Bologna process.

Bourdieu argues that what may be of interest when considering a field, such as the 'intellectual field' (and related fields) are not merely the agents per se, or what he calls different 'social realities' like 'individuals, groups or institutions' but rather the 'objective relationships between the relative positions that one and the other occupy in the field' (Bourdieu, 1996: 181-2). According to Bourdieu struggles within the field are driven for the common good of agents in the field or more correctly so as to ensure the continued existence of the field, as whole. Therefore, one possible approach is to identify the relations between actors occupying specific positions within the field of higher education policy (if we assume the existence of such a field) and the forces of the field, which govern those relations (Bourdieu, 1996: 9).

The Bologna Process is truly a focal point for ongoing struggles over what a European Area of higher education should represent. It is the involvement of social agents with different (often conflicting) positions and different stakes in ongoing political debates, which I believe makes Bologna educational policies a relevant topic to be discussed with the help of certain of Bourdieu's theoretical concepts.

Bourdieu states that to the different positions which agents occupy 'correspond homologous *position-takings*' as for instance 'political acts and discourses' and 'the *space of positions* tends to govern the *space of position-takings*' (Bourdieu, 1996: 231, emphasis in the original). 'Each position' he proceeds 'is objectively defined by its objective relationship with other positions, or, in other terms, by the system of relevant (meaning efficient) properties which allow it to be situated in relation to all the others in the structure of the *global* distribution of properties' (ibid., emphasis added).

The Bologna Process may be described in official documents as merely a project for more effective intergovernamental cooperation in the field of higher education. However, Bologna goals and guidelines are more than just a way of constructing a common frame of reference for 'quality in higher education'. Throughout Bologna reports and communications, it is emphasised that working with Bologna goals and guidelines is the proper course of action towards realising a *European Higher Education Area of high quality*. In other words, Bologna policy reforms serve to identify the stakes and to coin the 'rules of the game' (Bourdieu, 2004: 83) binding, otherwise relatively autonomous local actors – the institutions of higher education – to a shared system of regulations. Alternative policy paths are excluded from discussions and other options for educational reforms appear difficult to justify. This is hardly surprising since as Bourdieu acknowledges the 'dominant players impose de facto as the universal standard…the principles that they themselves consciously or unconsciously engage in their own practices'. Hence, 'their own practice becomes the measure of all things'. (Bourdieu, 2004: 62-3)

The goal of 'European co-operation in quality assurance with a view to developing comparable criteria and methodologies' (set in the Bologna Declaration, 1999; see *n1*) has increasingly come to be perceived as one of the top priorities of Bologna, and thus of European higher education. In fact, already in the Prague Communiqué (2001, the first follow-up document after the declaration; see *n2*) and especially in the Berlin Communiqué (2003; see *n3*) the issue of quality assurance has been identified as integral to the success of Bologna reforms.

Identifying a set of common goals and encouraging national governments' continued commitment to these goals makes Bologna a powerful mechanism in the hands of EU policy makers. Among other things it is a convincing way of legitimating one political agenda above others. Policy is closely related to the modern state and *new forms of governance*. It is part of a global shift from a *welfare model* to a *neo-liberal model of governance* (the latter based on ideals of individualism, the centrality of the market and so on). Hence, policy making is more than a mere instrument of governance; it is one of the central organising principles of contemporary societies. (Shore and Wright, 1997: 6)

Shore and Wright contend that policies are utilised as instruments of governance and power in modern society. However, what is it that gives policy makers the authority and legitimacy to influence the course of action for entire countries' educational systems? Where does the persuasive power of policy language lie?

According to Shore and Wright part of the effectiveness of policy lies in its ability to 'hide its own mechanisms' (Foucault, 1978: 86; cited in Shore and Wright, 1997: 25). Policies are always politically motivated, yet they are often presented in a pragmatic and neutral tone, which creates an illusion that policy goals somehow stand above or outside politics. Furthermore, the positive clang and authority of the concept of *quality* used extensively in Bologna documents is strengthened by its association with words like *education, knowledge, learning* as well as words like *transparency, accountability and efficiency* (to name but a few). Behind the appealing rhetoric of policy hides a field where 'multiple, intersecting and conflicting power structures' meet and find expression (Shore and Wright, 1997: 13). Bourdieu calls such a field 'a field of struggles', where the 'manoeuvre available to [different agents'] strategies' depends on 'their position within the structure of the distribution of capital' (Bourdieu, 2004: 35). In this case, the adequate mastery of policy language, with all its codes and other intricacies, is an asset effective within the field of European policy, a peculiar form of capital or power 'defining the foreseeable future of the game that will be played out among agents' (ibid.: 61).

Thus, Bologna-related policy initiatives can be conceived of as a 'structure…which grounds the illusion of reality it produces' and hides it 'beneath the interactions of people, which are structured by it' (Bourdieu, 1996: 14).

Another policy tool, which the agents structured around the Bologna process have found use for is the *audit.* Making relatively autonomous fields, like the various disciplines under particular institutions of higher education, give 'auditable accounts' is tied to new initiatives in *quality management* and, once again, to new forms of governance where the state has 'an indirect supervisory role' and self-evaluation exercises are presented as empowering (Power, 1997: 10). By promoting the self-governance of universities, state agencies are left with a mere 'monitoring role' (ibid.: 98). However, the institutionalisation of *audits* accompanied by specific standards for the performance of organisations is not simply a way of giving more impetus to universities' internal self-improvement. It is moreover a means to make improvements 'externally verifiable' (Power, 1997: 11) or in other words subject to external control.

One may argue that the move to intensified external control and evaluation is detrimental to the future autonomy of European university disciplines. However, as Bourdieu is quick to remind us each 'relatively autonomous field' (or discipline) is 'subject to (external) *pressures'*. 'Autonomy is not a given, but a historical conquest, endlessly having to be undertaken anew' as for example 'the social sciences must endlessly reckon with external forces which hold back their 'take off''. (Bourdieu, 2004: 47, emphasis in the original)

Power argues that 'internal systems of quality assurance' (at the level of individual departments) are preoccupied with 'formal structure' (Power, 1997: 101). Auditing actively creates the environment, in which it can operate. Consequently, it reshapes (if necessary) existing structures to make them auditable. This in turn, can (and often does) result in tension 'between a concept of auditable performance derived from quality assurance systems and one which is rooted in the *specialist judgement* and *knowledge base* of different...professionals' (ibid.: 92, emphasis added). That is, academics may have very different notions of which practices can or should be subject to auditing, as compared to the intentions of policy makers and external evaluators.

In general, there is a shift in the logic of quality assurance in universities – from a locally based logic of 'self-evaluation' to 'standardised measures of *output*'. One of the main ambitions behind this shift, according to Power, is to 'bend...academia to what the government deems to be "the new reality"' (Power, 1997: 98-99). In this context, official

policy 'puts itself as a doctrine beyond question' (ibid.: 93). In a similar vain, Bourdieu concludes that the field of struggles '…will always be organised around the principal opposition between the dominant…and the dominated' where the 'former are able…to impose…the 'correct', legitimate way to play and the rules…of participation in the game'. The very structure of the field is defined by 'the unequal distribution of capital' among agents. (Bourdieu, 2004: 34-5)

Considering policy in the light of a social field or a 'field of struggles' presents a methodological challenge. How can one map out the objective relations between disparate agents (sometimes stretching across fields or sub-fields) 'playing' with the same policies and policy instruments, but from very different positions?

It may be argued that important positions in the common space of European higher education policy are occupied by agents represented in the face of entire organisations, such as the European Commission or agencies, such as national higher education agencies and so on. However, certain positions are occupied by agents in the faces of more or less powerful individuals, such as Ministers of Education and there surrounding committees of delegates, as well as, the academic and administrative staff found in particular institutions of higher education, under particular disciplines. All of the above, it can further be contended undertake actions as part of a 'network of objective relations' within which they struggle to defend or improve an existing position (Bourdieu, 1996: 231).

Let's once again take the notion of *quality of education*. While the term *quality* may be used to indicate one thing in Bologna policy documents at the European level, it might be translated rather differently into particular signatory countries' national policies, and be yet differently interpreted and applied from one institution of higher education to the next. The unifying factor or 'principle' as Bourdieu would have it, however, is 'the struggle itself'. As 'a 'system' of oppositions' the different 'position-takings' of particular agents are at the same time 'the product and the stake of a permanent conflict' (Bourdieu, 1996: 232). Policy is simultaneously based on elusive, at times arbitrary, notions of the proper order of things and has a rather 'real' effect on people and institutions. In this field of struggles, 'agents endowed with different resources confront one another to conserve or transform the existing power relations' (Bourdieu, 2004: 34).

If we assume that the space of European policy making is a field of contestation, where relations between individual actors, institutions and discourses across time and space are articulated (Bourdieu, 1996:182), it may be possible to trace how policy as a 'field' helps structure particular relations among agents and orients agents towards one or another of the objectively existing positions.

Method

In view of the limited length and breadth of the essay, I have restricted myself to research material which I believe gives a sufficiently comprehensive, if not exhaustive, picture of the Bologna policy framework. Based on policy documents, deemed relevant to the research topic, I have tried to follow how discussions of quality and quality-related issues at 'the top' are transmitted to and negotiated at the institutional and departmental levels.

I have concentrated on a mix of key Bologna documents found at all levels of implementation (European, national and institutional, with a focus on the European and institutional levels) and have investigated, in particular, the way quality in higher education is conceptualised at respective levels.

At the level of the European Union, I have chosen to look at Bologna documents such as the Bologna Declaration, the Prague, Berlin and Bergen Communiqués, as well as some additional material, such as: the European University Association's (EUA) report (especially the part concerning quality issues – *Defining Quality and Introducing a Quality Culture (2004,*see *n9)* and the European Association of Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA)'s report on *Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area (*see *n10).*

At the institutional level I have looked at the implementation of Bologna goals, taking place at Stockholm University, and in particular at the Department of Social Anthropology. For the purpose, I have firstly gone through instructional documents and reports found on the website specially designed for information on the Bologna reform (called accordingly *the Bologna site*). I have also gone through information about the Bologna process generally found on Stockholm University's official website.

Among the major documents in question is *The Bologna reform at SU – Guidelines and Background (Bolognareformen vid SU – vägledning och bakgrundsbeskrivning, 2005-05-05)* providing general overview and instructions on the stages of the local implementation of Bologna goals. Another important document I have taken into account, issued by Stockholm University's pedagogical centre – *Nivåplaceringsarbete* (Universitetspedagogiskt centrum, UPC, Lena Adamson, 2005-12-02) – takes up the work with the new system of levels and degrees, and the ensuing changes in the structure and design of programmes and courses at university departments. e.g. reports on how academic staff should work with *guidelines (riktlinjer), time-schedules (tidsplan), learning outcomes (lärandemål), grading (betygssättning), etc.*

Last but not least, I have considered Stockholm University's *Plan of Action for 2006* (*Verksamhetsplan 2006, 2005-12-02)* drawn up by the university's governing board (*universitetsstyrelsen)* with a special section on working with *quality indicators.*

My investigation of the Bologna Process within the Department of Social Anthropology consists of 10 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, between 1-1.30 hours, each. My intention with the interviews has been to elicit individual responses regarding the perceived effects of Bologna on the department. Due to lack of space, only a short summary of the responses from the interview will be presented below (For interview questions, see Appendix with *Interview Guide*).

The Bologna Process: Identifying the 'field of possible positions'

The official stated purpose of the Bologna Process is to create a European Higher Education Area, by 2010, by harmonising academic degree standards and quality assurance standards for academic faculties throughout Europe.

As the main actors responsible for creating a *European Area of Higher Education* by the year 2010 the Bologna Declaration (with its 29 signatories) identifies: national governments of European states, in particular the Ministries responsible for Higher Education, European institutions of higher education themselves (universities, university colleges and so forth) as well as to a certain extent, European non-governmental organisations with competence in higher education.

Supposedly, participating national governments control the level and speed of the process of integration of their respective country's higher education sector. The Bologna Process is an intergovernmental process, which means that the main responsibility for decision-making lies with member states. Co-ordination of education policies is largely achieved through 'soft law' (see *n4*) mechanisms: sharing examples of good policy practices, setting benchmarks (see *n5*), tracking progress against key priorities, peer-learning from and peer-reviewing one another, etc. However, the European Union is also a partner in the process, with the right to influence the implementation of Bologna goals (as for instance the harmonisation of quality standards).

Since the EU has no formal authority to impose Bologna goals on member states it utilises other channels to exercise its power. For instance, the EU is represented through the participation of the European Commission, which is part of the follow-up group monitoring Bologna reforms, and the Council of Europe, also a consultative member in decision-making. Consequently, the European Union manages to gain a certain degree of control in terms of achieving particular results. Following the Prague Ministerial meeting on May 19th 2001, Ministers acknowledge the 'constructive assistance of the European Commission', underlining that the Commission – as a supranational (European) institution – is a partner in its own right, though with a supporting role.

As it will be further confirmed in the discussions below, the positions of the European Commission and respective Ministers of education fit quite well Bourdieu's definition of a dominant agent as 'one who occupies a place within the structure such that the structure works in his favour' (Bourdieu, 2004: 34).

Moreover, Ministers place further responsibility on academic institutions which were, together with national agencies and the European Network of Quality Assurance in Higher Education (from now on referred to as ENQA, see *n6*) encouraged to create comparable and transparent *quality assurance mechanisms.* (Prague Communique, 2001, see *n2*)

Thus, institutions of higher education while officially participating as partners with a say in the process, are more importantly obliged to conform, to contribute to its successful implementation by adjusting their academic practices to fit the overall Bologna framework and to meet specific goals.

The *assuring* aspect of quality assurance schemes comes from the fact that they are designed in a way which is easy to 'read' and follow-up by policy-makers and evaluators. Consequently, the results which are being delivered within academic institutions can be verified (perhaps even controlled) externally. This does not necessarily have to be detrimental to the relative autonomy of institutions and disciplines, but it does mean that in the future they would have to comply with certain new rules other than their own internal norms and professional values.

In Berlin, Ministers agree to speed up the process by setting an intermediate deadline of 2005 for progress in *quality assurance* (among other policy areas*).* Work towards shared quality assurance methods and criteria is further organised around a number of common points. The points included, among other things: definition of the responsibilities of the actors involved.

Under the paragraph on *Quality Assurance*, in the Berlin Communiqué the need for a clearer definition of academic standards and practices is supported by the strong statement on behalf of Ministers that 'quality of higher education' is 'at the heart of the setting up of a European Higher Education Area' (the European Higher Education Area will from now on be referred to as EHEA; Berlin Communiqué, 2003, see *n3*). On the one hand Ministers continue to claim that the 'primary *responsibility* for quality assurance in higher education lies *with each institution* itself and this provides the *basis for real accountability* of the academic system' (Berlin Communique, 2003: 3, emphasis added). On the other hand, however, quite extensive powers in the area of quality assurance (from now on referred to as QA) are delegated to the European Network for Quality Assurance (ENQA, see *n6*). It may be argued that transferring the responsibility to promote good quality assurance practices and adequate feedback mechanisms to the ENQA, is once again a measure of control, contingent on the purposes of Ministers and EU policy makers.

While the ENQA is *called upon* to *develop* and *explore* possibilities for QA, higher education institutions (from now on referred to as HEIs) are given a clearly defined set of points to ascribe to. By making political ambitions appear as neutral and set objectives as the only plausible option, policies have the capacity to 'empower some...', in this case organisations like the ENQA, '...and silence others' such as HEIs (Shore and Wright,

1997: 7-8). When it all comes to the crunch, it is HEIs who are delegated the *responsibility,* or in other words, left with the main policy burden for instituting well-functioning and accountable internal QA mechanisms.

The above is once again a reminder of the 'rules of the game' where the dominant 'enjoy decisive advantages' and 'they constitute an obligatory reference point' for the dominated who are 'required actively or passively to take up a position in relation to them' (Bourdieu, 2004: 35). 'The dominant players' in this case European institutions and Ministers of education 'impose by their very existence, as a universal norm, the principles that they engage in their own practices'. As Bourdieu argues, 'there is no authority to legitimate the sources of legitimacy' (Bourdieu, 2004: 62-3).

At the latest Ministerial conference held so far, in Bergen, co-ordination of *quality standards* and the desire to ensure a shared measure of quality of academic practices like teaching continues to occupy centre-stage among Bologna objectives. Ministers meeting in Bergen place accent on recommendations like 'greater sharing of expertise to *build capacity* at both institutional and governmental level' and not least 'a high degree of cooperation and *networking*' as prospective paths towards ensuring adequate QA systems and continuous improvement of the EHEA (Bergen Communiqué, 2005; emphasis added, see *n7*). The rhetorical force of concepts like *capacity building, cooperation* and *networking* evokes visions of a European 'network society', where European organisations, such as the *European University Association* (EUA), the *European Association of Institutions in Higher Education* (EURASHE), the *National Unions of Students in Europe* (ESIB), the ENQA, etc., represent the interests of universities, students, QA agencies, at the European level.

In the light of the overly optimistic tone of Bologna documents, one cannot help but wonder: Who are those agents whose opinions manage to shine through the statements found in Bologna policy documents? And are there voices that remain unheard?

The Bologna Process, as any other policy process, has the ability to mask its own mechanisms, the power to orient participating agents to particular positions in the objective structure of existing relations.
In view of the above, an aspect of Bologna which can further be looked into is how agents at the receiving end of the policy process, namely local institutions of higher

education and disciplines, respond to the structural changes ensuing from the Bologna Process.

I have chosen Sweden and in particular the Department of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University to investigate how Bologna issues of *quality in higher education* are locally addressed and applied. Due to the lack of space, in what remains I will briefly outline how issues of QA promoted at the EU level are applied and interpreted at the institutional level of Stockholm University and at the disciplinary level of the Department of Social Anthropology.

At the other end of the policy spectrum: Bologna at Stockholm University and the Department of Social Anthropology

It is in fact the Swedish government that regulates and facilitates proper quality assurance mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is said that maintaining an adequate degree of quality in higher education is ultimately up to the measures taken within individual institutions. All in all, streamlining education activities in accordance with the goals set by the Bologna framework, is believed to provide Stockholm University (SU) with the adequate base for formal accreditation within the European Higher Education Area, and consequently with a higher quality of education.

Generally, the Bologna Reform is discussed as something necessary and beneficial within the public reports and communications issued (with rector's approval) by Stockholm University's *governing board* (see *n8*). The latter, can be perceived as a more or less conscious strategy or position-taking on behalf of local decision-makers. However, quality in higher education is describe in SU's Bologna documents rather one-sidedly (see under Method above), more in terms of enhancing the delivery of particular results and services, opening faculties and departments to scrutiny from the outside, and less as involving a creative process based on historically grounded professional values and traditions.

Nevertheless, while policy documents at the European level as well as the local institutional level tell one part of the story, characterised by a healthy doze of optimism, academics and administrative staff at the Department of Social Anthropology are more

critical. One commonly voiced critique among anthropologists at Stockholm University is that while teachers' workload increases, it is not compensated by an adequate increase in the flow of resources to universities. This is a key issue. Diminishing resources are perceived to be a potential threat to institutional autonomy and the capacity of institutions to support an education of high quality in the future. The people I interviewed were almost unanimously apprehensive of the continuously increasing, but uncompensated teacher workload and the structural changes this would imply. Once again this is a reminder of the structure of the field of struggles, based on the unequal distribution of capital. The 'possession of a large quantity…of capital gives a power over the field, and therefore over agents (relatively) less endowed with capital…and governs the distribution of the chances of profit' (Bourdieu, 2004: 34).

It should, however, also be emphasised that resistance is always an issue to be reckoned with and those 'least eminent' or those 'poorest in…capital', are those most likely to challenge at some point existing 'assessment criteria' and ultimately alter the current structures of the field (Bourdieu, 2004: 58). There is at times implicit and at times quite open resistance to certain aspects of the standardisation of the education system. This is based on (among other things) a good amount of scepticism towards the effectiveness of external evaluation structures, in general.

Ultimately, since staying out of the Bologna Process is not considered an option by members of the department, for fear of being marginalised, and since additional resources are nowhere in sight, it appears that academics often choose to 'play along' with externally enforced rules, while remaining loyal to their own professional values and internal conceptions of *quality of teaching*. The Bologna process is but one attempt to specify rules for academic quality, which nevertheless leaves a gray zone regarding occupational secrets, issues of brilliance and creativity, and so on where rules for academic quality are still open to negotiation.

Concluding words

I have made, within the limits of the current essay, but a tentative attempt to outline the webs of relations created through struggles in the common space of European higher

education policy over the power to determine *quality in higher education.* I argue with Bourdieu that this power is simultaneously a stake in the game (i.e. in the field of power) and the reason for the existence of the game. It is what Bourdieu calls the *illusio,* the 'belief in the game' (Bourdieu, 2004: 51), which is at the same time the 'cause and effect of the existence of the game (Bourdieu, 1996: 167).

For a process like Bologna, based on voluntary co-operation, the enforcement of adequate quality assurance technologies and feedback mechanisms is very important. It is one way of ensuring a measure of control and authority over the European Higher Education Area. To assign standards to academic performance, however, is not only a means of regulating the quality of higher education and setting the terms for academic activities, it is a means of ensuring the future existence of a common European space of higher education, as such.

While agents at the institutional level may voice criticism against the top-down logic of such mechanisms, at present, their voices are at best channelled through a plethora of national bodies and agencies, and international organisations, which arguably represent their interests. At worst, they are silenced by Bologna's persuasive and prescriptive policy tone.

Demands for more responsiveness on behalf of institutions of higher education, with a greater focus on outcomes and service 'delivery', hold the potential to transform the way institutions are going to perceive of their role and their internal activities in the future. The limited capacity of European academia to support an education system of high quality – both financially, in terms of additional funding, and in terms of human resources or the capacity to employ more staff – further exacerbates the aspect of institutions' continued autonomy.

Perhaps the fact that the issue of limited resources is barely acknowledged in policy documents, in combination with increasing demands for audit, is a way of exercising twofold pressure on academic institutions. Perhaps there is an ambition on behalf of policy makers to discipline academia as an object of power, capable of providing a particular type of intellectual capital on a regular basis.

In this light, policy is a serious mechanism – for centralising the power to co-ordinate and order individuals and institutions in space and time – in the hands of politicians. It is

a social space where the contesting relationships between policy makers and the institutions and individuals they seek to affect meet. It is a field where the objective relations between positions, relations 'of domination or subordination, of complementarity or antagonism, etc.' are enacted (Bourdieu, 1996: 231), a field where official reports and communications regarding the harmonization of academic and quality assurance standards are dominant position-takings.

In view of the above, one condition for the relative autonomy of a higher education institution, such as Stockholm University and the discipline of Social Anthropology is the continued ability to transform the dominant values (Bourdieu, 1996: 17) promoted by European policies like Bologna into values recognizable within their own institutional and disciplinary context.

References:

1. **Bourdieu, Pierre 1996** *The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field.* **Stanford University Press, U.S.A.**

2. **Bourdieu, Pierre 2004** *Science of Science and Reflexivity.* **The University of Chicago Press, Cambridge, Great Britain.**

3. **Broady, Donald 1998 Ur 'Inledning: en verktygslåda för studier av fält',** *Kulturens fält,* **red. D. Broady, Bokförlaget Daidalos, Göteborg, pp. 11-26. Quotes taken from pp.13-15.**

4. **Power, Michael (1997)** *The Audit Society. Rituals of Verification.* **Oxford University PressInc., New York.**

5. **Shore, Cris and Wright, Susan, eds. (1997)** *Anthropology of Policy. Critical perspectives on governance and power.* **London & New York: Routledge.**

Notes:

1. *The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999*. **Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education.**
   http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/bologna_declaration.pdf **18 April, 2006**

2. *Towards The European Higher Education Area.***Communiqué of the meeting of European Ministers in charge of Higher Education in Prague on May 19th 2001.**
   http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/Prague_communiquTheta.pdf **12 Nov., 2006**

3. *Realising the European Higher Education Area.* **Communiqué of the Conference of Ministers responisble for Higher Education in Berlin on 19 September 2003.**
   http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/030919Berlin_Communique.pdf **17 Sept. 2006**

4. **The term 'soft law' refers to policy mechanisms with no or weak binding power. These are, most often, agreements reached between parties (usually states): 'codes of conduct', 'guidelines', 'communications', etc. 'Soft law' instruments are often used to indicate how parties intend to perform tasks, within a certain area of expertise (in this case *education*).**
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisbon_Strategy **5 November, 2006**

5. **Benchmarking is a process used for the evaluation of (organisational) activities in a particular sector. Its purpose is to challenge exisiting practices in order to improve them. This is usually achieved by devising plans on how to adopt the 'best practice' (the most effective method or technique) for delivering a desired outcome. It is further based on continually reviewing and re-evaluating performance.**

6. **The European Network for Quality Assurance was established in 2000 to promote European co-operation in quality assurance. In November 2004 it was transformed (by the General Assembly) into the European Association of Quality Assurance in Higher Education.**
   http://www.enqa.eu/index.lasso **7 November, 2006**

7. *The European Higher Education Area – Achieving the Goals.* **Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen, 19-20 May 2005.**

8. **The governing board of a Swedish higher education institution consists of 15 members. Three members represent the institution's teachers and are appointed by the institution through elections, three are nominated by the students, eight are appointed by the government. The government is also responsible for**

appointing a vice-chancellor (National Reports, 2004-2005)
http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/EN/national_impl/00_Nat-rep-2005/National_Reports-Sweden_050114.pdf **20 May, 2006**

9. *II. Defining quality and Introducing a Quality Culture.* **Report of the Quality Culture Project, Round II (2004)**
http://www.eua.be/jsp/en/upload/QCII%20Report%2030.03.05.1115967574238.pdf **1 June, 2006**

10. **ENQA Report to Ministers meeting in Bergen:** *Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area* **(2005).**
http://www.enqa.eu/files/BergenReport210205.pdf **7 November, 2006**